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Abstract: Norwegian Cultural Policy: A Civilising 
Mission? 
 
This dissertation aims to explore the extent to which what has been 
termed „the civilising mission‟ has been a central rationale behind 
Norwegian cultural policy. 
 
In order to contextualise the research the German term Bildung, which 
refers to human growth processes, is used as a conceptual framework. 
Bildung can be achieved in two different, albeit related, ways: firstly, 
through an object approach, which takes great works of arts as its point of 
departure and where personal growth can be achieved through exposure 
to these and which endorses clear cultural hierarchies, and secondly, 
through a subject approach, which emphasises each individual‟s own 
preferences and desires and where a much greater range of cultural 
activities can facilitate personal growth. 
 
In addition to an historical analysis of the ideas that have informed 
Norwegian cultural policies dating back to 1814, this project draws upon 
„green papers‟ published by the Norwegian government through its 
Ministry of Culture. This is supplemented by a more detailed analysis of a 
key cultural policy initiative of the 2000s: den kulturelle skolesekken 
(DKS) 1 , which is a major programme initiated to enable children in 
                                            
1 Translated to English as the Cultural Rucksack. 
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primary school to be exposed to art-works produced by professional 
artists. 
 
The project concludes that although a subject and an object approach to 
Bildung have co-existed throughout the period charted here there has 
since the 90s been an increased focus on the object oriented approach. 
This appears evident both in the general cultural policy discourse but 
particularly through the disciplining aspect of DKS and its strong focus on, 
what is being referred to as, the „professional arts‟ as a vehicle for 
Bildung. 
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Introduction: Norwegian Cultural Policy – A 
Civilising Mission? 
 
Oliver Bennett argues that the dominant rationale behind governmental 
intervention in the field of culture in the UK and other European 
democracies since the nineteenth century, has been what he has termed 
„the civilising mission‟.2 The level of authoritarianism within this policy 
rationale has, according to Bennett, in the UK at least, varied over the 
years. Whereas in the nineteenth century the arts and culture were 
crudely perceived to have the power to uphold public order, this 
diminished somewhat in the twentieth century. However, the mission to 
civilise, in terms of giving people guidance, pulling them out of their 
ignorance, forming their character and encouraging an ordered mind 
persists. All these civilising measures have, according to Bennett, been 
based on the fundamental assumption that European high art is of 
superior value, and that it is this culture that has the power to civilise. 3  
 
The civilising mission relates to the understanding that culture has the 
capacity to transform people who come in contact with it. This 
understanding can, as we shall see, attach itself to such a transformation 
                                            
2 Oliver Bennett, „Cultural Policy in the United Kingdom: Collapsing Rationales and the End of a 
Tradition‟, in The European Journal of Cultural Policy 2.4 (1995), pp. 199 - 216; Oliver Bennett, 
„Cultural Policy, Cultural Pessimism and Postmodernity‟, in International Journal of Cultural 
Policy 4.1 (1997), pp. 67 - 84. Bennett argues that modern cultural policy (since 1945) has been 
informed by other rationales as well, namely national identity and prestige and more recently the 
economic benefits that it has been claimed investments in culture can yield. However, the 
rationale behind the foundation of most of the cultural institutions established since 1945 to 
administer culture and create cultural policy, has, according to Bennett, been based on a civilising 
mission, (Bennett (1995)). In his paper published in 1997 Bennett extends this argument and 
claims that the civilising influence of the arts has acted as the dominant justification amongst 
European advocates of cultural policy.  
3 Bennett (1995), p. 214. 
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in two ways: either through the exposure to culture, narrowly defined as 
the arts, paternalistically selected and programmed by elite experts, or 
alternatively through the experience of culture more widely defined and 
where the choice of cultural activities is codetermined by people 
themselves. Referring to the understood transforming power of the more 
narrowly defined arts, Eleonora Belfiore and Oliver Bennett argue that 
their frequently expressed capacity „to transform the lives not just of 
individuals but of whole communities‟, is one of the most fundamental 
reasons behind their continuously strong position in society.4 A position 
which, according to the two authors, is illustrated by the place the arts are 
being given in school and university curricula, government agencies that 
have been established in so many countries to support them and the ever 
increasing number of institutions set up to mediate them to a large 
audience.5  
 
This mission to transform people can be perceived on two levels. Firstly, 
based on a broad understanding that the arts (or culture defined more 
widely) have transforming effects at an aggregated level not necessarily 
informed by what Sigrid Røyseng describes as a „calculating interest and 
a utility calculating rationality‟, 6  which can be explained and tangibly 
perceived, but rather by a more abstract faith in the transforming effects 
of culture. Secondly on a more crude level where it is assumed that the 
                                            
4  Eleonora Belfiore and Oliver Bennett, The Social Impact of the Arts (London: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2008), p. 2. 
5 Belfiore and Bennett (2008), pp. 1 - 2. 
6 Sigrid Røyseng, Den gode, hellige og disiplinerte kunsten: Forestillinger om kunstens autonomi 
i kulturpolitikk og kunstledelse (Bø: Telemarksforskning-Bø, 2007). 
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positive social impacts of the exposure to or participation in cultural 
activities can be measured. 
 
Belfiore and Bennett argue that most arts policy nowadays is informed by 
this second level where a demand to measure the alleged social impacts 
of the arts has become something of an orthodoxy and that this is part of 
a shift towards more crude evidence-based policy-making in the public 
sector more generally. However, the trouble for the arts is that their 
alleged transformative powers are extremely difficult to substantiate, let 
alone measure, and this becomes highly problematic in a climate where 
public policies are increasingly informed by a demand to achieve such 
measurable outcomes. Consequentially, Belfiore and Bennett suggest 
that twinned with the already mentioned prominent position given to the 
arts in society exists another narrative, which expresses a sense that the 
arts are beleaguered and that the rationales for their existence and 
indeed the public support for the production and mediation of them is 
regularly questioned and not put forward with as much confidence as 
seen in many other areas of public life and public administration.7  
 
Others have also observed that the value of culture, more broadly defined, 
no longer rests on a conviction, but that it must demonstrate its 
contribution to measurable economic impacts. Peter Duelund for example 
                                            
7 Bennett places this lack of confidence in a wider context in his book Cultural Pessimism, where 
he suggests that as part of a growing pessimism in the West during the last decades of the 
twentieth century, a strong narrative of intellectual decline has evolved. This was partly fuelled 
by a narrative of artistic decline, which „included within it an account of a widespread relativism 
within the general culture that had the effect of reducing art to little more than just another 
component of the leisure industry‟; Oliver Bennett, Cultural Pessimism: Narratives of Decline in 
the Postmodern World (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2001), p. 132. 
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argues that the arts and culture in the Nordic countries have been made 
subject to an intense instrumental pressure, which has had devastating 
impacts.  He goes as far as characterising Nordic cultural policy thus: 
 
today, the state, regional and local authorities have entered into a 
symbiosis with the private sector in order to give a higher priority to the 
economic basis of the arts and culture. Experience and turnover have 
gradually replaced the original goals of cultural policy, i.e. participation, 
education and enlightenment. […] the financial and political media have 
colonised the intrinsic values of the arts and culture.8  
 
In other words, participation, education and enlightenment have been 
sacrificed at the expense of culture‟s economic impact.  
 
Similarly, Jim McGuigan suggests that amongst three different „general 
discourses of cultural policy‟, which define culture and position agents 
within this field, a market discourse has lately been in the ascendancy.9 
State intervention in the field of culture persists but is informed by a 
„market reasoning‟ where:  
 
market mechanisms are the superior means for allocating resources, 
producing and circulating cultural products, giving the customer what he 
or she is said to want. 10 
 
Others have uttered similar sentiments, and there is a common 
understanding amongst cultural policy scholars that the arts in particular 
                                            
8 Peter Duelund, „The Nordic Cultural Model. Summary‟, in Peter Duelund (ed.), The Nordic 
Cultural Model (Copenhagen: Nordic Cultural Institute, 2003), pp. 520 - 521. 
9 Jim McGuigan, Rethinking Cultural Policy (Maidenhead: Open University Press, 2004). The 
other two general discourses are, according to McGuigan, that of „state‟ and „civil/communicate‟.   
10 McGuigan (2004), p. 59. 
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are beleaguered and that their intrinsic values are threatened. 11  My 
project is not preoccupied with the arts only, but will attempt to analyse 
cultural policy more widely. However, the above-mentioned observations 
may imply that the civilising mission might be losing its potency and 
influence.  
 
However, in a Nordic context and casting some doubt on both McGuigan  
and Duelund‟s above-mentioned observations, Mangset et. al. ask 
whether some of the transformation processes that Nordic cultural 
policies allegedly have been made subject to (because of the general 
challenges that welfare states have been faced with), might have been 
overstated by both politicians and cultural policy researchers.12  
 
It is within these, albeit far from consensual, observations of a cultural 
and political context that I shape the research question of this thesis. 
 
Research question 
 
Hence, this thesis takes as its main task: 
 
                                            
11 Jo Caust, „Putting the “art” back into arts policy making: how arts policy has been “captured” 
by the economists and the marketers‟, in International Journal of Cultural Policy 9.1 (2003), pp. 
51 - 63; Clive Gray, „Commodification and Instrumentality in Cultural Policy‟, in International 
Journal of Cultural Policy 13.2 (2007), pp. 203 - 215; Oliver Bennett, „Beyond Machinery: The 
Cultural Policies of Matthew Arnold‟, in History of Political Economy 37.3 (2005), pp. 455 - 
482; Eleonora Belfiore, „Art as a means of alleviating social exclusion: does it really work? A 
critique of instrumental cultural policies and social impact studies in the UK‟, in International 
Journal of Cultural Policy 8.1 (2002), pp. 91 - 106; Belfiore and Bennett (2008).  
12 Per Mangset, Anita Kangas, Dorte Skot-Hansen and Geir Vestheim, „Editor‟s introduction: 
Nordic cultural policy‟, in International Journal of Cultural Policy 14.1 (2008), p. 3. 
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 An assessment of the extent to which the civilising mission 
has been and still is a key rationale behind Norwegian cultural 
policy.  
 
In order to address this I shall not limit myself to exploring arts policies 
only, but cultural policy more generally. However, although, as we shall 
see, Norwegian cultural policy traditionally has defined culture widely, and 
at times advocated what in the 1970s and 1980s was referred to as a 
cultural democracy, what are being referred to as the „professional arts‟ 
have – at the beginning of the twenty-first century – become at the heart 
of the civilising mission. Hence, my analysis of policy rationales in the 
twenty-first century will, in Chapter Seven of this dissertation, turn its 
attention to the arts in a more narrow sense through a study of the 
rationales behind a national scheme, which was formally launched in 
2001 under the heading, Den Kulturelle Skolesekken (DKS). 
 
In addition to the above-mentioned main research question, a related 
objective is to assess how culture is valued discursively amongst elites 
within the field of culture itself. This is of intrinsic importance to this 
project, but also to eventually shedding light on the extent to which 
culture is being de-valued and reduced to a tool which facilitates 
measurable impacts versus the more abstract idea of its broader civilising 
potential.  
 
14 
 
A civilising mission that aims to pull people out of their ignorance and to 
form their character relates to governmental or other institutions‟ 
objectives to enlighten. In a Norwegian context, the origins of this 
rationale (to enlighten) can be found in the nineteenth century.  
 
Notes on Civilisation and Culture 
 
Although „civilisations‟ are often referred to in the plural, Raymond 
Williams stressed that in modern English, „civilisation still refers to a 
general condition or state, and is still contrasted with savagery or 
barbarism‟,13 in other words a universal condition, rather than a process 
or a specific place in space or time. The emergence of the term 
„civilisation‟ in this absolute form as a condition or state coincides with, 
and relates to, the period of the Enlightenment. In fact, Williams 
emphasised that civilisation „has behind it the general spirit of the 
Enlightenment‟: 14  based on ideas, which broadly speaking advocate 
tolerance, reason, common sense and the encouragement of science and 
technology. 
 
That the civilising mission has been a major rationale behind public 
cultural policy is perhaps not so strange because the terms „civilisation‟ 
and „culture‟ are closely related. In fact, in their use in German the two 
terms were, in the late eighteenth century, synonymous, first referring to 
                                            
13 Raymond Williams, Keywords: A vocabulary of culture and society (London: Fontana Press, 
1988), p. 59.  
14 Williams (1988), p. 58. 
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the „general process of becoming “civilized” or “cultivated”‟, and later „as a 
description of the secular process of human development‟, 15  in 
accordance with Enlightenment ideas. As mentioned above, culture and 
civilisation thus referred to a set of values and ideas that were perceived 
to be of universal application.  
 
Culture with a capital „C‟ was the culture of the Enlightenment, which had 
developed over the centuries and reached its climax as a dominant and 
predominately European culture. This equation of one culture and one 
civilisation, with whatever falls outside of it being branded as barbarous, 
was, according to Williams, commonly subscribed to until Johann 
Gottfried von Herder towards the end of the eighteenth century 
challenged this Eurocentric approach, that celebrated European 
subjugation and domination of the rest of the world. Herder argued 
instead for replacing culture with a capital „C‟ with „cultures‟ in the plural, 
in other words, a departure from one universal civilisation, against which 
everything can be measured, replaced by a much more relativistic 
approach to culture. Consequently and from then on the relationship 
between the terms „civilisation‟ and „culture‟ becomes, according to 
Williams, more complex.  
 
Where the concept of one universal culture versus „cultures‟ in the plural 
resonates in the context of this thesis, that is, Norwegian cultural policy, is 
in its objective to enlighten, meaning „to give them [people] more 
                                            
15 Ibid., p. 89. 
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knowledge and greater understanding about something‟.16 Enlightenment, 
of which the literal Norwegian translation is opplysning, has been a 
central concept in Norwegian cultural and educational policy. Derived 
from this is the term folkeopplysning, which according to Geir Vestheim 
can be interpreted in two different ways: either as „enlightenment of the 
people‟, or „enlightenment by the people‟. The former regards people as 
an empty goblet, and thereby in need of being enlightened from the 
outside, which calls for a paternalistic approach where the elite in society 
have an important mission to pass down great ideas from a universal 
canon of art and thinking, in other words, an object model. The alternative 
perception rejects the function of the elite in society because people, or 
their representatives, can themselves determine the content of what they 
should be enlightened about, in accordance with Herder‟s relativistic idea 
of several cultures. This is what Vestheim calls the subject model.17  
 
In his assessment of the civilising mission cited above, Oliver Bennett 
emphasised that a fundamental assumption behind this cultural policy 
rationale was the superior value of European high art. Similarly, in 
Norway, as in most Western European states, the cultural policies that 
have been derived from a wish to enlighten people have manifested 
themselves in the policy of „democratising culture‟.18 The objective of this 
policy has been to make cultural expressions and offerings available, to 
as wide a part of a constituency as possible, transcending social, 
                                            
16 (Collins Cobuild English Language Dictionary, 1987). To enlighten is here referred to with a 
small e, not meaning a designation of a historic movement or a time-period.  
17 Geir Vestheim, Kulturpolitikk i det moderne Noreg (Oslo: Det Norske Samlaget, 1995), p. 89. 
18 Per Mangset, Kulturliv og forvaltning: Innføring i kulturpolitikk (Oslo: Universitetsforlaget, 
1992). 
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geographical, demographical and other barriers. Culture in this context, 
has also in Norway primarily meant intellectual and artistic expressions 
and, more often than not, traditionally been drawn from an already 
established and canonised range of art-forms and even art-works, or 
what is often referred to as the „high arts‟. However, Norway has seen a 
parallel development in the enlightenment by the people rationale when, 
during the second half of the nineteenth century, the concept of 
folkeopplysning also „became a tool in the fight for better conditions and 
democratic rights‟.19  In order to fight for their cause, and to position 
themselves in an increasingly democratic society, representatives from 
the lower classes themselves initiated and managed activities that were 
formed with the objective of enlightening people from these social 
strata.20 Vestheim argues that a shift can be observed during the second 
half of the nineteenth century from simply enlightenment of the people to 
„enlightenment of the people by the people‟.21 
 
It is of course too simplistic to say that these two approaches to 
folkeopplysning are radically opposed to each other in the sense that one 
perceives culture in accordance with the eighteenth century idea of a total 
condition of just one culture whereas the other is being perceived in a 
completely relativistic way. Just as the two terms „civilisation‟ and „culture‟ 
stand in a complex relationship with each other, so too do the two 
approaches to folkeopplysning. However, a trajectory of these two 
                                            
19 Vestheim (1995), p. 88.  
20  The most typical example of such activities is perhaps folkehøgskolen, which was an 
independent school system that grew out of the rural counter-cultures of the nineteenth century. I 
will return to this phenomenon in Chapter Four.  
21 Vestheim (1995), p. 89. 
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different sets of ideas can be found in Norwegian cultural policy 
discourses dating back to as far as 1814 and the birth of Norway as a 
nation. From then on a hegemonic struggle can be observed between 
culture to be understood as universal and predominately continental as 
the harbinger of enlightenment and human growth, as opposed to the 
understanding that this enlightenment and growth can be achieved 
through a much wider range of cultural manifestations.  
 
Hence, this dissertation is informed by Vestheim‟s two approaches to 
folkeopplysning: a subject  and an object approach. Based on this let me 
briefly outline my research design.  
 
Research design and methodology 
 
It is commonly acknowledged that the state in Norway did not intervene in 
the field of culture in a coherent and structured way until 1945.22 However, 
Vestheim‟s two approaches to folkeopplysning as mentioned above both 
have their origin in the nineteenth century. Hence, a study of twentieth-
century, or indeed post-1945, cultural policy rhetoric without any 
acknowledgment of its legacy from the previous century would have 
robbed the analysis of an important explanatory dimension. I am 
therefore starting this study by going as far back as 1814 when Norway 
broke from its union with Denmark and got its first constitution in the 
process. This historical study up until 1973 is based on secondary 
                                            
22 Vestheim (1995); Mangset (1992); Marit Bakke, „Cultural Policy in Norway‟, in Peter Duelund 
(ed.), The Nordic Cultural Model (Copenhagen: Nordic Cultural Institute, 2003), pp. 147 - 181.  
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sources by other scholars, and is followed by a more in-depth analysis of 
policy documents covering the period of the 1970s to 2003, as well as the 
reception of these papers in parliament.   
 
The study observes, acknowledges and concludes that both the object  
and subject approaches to folkeopplysning mentioned above have 
featured prominently in the cultural policy discourse all the way back to 
the nineteenth century, alternating in their ascendancy. However, it 
became clear during my textual analysis of policy papers that the subject 
approach, with its wide definition of culture in accordance with what in the 
1970s and 1980s was referred to as the objective to facilitate a cultural 
democracy, lost its potency in the 1990s and 2000s. Instead what are 
being referred to as the „professional arts‟ gained prominence as a 
vehicle of folkeopplysning.  
 
Hence, in order to study whether the civilising mission still plays a 
prominent role during the first decade of the twenty-first century as well 
as to interrogate what culture was deemed valid in this context, I chose to 
focus more comprehensively on the national scheme DKS. This is a 
programme which aims to expose all children in primary schools to the 
„professional‟ arts. In order to assess the extent to which the civilising 
mission might still hold a dominant position in the cultural policy discourse 
I decided to, in addition to analysing public policy documents, also 
conduct interviews with elite figures including artists, arts managers, 
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bureaucrats and politicians, when analysing the rationales behind this 
scheme.  
 
Hence, the thesis is made up of a historical analysis based on secondary 
sources, a textual analysis of policy papers and their reception in 
parliament and an in-depth study of the rationales behind DKS. Let me 
briefly sketch out the dissertation‟s chapter outline.  
 
Structure of dissertation – chapter by chapter 
 
The thesis comprises seven chapters in addition to this introduction. 
Apart from this introduction and the final conclusion (Chapter Eight) the 
chapters can broadly be categorised into two: Chapters One to Three, 
which construct a theoretical and methodological framework for the thesis 
and Chapters Four to Seven, which contain the empirical analysis.  
 
Chapter One starts out by developing the two approaches to 
folkeopplysning mentioned above into a more specific theoretical 
framework. I launch the German term Bildung, which can be broadly 
translated as human growth processes and which fairly accurately 
describes the ideas behind the two diverging approaches to 
folkeopplysning, and I identify four eighteenth to nineteenth century-
theorists, which I will in turn use to illuminate the concept of the civilising 
mission in a Norwegian context.  
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The ideas by the thinkers that will be presented in Chapter One are all 
normative in the sense that they prescribed recipes for how Bildung can 
be achieved. The civilising mission can also be perceived to have a 
power dimension, and Chapter Two explores this in the context of 
Antonio Gramsci‟s concept of cultural hegemonies and Michel Foucault‟s 
notion of governmentality. Despite these thinkers‟ conceptualisation of 
power often being coined in opposition to one another, I argue that they 
are in fact complementary in light of the research question of this project.  
 
Chapter Three outlines my methodological approach in detail. It contains 
a reflexive analysis of my own position as a researcher as well as a short 
contextualisation of how this compares with a limited selection of other 
academic works within the field of cultural policy studies. I then move on 
to discuss the concept of the study of discursive practices and make a 
case for why taking this approach is useful for a study of cultural policy 
rationales. I finally introduce my empirical approach, including a 
delimitation of my area of study and definition of terms as well as the level 
of analysis. The empirical data material is presented in more detail in 
Appendix One. 
 
The next four chapters trail the development of the Bildung rationale in 
Norwegian cultural policy from 1814 to 2003. Chapter Four starts by 
charting the period between 1814 and 1905, whereas Chapter Five 
concentrates on the period 1905 to 1973. Both chapters rely on 
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secondary sources only. Furthermore, these chapters help to historically 
contextualise the Bildung rationale in Norwegian cultural policy historically.  
 
Chapter Six contains an in-depth textual analysis of the government‟s 
Green Papers on cultural policy (six in all) between 1973 and 2003 as 
well as their reception in parliament. The focus is on how the concept of 
Bildung is represented in these texts, and although I identify a distinct 
Bildung discourse, which appears to be a key policy rationale I also 
identify two alternative discourses, which I identify as the marketisation 
discourse and the Progress Party discourse.  
 
My analysis of the manifestation of the Bildung discourse based on the  
above-mentioned policy papers indicates that an object approach to 
Bildung, which emphasised the significance of exposure to the 
„professional‟ arts, appeared to be in the ascendancy from the 1990s 
onwards and hence, in Chapter Seven I report on an in-depth discursive 
analysis of the rationales behind the arts in the school programme DKS. I 
suggest that what I call the object focused DKS discourse is a related 
sub-section of the general Bildung discourse.  
 
Chapter Eight contains a brief summary of the thesis and a conclusion, 
which argues that the civilising mission has indeed been a strong 
rationale behind Norwegian cultural policy at least since the middle of the 
nineteenth century. Although the object and subject approaches to 
Bildung have alternated throughout this period, the former is clearly in the 
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ascendancy during the first decade of the twenty-first century. This is 
epitomised by DKS, through which I conclude that the civilising mission is 
intensifying rather than disappearing.  The rationales behind DKS are 
informed by a discourse, which harbours a fear of a culturally relativist 
intellectual anarchy fuelled by the power of the culture provided by the 
commercial cultural industries. This is based on a powerful understanding 
of the transformative power of the „professional‟ arts and is fuelled by an 
effective discursive practice, which relies both on explicit statements that 
are taken as orthodox, but also on what is regarded as so obvious that it 
does not need to be said or uttered. Consequently, DKS does not need to 
demonstrate measurable impacts. Its support rests instead on an abstract 
faith in its Bildung potential and transformative power.  
 
Before reflecting on some of the limitations of this study and some 
suggestions for further research, Chapter Eight continues by attempting 
to situate my findings within the context of what appears to have become 
a dominant position amongst cultural policy scholars: that the arts have 
become beleaguered and that their intrinsic values are threatened. I 
conclude that the object focused Bildung rationale that informs DKS 
appears to nuance the conclusion that a utility calculating rationale 
permeates the cultural policy research completely. This does not, at least 
not in a Norwegian context, appear to show the complete picture.   
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Before I move on to develop my theoretical framework in the next chapter 
let me briefly say a few words about the cultural context in which this 
thesis has been conceived.  
 
Some notes about cultural context 
 
I have researched this thesis based at the University of Warwick in the 
UK, but focused on Norway. I am not attempting to make a comparative 
study of these two countries. However, due to the fact that I have been 
based in the UK and submitting and defending the thesis at a British 
university, some examples from cultural policy decisions taken in the UK 
will at times be brought in to support and illuminate my argument. This 
does also relate to the fact that the ideas of Matthew Arnold, which will be 
given a central position in the next chapter, have been found to influence 
twentieth-century British cultural policy. 
 
Finally, I should point out that I do not master German, French nor Italian 
at a sufficient level for me to engage with the writings of the authors I am 
referring to who write in these languages in their original language. 
Reading these writers in translation might put me at a certain distance 
from them or from their originally intended messages. However, I still 
believe that these texts have illuminated my project to a great extent and 
that the benefit of making use of them albeit in translation outweighs the 
disadvantage of not reading the original versions of these texts.  
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Moreover, my quotations from Norwegian texts - whether from academic 
or non-academic sources - have been translated by myself. I also use the 
term Bildung quite frequently throughout the thesis, and this term will be 
subject to a comprehensive discussion in the next chapter. There are not 
really any direct translations of this term in either Norwegian or English: 
the closest word in Norwegian is dannelse. However, both the terms 
Bildung and dannelse relate broadly to the English terms human growth 
and enlightenment, and these four terms: Bildung, dannelse, 
enlightenment and growth, are thereby at times used interchangeably. 
However, I shall attempt to stick to the former term Bildung, which I shall 
demonstrate in the next chapter as the one that most precisely captures a 
key rationale behind Norwegian cultural policy.  
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1. The Civilising Mission: Object Versus Subject     
Approaches to Bildung 
 
In this chapter I shall present two sets of theoretical frameworks drawn 
from a carefully selected group of eighteenth and nineteenth-century 
thinkers: firstly, the German thinkers Johann Gottfried von Herder and 
Wilhelm von Humboldt, and secondly, the Victorian English thinkers 
Thomas Carlyle and Matthew Arnold. I will argue that some of the 
theories of these two sets of thinkers broadly correspond with the idea 
that I spelled out in my Introduction Chapter: that Norwegian cultural 
policy has been guided by two different approaches to folkeopplysning, 
one subject-oriented, where people themselves should determine the 
content of the cultural activities that can facilitate Bildung, and how they 
can be enlightened, and an object approach, which is based on the 
understanding that enlightenment can be achieved through the exposure 
to a pre-established canon of art and thinking passed down by an 
enlightened elite. The objective of this presentation is to develop a 
theoretical framework, which will help illuminate and interrogate the 
civilising mission in Norwegian cultural policy discourses analysed in the 
subsequent chapters. Central to this is the term Bildung as this is being 
coined by the two German thinkers Herder and Humboldt.  
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1.1 Bildung: two approaches 
 
A term closely linked with opplysning is what in Norwegian is called 
dannelse or to be dannet.23 There is no common translation of this term in 
English. The German equivalent is Bildung, which in Germany has a long 
history, although the term was not fully established until the early 
nineteenth century.24 Henrik Kaare Nielsen has argued that Bildung in 
English conceptualises:  
 
human growth processes, which integrate the development of 
individuals‟ sensuous, emotional and intellectual potentials and make 
them capable of reflecting on themselves in term of their embeddedness 
in, and obligation toward, the social and cultural context.25   
 
Korsgaard and Løvlie argue that Bildung relates to people‟s personal 
growth in relation to themselves, in relation to the wider world and in 
relation to the society in which they live.26  
 
Rather than just taking these definitions at face value, in the first part of 
this chapter I will elaborate further on Bildung. Given that it is so 
established, I shall refer to Bildung rather than the Norwegian term 
dannelse. In fact, the latter term is not used much in Norwegian, and is 
not even, according to Rune Slagstad, included in seminal Norwegian 
                                            
23 Ove Korsgaard and Lars Løvlie, „Innledning‟, in Rune Slagstad, Ove Korsgaard and Lars 
Løvlie (eds.), Dannelsens forvandlinger (Oslo: Pax Forlag, 2003), p. 10. 
24  Hansjörg Hohr, „Does beauty matter in education? Friedrich Schiller‟s neo-humanistic 
approach‟, in Journal of Curriculum Studies 34.1 (2002), pp. 59 - 75. 
25 Henrik Kaare Nielsen, „The Technocratisation of the Field of Cultural Policy and the Role of 
Critical Research‟, in Nordisk Kulturpolitisk Tidskrift 9.1 (2006), p. 152, note no. 1.  
26 Korsgaard and Løvlie (2003), p. 11.  
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encyclopaedia. 27  References to dannelse (Bildung) in Norwegian 
language generally, and in cultural policy discourses in particular, are, as 
I shall demonstrate in Chapters Five to Seven, instead often not 
articulated explicitly, but rely on unstated assumptions. Finally, it should 
be noted that Bildung could be used both when referring to the result of a 
process and to the process itself.28  
 
According to Belfiore and Bennett, the idea that culture, and particularly 
the arts, can have positive social impacts dates back as far as Classical 
Greece and the writings of Aristotle. Some of Aristotle‟s ideas, like the 
cathartic effects that theatre can have on its audience, have, according to 
these authors, reverberated through history and resonate strongly even in 
a contemporary discourse about the impacts of the arts.29 The German 
tradition of the celebration of Bildung can also be said to be influenced by 
this tradition of the positive impact of culture, but as we shall see this is 
not necessarily exclusively the case in the context of the arts and 
aesthetics. Instead, as Korsgaard and Løvlie argue, there are several 
approaches to both enlightenment and Bildung.30 
                                            
27 Rune Slagstad, „Nasjonalbiblioteket som samfunnsinstitusjon‟, Morgenbladet, 2 - 8 September 
2005, pp. 18 - 20. There is not a strong tradition for referring to the term nor the concept of 
Bildung in a British context either, (certainly not within a cultural policy context). A simplified 
translation when referring to the term in a British context could simply be just „formation‟ as the 
Bildung process, or „to be cultured‟ as the result of the Bildung process. Michael Forster, in his 
preface to his translation of some of Johan Gottfried von Herder‟s, work argues that the German 
term Bildung can invariably be translated to English as form/formation, educate/education, 
civilise/civilisation, cultivate/cultivation or culture, Michael N. Forster, Johann Gottfried von 
Herder: Philosophical Writings, edited and translated by Michael N. Forster (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2002), p. xliii. However, as will be seen below, this is too simplistic 
and does not capture the versatility of the term as well as the different meanings given to it by 
different thinkers. 
28 Hence, one can talk about both a process of Bildung (or a Bildung process) and reaching (or 
achieving) Bildung. Both these uses of the term will appear successively in this thesis.   
29 Belfiore and Bennett (2008).  
30 Korsgaard and Løvlie (2003), p. 11. 
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Based on the two different ways in which culture and civilisation have 
been interpreted since the eighteenth century, as pointed out in the 
introduction to this thesis, I shall rely on two broad sets of theories that 
have attempted to establish how culture can facilitate Bildung. The first, if 
not unequivocally equating culture and civilisation then at least presenting 
a clear idea about how different cultures or cultural manifestations 
compare in a cultural hierarchy, draws on the ideas of Matthew Arnold 
and Thomas Carlyle. Particularly Arnold‟s thoughts on culture and 
anarchy will be given due prominence.  
 
However, Arnold‟s thoughts were preceded by the notion of Bildung, as it 
appeared amongst what has been termed the Weimar circle of German 
thinkers around the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. Here, 
the ideas of two thinkers from this tradition (JG Herder, and W von 
Humboldt) will be discussed. It will be acknowledged that Matthew Arnold 
and Thomas Carlyle were aware of the three mentioned Weimar thinkers 
and also to an extent influenced by them. Hence, just as the terms 
„culture‟ and „civilisation‟ relate to each other in a complex association, 
and just as Vestheim‟s two approaches to folkeopplysning are also 
related, so are the two groups of theorists presented here. However, 
rather than emphasising how the thinkers might have influenced each 
other, their approach to Bildung will take centre-stage, in order to create a 
theoretical framework for the study of modern cultural policy in Norway.  
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What both sets of theories have in common is a preoccupation with how 
culture can improve the well-being of individuals. However, they differ in 
terms of what type of culture can facilitate this. Hence, taking how these 
writers relate to Vestheim‟s object and subject model of folkeopplysning 
as a starting point, it will be argued that two different blocs crystallise, 
with Carlyle and Arnold broadly supporting the object model and Herder 
and Humboldt broadly supporting the object model. These can act as two 
separate theoretical rationales behind the two policy objectives of 
democratising culture and facilitating a cultural democracy respectively.  
 
It should be emphasised straight away that it is not necessarily „influential‟ 
theories that are being charted here, in the sense that I do not argue that 
these theories have had a direct influence on cultural policy in Norway (or 
anywhere else for that matter). There are, for example, few, if any, direct 
traces of Matthew Arnold‟s thinking on either Norwegian ideas in general 
or on Norwegian cultural policy more specifically, as in the UK. Neither 
will it be argued that Victorian theories are direct derivatives of those of 
the Weimar-thinkers, although some connections have been 
acknowledged.31 The different thinkers have been chosen for their ability 
to illuminate Vestheim‟s two different approaches to folkeopplysning and 
to create a theoretical framework within which to analyse how these play 
out within Norwegian cultural policy discourse in order to assess to what 
extent the „civilising mission‟ has acted and continues to act as a rationale 
                                            
31 Matthew Arnold, Culture and Anarchy (London: Cambridge University Press, 1935), p. 70 and 
pp. 126 - 127, W.H. Bruford, Culture and Society in Classical Weimar: 1775 – 1806 (London: 
Cambridge University Press, 1962), p. 2; J.W. Burrow, „Editor‟s Introduction‟, in J.W. Burrow 
(ed.), Wilhelm Von Humboldt: The limits of state action (Indiapolis: Liberty Fund, 1993), p. xvii 
and xlvi-xlvii. 
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behind Norwegian cultural policy.  Hence, it is the differences, as well as 
the similarities, between the two sets of ideas and how these can 
illuminate this project, that are of relevance in this context.32  
 
The journey starts from what many regard as the heyday of German 
thinking and philosophy in Weimar around the end of the eighteenth and 
the beginning of the nineteenth century.  
1.1.1 The German concept of Bildung – The Weimar circle 
 
Nielsen‟s broad definition of the classical German term Bildung presented 
above emphasised its preoccupation with growth processes and people‟s 
self-reflection. However, such processes have been given different 
meanings at different points in history and by different thinkers: the 
Bildungsidee can in other words differ.33 The roots of the Bildungsidee 
can be traced back to the sixteenth century, but reached its crescendo in 
what Bruford calls „Classical Weimar‟ during the second half of the 
eighteenth and the early nineteenth centuries.34  
 
                                            
32 By the same token, it must also be emphasised that the ideas of scholars often change during 
the course of their lifetime and it is thus not each writer‟s overall philosophy that is being 
presented here, but some of their ideas. It is therefore acknowledged that these might have been 
different before the actual work that is being cited here or might subsequently have changed 
again later on during each writer‟s career. Finally, a disclaimer must be added to the effect that I 
did not attempt to paint a complete picture of the Weimar thinkers of the eighteenth and 
nineteenth century neither is all the thinking about culture and society in nineteenth-century 
England included. Instead, an eclectic mix of thoughts from a bundle of eclectically chosen 
thinkers have been chosen, where it is the thought‟s potential to support the two mentioned 
approaches to cultural policy that have acted as the selection criteria. 
33  Susanne Hermeling, „Bildung – the freedom of the educated‟, in Journal of Adult and 
Continuing Education 9 (Autumn 2003), pp. 167 - 180.  
34 Bruford (1962). 
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It may be argued that the most influential Bildung thinker was Johann 
Wolfgang von Goethe, who, particularly in his so-called Bildung novels 
(Bildungsroman), propagated many of the same sentiments and ideas 
that will be presented in this chapter. His ideas, however, were spread 
around a range of publications and it is hard to find a coherent strong 
course of argument, or a scholarly project, in his work. Hermeling, argues 
that the foundation of the Bildungsidee was laid by the philosophers of 
German Idealism (Kant, Hegel, Schelling and Fichte), and was theorised 
as a Bildungsidee, by Herder and Humboldt and also by the poets of the 
Bildungsidee, Goethe and Schiller. Hermeling also traces the term to the 
Middle Ages, and the mystics, through the Baroque period of the 
sixteenth and seventeenth centuries and up to the eighteenth century. 
Throughout this period the term had strong Christian connotations.35 The 
term represents a religious paradox: 
 
How can a human being be an image36 of God (Imago Dei) at the same 
time as it strives to realise what one already is, through achieving a 
reunion (Imitatio Christi).37  
 
                                            
35  According to Hermeling reference was first made by the mystics of the thirteenth and 
fourteenth centuries to Bildung as a symbol of how man could be reborn in the image of God or 
„the moulding of the soul into the form of God‟ (Hermeling 2003, p. 169). During the baroque 
period, the term was being referred to as a battleground between the Holy Ghost and the devil, 
before in the eighteenth century it became a platform of a Christian ethic, which puts great 
emphasis on equality „upon which the demands of a not yet established social class could be 
based‟ (ibid., p. 170). Bildung would thus not only harbour a liberating growth for each 
individual but for the whole of humanity. 
36 Image being ein bild in German; Bildung referring to the Image of God, (Korsgaard and Løvlie 
2003, p. 10).  
37 Ibid.  
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It was however not until the eighteenth century that the term‟s firm 
connection with religion was relaxed, and the religious paradox was 
replaced by a pedagogical paradox:  
 
How to obtain authority through education, when education implies being 
subjugated to somebody else‟s authority, and authority at the same time 
is each individual‟s own achievement.38  
 
The term thus became associated with some of the conundrums 
surrounding man‟s genuine realisation of his self. However, the link with 
the Christian religion prevailed (as was also the case with some of the 
Weimar thinkers), and self-development was rather referred to as an 
example of how individual redemption could be achieved.39  
 
Because of the already mentioned lack of a scholarly project in the 
writings of Goethe his writings will not be included here. Instead the focus 
will be on Herder and Humboldt, whose writings about Bildung were 
clearer and more coherent.40 What all these writers had in common was a 
                                            
38 Ibid. 
39
 The Romantic F Schlegel puts it thus: „Becoming God, being human, educating (bilden) 
oneself are expressions that mean exactly the same‟ (Hermeling 2003, p. 171). The eighteenth 
century idea of self-development was also influenced by the thinking of Leibniz (the idea that the 
human soul is a self-contained entity that follows its own laws) and Shaftesbury (who 
emphasised the importance of self-formation in order to shape an inner moral beauty) (Hermeling 
2003). I am not making a major argument out of the bildung term‟s connection with Christian 
thought. However, it is worth keeping this in mind when applying this theoretical framework to a 
study of Norwegian cultural policy as a „civilising mission‟.   
40 Again, it should be emphasised that there could be good reasons for choosing an entirely 
different group of bildung thinkers. For many, Kant and even Rousseau would spring to mind 
(the latter not even being German but could easily be argued to be writing in the same tradition, if 
not being the main inspiration of all the others). However, Kant and Rousseau‟s theories do not 
contrast so much with that of Carlyle and Arnold as Herder and Humboldt do, and are thus not so 
pertinent for the purpose of my work. Firstly, Rousseau (as Kant) puts more emphasises on the 
importance of the state; that is he argues for a political category of sovereignty based on a legal 
foundation, whereas for Herder and Humboldt such sovereignty should be based on culture and 
language of the people or the Volk. Another difference lies in how Rousseau makes a clear 
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view that the ideas of the Enlightenment are too simplistic, mechanistic 
and limited „to accommodate the full richness of the concrete world and 
the full range of human potentialities‟.41  
Bildung through a wide definition of culture - Johann Gottfried von Herder 
 
In the period between 1784 – 1791 JG Herder (1744 – 1803) published 
his philosophy of history, Ideas for the Philosophy of History of 
Humanity.42  In this seminal work Herder cautioned against a singular 
definition of one culture with a capital C, and advocated instead for a 
more diverse and complex approach to cultures in the plural.43 Within this 
context of different cultures across nations but also within nations he 
argued that man‟s chief aim in life was to develop his own potential in 
order for him to contribute positively to the maintenance and extension of 
his civilisation. It was this civilisation‟s (in whichever form it is classified, 
for example as a tribe, nation or group) culture (Kultur), which was 
important for Herder. Each civilisation‟s humanity (Humanität) was at any 
one time, on a developing scale, implying an inherent potential for 
development.44 Herder explicitly rejected the notion that the culture of 
some civilisations or societies should be regarded as of higher value than 
others. The difference between different groups of people in this respect 
                                                                                                                      
distinction between the formation of society and the formation of the individual, whereas Herder 
does not see this distinction but instead as part of one and the same process; that Bildung of 
society can only be achieved through the Bildung of the individual. This view is also shared by 
Humboldt. Finally, Kant takes a more paternalistic approach to Bildung where this process also 
contains a strong element of discipline (Korsgaard and Løvlie 2003).  
41 Burrow( 1993), p. xxv. 
42 Forster (2002), p. xxxvii. 
43 F.M. Barnard, J.G. Herder on social and political culture (London: Cambridge University 
Press, 1969), p. 24. 
44 Bruford (1962), p. 236.  
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was a relative one of degree and not of kind.45 The same scale could be 
applied when describing the development of each individual, and 
wherever she was on this scale she had something to live for, which 
would bring her contentment.46 This, of course, did not mean that she 
should not try to climb up the chain and excel, but not having reached the 
top (whether that would be possible or not) did not imply barbarism or that 
she, in any way, was „uncultured‟. Consequently, depending on its „image 
of Humanität’, the self determination of each individual or civilisation will 
take different forms, all of which must be regarded with equal respect.47  
 
According to Herder, there is no such thing as a people devoid of culture. 
Enlightenment and culture were not concepts solely confined to Europe in 
the era of „Enlightenment‟, but continuous and found world-wide. 
Consequently, the idea that European culture would for some reason be 
superior to other cultures was rejected by Herder as preposterous:  
 
For „European culture‟ is a mere abstraction, an empty concept. Where 
does, or did, it actually exist in its entirety? In which nation? In which 
period? Besides, it can scarcely pose as the most perfect manifestation 
of man‟s culture, having – who can deny? – far too many deficiencies, 
weaknesses, perversions and abominations associated with it. Only a 
real misanthrope could regard European culture as the universal 
condition of our species. The culture of man is not the culture of the 
                                            
45 Korsgaard and Løvlie (2003). 
46 Bruford (1962), p. 207.  
47 Korsgaard and Løvlie (2003).  
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European; it manifests itself according to place and time in every 
people.48  
 
Hence, „If we take the ideas of European culture for our standard, we 
shall, indeed, only find it applicable to Europe‟.49 Consequently, there was, 
according to Herder, „no single standard of „culture‟, in terms of which […] 
human phenomena […] could be judged‟ and he thus went on to apply a 
wide definition of culture, which did not include only works of intellectual 
or artistic sophistication.50 Hence, Herder did not make any distinction 
between „material‟ and „non-material‟ manifestations of creativity, 
between what man does and thinks. As F. M. Barnard puts it: 
 
Art, technology, industry and commerce form as much part of culture as 
do ideas, beliefs, values and myths. For culture is held to derive from 
both the physical and spiritual nature of man.51  
 
All these „material and „non-material‟ manifestations of human culture 
were accumulated and contributed to the maintenance and extension of a 
civilisation, bringing it forward to future generations as well as nourishing 
everything that had contributed to it from previous ones. A society‟s 
collective political identity should be based on a „common culture‟ rather 
than on a „common sovereign power‟ and form a common consciousness, 
where, as Barnard puts it, „each individual recognized himself as an 
                                            
48 Herder quoted in Barnard (1969), p. 24, footnote no. 56.  
49 Ibid., p. 313.  
50 Ibid., p. 23.  
51 Ibid.   
37 
 
integral part of a social whole‟.52  Where the individual and collective 
identity merged was through language, which was the chief source of a 
common culture‟s emergence and perpetuation, which rendered it 
possible for a Volk or a nationality to be formed, and which, as described 
by Barnard, refers to „a territorial unit in which men conscious of sharing a 
common cultural heritage are free to order their lives within a legal 
framework of their own making‟.53  
 
However, even though each individual‟s cultural identity was rendered 
more important than voting-rights and representational democracy, it was 
clear that the Volkstaat could not be achieved without popular 
participation. Herder stressed the need for a political process where a 
decay from above (amongst the aristocratic power elite) would, combined 
with a growth from below, lead to a new society with this common culture. 
Herder acknowledged that the necessary popular participation could not 
happen without some guidance from „popular leaders‟ whom he called the 
„aristo-democrats‟, who would be men of intellectual excellence, rather 
than men of property, whose mission, importantly, would be complete 
once everybody had reached a political maturity. This was a kind of 
enlightenment of the people by the people, or at least by the 
representatives of the people, assisting them in „the attainment of 
universal civic consciousness within the nation‟.54  
 
                                            
52 Barnard (1969), p. 7. 
53 Ibid. 
54 Barnard (1969), p. 9. 
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Although Herder acknowledged that some guidance was needed in order 
to enlighten people as described above, the objective was not to „pass 
down‟ a pre-established cultural or intellectual canon, or, adversely, to 
elevate the common man, and help him to achieve the cultural capital of 
the upper classes or the more educated. Rather than a process where 
man merely passively received external wisdom and intellect, for Herder 
Bildung was an:  
 
interactive social process in which men influence each other within a 
specific social setting and in which they both receive from and add to 
their distinctive historical and communal heritage.55  
 
In fact Herder was sceptical about the alleged transforming power of 
„refinement‟, „education‟ and „the arts‟, in accordance with the ideas of the 
Enlightenment. He links this to happiness and asks whether refinement 
actually promotes happiness:  
 
Think not, sons of men, that a premature, disproportionate refinement or 
education constitutes happiness; or that the dead nomenclature of all the 
sciences and the pretentious parading of all the arts will help you in any 
way to enjoy life.56  
 
Instead he is afraid that too much exposure to the refined, education and 
the arts might have damaging effects: 
 
                                            
55 Ibid., p. 12.  
56 Herder quoted in Barnard (1969), p. 308. 
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The feeling of happiness is not acquired from words learned by rote, or a 
knowledge of the arts. A head stuffed with knowledge, even golden 
knowledge, oppresses the body, restricts the breast, dims the eye, and 
adds a morbid burden to one thus afflicted.57   
 
Happiness is instead an internal state, originating „within the breast of 
every individual‟.58 
 
The already mentioned interactive social processes where men influence 
each other were, by Herder, thought of as fundamental for his ideal 
Volkstaat. A basic prerequisite for this was freedom of thought and 
expression, which it was the State‟s responsibility to facilitate. However, 
Herder thought that clear limitations should be set as regards the areas 
the state should be involved in since, he argued, too many laws and 
regulations would only stifle human creativity. Neither was people‟s 
happiness the business of the state, because happiness could not spring 
from this institution: „For how many people of the world are entirely 
ignorant of this institution [the state] and yet are happier than a good 
many devoted servants of the state‟?59 
 
 
 
                                            
57 Ibid.  
58 Ibid. 
59 Herder quoted in Barnard (1969), p. 310. 
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Bildung through cultural diversity and Man‟s own free choice - Wilhelm 
Von Humboldt 
 
Like Herder, Wilhelm von Humboldt (1767 – 1834) believed that 
everybody carries within them the potential for perfection and formulated 
Bildung,60 as meaning „the highest and most harmonious development of 
his [Man‟s] powers to a complete and consistent whole‟61 as the true 
purpose of human existence.62 Two conditions had to be in place in order 
for man to be able to achieve this. He needed freedom and should be 
exposed to a diverse range of experiences, which Humboldt calls a 
„variety of situations‟.63  
 
Humboldt emphasised, just like Herder, the importance of language, and 
made references to the Volkstaat based on a common culture rather than 
on a political doctrine, as well as referring to a notion of community that 
had developed organically over time. He also argued along the same 
lines as Herder in terms of the importance he gave to any language and 
indeed any culture. However, although any language and culture should 
be regarded with respect, Humboldt argued that classical Greek poetry, 
art and philosophy were the fundamental Bildung ideal. However, this 
Hellenism should more than anything act as an inspiration and facilitate 
self-cultivation. As Korsgaard and Løvlie put it: 
                                            
60 Most of Wilhelm von Humboldt‟s thinking about Bildung can be found in his essay Limits of 
state action (1993), on which most of this section will be based. However, reflections around this 
theme can also be found scattered around several of the other publications he wrote, for example 
in some of his many letters that have been published. The main focus here will however be on the 
Limits of state action, and other sources are only referred to indirectly, that is through secondary 
sources. As with Herder, several of Humbolt‟s letters and diaries are yet to be translated into 
English.  
61 Humbolt (1993), p. 10. 
62 Hermeling (2003), p. 174.  
63 Humbolt (1993), p. 10. 
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The ethos of the past should act as the midwife for the moral and 
humanity of the present. The past should first and foremost act as an 
inspiration – literally animation and enthusiasm. Bildung was more 
important than learning and the [development of the] character more 
important than knowledge.64 
 
Humboldt defined culture widely when arguing for the type of activities 
that could achieve Bildung. He argued that if man had freedom and was 
exposed to a „variety of situations‟, then whatever development and 
realisation he was going through was of noble value and gave „to human 
nature some worthy and determinate form‟.65 However, this could only be 
achieved if whatever Bildung activity man embarked on was not carried 
out simply as a means to an end, but rather succeeded „in filling and 
satisfying the wants of his soul‟.66 If the main rationale for carrying out the 
activity was guided by the intrinsic value of doing it, then it would awaken 
love and esteem and consequently contribute to the ennoblement of 
human nature. Hence, self-cultivation could be achieved literally through 
any activity or means, it was a matter of approach and attitude that would 
determine whether the activity would contribute to Bildung or not.  
 
In fact, Humboldt was only marginally interested in how an activity 
improved the outside world, or whether it contributed to reaching an 
external objective. Instead it was how it could improve one‟s inner self, or 
                                            
64 Korsgaard and Løvlie (2003), pp. 24-25.  
65 Humboldt (1993), p. 23.  
66 Ibid.  
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satisfy one‟s inner restlessness that mattered.67 Elsewhere he wrote: „The 
first rule of a true ethical code is “Improve yourself”, and “Influence others 
through what you are” comes only second‟.68  
 
Anything being imposed from outside through instructions and guidance 
which did „not spring from a man‟s free choice‟, would not receive his full 
attention, „but still remains alien to his true nature‟. Such tasks or 
activities, would not be performed „with truly human energies, but merely 
with mechanical exactness‟.69  
 
A key concept in Humboldt‟s writing was thus that self-development or 
self education could not be imposed from above and the state would 
hence just act as an obstacle to a Bildung process. In fact, Humboldt was 
tempted to argue that there should be no state interference in private 
affairs at all, unless each individual‟s rights were under threat. 70  A 
summary of Humboldt‟s approach to self-cultivation has been expressed 
by Bruford thus: „there must be a minimum of interference from without 
and a maximum of variety in their opportunities for experience‟.71  
 
Such an idea of leaving people‟s growth to themselves in this way was 
not shared by what I call the Victorian civilisers: Robert Carlyle and 
Matthew Arnold.  
                                            
67 W.H. Bruford, The German tradition of Self-cultivation: Bildung from Humboldt to Thomas 
Mann (London: Cambridge University Press, 1975), p. 17.  
68 Humboldt quoted in Bruford (1975), pp. 14 - 15.  
69 Humboldt (1993), p. 23.  
70 Ibid., p. 16. 
71 Bruford (1975), p. 16.  
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1.1.2 The Victorian Civilisers  
 
Matthew Arnold‟s writing about the potential formative effects of great 
works of art and thinking fit into an English tradition of arguments about 
the civilising effects of the arts, coined by thinkers, politicians and art 
critics alike. These arguments both predate and are again subsequent to 
the publication of Arnold‟s seminal series of essays, Culture and Anarchy, 
after which some critics explicitly refer to Arnold when phrasing their 
argument.72  
  
It has been acknowledged that Matthew Arnold was surely aware of the 
thinking that originated from the Bildung writers of Weimar.73 However, 
there were, as we shall see, some significant differences in his cultural 
theory from that of his German predecessors. Arnold was also heavily 
influenced by several of his English predecessors, amongst them 
Thomas Carlyle (1795 – 1881)74, who again was also influenced by the 
Weimar thinkers.75 A potential chain of influences can thus be drawn from 
Weimar Germany via Thomas Carlyle to Matthew Arnold, whose ideas, it 
is again acknowledged, have been highly influential over modern British 
cultural policy.76  
                                            
72 See Janet Minihan, The Nationalization of Culture: The Development of State Subsidies to the 
Arts in Great Britain (New York: New York University Press, 1977), as well as Bennett (1995).  
73 Arnold in fact named Herder as an example of what he called „great men of culture‟ Arnold 
(1935), p. 70. He also acknowleged Humboldt‟s work on the limits of state action (Ibid, pp. 126 - 
127). See also Bruford (1962), p. 2 and Burrow (1993), p. xvii and xlvi-xlvii.  
74 Raymond Williams, Culture and Society: 1780 – 1950 (London: Chatto & Windus, 1958), p. 
115. 
75 Bennett (2001) p. 7, Williams (1958), p. 71. Carlyle also wrote a biography of The Life of 
Schiller; CR. Vanden Bossche, Carlyle and the Search for Authority, available online at 
www.victorianweb.org/authors/carlyle/vandenbossche/2a.html#schiller1  
76 It must be acknowledged though that other nineteenth-century writers might also have been 
influenced by the Weimar thinkers, and that other nineteenth-century English writers might also 
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The need for a „spiritual aristocracy‟ - Thomas Carlyle 
It should be noted that the critics from Victorian England conducted their 
criticism in response to, and under different conditions from, the Weimar 
circle. By the time Carlyle, and subsequently Arnold, coined their critique, 
English society was to a great extent being characterised by industrialism 
and capitalism, whereas the German society, which Herder and Humboldt 
wrote about, could largely be described as pre-industrial.  
 
In his seminal essay „Sign of the Times‟ (1829) Carlyle described the time 
of his writing around the 1820s as the Age of Machinery, where the 
mechanical had invaded all spheres of life in such a way that no longer 
were men masters of the mechanical, but had instead become slaves to it. 
Even the internal and spiritual dimensions of life (including art) had been 
subdued to mechanics. All the industrial and technical advances had 
resulted in a formidable material accumulation of wealth, however, only at 
the expense of the internal and the spiritual. Carlyle lamented this deeply. 
„Philosophy, Science, Art, Literature all depend on machinery‟ 77  he 
argued, and „Men are grown mechanical in head and in heart, as well as 
in hand‟.78  
 
This mechanical hegemony also influenced the way government was 
perceived, where, according to Carlyle, there was an over inflated interest 
                                                                                                                      
have influenced British cultural policy, and finally that Arnold was also influenced by other 
English thinkers but Carlyle; Williams, for example, mentions Coleridge, Burke and Newman 
(Williams (1958), p. 115).  
77 Thomas Carlyle, The Collected Works of Thomas Carlyle (London: Chapman and Hall, 1858), 
p. 102, available online at www.victorianweb.org/authors/carlyle/signs1.html  
78 Ibid., p. 103. 
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in political arrangements: „Where the laws, the government, in good order, 
all were well with us; the rest would care for itself‟.79     
 
This worried Carlyle, because his answer to the lack of spiritual and inner 
growth was, in contrast to that of Herder and Humboldt: rather more 
government than less. Although the government was preoccupied with 
laws, it still took, in his view, too much of a laissez-faire80 approach to 
politics. However, a strong government did not necessarily mean more 
democracy, which to Carlyle again seemed to represent machinery, and a 
rather unhealthy preoccupation with power. Democracy was surely not 
the answer, for „while civil liberty is more and more secured to us, our 
moral liberty is all but lost‟, and whilst „free in hand and foot, we are 
shackled in heart and soul with far straiter than feudal chains‟.81  For 
Carlyle there lay no finality in democracy, because it could not free man 
from the mentioned shackles. Democracy offers nothing, „except 
emptiness, and the free chance to win‟.82 In fact he saw democracy as 
representing the same as laissez-faire, because it left men to follow their 
own interest.  
 
What was needed to free man from his shackles was a „spiritual 
aristocracy‟, as Williams puts it, „a highly cultivated and responsible 
minority, concerned to define and emphasize the highest values at which 
                                            
79 Ibid., p. 106. 
80  Laissez-faire; meaning that activities in society would be subject to a minimum of 
governmental interference.  
81 Carlyle (1858), p. 115.  
82 Quoted in Williams (1958), p. 79.  
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society must aim‟.83 Such a class of „Writing and Teaching Heroes‟ should 
form the back-bone of a strong government, whose prime task was to 
educate.  
 
To impart the gift of thinking to those who cannot think, and yet who 
could in that case think: this, one would imagine, was the first function a 
government had to set about discharging.84  
 
Several of the ideas and critiques coined by Carlyle clearly influenced 
Matthew Arnold who, it could be argued, developed them into a more 
coherent normative cultural theory.  
Matthew Arnold 
Matthew Arnold‟s seminal series of essays brought together under the 
title of Culture and Anarchy was published in the UK in 1865. Here Arnold 
expressed his fear of what increased liberalism and freedom for the 
individual could lead to. He was critical of a prevalent notion that „it is a 
most happy and important thing for a man merely to be able to do as he 
likes‟, without much consideration as to „what he is to do when he is thus 
free to do as he likes‟.85 Arnold was afraid that this increased freedom for 
everybody could lead to anarchy. In fact, Arnold was pessimistic and 
disillusioned with the time he was living in, which he considered to be 
preoccupied with ends rather than means and the mechanical nature of 
nineteenth-century society.  
                                            
83 Williams (1958), p. 84.  
84 Quoted in Williams (1958), p. 82. 
85 Arnold (1935), p. 74.  
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His answer to these potential difficulties was culture, which he argued 
would benefit both each individual citizen and society as a whole: 
 
Culture, which is the study of perfection, leads us […] to conceive of true 
human perfection as a harmonious perfection, developing all sides of our 
humanity; and a general perfection, developing all parts of our society.86  
 
Although Arnold‟s notion of culture did include all sides of humanity he 
was not particularly referring to ordinary people‟s own expressions, but 
instead to a culture of perfection through great works of art and thought 
(Perfection and Intelligence or what Arnold called Sweetness and Light). 
His culture was defined as:   
 
a pursuit of our total perfection by means of getting to know, on all the 
matters which most concern us, the best which has been thought and 
said in the world.87  
 
In order to administer this culture of „Sweetness and Light‟ and make sure 
it was being diffused to as many as possible, Arnold argued, just like 
Carlyle, for the importance of a strong state. The English state at the time 
was not one of a strong central power, but was rather ruled through the 
principle of laissez-faire. However, who should lead the state? It was in 
response to this that Arnold launched his idea of the „great men of culture‟, 
who:  
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87 Ibid., p. 6. 
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are those who have had a passion for diffusing, for making prevail, for 
carrying from one end of society to the other, the best knowledge, the 
best ideas of their time; who have laboured to divest knowledge of all 
that was harsh, uncouth, difficult, abstract, professional, exclusive; to 
humanise it, to make it efficient outside the clique of the cultivated and 
learned, yet still remaining the best knowledge and thought of the time, 
and a true source, therefore, of sweetness and light.88  
 
However, it was not immediately obvious where these „great men of 
culture‟ were to be found. Arnold, like Carlyle, could not see how any of 
the social classes in the UK at the time, as an entity, could fulfil such a 
noble task. Similarly to Herder who talked about a „decay from above‟, 
Arnold argued that the aristocracy, which he termed the Barbarians, was 
not suited because they were too preoccupied with defending the status 
quo and were unable to approach new ideas. The middle class (or the 
Philistines) was also useless because they were too focused on their own 
individual success and the faith in „machinery‟. Finally, the working class 
(or the Populace) was either too eager to become Philistines or simply 
too degraded and brutal to contribute anything towards the sweetness 
and light that Arnold argued was needed. The majority of people within all 
these classes lived in what Arnold called their „ordinary selves‟, and they 
could not see beyond the interests of their own class.  
 
Arnold‟s response to this was to identify a fictitious group of people who 
instead were driven by their „best selves‟. These were people „who are 
                                            
88 Ibid., p. 70. 
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mainly led, not by their class spirit, but by a general humane spirit, by the 
love of human perfection‟.89 Such people, whom Arnold called „aliens‟ and 
who to an extent resemble Herder‟s notion of „aristo-democrats‟, existed 
within all the three classes, and needed not to be feared because they 
represented unity and harmony and would hence not clash with other 
„ordinary selves‟ and were thus fit to govern the nation‟s culture with 
authority as „the great men of culture‟. However, as pointed out by 
Bennett, Arnold never said anything about how these „great men of 
culture‟ should be identified.90  
 
1.2 A theoretical framework 
 
There are clear similarities between the ideas of the four thinkers 
presented above, but when analysing them in more detail two different 
blocs crystallize: Herder and Humboldt versus Carlyle and Arnold. What 
the ideas of all the thinkers have in common were the importance of what 
the Weimar thinkers called Bildung, and which Nielsen has described as 
human growth processes. They all also acknowledged that this could be 
facilitated through culture (however this was defined). However, the 
prescription for what is needed in order to achieve this varies between the 
two blocs.  
 
In Herder and Humboldt‟s thinking self-development or self-cultivation 
was the prime objective of Bildung. It was thus man himself who had to 
                                            
89 Ibid., p. 109.  
90 Bennett (2005).  
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take responsibility for his development. Humboldt also went as far as 
saying that anything imposed from outside would not work; whatever man 
does must spring from his own choice. This again, would, according to 
Herder, contribute to the wider civilisation (although it should be noted 
that this was of less importance to Humboldt).  
 
Arnold agreed that any development of society as such hinged on the 
development of the individual. However, his view of who the agent for this 
development should be, contrasts with that of Herder and Humboldt. The 
guidance had to come from outside, from a selected few who were 
guided by their „best selves‟. Ordinary people, no matter their class-
background, were just too concerned with there own interests and their 
cultivation could not be left to themselves. This echoes Carlyle, who 
referred to the need for a „spiritual aristocracy‟. Herder also talked about 
„aristo-democrats‟ who in a transitional period would help people start 
their self-cultivation, but he stressed that they should be „popular leaders‟ 
whose remit would expire once the process of self-cultivation had started. 
Hence, the two blocs‟ approach to Bildung differed: the position of Herder 
and Humboldt can be described as supporting enlightenment of the 
people by the people, as opposed to Carlyle and Arnold who prescribed 
enlightenment of the people.  
 
How the theories differ regarding who should be the agent for the 
development and cultivation of man is linked to the thinkers‟ attitude to 
people‟s freedom. Where Herder and Humboldt argued that freedom of 
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thought and expression were an absolute prerequisite for an environment 
within which it was possible to achieve Bildung, Arnold, although he did 
not reject the increased level of freedom being granted to people in 
Victorian England, seems to have been more preoccupied with what 
people would do with this freedom. This again might explain the thinkers‟ 
different position regarding the role of the state, where Herder and 
Humboldt wanted less state interference and in reality advocated a 
laissez-faire approach to government, whereas Arnold and Carlyle took 
the diametrically opposite view and lamented the government‟s hands-off 
approach in England of their time. A stronger state did not necessarily 
mean more democracy though, and Carlyle even rejected this outright.  
 
Regarding the means through which Bildung could be achieved, there 
were also differences. Arnold referred to a culture of perfection, which 
was partly pursued by beauty, as the basis for his civilising project.91 This 
is challenged by Herder who rejected the notion that the culture of any 
people or civilisation (however this was defined) could be regarded as 
barbaric or coarse, which is linked to what culture, according to him and 
Humboldt, encapsulated. They defined culture widely and argued that all 
civilisations or cultures (in the plural), wherever they were located 
historically, geographically or socially, were of equal value.  
 
As will be seen in Chapter Four, a subject oriented approach to cultural 
policy has long traditions in Norway. This started with the Populist 
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Nationalist counter cultural movements in the nineteenth century, was 
kept warm in the socialist Labour-movement of the early twentieth century 
and was turned into a real policy-programme in the 1970s. By then it had 
also been informed by an international trend in cultural policy thinking, 
which had emerged in response to what had become the dominating 
approach: the democratisation of culture, the objective of which, to a 
large extent, tallies with the ideas of Matthew Arnold, and was countered 
by this new trend which had cultural democracy as its objective.92 It is 
striking how many of Herder and Humboldt‟s ideas can be traced in these 
cultural democracy policies, which were based on the idea that people 
should have more influence over cultural policy decisions and the 
allocation of money. Hence, the policies entailed more cultural policy 
decisions to be taken at a local level away from central government: that 
is, to minimise state intervention. These cultural policies did not only 
include signifying practices or aesthetic experiences but defined culture 
widely, which implicitly meant that cultural hierarchies were, if not 
abandoned, at least given less importance. Finally, a key corner-stone in 
this, by then, „new‟ cultural policy was active participation as supposed to 
passive exposure to excellent art. 
 
Table One below summarises the differences in ideas between the two 
groups of thinkers and how this again relates to the two policy objectives 
of democratisation of culture and cultural democracy.  
 
 
                                            
92 J.A. Simpson, Towards cultural democracy (Strasbourg: Council of Europe, 1976).  
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Summary of Bildung ideas  
  
Herder and Humboldt  Carlyle and Arnold 
  
 Enlightenment by the people 
(self-cultivation)   
 Enlightenment of the people 
(paternalistically imposed) 
  
 Minimise state intervention  Stronger state 
  
 Wide definition of culture  Culture as Beauty and perfection 
  
 All cultures and civilisations of equal 
value 
 Clear cultural hierarchies 
 
  
 All activities must spring from man‟s 
own choice 
 Guidance should come from a 
selected few who are guided by their 
„best selves‟ 
  
 Bildung through active participation or 
through exposure to a „variety of 
situations‟ 
 Growth through exposure to Beauty 
and excellence 
 
  
 Freedom a prerequisite  Concern with what people do with 
their freedom 
  
Approach to Bildung:  
  
 Subject oriented  Object oriented 
  
Related objective in modern cultural 
policy 
 
  
 Cultural democracy  Democratisation of culture 
 
Table 1: Subject vs. Object approach to Folkeopplysning: Summary of ideas 
 
However, it should be noted that there are still many similarities between 
both groups of thinkers and the corresponding cultural policy objectives. 
Chris Bilton, for example, points out that it is a mistake to see the two  
above-mentioned policy objectives (democratisation of culture versus 
cultural democracy) as completely separate and unrelated. In his view, 
both rely on idealistic assumptions that aesthetic experiences can have 
transforming effects on the individual.93 Hence the division between the 
                                            
93 Chris Bilton, „Towards cultural democracy: Contradiction and crisis in British and U.S. cultural 
policy 1870 – 1990‟ (PhD thesis, University of Warwick, 1997). 
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two concepts is far from clear and obvious. As we shall see in Chapter 
Five, the idea of cultural democracy has, in Norway, not been exclusively 
preoccupied with aesthetic experiences. However, cultural democracy 
advocates have, as has also been pointed out by Oliver Bennett, in 
similar ways to those advocating the democratisation of culture, 
„accorded culture and the arts a key role in personal and social 
transformation‟.94 In other words, although they appear to be different 
they are both „essentially “culturalist”‟.95  
 
Even a subject oriented approach to Bildung has to rely on a certain 
element of selection. Rather than a curriculum imposed by a benign, but 
paternalistic state, education was for Humboldt „essentially the 
modification of our sensibility through culture and experience‟.96 However, 
J.W. Burrow, who edited and translated into English Humboldt‟s The 
Limits of State Action, points out that there is an inherent dilemma in this, 
in that no matter how liberal an educational system is, somebody has got 
to make curricular decisions. 97  In one of a few direct references to 
Humboldt, Arnold himself commented that although Humboldt wished for 
less state intervention he was flexible enough to conclude that it would 
take a long time before the objective to have each individual stand 
                                            
94 Oliver Bennett, „Cultural Policy and the Crisis of Legitimacy: Entrepreneurial Answers in the 
United Kingdom‟ (Coventry: Centre for the Study of Cultural Policy, Working Paper 2, 
University of Warwick, 1996), p. 7. 
95 Ibid.  
96 Burrow (1993), p. lv. 
97The irony is that Humboldt went on to become Minister of Education and Art in 1806, and 
hence responsible for the syllabus of the Prussian Gymnaisa. Burrow continues by arguing that 
this syllabus might have been wider than most alternatives, but „it was still a selection from a 
number of possibilities‟, Burrow (1993), p. xlvii.  
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„perfect on his own‟, would be fulfilled.98 In a similar fashion Barnard 
argues that Herder was „realistic enough‟ when he recommended that, 
albeit only for a transitional period, a group of „aristo-democrats‟ were 
needed to support growth from below in response to the decay from 
above. 99  To conclude that these two approaches to culture and 
democracy are diametrically in opposition to each other is thus premature. 
It can therefore be argued that to divide Bildung motivated cultural 
policies into two clear factions: subject focused versus object focused is 
rather too neat. Both have Bildung as their prime objective and as we 
shall see in Chapter Five, in modern Norwegian cultural policy of the late 
twentieth century, they have existed fairly harmoniously together.  
 
As mentioned in the introductory chapter, Oliver Bennett argues that the 
civilising mission has traditionally been based on the assumption that 
European high art is of superior value. However, in a Norwegian context I 
shall argue that there is also a civilising dimension to the cultural policy 
efforts that aim to facilitate a cultural democracy, although this has very 
much been based on the assumption that people themselves should 
decide which cultural activities that were perceived to have a Bildung 
potential. However, there have been limits to such codetermination, which 
has traditionally, as we shall see, not included culture presented in a 
commercial context. Policies that aim to help people achieve Bildung, 
whether this is sought through the exposure to the „high‟ arts or through 
participation in cultural activities that people, or their representatives, 
                                            
98 Arnold (1935), pp. 126 - 127. 
99 Barnard (1969), p. 9. 
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have chosen themselves, are both initiated with the aim to give people 
guidance, pulling them out of their ignorance, forming their character and 
encouraging an ordered mind: in short they all aim to make people more 
civilised. Even policies that aim to allow people themselves to define their 
own cultural activities are rooted in this objective. Hence, although this 
term is not used in Norwegian I shall apply Bildung when identifying 
references to such human growth processes in Norwegian cultural policy 
discourse. Similarly, both the two theoretical traditions outlined in this 
chapter will be brought forward into the next chapters in my analysis of 
how both the subject and object models have been applied within 
Norwegian cultural policy.  
 
1.3 Summary  
 
This chapter has presented two sets of thinkers who have approached 
how culture can facilitate Bildung. Although it was acknowledged that the 
theories had not necessarily been directly influential on Norwegian 
cultural policy, it was argued that they were useful in debating and 
conceptualising policy objectives in Norway. It was further argued that of 
the ideas by the four thinkers presented, those of Arnold and Carlyle 
supported an object oriented approach to Bildung and hence the policy 
objective of democratising culture, whilst those of Herder and Humboldt 
supported a subject oriented approach and hence the policy objective of 
facilitating a cultural democracy. With reference to Chris Bilton and Oliver 
Bennett it was argued, however, that the differences between the 
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rationales behind these two policy objectives are subtle, in that they both 
rely on assumptions that culture can have transforming effects on the 
individual, or by using the Weimar thinkers‟ term: that they could both be 
a process of, or facilitate, Bildung.  
 
The ideas presented by the thinkers in this chapter were all normative in 
the sense that they prescribed recipes for how Bildung could be achieved 
and they all assumed that everybody carried within them the potential to 
grow and to become a fuller person. However, none of these thinkers 
proposed to use culture to cement power relations or as a means for the 
state to govern its subjects. The scholarship of other writers has taken a 
more critical approach to how culture acts as a central component in a 
struggle for power. This is the subject of the next chapter.  
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2.0 The Civilising Mission: Hegemony and 
Government 
 
As already mentioned in the previous chapter, Matthew Arnold‟s theory of 
culture was highly idealistic. He sincerely believed that many of England‟s 
challenges at the time of his writing could be met by letting in more 
„sweetness and light‟. However, he did not subscribe to the idea that 
culture was to be used as a factor in conserving existing power structures. 
Instead, according to Bennett, he:  
 
specifically rejects the idea of possessing culture, of culture as an engine 
of social or class distinction, separating its holder, like a badge or title, 
from other people who have not got it.100  
 
Other writers have approached cultural theory rather differently and 
acknowledged to a greater extent Raymond Williams‟ dictum that:  
 
the one vital lesson which the nineteenth century had to learn […] was 
that the basic economic organization could not be separated and 
excluded from its moral and intellectual concerns.101  
 
Herder and Humboldt had emphasised the potential to gain freedom 
through culture. However, they referred predominately to an „inner 
freedom‟: in fact they had all turned their back on the French revolution, 
with its „vulgar‟ preoccupation with democracy, and material redistribution. 
                                            
100 Bennett (2005), p. 468. 
101 Williams (1958), p. 25.  
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However, as already mentioned, according to Vestheim, growth and 
empowerment achieved through Bildung could also be applied by people 
to fight a tangible, as opposed to an inner cause, or for groups or classes 
to position themselves in relation to other groups in society. Such an 
instrumental use of culture to position a class or a „bloc‟ of people, in 
relation to other classes, or to use culture to achieve consent about a 
cause or a certain understanding of reality in order to defend or create a 
„hegemony‟, has less to do with both the Weimar thinkers or Carlyle‟s and 
Arnold‟s idealism. It is instead related to culture‟s power-potential, where, 
rather than to facilitate inner growth, culture‟s perceived civilising potential 
might act as an instrument to „govern‟, or be used as an instrument to 
maintain or dispute existing class relations in, perhaps, more sinister 
ways.  
 
Hence, following the previous chapter‟s attempt to develop a theoretical 
framework in order to analyse the two approaches to Bildung, this chapter 
will move on to discuss two different theoretical approaches to the 
question whether the promotion of Bildung in some way may be related to 
power, which again will be used to formulate a methodology for the 
empirical section in the following chapter. This chapter will focus on some 
of the ideas of the Italian neo-Marxist Antonio Gramsci and his concept of 
hegemony, and some of the ideas of the French thinker Michel Foucault 
and his concept of „governmentality‟ as well as his emphasis on how 
power is manifest through discourses of „truth‟. I have chosen these two 
thinkers because they are complementary, and although their approaches 
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might be perceived to be in diametrical opposition to each other, I will 
argue that a theoretical framework that includes the ideas of both is of 
benefit to my investigation of Norwegian cultural policy as a civilising 
mission. Prior to reaching this conclusion, the final section will compare 
some of the ideas of these two thinkers.  
 
2.1  Antonio Gramsci and the notion of cultural hegemony 
 
Robert Hewison argues that the power structure within the arts sector in 
Britain exemplifies how the elite sections, or the upper classes, have 
used culture to achieve consent in order to cement their power. Hewison 
cites T.S. Eliot as a writer who embraced the cultural importance of the 
elite in society. Although a guardian of the world‟s great artistic 
achievements, he did not quite agree with Matthew Arnold regarding the 
democratisation of culture. Eliot argued that „the true purpose of 
education was „to preserve the class and to select the elite‟,102 rightly 
interpreted by Hewison as implying that „The elite would preserve Culture 
– and Culture would preserve the elite‟.103  
 
As opposed to Arnold‟s paternalistic „care‟ and his argument about 
culture‟s inherently beneficial potential, Eliot emphasised that an essential 
condition for the preservation of the quality of culture with a capital „C‟, or 
what he referred to as the „more conscious part of culture‟ was „that it 
                                            
102 T.S. Eliot, Notes towards the Definition of Culture (London: Faber and Faber Limited, 1948), 
p. 100.  
103  Robert Hewison, Culture and Consensus: England, art and politics since 1940 (London: 
Methuen, 1995), p. 53. 
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should continue to be a minority culture‟ for the „cultured‟ classes and 
elites.104 
 
However, according to Hewison, such a national elite culture must be 
treated carefully by the dominant group in order for it to be an efficient 
tool for the country‟s leadership.105 Hence, it is not sufficient for the elite 
to exclusively treat this culture as a minority culture. Instead, the 
dominant classes of society must be employed in servicing but also in 
policing culture. It is important that the culture of the dominant class is not 
enjoyed exclusively by that class, but disseminated to the whole of 
society, so that the dominant culture „becomes identified with the culture 
of society as a whole‟.106 According to Gramsci, bourgeois-democratic 
forms of rule differed from those of the previous ruling classes, such as 
the sovereign rulers prior to the eighteenth century, in that they were not 
exclusive, and cut off from the populace. Instead, according to Tony 
Bennett, the bourgeois-democratic forms of rule aimed: 
 
not merely at exacting the obedience of the popular classes but further 
aspire[d] to win their active support for, and participation in, the projects 
of the ruling classes107.  
 
Bennett continues that, according to Gramsci, this is the end to which:  
 
                                            
104 Eliot (1948), p. 107 
105 Hewison (1995), p. 15. 
106 Ibid., p. 16. 
107 Tony Bennett, Culture: A Reformer’s Science (London: Sage Publications, 1998a), pp. 67 - 
68. 
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all of the major ideological apparatuses of both state and civil society – 
from popular schooling through the media to the institutions of art and 
culture – are dedicated.108 
 
The operative principle behind this bourgeois hegemony of consent is 
primarily psychological, where the subordinate classes are repeatedly 
being made subject to bourgeois ideologies and values. Hence, even 
though the working class, or the working class together with the peasants, 
would outnumber all other classes (this was certainly the case at the time 
of Gramsci's writing), obtaining socialism through democratic means 
(which indeed was the objective of the social-democratic movement), is, 
according to Gramsci, impossible. Such an objective is purely illusory 
because the ideological power in the public sphere „neutralizes the 
democratic potential of the representative State […] through […] its 
indoctrination through the means of communication‟.109 Gramsci argued 
that the bourgeois hegemony in Western democracies had reached a 
stage where its ideology and understanding of reality had prevailed over 
all other subordinate groups, which had thus brought about:  
 
not only a unison of economic and political aims, but also intellectual and 
moral unity, posing all the questions around which the struggle rages, not 
on a corporate but on a “universal” plane, and thus creating the 
                                            
108 Bennett: (1998a), p 68. 
109 Perry Anderson, „The Antinomies of Antonio Gramsci‟, in New Left Review 100 (November - 
December 1976), p. 28. 
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hegemony of a fundamental social group over a series of subordinate 
groups.110 
 
When Gramsci referred to civil society as the arena where the 
bourgeoisie exercised its ideological power he was referring to „the 
ensemble of organisms commonly called “private”‟, 111  including 
institutions like the church, trade unions, schools and so on. To this, 
referring to Hewison‟s interpretation of hegemony when analysing the 
British arts sector, could be added arts organisations and other cultural 
institutions such as national broadcasting. The function of „hegemony‟, 
which the dominant group exercises throughout society, comprised of: 
 
The spontaneous consent given by the great masses of the population to 
the general direction imposed on social life by the dominant fundamental 
group; this consent is „historically‟ caused by the prestige (and 
consequent confidence) which the dominant group enjoys because of its 
position and function in the world of production.112  
 
As opposed to Arnold‟s idealistic faith in culture as a benign tool for the 
common good, Gramsci‟s idea of the intellectual and moral leadership on 
which the supremacy of the ruling group was based has the domination of 
antagonistic groups and the leadership of kindred groups as its objective. 
Arnold did not explicitly propagate such domination. For example, he did 
not have sufficient faith in the objectives of the members of any existing 
                                            
110 Antonio Gramsci, Selections from the Prison Notebooks, edited and translated by Q. Hoare 
and G. N. Smith (London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1971), pp. 181 - 182.  
111 Ibid., p. 12. 
112 Ibid.  
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single class in society because they were not necessarily guided by their 
„best selves‟.  
 
Gramsci argued that the bourgeois power in the West had undergone a 
shift from a previous situation, which was determined by force, 
domination and violence, to one of consent, hegemony and civilisation,113 
or a shift from a political hegemony exercised through the state to a civil 
hegemony exercised through civil society.114 Such a hegemony was an 
unstable equilibrium between the dominant group and the subordinate 
groups, where the former had to take account of the „interests and the 
tendencies of the groups over which hegemony is to be exercised‟,115 
meaning the leading group had to make some sacrifices on behalf of 
subordinate groups. This was a perpetual battle based on an „incurable 
structural contradiction‟ between different groups in the hegemony. 
However, even though the hegemony was ethico-political, in the sense 
that it bonded society by means of ideological, moral and cultural 
                                            
113 Anderson (1976), pp. 20 - 21.  
114 It is this concept of Civil Hegemony that is of interest here. Elsewhere in his writing, Gramsci 
argues that the dominant group in society uses both coercion and consent in order to achieve 
hegemony; that is both a concept of political Hegemony through the state and a civil hegemony 
through civil society and that power is exercised through a combination of these. Elsewhere the 
distinction between civil and political society disappears altogether. „Thus, in the enigmatic 
mosaic that Gramsci laboriously assembled in prison, the words “State”, “civil society” “political 
society”, “hegemony”, “domination” or “direction” all undergo a persistent slippage‟, (Anderson 
(1976), p. 25). However, it is acknowledged that it is the notion of Civil Hegemony that is mostly 
prevalent in Gramsci's writing, and certainly the one that has been most influential and also most 
relevant for my argument. The mentioned persistent slippage is probably due to the extremely 
difficult conditions under which Gramsci wrote. From November 1926, Gramsci was imprisoned 
by the Italian Fascist dictatorship and was either still imprisoned or medically too weak to leave 
prison until his death in April 1937. All of Gramsci‟s work referred to in this dissertation was 
written during this period. To avoid his notes and letters being censored by his prison guards, he 
had to conceal his true message when writing. For example when referring to different groups or 
classes in society, Gramsci tended to „neutralise‟ his position through generalisations. The 
bourgeoisie and the proletariat for example often „alternate simultaneously as the hypothetical 
subjects of the same passage – whenever, in fact, Gramsci writes in the abstract of a “dominant 
class”‟ (Anderson (1976), p. 20). 
115  David Forgacs, A Gramsci Reader: Selected Writings 1916-1935 (London: Lawrence and 
Wishart, 1988), p. 211. 
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cements, it also had to be economic, and this is what sustained the 
hegemonies in the West, where the bourgeoisie both kept control of the 
economy and exercised a cultural, moral and ideological leadership. 
„Cultural activity‟ and a „cultural front‟ were necessary „alongside the 
merely economic and political ones‟. 117  Given that this thesis is 
concerned with how culture has been applied to civilise, it is this cultural, 
moral and ideological leadership, rather than the purely economic one, 
that is of most interest here. 
 
Tony Bennett also refers to Gramsci in his study on the development of 
Western public museums where he argues that „a Gramscian perspective 
is essential to an adequate theorization of the museum‟s relations to 
bourgeois-democratic politics‟.118  
 
However, Bennett continues by saying that a Gramscian analysis of 
hegemony is only equipped to analyse the broader cultural battles and 
alliances in society, and does not take account of the specific rationales 
inherent within different sectors or indeed within particular institutions. In 
order to unpick what he calls the political rationality of the museum, 
Bennett argues that Gramsci‟s theories fall short, because the study of 
hegemony appears to be „institutionally indifferent‟. This gap can be filled 
through the scholarship of Michel Foucault, which takes institutions, their 
technologies and their discourses as the starting point for its analysis of 
power.  
                                            
117 Ibid., p. 194.  
118 Tony Bennett, The Birth of the Museum: History, theory, politics (London and New York: 
Routledge, 1995), p. 91. 
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2.2 Governmentality and discourse: Michel Foucault  
 
Governmentality 
 
In Michel Foucault‟s lecture on Governmentality, „government‟ and „to 
govern‟ were posed as central terms. He argued that since the sixteenth 
century a new, more complex approach to government has emerged, 
breaking with a Machiavellian inspired account, which only emphasised a 
strong leader, with scant attention being paid to the ruler‟s principality. 
This new approach put more emphasis on how each individual citizen 
should behave and conduct his affairs. Man‟s successful government of 
himself would enable him to govern his family (meaning his goods and his 
patrimony), which again was a prerequisite for a successful government 
of the state. There was thus an upward continuity between man, family 
and the state, but also a downward continuity, which stipulated that „when 
a state is well run, the head of the family will know how to look after his 
family, his goods and his patrimony, which means that individuals will, in 
turn, behave as they should‟.119  
 
The link in this continuity is the government of the family where „the art of 
government‟ is thus how to introduce the meticulous attention of the 
father into the management of the state:   
 
                                            
119  Michel Foucault, „Governmentality‟, in Graham Burchell, Colin Gordon and Peter Miller 
(eds.), The Foucault Effect: Studies in Governmentality (Hemel Hempstead: Harvester 
Wheatsheaf, 1991), p. 92.  
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that is to say, the correct manner of managing individuals, goods and 
wealth within the family (which a good father is expected to do in relation 
to his wife, children and servants) and of making the family fortune 
prosper.120  
 
Hence, just as a father would exercise a certain amount of surveillance 
and control over his household and goods, similar mechanisms would be 
introduced to monitor the state‟s inhabitants‟ wealth and behaviour. The 
family thus becomes a model for the „art of government‟, which has as its 
objective to create common welfare for all through a set of specific 
„finalities‟, such as to ensure:  
 
that the greatest possible quantity of wealth is produced, that the people 
are provided with sufficient means of subsistence, that the population is 
enabled to multiply, etc.121  
 
The sovereign prince had previously not been interested in any of this, as 
long as he could accumulate his wealth and keep his enemies, whether 
internal or external, at bay. He would thus instead have governed 
primarily through law.  
 
Foucault observed (as did Gramsci) that from about the middle of the 
eighteenth century, the sovereignty of single rulers started to loosen its 
grip in Europe. However, whereas Gramsci emphasised how this made 
the bourgeoisie want the popular classes to support and participate in 
                                            
120 Ibid.  
121 Foucault (1991), p. 95.  
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their culture, Foucault emphasised how this power-transmission from a 
principality to the emerging bourgeois class enabled the family as a 
model for the „art of government‟ to become mobilised at an aggregated 
level on the entire population.  
 
It could of course be thought that a consequence of the shift from a 
sovereign prince to more democratic types of government would be a 
decreased need for discipline. Foucault argued the opposite and said 
that:  
 
the need for discipline was never more important or more valorised than 
at the moment when it became important to manage a population; the 
managing of a population not only concerns the collective mass of 
phenomena, the level of its aggregate effects, it also implies the 
management of population in its depths and its details.122  
 
Hence, by the time bourgeois parliamentarian democracies were 
established across much of Europe in the nineteenth century, in order to 
secure cohesion and prevent deviations from normality, the increased 
freedom and rights which followed were, according to Foucault, combined 
with a tightly knit grid of disciplinary coercions, the purpose of which was 
to survey and control the same people. This can be compared to 
Gramsci‟s idea of how a ruling class, through the state and its political 
hegemony, had coercive forces at its disposal to protect the hegemony 
should the consent of the civil hegemony be threatened. The difference 
                                            
122 Ibid., p. 102. 
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was that Foucault did not, like Gramsci, relate this to a conflict between 
different social groups or social classes, but emphasised instead the 
disciplining and governing potentials within institutions, like the prison, the 
asylum, the school and the hospital.123  
 
According to Tony Bennett, the mentioned aggregation of the populace 
into a people also had its effect in the area of culture:  
 
For it was the emerging ascendancy of new ways of thinking about the 
population which made it intelligible to expect that general benefits might 
result from culture‟s more extended distribution.124 
 
Elsewhere Bennett argues that it is due to such a governmentality that 
modern governments have increasingly become preoccupied with culture 
as „a distinctive area of policy concern‟.125 Consequently, he argues that 
the whole academic field of cultural policy studies can be perceived to be 
preoccupied with „the many and diverse ways governments seek to 
influence cultural activity‟ through:  
 
„a historically distinctive set of concerns and relationships through which 
cultural resources are managed in ways that are calculated to regulate 
                                            
123 As will be shown later on in this chapter, Tony Bennett has suggested the public museum as 
an example of a cultural institution with disciplining power. Others have argued that literary 
education, and to an extent also the theatre have been used for the same objective (H. Lee, ‘Use 
of civilising claims: Three moments in British theatre history’, in Poetics 36.4 (2008), pp. 287 - 
300). 
124 Bennett (1998a), p. 124.  
125  Tony Bennett, „Culture and Policy – Acting on the Social‟, in International Journal of 
Cultural Policy 4.2 (1998b), pp. 271 - 289.  
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ways of life and the relationships between them with a view to, in so 
doing, acting on the social in a particular manner‟.126   
 
Implicit in this statement about what constitutes the field of cultural policy 
studies lies a subscription to a Foucauldian understanding of the 
government of culture, which has as its objective, through cultural policies, 
to „influence on the relationships between different ways of life‟, to 
„provide a means of acting on the social‟127, through a construction of a 
particular society, meaning a specific realm of conducts and relationships.  
 
Taking such an approach to governmentality, where culture is used to 
influence people‟s conducts and relationships, Tony Bennett has 
researched what he calls the birth of the museum. Rather than approach 
the function and power of museums, in a broad context using grand 
theories like Marxism, he studies their role by focusing specifically on 
what he calls the political rationality of the institutions itself, which he 
argues has been different from the rhetoric that governs their stated aim. 
Bennett acknowledges that museums have had an important role to play 
in the Gramscian thesis that a ruling class will rule partly by means of 
making concessions to other classes to retain hegemony, in that it has 
„allowed‟ people from the lower classes to mingle and mix with the elite in 
order to facilitate social cohesion. Such promotion of social cohesion 
across classes was one of the objectives behind the museums that were 
established in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. However, at the 
same time museums also served as instruments to differentiate people, 
                                            
126 Ibid., p. 272. 
127 Ibid., p. 278 - 279. 
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through techniques of regulation and self-regulation with the objective of 
improving people‟s manners. Bennett argues that: 
 
the practices of the museum served to drive a wedge between the 
publics it attracted and that recalcitrant portion of the population whose 
manners remained those of the tavern and the fair.128  
 
According to Bennett, the museum aimed to contribute to cohesion 
around a bourgeois hegemony through promoting its activities as 
representing a culture, which was primarily bourgeois but framed as 
belonging to all, at the same time as it also contributed to the same 
hegemony through the programming of behaviour. Analysing the museum 
as a „technology of behaviour management‟, which took on these tasks 
due to its own political rationality, makes this Foucauldian analysis of the 
power of the museum different from a Gramscian one, although the 
approaches are connected.  
 
The discourse of „truth‟ 
 
Foucault also added that governmental power could not be exercised 
without upholding a universally held „truth‟. A bourgeois democracy would 
have fewer visible tools of power than an absolute ruler. Hence, 
according to Foucault „we are subjected to the production of truth through 
                                            
128 Bennett (1995), p. 99.  
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power and we cannot exercise power except through the production of 
truth‟.129  
 
This truth is produced through discourses, which according to Iver 
Neumann can be understood as a system: 
 
for production of a set of statements and expressions, which, through 
being written into institutions and to appear as more or less normal, 
constitute reality for its bearers and have a degree of regularity in a set of 
social relations.130 
 
Whoever can develop (or construct) a discourse of truth will potentially 
have the power to set the agenda and determine what can be discussed 
and what cannot. Or, as Robert Young has remarked, once „discursive 
practices‟ of truth are established, it becomes „virtually impossible to think 
outside of them‟.131  
 
Such discursive practices can also act as instruments, which secure 
cultural cohesion and prevent deviations from normality, through the way 
they „produce‟ people‟s skills and understanding. As described by Pål 
Augestad:  
 
                                            
129 Michel Foucault, „Two Lectures‟, in Michael Kelly (ed.), Critique and Power: Recasting the 
Foucault / Habermas Debate (Cambridge, Massachusette and London, England: The MIT Press, 
1998), p. 31.  
130 Iver B. Neumann, Norge – en kritikk: Begrepsmakt i Europa-debatten (Oslo: Pax, 2001a), p. 
18.    
131 Robert Young (ed.), Untying the Text: A Post-Structuralist Reader (London and New York: 
Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1981), p. 48. 
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People‟s thinking and actions can be influenced by getting [them] to 
subscribe to certain sets of knowledge and models of understanding - 
getting them to use these as a basis on which to understand reality and 
oneself.132 
 
According to Foucault, power does not have to be suppressive in the 
sense that it is guarded by sticks, penalties, rules and regulations. It can 
just as much invest in pleasure. Power can be concealed in what appears 
as enjoyable and obvious, where power, knowledge and pleasure are 
tightly connected.133 As an example, Augestad describes how Norwegian 
health policy has managed to institutionalise the enjoyment of living a 
healthy life, through a discursive power which penetrates people‟s 
behaviour and makes things which many at the outset regard as less 
pleasant, like eating healthily and exercising, be perceived as 
enjoyable.134 The power produces pleasure and expectations, and this is 
made obvious to everybody through the production of truths, as 
manifested by knowledge and discourse. These expectations are 
subscribed to by, if not all, then at least the majority, and they do not 
necessarily need to correlate with one‟s own actual behaviour. Most 
people who only eat burgers and other junk-food and become overweight 
in the process, appreciate and „buy into‟ the superiority of salads, 
vegetables and other healthy food, in other words the latter are, by most, 
positioned at a higher level within a „food-hierarchy‟. The message that 
                                            
132 Pål Augestad, „Resept for et sunnere Norge: Et foucaultsk blikk på norsk helsepolitikk‟, in 
Sosiologi i dag 35.2 (2005), pp. 33 - 52.  
133 Ibid., p. 44.  
134 Ibid. 
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salad is best is internalised beyond people‟s own behaviour. The 
government‟s objective, though, is that through this pleasure discourse 
people will, over time at least, change their behaviour.  
 
2.3 Gramsci and Foucault – strange bedfellows? 
 
Rather than applying a totalising form of analysis on power relations 
between different classes or groups in society as Gramsci did, Foucault 
was preoccupied with the micro power of individual institutions, and on 
the „singularity‟ of events. In other words, rather than analysing social 
structures in society, Foucault‟s focus was on strategies and mechanisms, 
in other words, on the application of power. Such an approach to the 
study of social phenomena will inevitably determine the methodologies 
applied to the research problem in question, and at first glance, this 
seems incompatible with a Gramscian focus on hegemony. Some 
contemporary scholars, like Tony Bennett, argue that Gramsci‟s focus on 
hegemony was too preoccupied with an antagonism between the people 
and a bourgeois power bloc. Bennett further argues that the problem with 
a Gramscian criticism is that it:  
 
is often a politics which is all phrase and no content, except for a 
rhetorically contrived one; a politics in which everything is invested in the 
production of a „people versus the power-bloc‟ antagonism, but one in 
which it becomes impossible to say who „the people‟ are or who they 
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might be, whom this category should include and whom it should 
exclude.135 
 
 
The subscription to such a people/power bloc antagonism as a basis for 
the study of power rests on the assumption that the fundamental, or the 
ruling, classes‟ structural economic importance forms a relatively fixed 
point of reference, around which all the subordinate groups in society can 
form a unitary force of opposition.136 According to Bennett, to perceive 
power struggles in this is way is too simplistic. This antagonism is even 
more problematic when applied to the Norwegian context where, as will 
be shown in Chapters Four and Five, the correlation between economic 
control and hegemonic power has been less pronounced during the 
second halves of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries than such a 
subscription to Gramscian theory would indicate.  
 
Secondly, it is argued that Gramsci‟s theory is indifferent to the political 
rationality of the institutions of power. Gramsci was not concerned with 
the carriers of ideologies and values, meaning that he looked through, 
rather than at ideological apparatuses (as for example in cultural 
institutions) where their capacity to transmit bourgeois values to 
subordinate classes were taken as pre-given, or as neutral carriers who 
did not take on any rationality of their own. For Gramsci it was the battle 
of ideas that mattered most, not the organisations per se. Hence he „fails 
                                            
135 Tony Bennett, Outside literature (London and New York: Routledge, 1990), p. 254. 
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to take adequate account of the more mundane and technical means 
through which power is routinely exercised‟.137  
 
Central to Gramsci‟s theory is the idea that the ruling power-bloc can 
maintain its hegemony in one of two ways: through coercion or through 
consent, where the non-violent latter is by far preferable and also taken to 
be the most effective. 
  
According to Bennett, a Foucauldian approach to power differs radically 
in that it neither subscribes to the idea that one bloc maintains its 
hegemony „in a unified manner as the expressions of a general form of 
power‟ nor to the notion of consent. Instead, Foucault emphasised the 
importance of knowledges, „conceived as discourses which function as 
„the truth‟ in a particular set of social relations‟, 138  as well as the 
importance of the technologies that develop within, and form part of the 
political rationality of, institutions. Hence, rather than seeing through the 
institutions that mediate power, Foucault made these the prime objects of 
his research. The subscription to Foucault‟s governmentality thesis, 
where reform of each individual‟s self determines the extent to which he 
can also look after his family, which again determines the condition for 
the state to control the populace, makes, according to Bennett, Gramsci‟s 
emphasis on ideologies-in-struggle seem less important:  
 
than the institutional mechanisms which provide for a particular 
organisation of the relations between persons, positions, symbolic 
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resources, architectural contexts, etc. within the framework of a particular 
technology.139  
 
With the family as the model for government, these technologies, which 
can be institutions of culture, like libraries, public lectures and art galleries, 
play an important part in the reform of the self. Tony Bennett explains this 
connection thus:  
 
If, in this way, culture is brought within the province of government, its 
conception is on a par with other regions of government. The reform of 
the self – of the inner life – is just as much dependent on the provision of 
appropriate technologies for this purpose as is the achievement of 
desired ends in any other area of social administration.140   
 
Such an objective to facilitate the reform of the self is, according to 
Bennett, not only found in policies that aim to grant access to an elitist 
concept of the arts. Cultural policies that define culture more widely, as a 
„whole way of life‟, and which place less emphasis on distinctions of value 
between different kinds of culture, more in line with Herder‟s ideas, have, 
rather than removing the desire to reform, laid „open the ways of life of 
different sections of the populace to reformist programs of 
government‟.141 In other words, the wish to facilitate cultural democracy is 
as engaged in a reformist programme (perhaps an even more potent one 
in that it by definition should reach out to more people) as policies that 
want to democratise the „high arts‟.  
                                            
139 Bennett (1998a), p. 71.  
140 Bennett (1995), p. 18. 
141 Bennett (1998a), p. 91. 
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It is clear that a Foucauldian approach to the study of power differs 
significantly from a Gramscian one, particularly in terms of their levels of 
analysis and starting points.  Tony Bennett concludes that the former‟s 
approach is best suited for the study of power within the fields of cultural 
studies and cultural policy studies. The differences between the two 
approaches to power are summarised in Table Two.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2: Gramsci vs. Foucault – summary of ideas 
 
Power-
dimension 
Gramscian 
approach 
Foucauldian 
approach 
   
Class Antagonistic 
relationship 
between the 
bourgeoisie and 
subordinate 
classes. 
Discards the Marxist 
notion of ideology 
and class as 
determining factors. 
 
Hegemony/ 
Governmentality 
Hegemony based 
on both economic 
power and moral 
leadership by the 
ruling bourgeois 
class.  
Governmentality as 
an upward and 
downward continuity 
between the 
management of the 
self and the 
management of the 
state. 
Tools of power Rule by consent. Power exercised 
through the 
discursive production 
of „truths‟. 
The role of 
institutions 
Indifferent to the 
political rationality of 
institutions of 
power. 
Institutions take on a 
political rationality of 
their own through 
technologies of 
power. 
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However, this does not mean that Foucault‟s theories necessarily have to 
be located in diametrical opposition to Gramsci. A focus on hegemony 
and power blocs does not necessarily negate the political rationality of the 
organisations involved and vice versa. As mentioned above, Gramsci‟s 
ideas are not being discarded by Tony Bennett, who sees the value of 
both thinkers: 
 
With thinkers as complex and many-sided as Gramsci and Foucault, 
there is, of course, little point to be served in siding with the one in an 
unqualified way against the other and no point at all in discounting the 
contributions of either.142  
 
Although critical of grand theories, Foucault‟s work does not contain a 
sustained discussion of Marxist theory. However, as was mentioned 
above, it is still argued by some that Foucault‟s work can be read „as a 
response to, or in effect as a critique of fundamental elements of both 
Marxist analysis and socialist political strategy‟.143  
 
According to Tony Bennett, both Gramsci and Foucault acknowledge: 
  
 
that modern systems of rule are distinguished from their predecessors in 
terms of the degree and kind of interest they display in the conditions of 
life of the population.144  
 
Following on from this, they are also both concerned with the lives of 
people from the subordinate classes.  
                                            
142 Ibid., p. 9. 
143 Barry Smart, „The Politics of Truth and the Problem of Hegemony‟, in David Couzens Hoy 
(ed.), Foucault: A Critical Reader (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1986), p. 157. 
144 Bennett (1998a), p. 67. 
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Foucault does not make references to the theories of Gramsci, but the 
former‟s concept of power and knowledge can be read as similar to the 
latter‟s concept of hegemony. Barry Smart has even argued that 
Foucault‟s work here is anticipated on several points by Gramsci‟s.145 
Gramsci argued, for example, that, when a hegemony was established, it 
resulted in an intellectual and moral unity, which universally posed all the 
questions over which the struggle raged: that is, the establishment of a 
certain truth. Foucault argued that there was a mutual dependency 
between truth and power where one could not exist without the other, and 
that „truth‟ manifests itself through discursive practices. Hence, it is as if 
hegemony gives birth, or acts as a prerequisite, to discursive practices.  
 
It is also possible to analyse Gramsci‟s thoughts through a Foucauldian 
lens. Gramsci argued that a consensual hegemony is achieved by 
actively pursuing a programme of cultural leadership in addition to 
governing through economic and political means. This hegemony 
contributes to or constitutes a form of social cohesion, through practices, 
which have as their objective the creation of forms of knowledge and truth 
where people have learned to recognise themselves as subjects, and can 
be perceived as tools of government implemented through institutions. 
The above-mentioned practices, techniques and methods would be 
described by Foucault as „technologies of power‟146, conceived in terms 
of a process of „governmentalisation‟.  
 
                                            
145 Smart (1986), p. 158.  
146 Ibid., p. 161.  
81 
 
To sum up, both the ideas of Gramsci and Foucault, as described here, 
are preoccupied with an analysis of reality, rather than with normative 
suggestions as to how things can improve. There are several 
intersections between these thoughts and I will argue that they can both 
be utilised for the practical purpose of this project, particularly with 
reference to the relationship between hegemony and discursive practices, 
which will be explored further in the next chapter.   
 
2.4 Summary 
 
Following from Chapter One, which aimed at illuminating the „civilising 
mission‟ through a set of normative theories about culture and growth, 
this chapter started by discussing how culture, according to Gramsci, 
could contribute to a political hegemony. This was then followed by a 
discussion of Foucault‟s notion of micro power and the political rationality 
of institutions, applied to cultural policy, through Tony Bennett‟s study of 
the museum. Foucault‟s ideas are often contrasted to a Marxist 
theoretical tradition, in which Gramsci belong. However, due to Gramsci 
being less reductive than traditional Marxism, it was argued that there are 
several similarities between a theoretical framework based on the 
thinking of both Gramsci and Foucault. It was contended that the same 
phenomena could be studied using both a Gramscian and a Foucauldian 
approach, and that these approaches could complement each other.  
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The theories presented by the thinkers in Chapter One were normative in 
that they prescribed recipes for how things could improve. This was not 
the case with Gramsci and Foucault who instead took a step back and 
analysed social phenomena critically, putting less emphasis on 
prescribing solutions.147 A combination of these two normative and critical 
theoretical approaches will be referred to when analysing to what extent 
the „civilising mission‟ has been a central rationale behind Norwegian 
cultural policy, both in a historical and contemporary context. The actual 
approach to the empirical research will be outlined in detail in the 
following chapter, but it should be mentioned here that the normative 
theories will be used as an attempt to put the notion of Bildung into a 
wider theoretical context in order to tease out more specific aspects of 
these policies. With reference to critical theories, I will attempt to identify 
whether cultural policy might have been used to establish and/or maintain 
hegemony as well as to analyse the political rationality of specific policies 
and organisations and to identify power-related discursive practices. I 
argue that it makes valid sense to use both a Gramscian and Foucauldian 
approach to investigate the extent to which the civilising mission has 
been a core rationale behind Norwegian cultural policy.  
 
In the next chapter I shall outline in more detail how I will go about 
identifying the mentioned policy rationales.  
                                            
147  This is a truth with modifications. Gramsci started out as a political activist (which 
subsequently led to his imprisonment), but as already mentioned, his writing changed from one of 
action to one of analysis during the course of his imprisonment. Foucault was also involved in 
activist movements; for example, he was a central figure in the revolts in Paris during the spring 
of 1968. This is not reflected in the writing referred to in this thesis though, and is of less 
importance here.  
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3.0 Research Design 
 
In this chapter I shall introduce the concept of discursive practices, and 
why an analysis of such practices is useful for this project. This will be 
followed by an exposition of what I understand to be a hegemonic 
understanding amongst several cultural policy scholars and how these  
scholars may contribute to an overall cultural policy discourse, in which 
the arts, in particular, are presented as being beleaguered by 
instrumentalism, partly because their alleged transformative powers are 
so hard to substantiate. I shall argue that the arguments by these 
scholars are based on the assumption that the arts ideally should be 
celebrated for their intrinsic value. I will declare my own values in this 
context, which harbour a certain scepticism to this assumption. In the 
concluding section I will briefly introduce my empirical approach to this 
project, which is outlined in more detail in Appendix One. 
 
3.1 Discursive practices  
 
 
In November 2006 the former Member of Parliament for the Socialist Left 
(Sosialistisk Venstreparti SV), Paul Chaffey, wrote in an article in the 
Norwegian periodical Samtiden about how the left in Norwegian politics, 
despite perhaps not being supported by the majority of voters, has 
obtained an ideological hegemony in current social debate. Chaffey, who 
himself left SV for a job with the Confederation of Norwegian Enterprise 
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(Næringslivets Hovedorganisasjon NHO)148 and admitted that he had of 
late voted for the Conservative Party (Høyre), argued that this hegemony, 
which he terms the „goodness hegemony‟, sets the standard for what can 
be debated in the public sphere and how it can be debated. He argued 
that having ideological hegemony implies winning the debates about 
concrete issues:  
 
This implies that one will achieve that NRK149 always asks whether there 
is enough money for welfare in the national budget and never asks 
whether the increase in expenditure in the budget can be damaging for 
the Norwegian economy. Or that a slightly lower growth in the public 
budgets is always described as a cut-back. And this is the left‟s most 
important victory in Norwegian politics. This way of asking the questions 
is adopted by many more than a relatively few socialists who want to 
abolish capitalism. Hence, SV has a value-based hegemony in the 
political debate which extends way beyond its own voters.150  
 
Chaffey thus argues that what can be talked about and the questions that 
can be asked in the public sphere are dictated by a strong hegemony. At 
the same time, this hegemony continues to be upheld by how language is 
being used through what Michael Shapiro calls „discursive practices‟:151 a 
concept that I shall return to below. I find Chaffey‟s reflections about 
Norwegian public debate in the area of social and economic policy 
enlightening. This dissertation is not about social or economic policy, and 
I shall not make any further comments about Chaffey‟s claim. However, I 
                                            
148 UK equivalent, Confederation of British Industry (CBI).  
149 The Norwegian public broadcasting company (Norsk Rikskringkasting).  
150  Paul Chaffey, „En politisk reise‟, Dagbladet, 16 November 2006, available online at  
http://www.dagbladet.no/kultur/2006/11/16/483081.html 
151 Michael Shapiro, Language and Political Understanding: The Politics of Discursive Practices 
(New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1981).  
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am compelled by the idea of taking language as the starting point for 
studies of social phenomena, and my aim to assess to what extent the 
„civilising mission‟ has been a prevalent rationale behind Norwegian 
cultural policy, will thus be achieved through disclosing how this rationale 
might be detected through the analysis of discursive practices. Such 
discursive practices might harbour automatic subscriptions to truths and 
knowledge, which are internalised to such an extent that they are not 
necessarily explicitly articulated, whereas others rely on being repeated 
again and again.  
 
Many scholars in the fields of the social sciences and the humanities are 
increasingly subscribing to the idea that the subjects they focus on are 
not necessarily absolute truths but rather more fluid in the sense that they 
are constructed by the way they are being referred to, debated and talked 
about. Neumann argues that as a consequence, a new methodology 
literature is needed, which accepts the implicit uncertainty that comes 
with questioning the division between „reality understood as a physically 
given reality, and reality understood as a social representation‟.152 
 
The acknowledgement of such a division, and that social representations 
are bearers of meaning, truth and knowledge and hence also power, is 
informed by the earlier scholarship of Michel Foucault, particularly his 
Archaeology of Knowledge. Representations in this context are 
understood as:  
                                            
152  Iver B. Neumann, Mening, materialitet, makt: En innføring i diskursanalyse (Bergen: 
Fagbokforlaget, 2001b), p. 15. 
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things and phenomena in the way they appear for us, thus not the thing 
in itself, but the things filtered through what comes between us and the 
world; language, categories and so on.153 
 
What makes Foucault‟s scholarship radically different from more 
positivistic approaches to social science research is his postulate that 
meaning lies on the surface of a discourse. The discourse is meaning. 
Hence, rather than searching for discourses, whether in the present or 
the past, as representing some deeper meaning, his methodology, which 
he calls archaeology, searches for „monuments‟ in the discourse that do 
not need to be deciphered: 
 
Archaeology tries to define not the thoughts, representations, images, 
themes, preoccupations that are concealed or revealed in discourses: 
but those discourses themselves, those discourses as practices obey 
certain rules‟.154  
 
The unique quality of language and texts is that their task is primarily to 
create meaning, and a possible methodological approach is thus to focus 
mainly on language and texts. 155  Research that is concerned with 
discursive relations focuses on the foundations which determine the rules 
about what can be talked about. As argued by Shapiro: 
 
                                            
153 Ibid., p. 33. 
154 Michel Foucault, The Archaeology of Knowledge (London and New York: Routledge, 2003), 
p. 155.  
155 The term „text‟ here is not necessarily reduced to physical texts (like signs on paper or screen) 
only; other social practices can be read as text, meaning as signifying systems. Sociologists of 
culture, for example, refer to any signifying practice, what in everyday speech often is referred to 
as art-works, such as films, books and songs, as text.  
87 
 
To analyze such [discursive] relations is to politicize a far broader aspect 
of human relations than is characteristic of the kinds of analyses directed 
toward relationships that a society explicitly recognizes as political. It is 
to analyze not simply what we talk about but also why and how we talk 
about it.156  
 
There is a strong relationship between human actions and language. 
Actions, in whatever shape or form, cannot be interpreted, except through 
language. Similarly, intended actions cannot be expressed but through 
language. Hence, according to Shapiro again: 
 
When we therefore review the sets of constructs relating to conduct that 
exist in language, we are viewing not only the horizons of possible 
speech but also the horizons of possible actions. The possibilities of 
action, then, exist in the language of a culture, and the actions that 
actually emerge are presented as a result of the controlling 
interpretations, those with general legitimacy.157 
 
Following from this he terms discursive practices as those:  
 
interpretations of conduct that produce and affirm actions and their 
concomitant subjects and objects that are institutionalized because the 
interpretations are oft repeated and accepted.158  
 
Whether intentional or not, discursive practices, if successful, have the 
ability to define the terms on which subjects and phenomena can be 
talked about. Such practices define which views and opinions are 
accepted as normal and which are branded as deviant. Discursive 
                                            
156 Shapiro (1981). pp. 154 - 155.  
157 Ibid., p. 130. 
158 Ibid.  
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practices are therefore strongly related to power, not necessarily in terms 
of cohesive forces, but in terms of the power to define the truth.  
 
 
Although discursive practices set limitations about what can be talked 
about, by whom, and in which ways, within a particular discursive context, 
this does not mean that it is impossible for other people to discuss and 
debate other things. However, this would if so not take place within this 
discourse but within other alternative discourses. As mentioned in the 
introductory chapter, Jim McGuigan has identified three different, what he 
terms, „discursive formations‟ of cultural policy: „state‟, „market‟ and 
„civil/communicative‟. He argues that these position „agents and subjects, 
producers, consumers, citizens and mediators, within the discursive 
practice of the cultural field‟.159 Although all the three formations remain in 
play, the market discourse is, according to McGuigan, now hegemonic.160  
 
When focusing specifically on the arts and the institutions that produce 
and mediate them, as well as how they are supported and regulated by 
governments, different discourses might crystallize. Belfiore and Bennett 
argue, as outlined in the introductory chapter, for the existence of twin 
narratives about the arts‟ position in society. On the one hand, a narrative 
which allocates a central place for the arts due to its alleged positive 
transformative power: twinned with an alternative narrative of 
beleaguerment, which portrays the arts as vulnerable, simply because the 
already mentioned transformative powers are so hard to substantiate. 
                                            
159 McGuigan (2004), p. 35.  
160 Ibid., p. 60. 
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The latter narrative, they argue, has partly evolved because of the current 
climate within the public sector where public bodies increasingly are 
guided by evidence-based policy-making, which puts the arts under 
pressure to demonstrate their social impacts, instead of being celebrated 
as an end in itself.  
 
Belfiore and Bennett give examples of the laments over the beleaguered 
position of the arts from a range of different countries, including the UK, 
the USA, Australia and Italy. Almost all these examples refer to 
responses by arts advocates to suggested cuts in public funding of the 
arts,161 and it is perhaps not surprising that any recipient of public funds 
starts „banging the drum‟ when their funding is threatened. However, the 
increasing lamentation of the so-called instrumental use of the arts (or 
culture),162  also represents this sense of beleaguerment. These „cries 
against the excessive politicisation of Arts Councils and Ministries of 
Culture, and the laments over the excessive pressure and demands 
placed by governments of today over the arts they finance and 
promote‟163 can, according to Belfiore and Bennett, be found amongst 
both arts advocates outside and within academia. An example of one of 
the most vociferous voices from within the arts sector in the UK is John 
Tusa, who laments that arts institutions are increasingly being judged by 
                                            
161 The exception is the case from Australia, which pertains to a philosopher, who argued that 
universities typically despise their own departments of literature and the fine arts.  
162 Geir Vestheim defines instrumental cultural policies as using „cultural ventures and cultural 
investments as a means or instrument to attain goals in other than cultural areas. […] The 
instrumental aspect lies in emphasizing culture and cultural ventures as a means, not an end in 
itself‟, (Geir Vestheim, „Instrumental Cultural Policy in Scandinavian Countries: A Critical 
Historical Perspective‟, in European Journal of Cultural Policy 1.1 (1994), p. 65). 
163 Belfiore and Bennett (2008), p. 194. 
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whether they „deliver product‟ rather than whether they „offer 
programming‟, and that they are: 
 
rated, and possibly, funded, by their commitment to access, outreach 
and their contribution to economic regeneration and urban renewal and 
redevelopment.164  
 
However, such cries against the instrumentalisation of the arts can also 
be heard within academia. Lisanne Gibson goes as far as saying that we 
are experiencing an „open season attack‟ on instrumental cultural 
policies.165  
 
3.2 The discourses of cultural policy research  
 
In an extended book review-essay, Oliver Bennett focuses on two books 
(Justin Lewis and Toby Miller‟s edited book Critical Cultural Policy 
Studies: A Reader and Mark J. Schuster‟s Informing Cultural Policy: The 
Research and Information Infrastructure) and argues that both are 
„staking claims to the ownership of cultural policy research‟.166 Bennett 
criticises both books for taking a too narrow approach to cultural policy 
research, where on the one hand the first, presenting a bundle of articles 
mostly from the „cultural studies‟ tradition, (which Bennett argues are 
inherently preoccupied with power-relations, and which define cultural 
                                            
164  John Tusa, „Thou shalt worship the arts for what they are‟. Edited version of a speech 
delivered at the Guthrie Theatre in Minneapolis, USA, available online at http://www.spiked-
online.com/Articles/00000006DA07.htm. 
165 Lisanne Gibson, „In defence of instrumentality‟, in Cultural Trends 17.4 (2008), p. 248. 
166 Oliver Bennett, „The Torn Halves of Cultural Policy Research‟, in International Journal of 
Cultural Policy 10.2 (2004), p. 237. 
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policy studies as a „reformist project‟), is based on the assumption that 
cultural policy is a project of governmentality which has the „management 
of populations through suggested behaviour‟ as its objective. 167 
Schuster‟s book, on the other hand, defines cultural policy simply to be 
„what governments, their ministries of culture, arts councils and related 
organisations determine them to be‟, 168  and hence harbours a rather 
reductive approach. Neither of these two cultural policy „traditions‟ 
acknowledge the existence of the other, nor do they acknowledge the 
approach of alternative „traditions‟ or „schools‟ of cultural policy studies. 
Bennett calls for more reflexivity and Lewis and Miller are particularly 
singled out for not being „engaged in a constant and rigorous 
interrogation of one‟s own assumptions as well as those of others‟,169 
which he argues is the very essence of being „critical‟. However, Schuster 
is also accused of tending to „see everyone‟s politics but his own‟.170  
 
Although Bennett does not claim that these two book projects represent 
two seminal traditions or „schools‟, he implicitly maintains that the 
intellectual trajectory (or lack of such in the case of Schuster) found in 
them can be identified in much of what is today presented as cultural 
policy research internationally. Thus, Bennett indicates that cultural policy 
research might be made up of „torn halves that never add up to a 
whole‟.171 
 
                                            
167 Ibid., p. 238; citations of the original source by Lewis and Miller.  
168 Ibid., p. 242 
169 Ibid., p. 240.  
170 Ibid., p. 244.  
171 Ibid., p. 246. 
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However, despite Bennett‟s call for more reflexivity amongst writers in the 
field of cultural policy studies there is, in my view, also a lack of reflexivity 
on his  own account, in that in this article he fails to acknowledge a third 
direction (or a „third way‟) in cultural policy studies. I am referring to some 
of the work by a segment of scholars who are either based in the 
humanities or in what Bennett refers to as „critical sociology‟.172 Bennett 
can himself be categorised as part of this category, which is distinguished 
from the two traditions represented in his review-essay in that it does not 
subscribe to the cultural studies tradition of a highly theory-based 
preoccupation with disciplining governmentality and the assumption that 
all arts policy is based on elitism; neither does it subscribe to Schuster‟s 
empirical preoccupation with the collection of facts and statistics, which 
has been drained of any preoccupation with „history, values and 
meaning‟.173 Instead I argue that this third tradition is often explicit in its 
condemnation of advocacy-based research, particularly when this is 
based on the alleged social and economic impacts of arts activities. This 
is twinned with a disapproval of neo-liberal trends in the field of 
governmental cultural policy, and contains instead an implicit celebration 
of the intrinsic values of the arts or the value of the arts for their own sake 
and expresses a fear of these values being threatened by increased 
managerialism and public interference in that which should normatively 
be an autonomous field of the arts.  
 
                                            
172  Oliver Bennett, „Intellectuals, romantics and cultural policy‟, in International Journal of 
Cultural Policy 12.2 (2006), p. 123. 
173 Bennett (2004), p. 244. 
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One of Bennett‟s own intellectual projects appears to mount a strong, 
albeit implicit critique of what he has observed to be an increasing 
tendency since the 1980s, particularly in the UK, of governmental bodies‟ 
use of the arts in instrumental ways to meet other public policy objectives. 
This is twinned with an explicitly articulated scepticism about whether the 
impact of the arts in these instrumental terms can be measured. Bennett 
laments the forces of relativism and instrumentalism and instead 
suggests the return to Matthew Arnold‟s „principle of authority‟. He asks 
why it appears as if arguments in favour of governmental support „based 
on the intrinsic merits of the arts seem to be „losing their potency‟‟.174 In 
accordance with Arnoldian values, Bennett laments the disappearance of 
a process which:  
 
represent[s] a constant and public interrogation of what actually 
constituted the best: the process would become the principle. In this way, 
the search for cultural value would itself become the driving force of 
cultural policy.175  
 
Such a statement contains an implicit critique of anything that can 
threaten the intrinsic value of the arts.   
 
Similar laments can be traced in the writing of Belfiore, who is sceptical 
about all „instrumental‟ cultural policies. She fears that the logical 
consequence of an instrumental cultural policy might be that there will not 
                                            
174 Bennett (2005), p. 478. 
175 Ibid., pp. 479 - 480. 
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be any rationale for a cultural policy at all, because „arts provision could 
be easily absorbed within existing social policies‟.176  
 
She further articulates clearly how she perceives the value of culture and 
the autonomy of the cultural field (or rather the arts and the arts field), 
when she argues that: 
 
Culture is not a means to an end. It is an end in itself.177  
 
The author ponders less on why this is so, and presumably perceives the 
intrinsic value of the arts (or culture) to be such a powerful and obvious 
assumption that it does not merit any further exploration. Instead, Belfiore 
appears to identify the field of the arts as a sector which is ideally entitled 
to a large degree of autonomy, and assumes that what the arts sector 
provides should be part of a general welfare provision, and that it should 
„attempt to elaborate a definition of what makes the arts intrinsically 
valuable to society‟,178 again without giving any suggestions as to what 
this might be. The importance of these unidentified „intrinsic‟ values of the 
arts appears to be a crucial, unstated, but underlying, assumption 
amongst a range of scholars within this „third way‟ of cultural policy 
studies.  
 
                                            
176 Belfiore (2002), p. 104. From the focus of the rest of this article, which is on „the arts‟ rather 
than culture in any wider sense, I detect that it is really „arts‟ policies that the author is here 
referring to. 
177 Ibid. Again, I presume that the author is referring to the arts rather than culture in the wider 
sense (including for example food, sports and wider leisure activities) given that the rest of the 
article focuses almost exclusively on the arts. I should emphasise that the term „the arts‟ is not 
given a definition either.  
178 Belfiore (2002), p. 185. 
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In their most recent project Belfiore and Bennett attempt to identify where 
the assumptions of the transformative powers of the arts originate from 
and how they have been able to maintain their discursive power and 
influence throughout history up to today.179 This appears to be a more 
open ended and explorative approach to the valuation of the arts than the 
examples listed above. However, the authors cannot free themselves 
from arguing that impact studies do not „engage with the real purpose of 
the arts‟, and that the arts‟ eventual economic and social impacts „are not 
the primary characteristics of the aesthetic experience‟. 180  From a 
scholarly point of view, these authors appear to observe and lament that 
the arts are being beleaguered by utilitarian forces, which aim to make 
use of the arts for instrumental purposes rather than celebrating them for 
their own sake.181 However, this celebration of the arts‟ intrinsic values is 
often implicit and taken as given and not made subject to further 
elaboration.  
 
Røyseng takes issue with this conclusion in a Norwegian context. To 
refer to cultural policies as instrumental, she argues, implies that they are 
governed by utilitarian principles, which „reduce culture to a useful tool, 
which is awarded little value by virtue of itself‟. 182  The instrumental 
application of the arts produced by publicly financed organisations (the 
professional arts) allegedly challenge their autonomy and this, she argues, 
                                            
179 Belfiore and Bennett (2008). 
180 Ibid., p. 7. 
181 For examples of other scholars with a similar position see; Caust (2003) and Gray (2007). In a 
Scandinavian context this diagnosis of instrumentality has been echoed by scholars like Per 
Mangset (1992), Geir Vestheim (1994 and 1995) and Peter Duelund (2003). 
182 Røyseng (2007), p. 230.  
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has triggered unease and has consequently been the focus of much 
writing and scholarly works within the field of cultural policy studies. 
However, Røyseng questions the extent to which this actually has 
weakened the autonomy and status of the arts. Instead, she argues that 
the increasing „cultural turn‟ in the business sector, in the public sector‟s 
regeneration and integration efforts, the health sector and so on signifies 
a deep respect for the arts and their alleged transforming potentials.183 
 
The continuous discourse of beleaguerment that portrays the arts as 
vulnerable and subdued under the forces of instrumentalism, can, 
according to Røyseng, actually give the arts strength rather than weaken 
them. Belfiore and Bennett do not question whether this vulnerable 
position is real, but argue instead that this is due to the transformative 
claims made for them being „extremely hard to substantiate‟.184 Røyseng 
suggests instead that the discursive efforts that go into warning against 
the corruption that the alleged utilitarian demands are causing the arts, 
are part of a „purifying‟ process and that „the instrumental diagnosis [can] 
supply a strength that the same diagnoses deny‟.185  
 
Hence, the discourse of beleaguerment draws on contributions both from 
within and outside of academia. A specific policy field might be informed 
by several discourses, which sometimes co-exist alongside each other 
and at other times are involved in fierce hegemonic battles about different 
understandings of what is true. I am intrigued by the possibility of 
                                            
183 Ibid., p. 231.  
184 Belfiore and Bennett (2008), p. 5. 
185 Røyseng (2007), p. 232. 
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exploring policy rationales through the analysis of how discourses are 
practiced by different constituents in a field and shall adopt this approach 
to my analysis of the rationales behind Norwegian cultural policy. In this 
chapter I have presented how several scholars within academia 
contribute to the discourse of beleaguerment. In the next four chapters, I 
will attempt to identify how the rationales behind Norwegian public 
cultural policy are manifest through discursive practices that originate 
within the administrative and political fields that govern cultural policy 
(such as central government and parliament), as well as within the 
cultural sector itself.  
 
The field of cultural and arts policy studies, is saturated with references to 
value and where subjective opinions - almost by definition – will have an 
impact on the kinds of research questions scholars ask and the platform 
from which they conduct their intellectual interrogation. Scholars‟ value 
might again be determined by their cultural and social background.  
 
3.3 The cultural policy researcher and the field  
 
Røyseng suggests that many researchers in the area of culture are 
unfulfilled or frustrated artists.186 Whether this is also the case within the 
field of cultural policy research shall not be said but it appears that many 
of them - at least in a British and Norwegian context, which is where most 
of the cultural policy research work that I am familiar with originates - 
                                            
186 Ibid., p. 80. 
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have some sort of affinity with the arts, either through having had a 
previous career as artists, arts administrators or arts managers or at least 
through a university degree in the humanities. With this in mind, Røyseng 
continues by assessing the level of autonomy amongst cultural policy 
researchers and debates the extent to which research in the field of 
cultural policy has been carried out in close proximity either to the state 
apparatus or in accordance with what she describes as dominant values 
within the field of the arts and culture itself. Amongst others she cites Dag 
Solhjel who argues that cultural policy researchers, at least in Norway, 
have defined the term cultural policy in accordance with their own political 
conviction which implies that culture should be a public good, and that it 
is the state‟s task to re-distribute it to an as wide selection of the 
population as possible, in accordance with social-democratic and welfare-
ideological principles.187  
 
It could be argued that the potentially causal relationship between the 
researcher and the field in terms of how the former determines the 
problems being raised and approaches being taken, and indeed again the 
assumptions on which these problems and approaches are based, will 
increase with the level of proximity between the researcher and the field. 
Solhjel‟s critique can, in this context, be interpreted in two ways. On the 
one hand, his claim that cultural policy researchers allegedly have 
defined the term „cultural policy‟ as being preoccupied with social-
democratic policies where mediation of the arts is an inherent 
                                            
187 Ibid., p. 18. 
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responsibility of the welfare-state, could imply that the values and ideas of 
scholars are to an extent aligned with the ways of thinking found within 
politics and the bureaucratic machinery of the state. On the other hand, 
his argument that cultural policy researchers perceive culture to have a 
specific importance that must be protected seems to indicate a set of 
values close to what can be found within the sector itself. Røyseng is not 
conclusive about which direction cultural policy scholars lean but based 
on her above-mentioned conception of the values inherent within the arts 
sector, she indicates that cultural policy researchers have had „an equally 
great, if not greater, proximity to the values of the field of the arts and 
culture, as to those of the government‟.188  
 
Just as intellectual legacies that inform cultural policy might persist only in 
what Oliver Bennett calls „unstated institutional assumptions‟189, so could 
a similar claim be made for cultural policy research. For Belfiore and 
Bennett, for example, such an assumption, from which they conduct their 
intellectual interrogation, appears to be the normative idea that the arts 
should be celebrated and nourished as an end. 
 
For Pierre Bourdieu and Loïc Wacquant it is very important that 
researchers in the social sciences go through a process of reflexivity in 
their attempt to objectify their research question and the field they 
investigate. Bourdieu and Wacquant argue that the social science 
researcher must acknowledge that everybody, including themselves as 
                                            
188 Ibid., p. 85. 
189 Bennett (2006), p. 117.   
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academic researchers, is part of the reality that is the object of their 
research, and that:  
 
the problems that he [the researcher] raises about it [the social world] 
and the concepts he uses have every chance of being the product of this 
object itself.190 
 
Only by making themselves subject to such a reflection can researchers 
be able to make, what Bourdieu and Wacquant call, epistemological 
breaks, meaning:  
 
breaks with the fundamental beliefs of a group and, sometimes, with the 
core beliefs of the body of professionals, with the body of shared 
certainties that found the communis doctorum opinio.191 
 
In her doctoral dissertation, Røyseng argues for the rewards that the 
mentioned epistemological breaks can render and she outlines the 
journey she herself undertook in order to detach herself from the field 
which she investigated and which she traditionally had been very close to, 
if not a part of. She reflects on her own position as a researcher and 
concludes that her own values correlate with those of the field of the arts, 
which she states as having „the faith in the arts as a space of experience, 
which is genuinely different from others‟.192  
 
                                            
190  Pierre Bourdieu and Loïc Wacquant, „The Purpose of Reflexive Sociology (The Paris 
Workshop)‟, in Pierre Bourdieu and Loïc Wacquant (eds.), An Invitation to Reflexive Sociology 
(Cambridge: Policy Press, 1992), p. 235. 
191 Ibid., p. 241. 
192 Røyseng (2007), p. 82. 
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These values have repercussions for how the state should relate to this 
sector, which as far as possible should: 
 
be content with transferring a reasonable amount of money, keep a 
simple control with the use of this money, and beyond this not interfere 
with the arts‟ internal affairs.193  
 
Based on this declaration she argues that to make the autonomy of the 
arts (which she initially strongly perceived to be under threat from neo-
liberal inspired policies) the subject of her research was for her almost 
inevitable. However, the result of her studies is different to that of, for 
example, McGuigan and Belfiore and Bennett in that she does not 
conclude that the arts‟ own logic would melt together with the logic of the 
market and economics, as a result of the alleged neo-liberal pressure, 
materialised through the government‟s increased reliance on 
performance indicators in accordance with the principles of New Public 
Management. Instead she concludes that the arts are in fact awarded a 
„holy‟ status, which makes them robust and resilient against the 
challenges put to them from a wider society that is increasingly governed 
by those same neo-liberal values. In order to reach such a conclusion, 
Røyseng admits that she herself had to undergo epistemological breaks, 
which enabled her to objectify understandings that are „subjectified‟ by 
the people in the field that she studies, as well as by herself. 
 
                                            
193 Ibid. 
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A truly reflexive research project might dwell on why it poses certain 
research questions. Choosing one path for one‟s research will inevitably 
lead to the discarding of other paths, which of course is entirely legitimate. 
Similarly, it is neither avoidable nor discreditable to have a political 
conviction. However, epistemological obstacles might come about when 
convictions and the rationales for the choice of research questions and 
approaches are not recognised. Oliver Bennett talks about the 
importance of „retain[ing] our ideals‟,194 but his own ideals are left vague 
and implicit. Bourdieu suggests that really reflexive research will 
systematically explore „unthought categories of thought which delimit the 
thinkable and predetermine the thought‟.195 After having briefly described 
the assumptions on which, according to my understanding, some cultural 
policy research is based, let me present my own assumptions.  
 
3.4 The suspicious researcher 
 
As mentioned above, many researchers in the field of cultural policy 
studies have, or have had, some sort of affiliation with the field they are 
studying. This is also my personal case (although I cannot be classified 
as a frustrated or unfulfilled artist). However, I often get the feeling that 
my social, and perhaps even educational, background is different from 
that of many of the people I have encountered who work in the cultural 
sector, as well as from that of my colleagues in the field of cultural policy 
studies. I come from a home where neither of my parents had undergone 
                                            
194 Bennett (2005), p. 480. 
195 Bourdieu cited in Loïc Wacquant, „Toward a Social Praxeology: The Structure and Logic of 
Bourdieu‟s Sociology‟, in Bourdieu and Wacquant (1992), p. 40.  
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higher education and where visiting arts events away from home were not 
high on the agenda when I grew up. Apart from a few cinema visits I was 
rarely, if ever, taken to see exhibitions or live performing arts events with 
my parents. However, from my early teens I became a frequent consumer 
of artistic expressions that could be consumed at home, particularly 
music through radio-listening and music recordings. Later on in my 20s, I 
also started frequenting exhibitions and live performing arts events on my 
own initiative.  However, it was not until I was in my 30s that I 
encountered the arts sector at first hand through being employed in 
organisations that either funded and supported or directly produced art 
works (mostly in the field of theatre).   
 
As already mentioned Oliver Bennett argues that contemporary public 
cultural policy has much to learn from Matthew Arnold, particularly in his 
critical disposition, which in its consequence would make the process of 
„a constant and public interrogation of what actually constituted the 
best‟, 196  the principle of policy-making. The problem with this idealist 
position is that it is based on the assumption that such a constant and 
public interrogation is actually possible in practice. Should it be possible it 
would obviously constantly be debating the terms and principles on which 
an interrogation of what was best should be based. This is of course 
highly subjective, and something I have reflected over myself with respect 
to my own personal way of valuing culture.  
 
                                            
196 Bennett (2005), p. 479. 
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I rarely find clarity in references to the „intrinsic‟ values of the arts; on the 
one hand such references could be perceived to be the argument of last 
resort; the only one that can be clung to when all other claims for the 
importance of the arts have been rejected, but on the other hand this term 
can also, in my view, be embedded with power and is a term for whom 
those who understand what it implies can subjectively just nod in 
recognition, implicitly excluding those who do not. Roger Scruton 
compares the intrinsic value of art with that of religious faith, arguing that 
„art suddenly leapt into prominence at the Enlightenment‟, at the same 
time as religion started to lose its impact and significance. 197  He 
continues by arguing that the arts and religion are similar in that they both 
give great meaning to those who have either religious faith or an 
understanding of the intrinsic values of the arts. Just as the faithful 
experience that their belonging to their religion is not a means but an end 
in itself, so can those who are „blessed by a high culture‟ be able „to retain 
the consoling vision which religion grants to all its supplicants‟.198 Scruton 
continues that it is impossible for the unbelieving anthropologist, who 
observes a religion from the outside to appreciate this preoccupation with 
ends rather than means.  
 
When experiencing a common discourse whereby one or more 
individuals share an understanding of the „intrinsic values of the arts‟, 
particularly when expressed in general terms, I often find myself 
somehow bewildered, in the shoes of the anthropologist who observes 
                                            
197 Roger Scruton, An Intelligent Person’s Guide to Modern Culture (London : Duckworth, 1998), 
p. 37. 
198 Ibid., p. 39. 
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from the outside, and who would perhaps like to enter the conversation, 
but who find it difficult to do so. Each individual attaches of course value 
to an art-work that he or she is experiencing, particularly during this 
experience itself, and this is often a value, which is intrinsic in that it is 
concerned with the art-work as an end in itself. This varies greatly 
between individuals, based on their background, preferences and taste. 
However, from then to apply an aggregated value to „the arts‟ or „culture‟, 
in the plural, or as a totality, which is commensurate for everybody or for 
humanity (particularly when the terms „the arts‟ or „culture‟ are not even 
defined, but even if they were) is for me problematic. Similarly I am 
sceptical about the idea that the arts have a unique potential to stimulate 
Bildung. Instead it is my inherent understanding, purely based on my own 
life experiences and observations, that Bildung can be achieved through 
a range of different means in a range of different ways. This does include 
the exposure to, or participation in, the arts, but similarly to Belfiore and 
Bennett, I question whether this potential is commensurate. 199  I 
absolutely believe that some art works can harbour this potential in 
certain circumstances. I equally believe that other art-works in other 
circumstances have very little of this potential. I acknowledge that my 
understanding of both the alleged intrinsic values of the arts and the arts‟ 
Bildung potential might be related to the cultural capital I acquired through 
my upbringing. 
 
                                            
199 Belfiore and Bennett (2007), p. 136. 
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I have attempted to problematise the term „intrinsic‟ value of the arts. 
Equally problematic is the term „instrumental‟ when used in the context of 
cultural policy. Inspired by Matthew Arnold, Oliver Bennett argues, as 
mentioned above, that, rather than valuing culture (or the arts) for its 
instrumental utility rationale, cultural policy should engage in a constant 
search for cultural value. However, he says little about how this could pan 
out in practice. It might be relatively easy to identify „instrumental‟ cultural 
policy decisions, whereas it might be more difficult to grasp, in practical 
terms, policies that are entirely occupied by culture as an end in itself. 
Would not all interventions in the field of culture (for example through 
financial support) whether from governments or others be instrumental in 
that they are concerned with some kind of mean, something that should 
be achieved? Clive Gray admits that all public policies are initiated to 
achieve something.200 It is therefore more fruitful to refer to instrumental 
cultural policies more as a matter of degree than of kind. If we relate this 
to Bildung then policies that are based on a more abstract faith in the 
transforming effects of the arts can perhaps be regarded as less 
instrumental. It is perhaps not until these transforming effects are 
articulated explicitly as tangible, or even measurable, impacts, and that 
this is coined as the prime rationale for the instigation and funding of arts 
activities that they become unashamedly instrumental.201 
 
                                            
200 Gray (2007), p. 205. 
201 By means of an example Estelle Morris, the former Arts Minister in the UK, has argued that 
she knows that the arts and culture make positive contributions to „health, education and crime 
reduction‟ (quoted in Belfiore and Bennett (2007), p. 136). Policies that are explicitly designed to 
make use of cultural activities or cultural schemes to contribute to these areas, and where the 
social (or educational) impacts are sought measured, can perhaps be described as crudely 
instrumental.  
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However, there is, according to Lisanne Gibson, little consensus about 
the valuation of the degree to which different policies are instrumental or 
indeed whether a policy celebrates the intrinsic value202 of an art-work or 
arts activity as opposed to reaping its instrumental contribution to other 
objectives. Hence, this instrumental versus intrinsic dichotomy is in her 
view false, but even if it was not it does little to assist scholars or policy 
makers in thinking about whether particular policies, or „programme and 
policy environments‟ are intrinsic or instrumental. She singles out 
museums as a typical example of an operation which „cannot be reduced 
to [such a] simplistic binary opposition‟.203 Again, different scholars‟ take 
on this will be informed by their values. Gibson, for example, displays a 
different value than those inherent in Belfiore and Bennett‟s suggestion 
that the real purpose of the arts is not to generate social or economic 
impacts and that these are not the primary characteristics of the aesthetic 
                                            
202  The term „intrinsic value‟ is not un-contentious. The term is closely linked to the term 
„goodness‟ and Christine M. Korsgaard emphasises that a distinction should be made between 
things which have their value in themselves; intrinsically good things, and things valued for their 
own sake; ends or final goods. Due to a certain sloppiness, also amongst philosophers, this 
distinction is not always made. I shall not make this subject to an extensive debate here, but just 
stress that this distinction is important in the context of the valuation of cultural manifestations or 
cultural artefacts. This is because, according to Korsgaard, an equation of intrinsically good 
things (that have their value in themselves) and things valued for their own sake (as ends) ignores 
the fact „that different people value different tings for their own sake‟. When referring to the 
intrinsic values of the arts versus the arts as ends, this distinction ought to be made, because the 
former is different from the latter in that a thing‟s possession of intrinsic goodness is quite 
independent on whether anyone cares about it or not, whereas things valued for their own sake is 
dependent on this valuation. This brings us to the core of the value debate in a cultural policy 
context, because it begs the question; who should make the valuation that things have for their 
own sake? Christine M. Korsgaard, „Two distinctions in Goodness‟, in The Philosophical Review 
92.2 (1983), pp. 169 - 195. 
203 Gibson (2008), p. 249. It should be mentioned that Gibson draws the majority of her examples 
from public policy for museums and galleries. By means of example of how there is a lack of 
consensus in terms of which policies are instrumental and which are intrinsic, Gibson cites Clive 
Gray, who argues that a museum‟s education programme is amongst its core activities, but that 
instrumentality would mean that the museum shifted away from these activities and instead tried 
to meet what he terms „externally derived objectives‟ such as facilitating social inclusion or 
community regeneration. However, according to Gibson, these are typical key rationales behind a 
museum‟s decision to set up education departments in the first place, and others will therefore 
perceive education activities as inherently instrumental. 
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experience. Gibson argues instead that cultural policy is „constitutively 
instrumental‟, and that ignoring its instrumental value might pave the way 
back to „ the kinds of elite, exclusionary policies which have characterized 
cultural administration in the past, and in many cases still do‟.204 In other 
words, Gibson fears the celebration of the intrinsic value of the arts, and 
hence her reading of the current situation, both in Britain and Australia, is 
significantly different from that of Belfiore and Bennett.  
 
I shall not elaborate more on this here, but just emphasise that I do not 
see this research project as part of what Gibson terms an „open season 
attack‟ on instrumental cultural policies, and rather than being influenced 
by the aim to protect (or indeed protest), is probably informed by a 
critique of the assumptions on which the ideas of the alleged intrinsic 
values of the arts rest. My scepticism to some of the assumptions that I 
alleged that some cultural policy research is informed by, as outlined so 
far in this chapter, apart from having an impact on my research questions 
and approach, might also impact on my results. This has implicitly 
informed my research question, choice of theoretical approach, my 
reading of the chosen texts and my choice of empirical methodologies, 
and may subsequently also affect my conclusions. Given that both my 
own biography and opinions might have an impact on my results it is 
important to clarify that this is not an ontological research project, but one 
that is more engaged with epistemology through reflections and critique. 
Thus, this project attempts to illuminate, not necessarily to prove anything. 
                                            
204 Ibid., p. 247.  
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Although I am constantly reflecting on my position as a researcher and 
my proximity (or lack of) to the field I am investigating, I am not convinced 
whether I myself have been able to make the necessary epistemological 
breaks in order for my research to be as open, objective and explorative 
as I aspired it to be. 
 
Let me now move on to present my empirical material.  
 
3.5 Empirical approach 
 
The past tense of my research question indicates that the focus should 
be on a historical study of the extent to which the „civilising mission‟ has 
been a prevalent rationale behind Norwegian cultural policy. The ultimate 
aim though is to say something about the contemporary reality through 
contemporary discourses. However, disentangling contemporary policies 
as well as their surrounding discourses from their historical forbears 
would mean that knowledge about the evolving rationales and possible 
hegemonic structures would be lost. The longer historical lines are 
particularly important when studying Norwegian cultural policy because, 
as will be shown in the next chapter, they have been so closely 
connected to the development of a national identity, which has evolved 
slowly over time, in a climate of political consensus.  
3.5.1 Delimitation and definition of terms 
  
Before an empirical focus can be determined, a clear delimitation of the 
subject matter is called for. Cultural policy is obviously closely related to 
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culture, the meaning of which is by no means obvious. As will be 
demonstrated in the following chapters, the notion of culture has, in a 
Norwegian cultural policy context, been subject to changes over the years.  
 
A useful and, commonly used, starting point for a delimitation of culture is 
Raymond Williams‟ seminal interrogation of the term in his book 
Keywords. Here Williams argues that in contemporary English (the book 
was originally published in 1976) the word culture can be given three 
broad meanings. These, which broadly correspond with their use in the 
Norwegian language too, are: the idea of culture as „a general process of 
intellectual, spiritual and aesthetic development‟, culture as „a particular 
way of life, whether of a people, a period, a group, or humanity in general‟ 
and finally culture as „the works and practices of intellectual and 
especially artistic creativity‟. 205  Later Williams elaborated on these 
definitions and merged the first and third meanings into an understanding 
of culture as a „signifying practice‟, which incorporates not only „the 
traditional arts and forms of intellectual production‟ but also everything 
that could be labelled as a general signifying system such as language, 
philosophy, journalism, fashion and advertising.206 
  
Picking up on this idea, Oliver Bennett argues that cultural policy routinely 
refers to the actions taken within the sectors that produce culture as a 
„signifying system‟ and „the measures adopted by both central and local 
                                            
205 Williams (1988), p. 90.  
206 Raymond Williams, Culture (London: Fontana Paperbacks, 1981), p. 13. 
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government to support‟ these sectors.207 This may be the case because it 
is difficult in policy terms to apply a wider, what sometimes is described 
as an anthropological, approach to culture. Such an approach to culture 
as „a collective consciousness‟, and more in line with Williams‟ reference 
to culture as a whole way of life, is according to Carl-Johan Kleberg, 
relativistic and useful for social science researchers but problematic for 
practical cultural policy-making.208  For, as Erik Henningsen argues: to 
define the „territory of cultural policy‟ in this way would be absurd in that it 
would have to include almost every human activity, and thus „points to a 
dimension of meaning integral to all social action‟.209 It is thus important 
to distinguish between how the term culture is being used for analytical 
purposes and how it realistically can be approached in terms of cultural 
policy and cultural policy studies.  
 
However, to focus on support for culture as a „signifying system‟ only, 
misses out on a range of areas, which in the Nordic countries, have been 
regarded as elements of a cultural policy. As will be demonstrated in 
Chapters Five and Six, in Norway, the term culture has traditionally (at 
least since the 1970s) been defined widely in a cultural policy context to 
certainly include sports but also what is termed youth work (for example 
                                            
207  Bennett refers to cultural policy as the „totality of actions‟, taken within the sectors that 
produce culture as a „signifying system‟, „such as broadcasting, film, design, publishing and 
recording as well as the live performing arts, museums and heritage‟ and „the measures adopted 
by both central and local government to support‟ these sectors (Bennett (2006), p. 123). I 
presume that these are the sectors that Belfiore and Bennett, whom I cited earlier on in this 
chapter, refer to when making use of the term „the arts‟. 
208  Carl-Johan Kleberg, „The Concept of Culture in the Stockholm Action Plan and its 
Consequences for Policy Making‟, in The International Journal of Cultural Policy 7.1 (2000), p. 
51. 
209 Erik Henningsen, „Reply to Carl-Johan Kleberg‟ in The International Journal of Cultural 
Policy 7.1 (2000), p. 75. 
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leisure-time clubs for young people or scouting) and general leisure 
activities like outdoor life (including for example rambling and skiing). 
Kleberg argues that in order to relate a scientific definition of culture (in 
whatever way) to how this is applied to cultural policy, it might be useful 
to distinguish between culture „as an aspect of development, [or] the 
cultural dimension of development‟ and „culture as a sector of society‟.210 
There is an analogy between this distinction in policy terms by Kleberg, 
and Williams‟ above-mentioned elaboration in that an understanding of 
culture as being constituted by other social activities (or policies) aligns to 
an understanding of culture simply as a sector of society, as opposed to 
being constitutive and hence being an aspect or dimension of 
development in other sectors.  
 
As will be demonstrated in the next chapter, Norwegian cultural policy 
documents have at times explicitly argued that this policy should be 
defined widely and facilitate general development and deliver the terms 
for other sectors in society, such as regional, housing and social policy, 
and hence not be perceived as a sector separate from other sectors, but 
in line with an understanding of culture to be constitutive. Cultural policy 
perceived in this way, might realise Belfiore‟s fear that cultural policy 
would be absorbed within more general public policies. If so, it could be 
that the policies would move from being, what Jeremy Ahearne termed 
explicit cultural policies (meaning policies that government would label as 
cultural), to implicit cultural policies (meaning „any political strategy that 
                                            
210 Kleberg (2000), p. 54. 
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looks to work on the culture of the territory over which it presides‟).211 
Regional, housing, social and other policies would all have an impact on 
culture in the widest sense, but not necessarily be labelled as cultural. 
How the Norwegian government of the 1970s and 1980s envisaged these 
policies to be labelled is of less importance, but Ahearne‟s distinction 
between implicit and explicit cultural policy, highlights that what cultural 
policy can be is highly fluid and can vary between policy contexts.  
 
Even the administrative definition of cultural policy can be complex in 
terms of which bodies are involved in planning and executing the policy. 
Let me move on to present a rationale for which institutions‟ policies I 
shall actually focus on.  
3.5.2 Level of analysis  
 
Marit Bakke argues that cultural policy in Norway is dealt with by a range 
of governmental ministries:  
 
Church and Education 212  (for example artists‟ education and music 
schools), Children and Family (for example initiatives for children and 
youth, voluntary leisure clubs), Environment (cultural preservation) and 
Foreign Affairs (cultural export).213   
                                            
211 Jeremy Ahearne, „Between Cultural Theory and Policy: The cultural policy thinking of Pierre 
Bourdieu, Michel de Certeau and Régis Debray‟ (Centre for the Study of Cultural Policy, 
Working Paper 7, University of Warwick, 2004), p. 114. 
212  Please note that this was published before the last change in the ministerial set-up (see 
footnote 216 below). As of 1992 culture is again rejoined with church affairs in the Ministry of 
Culture and Church Affairs (Kultur og Kirkedepartementet).  
213 Marit Bakke (2003), p. 163. It could be argued that, perhaps with the exception of Children 
and Family, this is still only dealing with culture as a „signifying system‟. Carl-Johan Kleberg 
goes even further in his anthropological approach to culture, arguing that traditional cultural 
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Equally, it could be argued that this project should take cultural policy as 
embedded in education policy, as its focus.214 Another ministry, which, 
according to Bakke, is deeply involved in culture is the Ministry of Local 
Government and Labour (Kommunal- og arbeidsdepartementet) since it 
is responsible for the transfer of state funds to local and regional 
government.215 As will be demonstrated in the next chapter, these funds, 
together with funds generated through local and regional taxation, make 
up a significant proportion of the funding of cultural activities in Norway. 
An important feature of Norwegian cultural policy is also that regional and 
local councils have a large amount of autonomy in the area of culture and 
hence are able to make their own cultural policy decisions.  
 
However, even though culture is defined more widely than to include only 
culture as a „signifying system‟, the Ministry of Culture has been 
absolutely central to policy formulations in this area.216Hence, although I 
have acknowledged that public cultural policy is being developed by a 
range of public bodies, both nationally, regionally and locally, this project 
will focus exclusively on the policies of central government through the 
Ministry of Culture, with the objective of identifying which rationales these 
                                                                                                                      
policy interacts (both in terms of how it is influencing and being influenced by) with a range of 
policy areas from town planning and neighbourhood policies, to employment, schools and higher 
education, (Kleberg (2000), p. 65). 
214 There is thus a vast potential for future research here.  
215  The responsibility of local government has from 2005 been located at Ministry of Local 
Government and Regional Development (Kommunal og regionaldepartementet). 
216 What is being referred to as the Ministry of Culture in this context was in fact between 1938 
and 1982 the Division for Culture within the Ministry of Church and Education; between 1982 
and 1990 the Ministry of Culture and Science; in 1990 the Ministry of Church and Cultural 
Affairs; between 1991 and 2001 the Ministry of Culture; and from 2002 the Ministry of Church 
and Cultural Affairs. However, for the purpose of clarity, the distinction between these different 
names will not always be made, but instead be replaced with the generic term; „Ministry of 
Culture‟.  
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policies have been informed by. Regional and local government will be 
referred to inasmuch as this decentralisation of power is part of state 
policy, but falls otherwise outside the remit of this project. I will be 
focusing on policies that are labelled as cultural and are thus explicit.    
 
Currently, the Ministry of Culture‟s activities are broadly divided into three 
areas: culture, sport and media.217 It can of course be argued that there is 
a strong civilising dimension to any country‟s media policy through its 
emphasis on regulation and censorship. However, as pointed out by 
McGuigan, communications and media polices have „largely been 
thought through in terms of political economy, signifying their industrial 
and economic importance.218 And although the censorship dimension in 
media policies might be interesting in a historical perspective, I find such 
explicit measures of less interest than the objective to facilitate Bildung 
through the wider cultural sector including the arts. Policy-making in the 
area of sport will also fall outside the remit of this project, as do non-
governmental cultural policies developed within the cultural industries or 
within other non-governmental organisations. This latter exclusion is 
based on the conviction that few agencies, other than the Norwegian 
government, have by far the same potential to attempt to achieve Bildung 
purely through cultural means.  
 
As already argued by Young, once discursive practices have been 
established it is very difficult to think outside of them. They might also be 
                                            
217 There is thus a different classification of culture here, certainly due to media (including the 
press and broadcasting) for administrative reasons being separated from other cultural areas.  
218 McGuigan (2004), p. 34.  
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internalised to such an extent that it might be difficult to identify where to 
find them. If they exist, as argued by Foucault, as a „system of exclusion‟, 
an important challenge is how to identify a slit that can be torn in order to 
get on the „inside‟ of the discourse. Keeping in mind my reflections over 
my own position as a researcher, this can be difficult and I believe would 
always be open to scrutiny. I shall not conclude that the rationales behind 
Norwegian cultural policy are based on discursive practices that govern 
what can be said and what are regarded as truths about this in society as 
such, but rather within one particular discourse; how these rationales are 
internalised within a cultural policy discourse. Although I am focusing on 
formal channels through my analysis of policy papers, which seems to 
denote a narrow policy-definition, I will be widening my scope and also 
collect information from other sources, which indicates a somewhat wider 
approach to this policy nexus. I have chosen to approach this in three 
ways, which broadly correspond with, and which make up the content of, 
the next four chapters: first an historical study of cultural policy-rationales 
with reference to secondary sources only (work by other scholars), 
covering the period between 1814 and 1973, followed by a in-depth 
textual analysis of general governmental green papers,219 which have 
outlined the broad ideas and principles of central government‟s cultural 
polices for the period between 1973 and 2003, and finally an in-depth 
study of the national programme that is DKS, which is based on a 
combination of the analysis of policy papers and interviews with elites.  
 
                                            
219  By Green Papers I refer to official reports which outline the government‟s policy on a 
particular subject; in Norwegian; Stortingsmelding (abbr; St.meld).  
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The rationales behind these different approaches, as well as the selection 
of empirical material, will be outlined in more detail in Appendix One. 
 
3.6 Summary 
 
This chapter started out by introducing the concept of discursive practices. 
I accepted that discursive practices have the ability to define the terms on 
which subjects and phenomena can be talked about. Several cultural 
policy scholars writing at the beginning of the twenty-first century argue 
that the market discourse has become hegemonic. The same scholars 
tend to lament an instrumental use of cultural policies. I argued that the 
writing of these scholars contributes to what Belfiore and Bennett have 
called a narrative of beleaguerment, which describes the arts as being in 
a vulnerable position because the claims of their transformative power 
are so hard to substantiate. This beleaguerment discourse is held up by 
voices both from within and outside of academia. I emphasised Belfiore 
and Bennett as two writers who lament the instrumental application of the 
arts and who would rather like to see them being celebrated for their 
intrinsic value. I continued by arguing that cultural policy studies are 
saturated with references to values that are interpreted subjectively, 
which again will impact on the platform from which cultural policy scholars 
conduct their research, so too with Belfiore and Bennett. I also referred to 
Røyseng who suggests that most cultural policy researchers identify 
themselves more closely with the values of the arts than the values of the 
state apparatus, and that this might be because many researchers have 
some sort of affinity with the arts field. She argues that this might mean 
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that scholars find it hard to objectify the field they are investigating, which 
might mean that they are facing epistemological obstacles. With this in 
mind I attempted to declare my own background and how I myself 
perceive the instrumental versus intrinsic cultural policy nexus and on 
how this might have influenced some of my own assumptions.  
 
 
As already mentioned, discursive practices (whether they originate from 
within or outside of academia) might be identified by frequent repetitions 
and high intensity, whereas others might rely on what is not said, and 
what does not have to be said. I am not going to focus on academic 
discourses in particular in this project. Instead, this study attempts to 
identify discursive practices as markers of the „civilising mission‟, as well 
as other eventual rationale(s) behind Norwegian cultural policy. In my 
search for discursive practices that could shed light on my research 
question I decided to interrogate both historical trajectories as well as the 
existing understandings of the rationales behind Norwegian cultural policy 
as they are manifest in contemporary discourses.  
 
This was followed by a presentation of my approach to and choice of 
empirical material, including delimitations and definitions of terms. A more 
detailed elaboration of my empirical material is included in Appendix One.  
 
The next four chapters trace the development of the Bildung rationale in 
Norwegian cultural policy from the ideas behind the first measures by 
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central government in the first half of the nineteenth century to the launch 
of DKS at the beginning of the twenty-first century.   
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4.0 Bildung in nineteenth-century Norway 
 
This chapter and the next will attempt to chart the ideas and rationales 
that have underpinned Norwegian cultural policy between 1814 and 1973, 
with particular reference to the policies‟ objective to stimulate Bildung. My 
research question attempts to assess whether and the extent to which the 
civilising mission has been a rationale behind Norwegian cultural policy 
historically and whether it still is. Hence, these next two chapters are 
fulfilling two objectives: both to contextualise contemporary rationales 
historically, but also to address an inherent aspect to my research 
question, which is to assess the extent to which the civilising mission has 
been a key rationale behind Norwegian cultural policy. This chapter will 
focus on the period between 1814: the year when Norway ceased being 
part of a composite state with Denmark and entered a union with Sweden 
instead, and 1905 when the country split with Sweden and became an 
independent state amongst states. As I will demonstrate in the next 
chapter, many of the ideas that originated during the period Norway was 
in union with Sweden (a period characterised by great nation building 
efforts) and that are relevant for an understanding of cultural policy 
rationales, can be rediscovered amongst the ideas uttered after 1905. 
However, in order to make the argument easier to follow, I have chosen 
to discuss these two time-periods in separate chapters. 220  The two 
                                            
220 Although this chapter will primarily refer to the nineteenth century (up to 1905) and the next 
chapter to the period between 1905 and 1973, there will be some referencing across the two 
chapters. In fact the final section in Chapter Five attempts to summarise both chapters.  
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chapters rely primarily on secondary sources: mostly academic and 
historical accounts presented by other scholars.  
 
The subjugation to Denmark that ended in 1814 had lasted for about 400 
years, and by entering into a union with Sweden, Norway got much more 
autonomy and gained its own constitution in the process. Thus, this 
period is of utmost importance, both when tracing Norwegian nation 
building generally and more specifically, when tracing cultural policy 
rationales.  
 
I will start by outlining how the Norwegian nation building project in the 
nineteenth century and the early twentieth century can be perceived as a 
hegemonic battle, characterised by how each of the battling groups made 
use of concepts of power, which related to how what being „Norwegian‟ 
represented. Inspired by Neumann this will be followed by an explication 
of three such representations: the Statist, the Romantic Nationalist and 
the Populist Nationalist representations. I will also present the cultural 
policy measures - in the widest sense - that originated within each of 
these representations, before I reflect on the eventual civilising aspect of 
these policies. I finally attempt to briefly summarise the different „historical 
blocs‟, and the manifestations of their different cultural policies in a table 
in the concluding section.  
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4.1 The battle for cultural hegemony in Norway 
 
In Chapter Three I made reference to Tony Bennett‟s critique of 
Gramscian analysis, which he argues relies too much on how „the people‟ 
are subjugated by a static power-bloc, but where it becomes difficult to 
assess exactly who „the people‟ are and who should be included or 
excluded from this concept. However, Neumann argues that defining „the 
people‟, has been an essential part of the struggle in the Norwegian 
hegemonic battle during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries because 
„the people‟ became one of several central power concepts. Such power 
concepts are used discursively by different groups to represent different 
interpretations of reality. I shall therefore start by presenting how the 
ideas of hegemony and concepts of power can act as a helpful theoretical 
framework for a historical analysis of cultural power battles in Norway.  
4.1.1 A hegemonic battle of the ‘Norwegian’ 
 
Applying the meaning of hegemonies to different classes at different 
historical times, Øystein Sørensen has described the Norwegian nation 
building project during the nineteenth century as a hegemonic battle of 
the meaning of the term „the Norwegian‟.221 In other words what did this 
term include and what did it exclude; how did it accentuate a particular 
meaning? Hence, Sørensen‟s interpretation of this term echoes 
Gramsci‟s reference to power-blocs and suggests that hegemony is not 
exclusively preoccupied with the means by which one ruling class (or 
                                            
221 Øystein Sørensen, „Hegemonikamp om det norske: Elitenes nasjonsbyggingsprosjekter 1770 – 
1945‟, in Øystein Sørensen (ed.), Jakten på det norske: Perspektiver på utviklingen av en norsk 
nasjonal identitet på 1800-tallet (Oslo: Ad Notam Gyldendal, 2001), pp. 17 - 48. 
123 
 
elite) exercised power over subordinate classes. Sørensen argues that 
rather than referring to one ruling elite, it often makes sense to talk about 
several elites, and in Norway these elites were involved in several 
different nation building projects. It is within this perspective that he tries 
to assess which of these projects were „winners‟ or „losers‟, the winners 
successfully achieving and „having control of a society‟s intellectual life 
purely through cultural means‟, and to set the terms „for the production of 
ideas in society‟.222  
 
Such a hegemony does not necessarily have to be held by a traditional 
elite or a „ruling class‟. As we shall see below, by the end of the 
nineteenth century a Populist Nationalist representation, which sprang out 
of counter cultural movements in the Norwegian countryside, had become 
hegemonic in Norway, both through their definition of what the term 
„Norwegian‟ contained, but also because representatives from these 
movements gained parliamentary power when they were elected as MPs. 
Later on in the twentieth century this was to be replaced by a new 
hegemony rooted in the Labour movement. These different 
representations were carried forward by what Gramsci calls „historical 
blocs‟.223 The notion of historical blocs is more complex than the Marxist 
crude concept of class, in that: 
 
                                            
222 Ibid., p. 20. 
223 Forgacs (1988), p. 424. 
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it promotes analysis of social formations that cut across categories of 
ownership and non-ownership that are bound by religious or other 
ideological ties as well as those of economic interest.224 
 
Such historic blocs may or may not become hegemonic. This depends on 
whether their leaders are able to:  
 
develop a world view that appeals to a wide range of other groups within 
the society, and they must be able to claim with some plausibility that 
their particular interests are those of society at large.225 
 
The main focus of this chapter will be on Norwegian elites, and the battle 
for hegemonies. Different historic blocs have throughout the nineteenth 
and twentieth centuries been jockeying for power in a system where no 
ruling class has entirely dominated. Thus, different hegemonies have 
been in place at different times in a climate of change where they have 
been challenged, and later toppled by, counter-hegemonies.  
4.1.2 Hegemonic positioning through the application of 
concepts of power 
 
Cultural hegemony often includes controlling, discursively, what 
Neumann refers to as concepts of power, meaning the „ability to establish, 
institutionalise, and activate concepts in such a way that they affect 
political actions‟.226 These are concepts charged with meaning but which, 
rather than being subject to an explicit political power struggle on an 
                                            
224 T.J. Jackson Lears, „The Concept of Cultural Hegemony: Problems and Possibilities‟, in The 
American Historical Review 90.3 (June 1985), p. 571. 
225 Ibid., p. 571. 
226 Neumann (2001a), p. 18. 
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every-day basis, will typically be bearers of a hegemonic power in the 
sense that they are not explicitly challenged. In other words they form 
part of discursive practices, because they produce and affirm actions 
through an institutionalised interpretation that has generally become 
accepted within a discourse. However, different groups that are involved 
in a hegemonic struggle might allocate different meanings or 
understandings to these terms, in other words, they might not agree on 
their social representation. Neumann argues that an important aspect of 
participating in a political battle is to strive to internalise certain aspects of 
the power-concepts that are favourable to one‟s own position to such an 
extent that their meaning is beyond discussion. According to Neumann, 
central power-concepts in nineteenth- and twentieth-century Norway 
include „the people‟, „the elite‟, „civil servants‟, „Norway‟, „the state‟ and 
„the nation‟. Different „historical blocs‟ will read different meanings into 
these concepts as part of their battle to regain hegemony. Apart from 
making concessions to other groups, it is also important to convince other 
groups to accept one‟s own definition:  
 
because it results in them [those one wants to convince] formulating the 
world on certain terms, becoming implicated in a given set of ways to 
make decisions about the world on, and developing a set of 
commitments to this perspective and these decisions.227  
 
Hence, an important aspect of any political battle is this struggle about 
the representation of these concepts. This is highly relevant when 
analysing the wider intellectual climate that has impacted on cultural 
                                            
227 Ibid., pp. 26 - 27. 
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policy rationales historically, and this will thus, together with the ideas of 
cultural hegemony, be applied in the following historical account (in this 
chapter and the next). Neumann has identified three representations by 
three different demographic groups amongst whom a hegemonic 
definition of some central concepts of power shifted throughout the 
nineteenth century. The following section will present this hegemonic 
battle and the different representations presented by the different 
historical blocs.   
 
4.2 Cultural representations of the ‘Norwegian’: 
nineteenth-century cultural legacies 
 
A modern account of Norwegian history can start as early as 1536, when 
King Christian III of Denmark reduced Norway‟s status to a province of 
Denmark. Prior to that, Norway had been part of a troubled union first 
both with Sweden and Denmark and later with Denmark only. Norway 
was, in the beginning of this new period, a province administered on a 
shoestring with very little resources allocated to it by the court in 
Denmark.228  The elite in Norway was during this period primarily made 
up of a stratum that was working on behalf of the Danish crown.  
 
This elite was initially the undisputed „bearer‟ of culture in Norway and 
was known as øvrigheten (loosely „the authorities‟) who governed the rest 
                                            
228 Iver B. Neumann, „This little piggy stayed at home: Why Norway is not a member of the EU‟, 
in Lene Hansen and Ole Wæver (eds.), European Integration and National Identity: The 
challenge of the Nordic states (London: Routledge, 2002), pp. 88 - 129. 
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of the population, almuen (loosely „the populace‟). 229  According to 
Neumann, the authorities were part of a corps for which European elitist 
cultural ideals were held in high esteem.230 This influx did, of course, also 
bring new cultural impulses. Hence, the culture of the Norwegian state 
bearing civil servant elite was firmly rooted in continental culture.   
 
After its defeat in the Napoleonic Wars in 1814, Denmark was forced to 
break away from its Norwegian province, which instead entered into a 
union with Sweden. By then, „the authorities‟ made up of the civil servants 
had consolidated their power in Norway to such an extent that, according 
to Neumann, they had both state bearing potential and state bearing 
aspirations. As the unchallenged elite, the civil servants managed, 
together with representatives from some other groups (including the 
peasants), to agree on a Norwegian constitution on which much of the 
legal basis of the union with Sweden was based. The constitution was 
strongly influenced by European Enlightenment ideas of the time. This 
was Norway‟s first step towards becoming an independent state amongst 
equals, and in this process, which took place over the following ninety 
years or so, three representations of what Norway and being Norwegian 
should be were, according to Neumann, involved in a hegemonic 
struggle: the Statist representation, the Romantic Nationalist 
representation and finally the Populist Nationalist representation. The 
next sections outline the development of these representations during the 
nineteenth century.  
                                            
229 Ibid., p. 92. 
230 Neumann (2002).  
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4.2.1 The ‘Statist’ representation 
 
In order for it to become such a state amongst equals, what was unique 
about Norway, or what distinguished it from the rest of Europe, needed to 
be defined. One could assume that since the elite was to such a high 
extent influenced by trends in Europe, a Norwegian identity would 
primarily be based on continental culture: the culture of the cities. The 
core civil servants, or those Neumann coins as the „Statists‟, did not after 
all break their cultural ties with Denmark after 1814.  
  
However, although the Statists were the undisputed elite with the state 
bearing potential and inspiration, the populace also had, compared with 
most other European countries at the time, a strong position in society. 
The majority of Norwegian society was, in the eighteenth and nineteenth 
centuries, employed in the primary industries including agriculture, 
forestry, fishing and hunting (about 80 per cent in 1801). 231  People 
employed in working the land in this way would in most other countries be 
termed peasants but this is not an entirely accurate description of this 
group in Norway.232 In fact, Norwegian peasants233 enjoyed a stature very 
different from their brothers and sisters elsewhere in Europe. They were 
not legally bound to their landowners, who were rarely „big‟ as in England, 
                                            
231 Tore Pryser, Norsk historie 1814-1860 (Oslo: Det Norske Samlaget, 1999). Pryser emphasises 
that this figure only includes women to a limited extent. Additionally, the fact that many people 
where involved in more than one profession means that these figures can only be regarded as a 
broad calculation of the demographic composition of the population at the beginning of the 
nineteenth century.  
232 In fact „the core of the peasant myth is a figure that is difficult to conceptualize with the term 
“peasant”, which connotes subordination in a feudal order. The Nordic peasant is rather 
somewhere between a yeoman and a freeholder in an English context, moving toward a farmer 
around 1900‟ (Bo Stråth and Øystein Sørensen, quoted in Neumann (2001), p. 93). 
233 Despite Stråth and Sørensen‟s re-description I will continue to use the term „peasant‟ in the 
absence of a better term.  
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for example. In fact, many Norwegian peasants owned their own land. 
Hence, Norwegian peasants were represented amongst the men who 
drafted the constitution of 1814. Almost half of all Norwegians gained the 
right to vote in 1814, which is a comparatively high proportion for that 
time, with the result that the majority of the electorate was made up of 
peasants.234 At the same time, the elite was weaker than in many other 
countries, because it drew its power and legitimacy from filling an 
administrative role as opposed to the possession of land or other wealth.  
 
Hence, the civil servant stratum could not ignore the peasants. Instead, 
many nourished a great admiration for them, and throughout the first half 
of the nineteenth century, the Norwegian elite continued to hail the 
Norwegian peasant as a bearer of Norwegian identity. But why was this? 
Why was it, as Neumann asks, that: 
 
a [bourgeois or civil servant] project based on a common European 
development and central modernisation variables such as literacy, 
industrialisation and bourgeois culture is positioned against an 
isolationistic [peasant-based] project based on a semi-literate language, 
disorganised agriculture and peasant culture?235  
 
Anne-Lise Seip suggests that this may be in response to a common 
experience amongst both the elite and the peasants: „that the country 
                                            
234 Sørensen (2001), p. 26. Land-ownership, which many of the „peasants‟ had was the criteria for 
having the right to vote; „everybody who owned or leased registered land got the vote‟ (Sørensen 
(2001), p. 26). In comparison; when Britain introduced its first parliamentary reform act in 1832, 
only men who lived in towns and who occupied property with an annual value of more than £10 
got the vote. This excluded six out of seven adult men from the voting process in that country; 
http://www.nationalarchives.gov.uk/pathways/citizenship/struggle_democracy/getting_vote.htm 
235 Neumann (2001a), p. 69. 
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was poor, underdeveloped, divided and under pressure from an external 
power [Sweden]‟.236 Another suggestion may be that focusing on the raw, 
free and clean ambience of nature was very much a trend in Romantic 
European thinking at the time. 237  Similarly, Iver Sagmo argues that 
Norway became a travel destination for intellectuals from England and 
the continent. 238 This was all part of a Romantic movement in Europe 
where people longed for the pure, free, clean and harsh nature, of which 
there was, of course, plenty in Norway.  
 
These Romantic ideas were influential to some of the members of the 
civil service strata at the time. The free peasant was seized upon as 
something uniquely Norwegian239 and would come to inform a National 
Romantic movement, whereby some of the civil servant elite: 
 
melded older identity elements into a new patriotism, whose … main 
elements were the freedom of ideas of the European Enlightenment, and 
whose main symbol was the free peasant that European intellectuals had 
sighted in Norway and which the civil servants had made their own.240 
                                            
236 Anne-Lise Seip,  „Jakten på nasjonal identitet: Kultur, politikk og nasjonsbygging i Norge i 
årene omkring. “Det nasjonale gjennombrudd” 1830 – 1870‟, in Nytt Norsk Tidsskrift 3.4 (1994), 
pp. 281 - 294. 
237 The North (meaning Norway) had, since Montesqieu published his L’esprit des lois in 1748, 
been the subject of such sentiments. After having read the old Nordic sagas, which had recently 
been translated into several languages, Montesqieu hailed the old Norsemen for their great 
democratic traditions with their Allting (where everybody had a vote) as well as the fact that 
Norwegian peasants and women had much liberty in comparison to several other countries at that 
time. He also mentioned that the Vikings had contributed to state-building in the areas they had 
conquered. Intellectuals such as Thomas Malthus and Mary Wollstonecracft visited Norway in 
the late eighteenth century and confirmed in their books how free the Norwegian peasant was; 
Neumann (2001a), p. 53. 
238 Historians have identified altogether 2472 books with travel-descriptions by mostly English 
and German visitors to Norway up to the year 1900; Ivar Sagmo, „Norge – et forbilde eller et 
utviklingsland? Folk og land i første halvdel av 1800-tallet – sett med tyske reisendes øyne‟, in 
Øystein Sørensen, Jakten på det norske: Perspektiver på utviklingen av en norsk nasjonal 
identitet (Oslo: Gyldendal Norsk Forlag, 2001) pp. 75 - 76. 
239 Sørensen (2001).  
240 Neumann (2001a), p. 59. 
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It could be argued that there was a civilising element in the plans and 
discourse of the civil servants and that this was rooted in Enlightenment 
ideas. However, rather than copying other elite cultures from Europe, the 
emphasis was on building an alternative Norwegian culture based on 
Norwegian cultural heritage and history where the Nordic myths, ideas of 
democracy and the status of the Norwegian peasant were central. 
However, the initial focus on the peasants was a construction in an 
attempt to create a national culture, but one where the elite culture was 
still assumed to be superior. Hence, although there was both an element 
of „looking back‟ (towards a medieval culture that had existed before 
Norway and Denmark merged into a composite state) as well as „looking 
in‟ (at a traditional Norwegian culture as opposed to a culture with its 
roots abroad), indications of clear quality hierarchies can be detected 
amongst the elites. Someone like the influential historian and later 
newspaper editor P. A. Munch, for example, declared that although the 
hegemonic elite culture should absorb elements from the national 
peasant culture, it was certainly not at the expense of the former. Others 
argued even more clearly and deliberately that the elite had a mission to 
civilise the populace. The academic and poet Johan Sebastian 
Welhaven241 argued in 1834 that the arts had to come out of their private 
and dilettantish forms, so that:  
                                            
241 Johan Sebastian Welhaven was part of what Rune Slagstad calls the „intelligentsia‟. They 
were a new generation of reform-eager intellectuals with a strong academic authority, which also 
included the law-scholar and long-standing member of parliament Anton Martin Schweigaard. 
There were many differences between these two figures; the latter subscribing to a highly 
utilitarian philosophy on which he wrote two ideological studies, whilst the former subscribed to 
an ethical-expressive idealism informed by Romanticism. However, their approach to Bildung 
was also similar in that they both subscribed to an object-approach. As Norwegian nineteenth-
century Bildung thinkers, the „intelligensia‟ was preceded by the philosophy professor and 
Cabinet Minister of the Ministry of Church and Education, Niels Treschow. Treschow published 
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the enjoyment of the lower classes little by little breeds […] under the 
eyes of a finer audience as well as under their management – the light 
must here, as everywhere, come from above
 .242 
 
The superiority of elite culture was, in other words, indisputable. Hence, 
the civil servants‟ references to terms like the populace, the peasant and 
the people, were, according to Neumann, discursive constructions. 
Although the civil servants upheld a representation of the people as the 
bearers of the nation, this same civil servant elite would still play a 
decisive role. As Neumann points out: 
 
Specimens of the „people‟ could perhaps be let loose amongst the 
mahogany furniture for a short period, for example to perform its 
authentic music, but it was clear for P.A Munch and other civil servants 
that the people needs the official class in order to achieve a satisfying 
cultural level.243  
 
Hence, the Norwegian Statist project appears to take an object approach 
to Bildung that chimes well with Arnoldian ideals.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                      
the three volume work About the State, between 1820 and 1823, one of which was dedicated to 
questions around religion, customs and culture. This could have acted as a written rationale for a 
cultural policy, but it never received anything like a seminal reception, due to the volume 
advocating a system of government, which could be described as close to enlightened despotism. 
For a further exposition of Treshow and the intelligentsia‟s impact on nineteenth-century cultural 
policy see Hans Fredrik Dahl and Tore Helseth, To knurrende løver: Kulturpolitikkens historie 
1814 - 2014 (Oslo: Universitetsforlaget, 2006); Rune Slagstad, De nasjonale strateger (Oslo: Pax, 
2001) and Dag Solhjell, Akademiregime og Kunstinstitusjon: Kunstpolitikk fram til 1850 (Oslo: 
Unipub, 2004a). 
242 Welhaven, quoted in Seip (1994), p. 284. 
243 Neumann (2001a), p. 70. 
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The „Statists‟ arts policies: looking back and looking out  
 
Elite culture enjoyed by civil servants and the bourgeoisie in the cities in 
Norway at the time was similar to that in Copenhagen and other 
European cities. Mangset argues that, by the end of the nineteenth 
century, Norway had reached „a climax in the bourgeoisie‟s interest in 
literature, theatre and the visual arts‟.244 However, all these art forms had 
become a natural part of the bourgeoisie‟s public sphere even earlier.  
 
An example of an institutionalised arts policy of the nineteenth century is 
the Drawing-school (Tegneskole), which was established in 1818, only 
four years after the split with Denmark. Although Norway did not have an 
institution named the The State Academy for Arts (Statens kunstakademi) 
until 1909, the Drawing-school was in practice such an academy and was 
from 1822 named The Royal Drawing and Art school in Christiania245 
(Den kongelige Tegne- og Kunstskole i Christiania). 246  A clear and 
distinct policy for the visual arts developed through this „academy‟, which 
amongst a range of functions, such as the training of new artists, the 
guardian of a national art collection and the active establishment of artist 
organisations, also supported activities that would further encourage what 
was regarded to be good taste. The school was unashamedly elitist 
through its highly competitive selection of members; it was for the few 
and it was to celebrate the best in the visual arts. As from 1884 the 
                                            
244 Mangset (1992), p. 27.  
245  Norway‟s capital (Oslo) was between 1624 and 1924 called Christiania. From the late 
nineteenth century the name Kristiania was also frequently used.   
246  Dag Solhjell, „Kunstpolitikkens nye kunnskapsregime‟, in Nytt Norsk Tidsskrift 03 - 04 
(2004b), pp. 456 - 467.  
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function of the art academy, which in practice acted as a visual arts 
council situated at arms length from government, was given to the Board 
of Visual Artists (Bildende Kunstneres Style) the aim of which was to 
„guard the good taste and the good art‟.247 
 
In addition to the foundation of an „art academy‟, which also saw the 
creation of a National Gallery, which opened in 1836, the government 
would set up two theatres in the second half of the nineteenth century: 
the National Stage (Den Nationale Scene) in Bergen in 1876 and the 
National Theatre (Nationaltheatret) in Oslo (1899),248 hence by the 1830s, 
the performing arts had come out of the intimate private organisations 
from where they originated. Parliament also granted a range of stipends 
to artists (mostly writers) throughout the nineteenth century, starting in 
1836.  
 
Most of these organisations, which developed in the first half of the 
nineteenth century, had as their purpose the dissemination of what was 
predominantly a continental culture, such as theatre, painting and music 
composed by continental composers. It was curated, and chosen, by the 
elite, but also distributed primarily to the same elite.  
 
Hence, although Neumann argues that the Statists hailed the peasant as 
the bearer of Norwegian identity, this was not revealed in cultural policy 
measures initiated by this representation. The hegemonic elite culture 
                                            
247 Solhjell (2004b), p. 462. 
248 Vestheim (1995), p. 23. 
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was informed by continental ideas. In Gramscian terms, concessions 
were made in an attempt to produce consent with the populace, but 
without letting the „superior‟ continental culture go. Although the peasant 
was hailed as the bearer of Norwegian identity, it was clear who should 
run the state. With reference to Rune Slagstad, Neumann describes it 
thus: 
 
The civil servants programmatically defined their role as being that of 
running the state, and the role of the state as being that of „leading and 
correcting public opinion‟ so as to bring about progress.249  
 
This signals an object approach to Bildung, where the civil servants 
clearly defined the state as an entity led by themselves with the attempt 
to guide the populace, but not necessarily through the mentioned arts 
organisations, which were mostly directed towards people from their own 
strata. There are clear distinctions between the elite and the populace.  
4.2.2 Romantic Nationalism  
 
Looking back, one could easily think that such a nation-building project 
devised by the elite but emphasising the values and culture of the 
peasants (the majority) would be bound for success. However, the 
Statists were faced with dissenters from within the civil servants, who 
were less concerned with a liberal representation of the Norwegian 
peasant. This group wanted to go further and explicitly rejected any 
cultural ties with Denmark (the continent). One prominent representative 
of this group was the author Henrik Wergeland, who postulated 
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Norwegian history as falling into two „semi-circles‟, one representing 
Norway‟s proud medieval Viking heritage prior to its union with Denmark, 
and the other its history since 1814. What was left in the middle should 
best be forgotten. This meant a radical break with Danish culture where 
„Norwegian culture, which had survived in the nooks and crannies of 
Norwegian valleys and fjords, had to be resuscitated‟.250  
 
Again, the peasant was central, though not through an elitist 
representation, but because peasants‟ culture was considered as „real‟ 
and unspoilt by 400 years of Danish colonisation and hence, represented 
what was regarded as authentic Norwegian culture. This representation 
was initially advocated by a marginal group, which was still mostly drawn 
from the civil servant elite, but was in line with influential National 
Romantic ideas in continental Europe at the time. Both Rousseau‟s focus 
on feelings, where the original and uncorrupted human, unaffected by the 
development in society, as well as Herder‟s idea of a nation‟s common 
culture, based on the people‟s way of life, were influential.251 An example 
of how this representation became manifest in cultural life was through 
the numerous expositions of „folk‟-culture in the cities, where folk-
musicians were invited to perform for the civil service strata and where 
members of this stratum even dressed up as peasants and participated in 
tableau scenes through „staged city fairs characterised by rural 
happiness‟.252   
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252 Neumann (2001a), p. 69. 
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According to Neumann, we see a shift from an emphasis on the concept 
of „the populace‟, which encompassed about 95 per cent of the population 
and which was not part of the civil servant stratum, to the concept of „the 
people‟, which „had a normatively more positive ring to it‟,253 and which is 
a concept that harbours immense symbolic power in Norway up to this 
day. The concept of „the populace‟ clearly did not encompass the civil 
servant elite, but whether the elite would be covered by the concept of 
„the people‟ is a question which, according to Neumann, is left undecided 
in the National Romantic representation.254 Within this representation the 
concept of the „nation‟ rests on „the people‟ as opposed to the previous 
representation through which the concept of the elite had been coined in 
opposition to „the populace‟. By the 1840s this National Romantic 
representation was, according to Neumann, about to become hegemonic, 
in the sense that it became impossible to refer to a nation bearing entity 
which was not based on the people. In Gramscian terms, the elite make 
further compromises to produce consent, but the civil servants are still the 
only state bearing stratum. The concept of the „nation‟, which is now 
firmly established as being made up of the people, is in other words 
distinguished from that of the state. The reason for this is because the 
guidance of the civil servants is still needed „to obtain a satisfactory level 
of culture‟, 255  which implies a „top-down‟ object approach to Bildung. 
However, this top-down approach did look increasingly inwards at a 
typical Norwegian past and displayed a keen interest in cultural 
                                            
253 Neumann (2002), p. 95. 
254 Ibid. 
255 Neumann (2002), p. 96. 
138 
 
manifestations that had their roots in a medieval history unspoilt by 
continental influences.  
 
Romantic Nationalist cultural policies 
 
Presumably referring to the privately funded cultural institutions that were 
mentioned in the previous section, many of which did not receive financial 
support from public bodies until much later, both Mangset and Bakke 
argue that the bourgeois elite of the nineteenth century established their 
own cultural institutions, to present their own culture to themselves.256 
Given that the elite (or „the authorities‟), as we have seen, only made up 
about 5% of the population, this does not appear to imply an attempt to 
civilise „the populace‟ (or indeed „the people‟) through facilitating Bildung. 
Bakke goes as far as saying that:  
 
Cultural values and everyday life among people in rural areas – judged 
by many to be the location of genuine Norwegian culture – were more or 
less ignored by the city establishment [of the time].257 
 
Hence, she argues that this was a period of cultural exclusion. This may 
be the case in the beginning of the nineteenth century but it ignores many 
of the other important cultural policy initiatives that were initiated later on, 
which had a strong focus on peasants and rural culture. However, 
according to Bjarne Hodne: 
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It was not the peasant culture as a total way of life, which triggered 
interest, but those elements in this way of life that carried cultural 
continuity. Those parts of the peasant culture that could build a bridge to 
the middle ages and independence for country and people, were 
attractive with an objective to create a platform of common culture.258 
 
But in order to create tangible representations of this rediscovered 
peasant culture, a greater understanding of it had to be acquired, and 
many of its artistic expressions, apart from crafts and architecture, did not 
exist in a tangible form but were passed on orally from generation to 
generation. The Romantic Nationalists realised that this culture needed to 
be collected before it was too late. Thus, throughout the first half of the 
nineteenth century, a range of scholars travelled through the rural parts of 
Norway collecting legends, folk-tales, ballads and folk-music in a true 
Romantic spirit. The most well-known are perhaps Asbjørnsen and Moe, 
who collected fairy-tales, many of which live on in the Norwegian public 
psyche today. This work was also inspired by continental ideas of the 
time, and was certainly not a uniquely Norwegian project.259 It is peculiar 
to note that these activities received public funding through scholarships 
from the University of Oslo, and were as such an integrated part of state 
cultural policy.  
 
However, the more tangible aspect of a medieval history was also given 
priority. Hans Fredrik Dahl and Tore Helseth argue that of all the sciences, 
historical research was the most important for cultural policy in the early 
nineteenth century. Funding allocations to the research and publications 
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of historic source-material such as old law-scripts increased rapidly in the 
first half of the century. Similarly, archaeological projects, and particularly 
funds to restore the great Nidaros Cathedral (Nidarosdomen) in 
Trondheim, were given significant funds, to such an extent that Dahl and 
Helseth conclude that:  
 
we must regard „digging for antiquities‟ [in the widest sense, including 
intangible antiques] as something of a budgetary main item during the 
nineteenth century.260  
 
This was all fuelled by the National Romantic representation and had as 
its objective to „strengthen the nation‟s identity and honour‟261 through 
identifying relics from the time before the 400-year-long unification with 
Denmark.262  
 
Another significant institutional development was the establishment of 
several museums. The University Museum of Antiquities was established 
in 1817 and had as its most important task the documentation of 
medieval history, and hence, contributed to the representation of this 
period. Norway did not have many other publicly funded museums until 
1880, when several folk-museums were established across the country to 
display Norwegian architectural heritage. Again, the main focus was on 
peasant and rural culture, in accordance with nationalist sentiments.  
                                            
260 Dahl and Helseth (2006), p. 70. 
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262 Governmental cultural policy developed hand in hand with private initiatives, such as the 
Society for the Preservation of Norwegian Ancient Monuments, (Foreningen til Norske Fortids 
Mindesmaerkers Bevaring), which received public funding in order to achieve its objectives, but 
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Institutions that were initially established as projects supporting the 
hegemonic Statist representation gradually became part of a nation 
building project, first in accordance with National Romantic ideas but still 
with the objective to civilise in accordance with European Enlightenment 
ideals. However, there was a sufficiently inward-looking dimension to 
these projects, for what Neumann terms a Populist Nationalist 
representation to break through. This breakthrough empowered „the 
people‟ to express themselves and hence, laid the foundation for a new 
hegemony. 
 
4.2.3 A new hegemony: Populist Nationalism 
 
The Populist Nationalists went much further than the Romantic 
Nationalists in their suggestions and demands. This was the first 
Norwegian social or political movement since the sixteenth century that 
was not exclusively made up of representatives from the elite. Their 
project was preoccupied with a Bildung based on Norwegian culture, 
language and history rooted in people‟s own everyday lives, rather than 
on a Danish (or continental) culture, and it paid little attention to a 
universal notion of „the best that has been thought and said in the world‟ 
in the Arnoldian sense. Thus, it appears that it perceived the concept of 
the people more like „subjects‟ in terms of Bildung, in that it was more 
open to celebrating the culture that emerged amongst the communities 
around Norway.  
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This counter culture manifested itself initially through four specific sub-
movements: the pietistic religious Christian movement, the language 
movement, the teetotal movement and the peasant movement.263 Albeit 
rooted in different value systems and also to an extent having their origins 
in different parts of the country, these sub-movements all had in common 
their contribution to a Populist Nationalist representation of Norway. Their 
first significant break with the Statist representation can, according to 
Neumann, be observed around 1866-1867, when a group made up of 
peasants, supporters of a new Norwegian language and young dissident 
academics fiercely rejected a move by the civil servant elite to strengthen 
the union with Sweden.264  
 
What all these voluntary organisations had in common was a hostility to 
the Statists, and instead of being indecisive about what the concept of 
„the people‟ should encompass, Populist Nationalists seized the radical 
consequence of the nation resting on the people in that the nation should 
take over the state, which left little space and purpose for the Statists. In 
fact, the Populist Nationalist representation regarded the latter with deep 
suspicion, and argued that there existed two cultures in Norway: a 
people‟s culture and a foreign „civil servants‟ culture, where the latter had 
not just been hegemonic for a long time but also controlled the state. 
Accordingly, the civil servant stratum was, according to Neumann 
„banished from the Norwegian nation, branded as a separate nation with 
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close ties to the Danish one, and as the enemy of the Norwegian 
nation‟.265  
 
In other words, there was no longer any need for the elite:  
 
The dannede [cultured or enlightened] strata do not have any dannende 
[enlightening] function for the people, because the people can manage 
on their own.266  
 
Not only do we here see a break with an elitist European Enlightenment-
culture, but the Populist Nationalist representation also advocates a shift 
from an object approach to a subject approach to Bildung. The Populist 
Nationalists cultural policy programme went beyond a preoccupation with 
cultural manifestations in its more narrow sense such as the fine arts and 
cultural heritage. Their focus was geared more towards policies for 
language, education and cultural activities rooted locally.   
 
Language as a marker of identity and empowerment  
 
The most important of the above-mentioned four sub-movements was 
arguably the one preoccupied with Norway‟s need to have its own 
language. The thesis that Norway was made up of two cultures and that 
the elite culture of the cities was suspect, was put forward by Arne 
Garborg, who was one of the most vocal advocates for a new written 
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Norwegian language.267 In fact, the battle between the Populist and the 
Romantic Nationalist representation was very much fought over language, 
typified by a public battle between Arne Garborg and Bjørnstjerne 
Bjørnson, where the latter argued that language, and in his view, the 
Danish-derived language was: 
 
the most important cultural marker and the condition for “dannelse”. 
“Dannelse” was for Bjørnson […] an enlightened condition within an 
exclusive area, which every individual according to his/her own abilities 
had to attempt to get in touch with. The arena for dannelse could be 
localised and qualitatively determined meaning that it “is” where the 
intellectual elite at any point is. […] It was thus the peasant and the 
people who should commit themselves to wake up and come to Culture 
and Language, not the other way around.268  
 
Bjørnson was clearly a National Democrat, who towards the end of the 
nineteenth century, advocated a militant kind of political nationalism.269 
However, he was at the same time a representative of the elite and 
distanced himself from some of what the Populist Nationalists stood for, 
particularly on the language question. Thus, Bjørnson took a paternalistic 
stance with the intention of civilising his subjects: the peasants and their 
culture, and he makes it clear who defines what dannelse means.    
 
The New Norwegian language movement, on the other hand, had both a 
national and a democratic objective: it would both contribute to people‟s 
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national sense of being Norwegian as well as making it easier for people 
to acquire knowledge through a language that was perceived as being 
closer to them. This movement, together with the peasant movement, 
found its outlet through a voluntary educational sector, which emerged 
alongside the official one. 
 
A new educational agenda and the role of voluntary organisations 
 
One of the most significant manifestations of the Populist Nationalist 
representation was perhaps what is called the people‟s high schools 
(folkehøgskole), the first of which was established in 1864. Although the 
aims and focus of these schools varied, they had in common a rejection 
of the Statists‟ project and a wish to develop an alternative educational 
system for peasants and others living in rural Norway.270 The schools 
were counter-cultural initiatives, leaning towards a subject approach to 
Bildung at least in terms of their rejection of a Danish curriculum in favour 
of one based on experiences closer to home. These schools developed 
alongside the official school system, funded privately and acted, 
according to Vestheim, as:  
 
voices for a populist nationalistic rural Norway, and they worked for 
Norwegian peasant culture, a liberal Christian view, for tolerance and for 
assisting people to adopt new knowledge through reading and 
independent thinking.271  
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Another important outlet for nationalistic ideas and the struggle for a new 
Norwegian language was a growing number of liberal youth organisations, 
which were also based on the principle that Bildung could not be 
achieved through a „top-down‟ approach and represented interests and 
ideas that primarily had their base in the regions. These organisations, 
which shared many of the same ideas as the folkehøgskole, became a 
significant nationalist force in the 1890s, also supported by members of 
the elite, such as Henrik Wergeland, who had been a keen supporter of 
using voluntary organisations to educate people.  
 
All these initiatives had in common a sceptical and hostile attitude to the 
Statists‟ project.272 They played a key role in the hegemonic change in 
favour of the Populist Nationalist representation and they also, as we 
shall see, came to have a profound influence of Norwegian cultural policy 
in the twentieth century.  
 
As demonstrated in these previous sections, Bildung was an important 
objective for all the different strata who were involved in the nineteenth 
century nation-building project, and we have seen that the approach to 
this Bildung gradually moved from an object to a subject orientation. As 
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articulated by Neumann: there was a change „from an Enlightenment 
celebration of the people‟s potential for learning to a celebration of the 
people‟s innate qualities‟.273  
 
Let me discuss in a little more detail the civilising aspects of these early 
cultural policy developments of the nineteenth century.  
 
4.2.4 The civilising aspect of nineteenth-century cultural policy 
 
All the organisations mentioned here contribute to cultural policy in the 
widest sense, but as I am particularly interested in state cultural policies, 
the reference to other organisations such as the liberal youth 
organisations and the folkehøgskole have been included to contextualise 
general trends and approaches to Bildung. However, even if we look at 
those schemes and institutions that were initiated and funded by the state, 
it becomes clear that both an object focused and a subject focused 
approach to Bildung are at play, and that this gradually shifted according 
to which representation was hegemonic.  
 
It was not that the Danish inspired institutions like the drawing schools 
and the subsequent National Gallery disappeared, but they were 
complemented by museums and archival activities, which were more 
inward-looking and concerned with what was increasingly perceived to be 
a more genuine Norwegian culture, situated closer to the people. Neither 
is it that the latter initiatives were entirely based on a subject approach to 
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Bildung in the sense that people themselves (or rather people situated 
very close to them) decided on a programme of folkeopplysning. The 
museums, for example, were institutions established by the civil servants 
in accordance with National Romantic ideas. However, they focused 
more on what was regarded as genuinely Norwegian and represented a 
break with Danish and continental culture.  
 
The establishments of the earlier institutions like the drawing school were 
perhaps less concerned with Bildung, and were rather initiatives which 
celebrated an elite culture for the elite. Both Bakke and Mangset claim 
that the bourgeoisie had established their own cultural institutions to 
celebrate their own culture.274 However, electoral reforms that would lead 
to democratic franchise on the basis of „one man – one vote‟, made the 
civil servants face a new situation. As mentioned in Chapter Two, 
Foucault has argued that an increased democratisation of society calls for 
ever more measures to be put in place to manage the population. 
Absolute monarchies can make use of force to control the population, but 
in a democracy it becomes vital to control the population through a 
different set of disciplinary measures. It appears as if the institutions 
established in the early part of the nineteenth century, to celebrate what 
was primarily a bourgeois civil servant culture  typified by the above-
mentioned drawing school, were less concerned with civilising the wider 
parts of the populace. Although Solhjell argues that they had as one of 
their functions to educate the bourgeoisie and help them to acquire a 
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certain taste,275 this does not appear to be part of a well planned social 
programme. And even though members of the elite, such as the poet 
Welhaven, argued that the light should shine from above, it appears that 
a real reform programme did not evolve before the ascendancy of the 
Romantic Nationalist, and even more so, the Populist Nationalist project 
later on.  
 
Primarily taking his examples from the UK, Tony Bennett argues that the 
object oriented approach to Bildung found in the museum, the art gallery 
and the library, was portrayed as „a disciplinary alternative to the 
alehouse‟.276 If there was such a civilising dimension to, for example, the 
establishment of the National Gallery, it does not appear to be nearly as 
potent as the nationalist projects. The shift towards a more subject 
focused Bildung project did not indicate that it was less concerned with 
discipline and reform. Particularly, the Populist Nationalist project would 
not limit its Bildung project to an engagement with the arts, but would 
move its reform programme forward through the education system, 
language policies and also through the voluntary sector.  
 
Albeit in a contemporary context, Tony Bennett argues that defining 
culture more widely in cultural policy terms, implies that a larger range of 
activities, or aspects of society are being „brought into the sphere of 
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culture as a field of government and […] as such, are laid open to 
reforming administrative programmes‟.277  
 
Bennett is here referring to how a wider definition of culture enables a 
wider aspect of human activities to become subject to governmental 
interference (a subject I shall return to in Chapter Six). The creators of 
Populist Nationalist policies of the nineteenth century did not perceive 
their education and language policies as cultural policies and, as such, 
this reference might not appear as immediately relevant. However, it 
appears clear to me that the reform programme of the nationalists had a 
stronger and better planned reformist and civilising agenda, albeit with a 
subject focus, than the Statist project had in the immediate years after 
1814. Clear traces of this project can be found also in the labour-
movements‟ policies of the twentieth century.  
 
Hence, Norwegian folkeopplysning was, towards the end of the 
nineteenth century, leaning towards being subject focused, at least in the 
sense that it rejected a continental bourgeois dannelse in favour of a 
culture much closer to home, where the people, excluding the elite, were 
admired and on which the nation should be built. As we shall see in the 
next chapter, this reverberated strongly in many of the ideas originating 
within the Labour movement during the first half of the twentieth century.  
But let me first summarise and conclude my findings in this chapter. 
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4.3 Summary 
 
As mentioned early on in this chapter, a hegemonic power implies having 
control of a society‟s intellectual life through cultural means. Sometimes 
such an intellectual hegemony goes hand in hand with a tangible political 
power, for example through control of parliament. However, this is not 
always the case as we can see in the hegemonic battle of Norway‟s 
nation-building. In this concluding section I shall attempt to summarise 
the different cultural hegemonies charted in this chapter by means of a 
table, before I finally ask to what extent the Norwegian folkeopplysning 
project, whether informed by an object  or a subject approach, epitomised 
a civilising mission during the nineteenth century.  
 
It can be concluded that there was indeed a civilising project in 
nineteenth-century Norway, initiated by a civil servant elite. The Statist 
representation had always emphasised that they were the embodiment of 
a common European civilising project in Norway. This took continental 
culture and Enlightenment values as its starting point, but realised that a 
representation of the peasant was necessary as part of its nation-building 
project: a representation which can be seen as a concession to the 
majority who made up the populace. However, since „the populace‟ was 
not sufficiently enlightened, civil servants were of the opinion that they 
had to carry the state, and guide „the populace‟ according to Arnoldian 
principles. However, I argue that these civilising measures did not take 
form as a fully fledged reform project. The civil servants elite appear to be 
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mostly concerned with nourishing their own culture for themselves. This 
view was hegemonic during the first decades of the nineteenth century.  
 
According to Neumann, when the National Romantics and their 
representation of the nation became hegemonic from the 1840s, in the 
sense that the concept of the people was now the absolute foundation for 
the nation, the focus shifted away from continental values and the 
peasant culture was even more romanticised. Hence, further concessions 
were given, now to the people rather than merely the populace, but it was 
still a civilising project, where the civil servants were the only ones with a 
state bearing potential, which implied that it was thus left unclear whether 
this stratum formed part of the nation or not.  
 
As seen from Table Three, this triggered cultural policy measures, that 
gave more attention to traditional Norwegian culture, which had its origin 
prior to Norway‟s union with Denmark, such as peasant and medieval 
culture. However this was not at the expense of the continental culture 
that had traditionally been celebrated by the civil servant elites.  
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Hegemonic 
Representation 
Power Concepts Examples of cultural policy 
measures 
   
Statism  The authorities govern 
the populace 
 The state is the bearer 
of culture, and the civil 
servant‟s culture which 
is continental, is 
superior. 
 However, the peasant 
is hailed as a 
representative of the 
typically „Norwegian‟.  
 
Norwegian culture is a seamless 
part of continental culture  
 Mostly focused on establishing 
institutions, which could 
produce and distribute the arts.  
 Examples are the drawing 
school and the National 
Galleries and private arts 
associations. 
 
   
   
Romantic 
Nationalism 
 The populace is 
replaced by the 
people.  
 Unclear whether the 
civil servant elite 
belongs to the people. 
 The nation rests on the 
people, but 
 The state is separate 
from the nation and 
still governed by the 
elite.  
 
Increased attention to traditional 
Norwegian culture, but not at the 
expense of continental culture  
 Celebration of peasant culture 
through the collection of fairy 
tales and folk-music. 
 Folk-museums 
 The Society for the 
Preservation of Norwegian 
Ancient Monuments.  
 
 
   
   
Populist 
Nationalism 
 Both the nation and 
the state rest on the 
people.  
 The nation does not 
encompass the civil 
servant elites.  
 No need for the elite 
because the people 
can manage on their 
own.  
 Danish and 
continental culture 
branded as illegitimate, 
and not belonging to 
Norwegian culture.  
 
The country is made up of two 
cultures: a people’s culture and a 
foreign ‘civil servant’ culture. 
Only the former can be regarded 
as legitimate 
 Efforts to construct a pure 
Norwegian language. 
 A subject focused educational 
system through the 
folkehøgskole. 
 The Society for the Promotion 
of Folkeopplysning. 
 
 
   
   
Timeline: 1814 1840 1884 1905 
 Constitution 
signed 
Rise of 
Nationalist 
Romanticism 
Introduction of 
Parliamentarianism 
Norway gains 
full 
independence 
 
 
Table 3: Hegemonic Representations in nineteenth-century Norway (1814 – 1905) 
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The ascendancy of the Populist Nationalists saw a significant shift 
towards culture as a common expression, where values emerged from 
below. Vestheim supports this view, when he argues that folkeopplysning 
developed from an „object model‟ to a „subject model‟.278 Although people 
from the civil servant strata contributed to this populist representation, it 
becomes clear that there really is no need for them or their culture 
anymore. The people do not only make up the nation, but also 
encompass the strata on which the administration of the state is based on.  
 
Oliver Bennett argues that in addition to the civilising mission, 
governments also get involved in culture for its potential economic 
benefits, or as a way to further national identity and prestige. 279  The 
economic justifications are of less relevance for nineteenth-century 
Norwegian cultural policy. However, it seems from the focus of this 
chapter that furthering and strengthening a national identity was a 
stronger rationale behind Norwegian cultural policy in the first half of the 
nineteenth century than a civilising mission, at least in the Arnoldian 
sense. However, these rationales are related in that, initially at least, 
certain representations emerged from above where civil servants made 
clear their role as the cultural leaders of public opinion. A new national 
identity was to be formed with peasants as a symbol, albeit under the 
guidance of civil servants.  
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So from this account of the Norwegian nation building project and cultural 
polices in the nineteenth century, it seems that a different civilising 
mission took hold in Norway. This resembled to start with, to a certain 
degree, Arnold‟s emphasis on the power of culture, but changed during 
the course of the century from focusing on the elite‟s notion of culture to 
increasingly placing local culture in the centre. As mentioned earlier, a 
national culture is, according to Hewison, useful in retaining a cultural 
hegemony, through historical memory and mythology. Given that the 
Norwegian elite did not have its own Norwegian historical memory, one 
had to be constructed. This memory and mythology was captured and 
made „real‟ by the peasants and this formed the basis for a new 
hegemony.  
 
This move away from a continental Enlightenment celebration to one 
where people themselves set the agenda met relatively little resistance in 
Norway, firstly because of the absence of an aristocracy but also because 
the civil servant elite‟s representation was not strong enough and 
because its construction of the Norwegian peasant as a national symbol 
in a way became an unwanted reality.  
 
Although we see a gradual shift from an object  to a subject approach to 
folkeopplysning there are no all-out winners or losers in this hegemonic 
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battle,280 and traces of all the nineteenth century policy ideas can be 
found after 1905, which I shall explore in the next chapter.  
                                            
280 One example is one of the Populist Nationalist‟s main objectives, which was to agree on one 
new language to unify the whole nation. This objective was never reached. Landsmål (New 
Norwegian) was indeed formally given status as an official Norwegian language and the same 
status as the Danish-derived written language, which was practiced by the elite. However, the 
language movement never reached its objective of creating consensus around one national written 
and spoken language, and although New Norwegian is still an official language to this day, it is 
only practiced by a minority of the population. 
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5.0 Towards Cultural Democracy: cultural policies 
of the twentieth century 
 
With Norway gaining full independence from Sweden in 1905, the 
Populist Nationalist counter-movements, discussed in the previous 
chapter, had won their battle against the civil servant elite. This coincided 
with a rapid increase in an urban Labour-movement, partly as a result of 
increased industrialisation. With the peasants and their supporters 
eventually integrating into the non-socialist liberal party of Norway 
(Venstre- V) the political struggle between Populist Nationalists and the 
civil servant elite was replaced by a struggle between the non-socialist 
parties and the socialist Labour Party with its roots in the Labour 
movement. During this period ideas related to cultural policy in the widest 
sense also became more articulate. Following on from Chapter Four‟s 
account of nineteenth-century cultural legacies, this chapter will thus 
continue to focus on cultural policies after 1905.  
 
This chapter will only chart ideas up to 1973, which was the year when 
the Norwegian government started producing green papers that focused 
exclusively on cultural policy. These and subsequent papers will be made 
subject to a more in-depth textual analysis in the next chapter. The first 
section of this chapter will focus on the period between 1905 and 1945, 
followed by an exposition of the policies conceived between 1945 and 
1973.281  
                                            
281 I am not including the period between 1940 and 1945 when Norway was occupied by Nazi 
Germany. The rationale for this exclusion in explicated in Appendix 1.  
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Just as in the previous chapter I shall briefly attempt to summarise the 
different „historical blocs‟, and the manifestations of their different cultural 
policies in terms of a table, before in the final section I attempt to draw 
some conclusions about the extent to which Bildung has figured in the 
cultural policy rhetoric (whether such a rhetoric has referred to culture as 
an explicit policy concern or not).  
 
5.1 1905 to 1940: from Popular Nationalism to Social 
Democracy 
 
Just as the cultural movements initiated by the Populist Nationalists in the 
late nineteenth / early twentieth century were counter-cultural, so was the 
Labour movement during the first decades of the twentieth century, in that 
it represented an alternative to the establishment. However, as we have 
seen, this bourgeois culture was not very strong and factions of the elite 
had themselves been advocates for the construction of a new Norwegian 
culture distinctly different from the Danish, although the Statist position 
was that this had to come in addition to a civilising continental culture, 
where their own representation should remain as the leading one. It did 
not take long though before the Labour movement came to represent the 
new hegemony.282 Vestheim argues that without comparison, the Labour 
movement was the most extensive and powerful movement in twentieth 
                                            
282  Neumann (2001a). Apart from a brief period for about a month in 1928, the Norwegian 
Labour party (Det Norske Arbeiderparti) did not take control of the government until 1935, from 
when, apart from a post-war coalition of about five months after the Nazis‟ occupation, it was 
solely in charge until 1963.  During the German occupation between 1940 and 1945, the Labour 
government, which was branded illegitimate by the Nazis, was based in London.  Berge Furre, 
Norsk Historie 1914 – 2000: Industrisamfunnet – frå vokstervisse til framtidstvil (Oslo: Det 
Norske Samlaget, 2000). 
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century Norway.283 It was not revolutionary but opted instead for social 
democracy where the struggle for a new hegemony was founded on 
democratic principles. The overall concern of the Labour movement in 
these first decades of the twentieth century was a political fight against 
capitalists and employers. However, this struggle was soon replaced by a 
representation, which, similarly to the Populist Nationalists of the late 
nineteenth century, firmly rested on the notion of the people as the core 
of the nation, which became hegemonic to such an extent that any other 
classes or groups had to attend to it, whether they wanted to or not.284  
 
This hegemonic representation of the people came to have a profound 
influence on Norwegian cultural policy later on in the century. Its cultural 
influence followed naturally from the folkeopplysning and language 
movement of the nineteenth century. In fact Vestheim argues that a 
straight line can be drawn from the Populist Nationalists to the cultural 
policies of the Labour movement:  
 
the labour movement inherited the fundamental idea that the cultures of 
the populace were independent, adequate cultures, which had the right 
to develop on their own terms, from the folkeopplysning- and language-
traditions of the nineteenth century.285  
 
Hence, although the nature of the Norwegian political landscape changed 
from an antagonism running between an urban elite and a rural counter 
culture to one between a socialist and a non-socialist fraction, the Labour 
                                            
283 Vestheim (1995), p. 97. 
284 Neumann (2001), pp. 171 - 172. 
285 Vestheim (1995), p. 95. 
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movement‟s cultural policies did not represent a radical break from the 
Populist Nationalists.  
 
The Labour movement concluded early that in order for the common 
worker to gain any real political influence, people needed to be 
enlightened and educated to gain knowledge and understanding of their 
own culture and values. The objectives were to give the working classes 
inner strength and help in the fight against the bourgeoisie. The strategy 
for the Labour movement was both to become involved in and gain 
influence over existing cultural organisations and institutions, as well as to 
establish alternatives. The former can, according to Vestheim, be termed 
a quantitative cultural policy, where the level of cultural experiences and 
artefacts and how they should be distributed or re-distributed are 
emphasised: in other words, to democratise culture. The latter is related 
to the Labour movement wanting to create an alternative culture, and 
define culture qualitatively different. These latter ideas were however not 
translated into official policy until the 1970s, and although a straight line 
can be drawn from the Populist Nationalist to the Labour movement, the 
latter would also want what was referred to as the high arts, such as 
music by classically trained musicians, theatre, and professional visual 
arts, to be available for the working class.  
 
According to Vestheim, the one organisation, which next to the Labour 
Party itself was the most important in spreading and establishing an 
alternative culture was the the Workers‟ Educational Association 
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(Arbeidernes Opplysnings Forbund – AOF). 286  Several other 
organisations were also central287 and they all had in common a more or 
less firm connection with the Labour Party. AOF was established in 1931, 
as a culmination of several attempts to create a national socialist 
organisation for education and folkeopplysning. The Labour Party had as 
early as around 1910 organised evening classes for workers to teach 
general subjects as well as to prepare them for participation in public life, 
but AOF‟s mission went further:  
 
The main task for AOF was to create a socialist and counter cultural 
alternative organisation for folkeopplysning. The mission statement said 
amongst other things that the organisation should „be part of the workers‟ 
socialist class struggle and work for the Norwegian working class‟ 
economic and political education and for an elevation of its intellectual 
and cultural level.288 
 
AOF argued strongly for a new and more democratic cultural policy. In 
one of its publications from 1936, it states that until now, culture (read: a 
canonised artistic heritage) has only been available to a few selected 
people. The Labour movement wanted to change this and: 
 
make culture a common guide for the whole of the people. Through theatre 
performances, art exhibitions and first and foremost through reading valuable 
literature shall the worker learn to appreciate real cultural values.289  
 
                                            
286 Vestheim (1995). 
287  Such as The Workers Sports Federation (Arbeidernes Idrettsforbund) and The Socialist 
Cultural Front (Sosialistisk Kulturfront).   
288 Vestheim (1995), p. 108. 
289 Cited in Vestheim (1995), p. 115. 
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In addition to the many documents and plans published by the Labour 
Party and by AOF in the 1930s, the government of the time also 
published papers containing policy-ideas. A resolution from the Ministry of 
Church Affairs‟ Council for Folkeopplysning (Kirkedepartementets 
folkeopplysningsnemnd), which was published in 1934, outlined what the 
government saw as the most important tasks for a publicly funded cultural 
policy. It suggested crisis aid to arts organisations facing hardship, 
support for a seminar series, study circles, touring exhibitions and film.290 
A theatre committee had also been established in 1935, which suggested 
a range of measures to meet what had become a growing financial crisis 
for the theatres. An important organisational change was introduced in 
1938 when a separate cultural department responsible for universities 
and higher education, broadcasting, and the arts and culture, was 
established within the Ministry for Church Affairs. 
 
In another publication from 1935, Håkon Lie (who was later to become 
party secretary of the Labour Party) argued that in addition to creating 
their own cultural expressions, workers must learn to appreciate the 
culture that has been created by other classes:  
 
Slowly theatre, music, song, painting, film, literature has demanded its 
place. The labour movement is not only a political, industrial and 
economic movement. In its deepest sense I guess its aim is to give 
workers the same part in the cultural heritage as other social classes.291  
 
                                            
290 Mangset (1995), pp. 123 - 124. 
291 Vestheim (1995), p. 115. 
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He continued by saying that the socialist cultural organisations had as 
one of their tasks to „educate workers to acquire the value of the arts‟.292 
In other words, it is the socialist cultural organisations, which are given 
the task to educate and to help the common man to grow by being 
exposed to the arts, here articulated as including theatre, music, and so 
on. In Gramscian terms, it is as if a bourgeois civilising project has 
succeeded by achieving consensus around bourgeois culture, here 
exemplified by the subscription to it by one of the main representatives of 
the working class. The arts are given a universal value in this statement, 
from which all groups and classes ought to learn. Vestheim describes the 
Labour movement‟s cultural policy thus: 
 
The labour movement thus gets a double task regarding culture and 
enlightenment. It shall both celebrate its own, new working class culture 
and administer the cultural heritage.293  
 
Hence, bourgeois enlightenment values continued to inform the cultural 
policy of the counter-cultural Labour movement of the early twentieth 
century, with the change that this time it was representatives from the 
working classes themselves who advocated Arnoldian values.  
 
In a similar way to the National Romantic movement of the nineteenth 
century, the Labour movement thus continued to straddle two horses. 
Using more modern cultural policy notions, they wanted to democratise 
                                            
292 Ibid., p. 116. 
293 Ibid. 
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culture and at the same time enhance a cultural democracy. In other 
words, they wanted to celebrate and develop further an alternative culture 
of the people but without allowing it to replace an established artistic 
canon. Another similarity between the Populist Nationalist movement of 
the nineteenth century and the Labour movement of the 1930s is that 
they both used culture politically to „create a political platform and a 
cultural legitimacy for political power‟.294  
 
The Labour Party formed its first long-term government in 1935, but the 
ideas about cultural policy that had informed the discussions within the 
party, AOF and other Labour organisations, were not translated into 
government policy just yet. Instead, these policies were formulated 
outside the parliamentary decision-making system, but they would come 
to have, as will be shown, a profound influence on governmental cultural 
policy decisions (from both sides of the political spectrum) decades after 
the Second World War. In the meantime, cultural policies remained 
patchy and reactive. Some decisions were made such as a law which 
stated that every Norwegian municipality should have a public library (the 
library act of 1935), a cinema act regulating public cinema exhibition from 
1913 and the appointment of a Chief Inspector of Ancient Monuments 
and Historic Buildings (riksantikvar) in 1912. In addition to this the 
parliament continued to give grants directly to selected artists. However, it 
was not until after 1945 that Norway developed a coherent and structural 
                                            
294 Vestheim (1995), p. 125. 
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cultural policy with its own administrative apparatus: 295  what I call a 
modern cultural policy.296  
 
5.2 Cultural policy between 1945 and 1973 – towards 
consensus 
 
The emerging rhetoric and documents about cultural policy issues after 
the war originated mostly either within the Labour Party or from 
organisations with strong links to it.297 However, the ideas debated during 
the 1930s about supporting an alternative culture growing from the grass-
roots and up, were pretty much absent and did not resurface until the 
1970s, I shall focus on these in Chapter Six. I should emphasise that the 
period charted in this chapter also saw the advent of television, which 
obviously became a formidable cultural force, which would reach out to 
most Norwegian households, and also become a tool for folkeopplysning. 
However, as pointed out in Chapter Three this falls outside of the remit of 
this research project.  
 
 
 
                                            
295 Mangset (1992). 
296 To locate 1945 as the year from which Norway only got a „proper‟ cultural policy has been 
disputed by Dag Solhjell, who argues that many policies were also instigated prior to and during 
the Second World War; Dag Solhjell, „Når fikk Norge en kulturpolitikk? Et debattinnlegg mot 
den konvensjonelle visdom‟, in Nordisk Kulturpolitisk Tidskrift 8.2 (2005), pp. 143 - 155. I am 
elaborating a bit further on Solhjel‟s critique in Appendix 1. 
297 Vestheim (1995); Helene Roshauw, „Fra mesenvirksomhet til velferdspolitikk: Utviklingen av 
norsk kulturpolitikk‟ (M.Phil thesis, University of Oslo, 1980). 
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5.2.1 Culture for all: the cultural policy of the post-war 
Norwegian Labour Party  
 
Vestheim has analysed the debate within the Labour Party in the 1950s 
and concludes that the emphasis on class struggle and an alternative 
working class culture withered somewhat after the war.298 Some critics 
within the Labour movement argued for a more humanistic and 
individualistic approach to cultural policy with intellectual and aesthetic 
objectives. The historian Halvdan Koht for example, who was also an 
active politician interested in cultural policy issues, argued that the Labour 
movement‟s class struggle was part of a national development and that 
all social classes had contributed at different times to the growth of a 
common national culture. Echoing Herder, he argued that none of these 
cultures were, more valuable than others but they had all instead, at 
different times, made their contribution. In the twentieth century the time 
had come for the working class to carry forward the traditions that had 
previously been laid by the bourgeoisie and the peasants. This is an 
important part of a socialist mission, which has as its objective to do away 
with social class, and hence also class culture, altogether. It was argued 
that a new culture which would encompass elements of the culture of all 
previous social classes would emerge.299  
 
This type of rhetoric echoes in some way the Romantic Nationalist 
representation of the nineteenth century when arguing that working class 
culture (as previously peasant culture) should not replace bourgeois 
                                            
298 Vestheim (1995).  
299 Vestheim (1995), p. 134.  
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culture but come in addition to it. It differed from the strong emphasis on 
the use of culture in a utilitarian class struggle, which could be found in 
the policy documents of the 1930s. If this rhetoric is part of a hegemonic 
political battle, then it appears as if the working class again is making 
concessions in order to establish its culture at the core of the nation: not 
coined in opposition to a middle class culture but instead co-opting it.  
 
Another advocate for the humanistic and individualistic importance of the 
arts and literature was the editor of the newspaper „Arbeideravisa’ in 
Trondheim, Ole Øisang. In a pamphlet published by AOF in 1951, he is 
not rejecting the welfare potential in an increased focus on culture, but he 
argues that there are also intrinsic values in the arts and literature that 
are important for the whole of humanity. Taking this Arnoldian stance it is 
argued that everybody (including the working classes) ought to 
experience the arts. There is also a strong Bildung aspect to his 
argument, when he reasons that reading makes people feel more secure 
due to increased knowledge and understanding as well as making them 
more unprejudiced and tolerant. There are also other impacts, which are 
related to a welfare agenda such as culture contributing to people‟s self-
confidence and their ability to take part in democratic processes, 
presumably to further the working class‟ agenda.  
 
However, although Koht and Øisang‟s works were influential to a certain 
degree, they were exceptions and most of the publications about cultural 
policy originating from within the Labour Party emphasised culture‟s 
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welfare potential. In 1959, the Labour Party issued a publication with the 
title: „a Cultural programme for debate‟ (et kulturprogram til debatt), which 
was the result of the work of a committee that had been given the task of 
developing a cultural programme for the party. Helge Sivertsen, a 
politician who was central in this committee, has argued that this 
document informed the Labour Party‟s cultural policy all the way up to the 
seventies.300 This document, like Koht‟s, also argues that the objective of 
socialism, and indeed socialist cultural policy, is to do away with class 
divisions altogether. However, it puts the main emphasis on the social 
benefits of culture and, according to Vestheim:  
 
points in the direction of an understanding of culture in accordance with a 
social science approach, where the social effects of a cultural policy are 
given most importance, not aesthetic qualities.301  
 
The emphasis on class struggle and the development of an alternative 
working class culture of the 1930s was replaced by a welfare policy 
aimed at everybody. The social impact, based on a wide definition of 
culture rather than aesthetic qualities, was given the most importance. 302 
 
However, modern cultural policy would not be informed by these ideas 
just yet. Although the debates within the Labour Party defined culture 
widely, this was not necessarily reflected in governmental policies of the 
first years after the war.  
                                            
300 Ibid., p. 138. 
301 Ibid., p. 140. 
302 Ibid., p. 144. 
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In 1949 the Ministry for Education and Church Affairs (Kirke of 
Undervisningsdepartementet - KUD) issued a green paper entitled About 
Support for Organised Youth Work and Initiatives for Leisure Culture. It 
has been argued that this paper, which proposed „a fundamental and 
general cultural programme‟,303 was the first proper green paper about 
cultural policy in Norway. Although the paper does not refer to notions 
such as „cultural democracy‟ and „a wider definition of culture‟ it clearly 
laid the foundation for these new ideas to come. The result of this 
proposal was that the government started a systematic funding of 
community halls around the country. The funding was partly raised from 
the official state football pools, which the government had introduced in 
1946. 304  These venues were designed to host a range of different 
activities, including „elite culture‟, cultural activities organised by the 
voluntary sector as well as sports. According to Vestheim: „As a symbol 
and signifier the community hall stood for stronger popular involvement 
and an open and manifold notion of culture‟.305  
 
These cultural policy measures attempt to straddle both the high arts and 
community culture and rely on both an object  and a subject approach to 
Bildung. I shall now outline how the need to disseminate the arts became 
a key objective of post-war cultural policy.  
 
 
                                            
303 Mangset (1992), p. 126. 
304 Given that DKS is funded by the state lottery, I shall cover the historical development of this 
source of finance in more detail in Chapter Six.  
305 Vestheim (1995), p. 160.  
170 
 
5.2.2 Democratisation of culture and the dissemination of the 
arts 
 
Despite all the rhetoric both within the labour movement in the 1930s 
about a new and different working class culture as well as the mentioned 
debates in the Labour Party in the 1950s, which focused on culture as 
being an integrated part of welfare policy, many of the decisions taken 
between 1945 and the 1970s were informed by the idea of democratising 
culture, meaning to bring the established arts (or high arts) to as many 
people as possible, crossing both social and geographical boundaries. 
The parliament decided to establish and fund a range of organisations, 
whose remit was to tour the arts around the country. The Norwegian 
Touring Theatre (Riksteatret) and a touring cinema (Norsk Bygdekino) 
were established in 1948, the Touring Art Gallery (Riksutstillinger) in 1952 
and a touring organisation for music (Rikskonsertene) in 1968. The idea 
behind all these institutions was to bring high quality art to audiences 
around the country who would otherwise not have had the opportunity to 
experience such expressions by professional artists. A national opera 
company (Den Norske Opera) was established in 1957, with a similar 
objective.306  
 
                                            
306 In addition to the establishment of these institutions, the arrangements where parliament gave 
stipends and guaranteed income to artists continued until 1963. Several of these stipends took the 
form of life-long salaries for distinguished artists, mostly writers. This was abolished and 
replaced with three-year working stipends for artists, which were decided on by expert groups 
and representatives of the Norwegian Association of Writers (Den Norske Forfatterforening); 
Geir Vestheim, „”(...) der er gift paa Pennen hans”: Kampen i Stortinget om diktargasjane 1863-
1962’ (Oslo: Unipub, 2005). Artists have also since 1975 been able to negotiate terms for artists‟ 
copyright compensations with the objective of improving their living conditions and enabling 
them to continue their practice; Mangset (1992), p. 144.  
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Mangset argues that all these decisions were taken in an atmosphere of 
optimism where the decision-makers thought that the arts only needed a 
vitamin injection or kick start as part of the rebuilding of the country after 
the war and that artists and arts institutions would survive on the private 
market as soon as people got more leisure time and more spending 
power due to an anticipated improved financial situation.307 However, it 
soon became clear that this was over-optimistic and that people‟s arts 
consumption in reality had instead declined.308 The financial condition for 
artists and arts institutions was thus far from as promising as had been 
predicted.  
 
Politicians, publishers, authors and others were particularly concerned 
about the future of Norwegian literature, particularly what was termed 
„quality‟ fiction.309 People had not taken up reading this type of literature 
to the extent hoped for by the government.310 In response to this the 
government decided to set up a Norwegian Cultural Fund (Norsk 
Kulturfond) and an arts council (Norsk Kulturråd) to administer it, which 
was to be financed through a tax on popular weekly magazines. It was 
                                            
307 Mangset (1992). 
308  The average Norwegian‟s expenditure on public performances at theatres, concerts and 
cinemas as a percentage of total expenditure went down from 1,1 per cent in 1946 to 0,3 per cent 
in 1968; Nils Øye quoted in Mangset (2002), p. 130. 
309 Vestheim (1995), p. 129.  
310 In fact, the number of Norwegian publications of novels, short-stories, poetry and plays had 
gone down from 136 in 1938 to only 86 in 1963, and the percentage of Norwegian published 
fiction (as opposed to in translation) went down from 68 per cent in 1931 to 31 per cent in 1959. 
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also decided that the government should purchase 1000 copies of every 
fictional book and assign them to the country‟s libraries.311  
 
Vestheim suggests that this shift away from the wish to create a new 
working-class culture, which was revered to such an extent in the 1930s, 
towards the inclination to democratise the arts can be explained by 
culture increasingly being perceived as a welfare good. In order to 
achieve this, decisionmakers focused primarily on designing and 
implementing a delivery system for established cultural expressions to 
reach a wide audience. 312  
 
The objectives were quantitative, where efficient delivery systems were 
given more prominence than considerations related to content, the 
programming of which would be determined by the four national touring 
organisations for film, visual art, theatre and music, as well as through the 
foundation of the Norwegian Cultural Fund / Arts Council, Norway, in 
accordance with „the arms‟ length principle‟.  
 
However, Vestheim does not say much about what the rationale behind 
including culture (meaning what he terms the high arts) as part of the 
provisions facilitated by the welfare-state was. The analysis of these 
policies through secondary sources such as the works of Vestheim, 
Mangset and Roshauw unveils only to a limited extent which rationales 
                                            
311 It is important to notice though that this was to exclude what was classified as “western and 
pocket crime” books. 
312 Vestheim (1995), p. 170. 
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they were based on, although Vestheim argues that this is related to 
folkeopplysning in the object sense, through the enlightenment of the 
people.313 Let me summarise this chapter, before I attempt to go beyond 
these writers and assess the extent to which a civilising mission has been 
a key rationale behind the cultural policies of the nineteenth century and 
twentieth century up to 1973.  
 
5.3 Summary  
 
By 1905 the Nationalist Populist representation had, according to 
Neumann, become hegemonic, where the notion of the people, meaning 
the people defined in opposition to and excluding the elite, was a central 
concept of power. Consequentially, the elite stratum was treated with 
suspicion. This is, according to Neumann, still the case today, particularly 
in debates about Europe, and this central position of the people was 
strengthened even further with the rise of the Labour movement during 
the first few decades of the twentieth century.  
 
This social democratic representation can be viewed as a „historic bloc‟, 
through which a hegemony, based on social democratic principles, 
emerges. In creating this historical bloc, which rests firmly on the notion 
of the people, the labour movement is „entering into an intimate 
collaboration with other working people, especially the peasants‟.314  
 
                                            
313 Vestheim (1995).  
314 Neumann (2001a), p. 100. 
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Hence, the social democratic representation, which acquires real power 
in 1935 when it takes control of parliament (a control it will keep with one 
exception until 1963) does not signify a radical break from Populist 
Nationalism. The main difference was the emphasis on working people 
rather than „the people‟, which included both manual workers in the 
industries as well as people working in the primary sector in the districts.   
 
This would also come to influence the cultural policies of the Labour 
movement, which through the Labour Party learnt to straddle two horses. 
In the 1930s, the antagonism between working class culture and 
bourgeois culture was replaced by a representation of the Norwegian 
nation, which did away with this conflict altogether and replaced it with 
one with the people at its core. Hence, the movement never rejected the 
high arts, but rather emphasised that everybody should have access to 
them and that a new working class culture came in addition to, not 
instead of, the arts. This policy rhetoric was instrumental, in that it 
emphasised culture‟s potential to enlighten and support people, but it also 
referred to the intrinsic values of the arts and the idea that society should 
celebrate both the new working class culture and cultural heritage. 
However, apart from „relief measures‟ to arts organisations facing 
economic hardship, few of these ideas were translated into real policies 
prior to the Second World War. Hence, several of the power concepts 
remain rhetorical, but both a subject  and object approach to Bildung is 
present in the discourse.  
 
175 
 
A summary of the two hegemonic representations of the twentieth century 
(up to 1973) are presented in Table Four.  
 
Hegemonic 
Representation 
Power Concepts Examples of cultural 
policy measures 
   
Social Democracy  Class and the working 
people as an antithesis 
to the state, replaced by 
the working people as 
the nation’s core. 
 The nation 
encompasses the 
working people plus 
everybody else.  
 The culture of the 
working people is 
independent and 
adequate.  
 But the arts given 
universal value  
 
The people need to gain 
knowledge and 
understanding of their own 
culture. 
 Various measures to 
address economic 
hardship for cultural 
organisations.  
 Plus an expression that all 
cultures (including the 
bourgeois cultural 
heritage) should be 
accessible for all.  
 
   
   
Welfare provision  A socialist nation, 
made up of a people 
encompassing 
everybody independent 
of class (nobody being 
excluded).  
 Consequently the 
nation shall do away 
with class and class 
culture altogether.  
 
Less emphasis on an 
alternative grass-root based 
culture and more on culture 
as part of welfare-provision 
accessible to all 
 Funding of community 
halls (disseminating both 
elite and folk culture). 
 Four touring organisations 
(for film, music, theatre 
and the visual arts), plus a 
national opera company 
 Guaranteed income for 
artists 
 The Norwegian Cultural 
Fund and Arts Council, 
Norway 
 
   
   
Timeline: 1905 1930 1945 1973 
 Norway gains 
full 
independence 
Rise of the 
Labour 
party 
Liberation from 
Nazis 
occupation 
Green 
papers and 
„new‟ 
cultural 
policy 
 
Table 4: Hegemonic Representations in twentieth-century Norway (1905 – 1973) 
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The 1950s saw a rhetoric originating from the Labour Party and its 
affiliated organisations, where the concept of the people covers 
everybody, including both the working-class and the bourgeoisie, aiming 
towards a socialist nation, which does away with class altogether. 
Consequently, the cultural policies after the war were less preoccupied 
with grass-root culture originating from the working classes and 
emphasise instead a universal culture, which should be part of the state‟s 
welfare-provision. Hence, it puts much emphasis on the arts, such as 
music performed by professional musicians, theatre and the visual arts.  
 
We see a turn towards an object approach, which celebrates a universal 
culture‟s ability to facilitate Bildung. There are thus fewer policies with the 
aim to re-focus on the alternative working class culture, which featured 
distinctly in the rhetoric of the 1930s.  
 
Before I move on to analyse in more depth how the idea-trajectories of 
the period between 1814 and 1973 informed the new cultural policies 
from 1973 and onwards, let me briefly take stock of the Bildung 
dimension in these earlier policies.  
 
5.4 Summary of Chapters Four and Five: The trajectories 
of the Folkeopplysnings idea  
 
In this and the previous chapter I have attempted to contextualise the 
analysis of late twentieth-century policy rationales by exploring the history 
of Norwegian cultural policy ideas, dating back to 1814 with a particular 
focus on the Bildung aspect of these policies. Because there are so few 
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papers articulating clear policy rationales and because I have only 
analysed them through secondary sources (through other scholars‟ work) 
it is at this stage difficult to make any decisive conclusions regarding how 
understandings of culture‟s role in a civilising mission were internalised in 
the discourses of the nineteenth century and the twentieth century up to 
1973. Some important concepts of power have been introduced, but they 
only relate to cultural policies indirectly. As we shall see in the next two 
chapters, clearer discursive practices crystallise from 1973, but several of 
these, particularly regarding culture‟s Bildungs potential, are informed by 
trajectories, going all the way back to the nineteenth century.  
 
Despite not necessarily being informed by explicitly articulated rationales, 
most of the cultural policies that I have charted in these two chapters 
(covering almost 160 years) have had as their aim to facilitate personal or 
social transformations. The articulations of some of the Statist and 
particularly the Romantic Nationalist projects of the nineteenth century 
had an object focused civilising dimension to them, expressed explicitly 
by some of the influential representatives from the elite that I quoted in 
the previous chapter, including Welhaven, Munch and Bjørnson.  
 
The increasing power gained by the Populist Nationalists towards the end 
of the nineteenth century, has, according to Vestheim, on the other hand 
profoundly influenced the cultural and educational agenda in Norway.315 
Although these Populist Nationalist ideas originated in the nineteenth 
                                            
315 Vestheim (1995).  
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century, they resonated strongly in the discourses of the Labour 
movement in the first half of the twentieth century and since 1945 as an 
important rationale behind aspects of modern cultural policy through its 
principle of cultural democracy. This demonstrates clearly, in Vestheim‟s 
view, how Norwegian folkeopplysning has seen a development from an 
object model to a subject model.316  
 
However, the Labour movement straddles two horses at the same time. 
On the one hand a class-less approach to culture was advocated, for 
example typified by Håkon Lie when he argued that workers should take 
part in the same cultural heritage as other classes, such as theatre, music 
painting and literature, as, in Arnoldian terms, an object approach to 
Bildung. In other words, the peasants and the workers aimed to educate 
themselves in accordance with Arnoldian values. On the other hand, the 
people should also gain knowledge and understanding of their own 
culture. This is inward-looking and less engaged with a European 
continental heritage.317  
  
However, such an inward-looking understanding does not appear to have 
been rooted in the policies after 1945, which saw a return to a perception 
of a universal culture, which everybody should subscribe to, in what was 
still hoped to become a class-less socialist society.  
                                            
316 Vestheim (1995), p. 89. 
317 Neumann appears to indicate that they succeeded in this to the extent that, over one hundred 
years later the nation has chosen to turn inwards in its encounter with the wider Europe through 
two EEC/EU referenda. 
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The Bildung potential in cultural policy has, in other words, developed 
along two parallel lines, where, perhaps apart from the Populist 
Nationalist project of the last decades of the nineteenth century, it was 
not a question of „either – or‟. Stuart Hall, writing about British culture, has 
argued that: 
 
It is crucial to replace the notion of „culture‟ with the more concrete, 
historical concept of „cultures‟: a redefinition which brings out more 
clearly the fact that cultures always stand in relations of domination – 
and subordination – to one another, are always, in some sense, in 
struggle with another.318 
 
This has clearly been the case in Norway too. However, Norway differs 
from the UK because these different cultures have also been part of the 
official cultural policy at different times, whereas in the UK it is easier to 
detect „a dominant culture, which represents itself as the culture‟.319  
 
As mentioned, the Bildung rationale (whether with a subject  or object 
approach) has been running like a red thread throughout all the cultural 
policies of the nineteenth century and twentieth centuries. I shall argue 
that this is epitomised by DKS. However, before that I shall focus in more 
detail on the policy texts published between 1973 and 2003, which are 
the subject of the next chapter. I shall start with the policy rationales of 
the so-called „new‟ cultural policies of the 1970s, which had cultural 
democracy as an objective and which aimed to define the content of 
governmental cultural provisions differently from the policies immediately 
                                            
318 Stuart Hall cited in Hewison (1995), p. 17. 
319 Ibid., p. 16. 
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after 1945. These policies were partly inspired by ideas which originated 
in the Labour movement of the thirties, and which we have already 
established go in a straight line back to the Populist Nationalist movement 
of the late nineteenth century. There are thus clear continuities in the 
Bildung rationale behind Norwegian cultural policy.  
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6.0 Cultural policy discourses: 1973 - 2003 
 
As argued in previous chapters, what I term a „modern‟ Norwegian 
cultural policy was initiated after the Second World War, when central 
government took a more active role in providing access to cultural 
expressions and activities. This policy‟s main objective in the beginning 
was to democratise culture, a policy-rationale which continues to be at 
the forefront, and which, I shall argue, reached a peak with the 
introduction of DKS in 2001. As will be demonstrated in the next chapter, 
DKS is to a high extent concerned with Bildung, and in this respect, it sits 
comfortably within Norwegian post-war cultural policies. However, this 
Bildung objective has also, at times during the second half of the 
twentieth century, been invoked by other types of cultural policy  
measures, which have been more subject focused in their orientation. 
However, such policy rationales were only to a limited extent articulated 
in the 1940s, 50s and 60s.  
 
Few documents were published during the first decades after the war that 
gave clear ideas about why the government should allocate public money 
to culture or set long-term objectives for its cultural policy. This changed 
in the 1970s, when central government began publishing its first cultural 
policy Green papers, which coincided with a substantial increase in public 
spending on culture. The purpose of the first Green paper, published in 
1973, was, according to Roshauw, for the first time: 
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to make a total evaluation of the public involvement in the cultural sector, 
based on the fact that different support arrangements had developed 
randomly without any clear political consideration.320 
 
Hence, following on from the broad presentation of Norwegian cultural 
policies in Chapters Four and Five, which took us all the way back to the 
dissolution of the union between Norway and Denmark in 1814, this 
chapter will explore the rationales behind Norwegian cultural policy since 
1973 in more detail. As will be demonstrated below, the policy papers 
between 1973 and 2004, as outlined in this analysis, harbour both a 
subject  and an object approach to Bildung.  
 
The aim of the chapter is to interrogate these Green papers (six 
altogether) and the subsequent debates in parliament with the aim, 
through an analysis of the discourses harboured in these texts, to 
understand better the rationales on which these policies were based. The 
mentioned papers, which have been published at regular intervals 
(approximately every ten years),321  outline central government‟s ideas 
and plans for its cultural policy over each following ten-year period or so.  
 
The chapter will start with a presentation of the background to the policy 
papers as well as the political context within which they were produced, 
followed by a brief introduction to the selection of texts and the approach I 
have taken to analysing them. This will be followed by a detailed 
                                            
320 Roshauw (1980), p. 133. 
321 Two of these six papers were published as additional papers two or three years after the 
original paper was published, due to a change in government in the meantime. Hence, two Green 
Papers were published in the 1970s, and the 1980s, and one in the 1990s and 2000s respectively. 
This is explained in somewhat more detail in Appendix 1.  
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examination of actual papers. The way in which the presentation of these 
documents is structured is informed by the policy rationales I have 
identified, which will be discussed further in the subsequent section. I 
argue that the main rationale harboured by these texts, is  concerned with 
how people‟s exposure to culture can facilitate Bildung. This view is 
internalised by means of a powerful discourse, which, although it changes 
over time and is made up of different layers, still holds together some 
strong assumptions about the Bildung potential of cultural activities. This 
Bildung discourse includes four sets of arguments, on which the 
foundation of these policies are based: a „value‟ argument, a „growth‟ 
argument, an „anti-commercial‟ argument and a „protection-of-national-
culture‟ argument. These arguments all have policy implications, which I 
shall also present in this chapter.  
 
The national budget‟s allocation to cultural activities and cultural 
organisations had increased steadily since 1945 and received a 
significant boost in the 1970s. However, in the 1980s it was clear that this 
bonanza would not continue and the cultural sector was requested to find 
alternative funds from private sources in order to secure its continual 
growth. This laid the foundation for what I term a „marketisation‟ discourse, 
which developed alongside the other discourses already mentioned and 
which increased in intensity over the years.  
 
It is curious to note that both the Bildung and the marketisation 
discourses were subscribed to by most of the actors and institutions 
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contributing to the policy papers and debates analysed, and this is what 
makes them strong and resilient. Differences in opinion could only in 
exceptional cases be traced to party-political allegiances. However, one 
exception to this was an alternative discourse held up by members of the 
Progress Party, who also entered the debate in the 1980s and who more 
or less argued that there was no need for any governmental intervention 
in the cultural sector at all, and hence implicitly rejected the Bildung 
discourse.  
 
Despite these being minority discourses, in the sense that they are 
eclipsed by the main Bildung discourse, I include a presentation of these 
two „alternative‟ discourses (marketisation and Progress Party) in this 
chapter, because they have grown to have a central position in these 
policy papers. Having said that, it is clear that the main rationale behind 
Norwegian cultural policies as represented in these policy documents, 
whether articulated explicitly or implicitly, is to facilitate Bildung. Both the 
Arnoldian emphasis on the transforming and civilising power of great 
works of arts, as well as Herder‟s more relativist, open definition of what 
types of culture have a Bildung potential are at play in these texts. 
Curiously, they are rarely coined in opposition to each other, but are 
mostly subscribed to amongst all the contributors. However, there 
appears to be a gradual change in the discursive intensity in favour of the 
object approach to Bildung, and DKS seems to have been introduced in a 
cultural policy climate which mostly celebrates the professional arts as 
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opposed to one where the Bildung potential is defined more widely 
through participation in a wider range of cultural activities.   
 
6.1 Background and methodological approach  
 
Before presenting the actual analysis of the policy papers and the 
debates, I shall briefly explain the political context within which these 
texts were produced, particularly in the case of the two seminal Green 
papers produced in the 1970s. I shall also elaborate on the rationales 
behind my selections of texts and the analytical approach I have taken.   
 
 
6.1.1 Political context 
 
A key finding that I will highlight in this chapter is that political party 
affiliation only determined the different understandings and assumptions 
in the Norwegian discourse on cultural policy to a limited degree. 322 
However, it is still useful to include a general presentation of the political 
landscape at the time of the publications and debates, to set the 
context.323  
 
In Chapter Five I argued that the cultural policies of the post-war years 
were integrated parts of the welfare policies of the government. The 
objective was to democratise culture, and the Labour Party expressed a 
                                            
322 Instances where such differences have been identified will be pointed out, otherwise it can be 
assumed that the representations presented in this paper have broad support across the Norwegian 
political party spectrum.  
323 Please see Appendix 2 for a table with all the policy texts I have consulted and Appendix 6 for 
a table of all the governments of the period covered in this policy-paper based study (1973 and 
2004), which also includes a listing of the prime minister and the parties that made up each 
government, the Norwegian abbreviation of each party-name as well as the location of all the 
policy-papers (Green Papers, responses by the parliamentary committee or minutes of plenary 
sessions in parliament) that I have analysed within each governmental period. 
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break from the tradition of active participation, which had been prevalent 
in the rhetoric of the 1930s. Vestheim argues that the ideas from the 
1930s were picked up again about forty years later, in the 1970s, and 
turned into policies which were also influenced by international trends at 
that time.324  
 
In 1974, the budget of the cultural section of the Department for 
Educational and Church Affairs‟ was distributed as follows: 64 per cent 
allocated to institutions primarily mediating the „high arts‟, 16 per cent on 
cultural heritage activities and 20 per cent for decentralised activities, 
meaning activities that could be characterised by a wider definition of 
culture.325 However, it became clear that the establishment of the four 
touring organisations mentioned in Chapter Five and the Arts Council, 
Norway had achieved little in actually democratising culture. As Vestheim 
puts it: 
 
The well-to-do middle class in the cities, with sufficient cultural capital 
and a relatively good financial situation, were in reality the receivers of 
the irrigation-policy of the 50s and the 60s.326 
 
Since 1960 politicians and bureaucrats had been working on a Green 
paper for culture but for various reasons this never materialised. 327 
                                            
324 Vestheim (1995). 
325 Roshauw (1980), p. 115. Roshauw has carried out the commendable task of breaking down the 
ministry‟s budget. The basket she characterises as the high arts includes established institutions 
like the National Gallery and the National Theatre, located in central areas (42 per cent), funding 
for the four touring organisations for film, theatre, music and the visual arts (10 per cent), and the 
Norwegian Cultural Fund (12 per cent). 
326 Vestheim (1995), p. 175. 
327 Ibid., p. 163. 
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However, the failure of the policies from the 1950s and 1960s was not 
ignored. Dahl and Helseth refer to a „second cultural panic‟, (the first had 
been the fear of the international cultural industries, which lead to the 
foundation of the Arts Council, Norway in 1965), because most people 
still did not make use of the high arts provision that was made possible as 
a result of public funding.328  
 
The response from politicians was a critical interrogation of the 
Government‟s cultural policy, including its priorities and objectives, where 
it was argued that the focus of governmental cultural policy should, to a 
greater extent, be on activating people rather than just mediating the arts. 
Another argument was that cultural policy decisions ought to become 
much more decentralised.329 This coincided with an acknowledgement of 
the potential power of the ever-growing cultural industries, which, as we 
shall see, were perceived as vulgar and as having a damaging effect on 
people.  
 
The resulting first Green papers of the 1970s were inspired by and in line 
with the recommendations from UNESCO and other international 
organisations as well as international trends at the time. 330   The 
governments in both Sweden and Denmark had presented similar papers 
to their parliaments, and these new ideas in all the three Scandinavian 
countries were highly influenced by the recommendations put forward 
after an international conference in Venice in 1970, organised by 
                                            
328 Dahl and Helseth (2006), p. 229. 
329 Vestheim (1995), p. 175. 
330 Ibid., p. 177. 
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UNESCO. The Council of Europe had also produced documents arguing 
that an increased support for culture could be viewed as an investment in 
people and as a basis for democracy and increased freedom.331    
The UNESCO influence 
 
Given that much of the rhetoric in the first Green papers of the 1970s to 
such an extent departed from the principle to democratise culture, 
meaning the arts, I shall elaborate a little further on the international 
trends it was influenced by, particularly the ideas originating from Unesco. 
Robert Hewison has juxtaposed the democratisation of culture with 
cultural democracy and argues that there is a:  
 
difference between a view of culture that, following the definition offered 
by Matthew Arnold in 1869, [...] [which] sees it as a „pursuit of our total 
perfection by means of getting to know the best which has been thought 
and said in the world‟ and that other view which sees culture as the 
common expression of a people, where values emerge from below, and 
are not imposed from above.332  
 
It is the juxtaposing of these two cultural policy ideas that the Venice 
conference and the subsequent and seminal book „Cultural development: 
Experience and policies‟ authored by the French civil servant and cultural 
policy maker Augustin Girard, were debating. The book was highly 
influential on the new cultural policies of all the Scandinavian countries: 
specifically Girard‟s recommendation to shift the focus of cultural policy 
                                            
331 Ibid., p. 60. 
332 Hewison (1995), p. 34. 
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from a focus on the democratisation of culture to one of a cultural 
democracy.333 
 
Vestheim argues that Girard‟s book is seminal in the sense that it 
expresses underlying thoughts of this particular period. Girard‟s 
intellectual project does not take culture‟s intrinsic values as its point of 
departure, but emphasises instead how culture can satisfy the „need for 
quality of life and identity‟.334  
 
Hence, cultural policy shall not „exist for the arts, but for the citizens and 
their lives. The arts are, in such a perspective, given a social function‟.335  
 
Girard‟s writing is less concerned with civilising measures in the more 
crude Arnoldian sense, in that he does not talk about anarchy and 
disorder. He is in no doubt of culture‟s universal value though: „Culture is 
the response to man‟s highest needs, the need which gives him his 
dignity, which makes him man‟.336  
 
However, Girard lamented what he called the piecemeal and 
dehumanising work that many workers were made subject to, and argued 
that this also spilled over into their leisure life, which Girard argued was:  
 
                                            
333 Vestheim (1995), p. 72. 
334 Ibid., p. 63. 
335 Ibid., p. 65. 
336  Augustin Girard and Geneviève Gentil, Cultural Development: experiences and policies 
(Paris: Unesco, 1983), p. 16. 
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governed by the attitudes imposed during working hours. Those who are 
most creatively employed also enjoy the most creative leisure, and those 
most passive in their work are equally so in their leisure.337  
 
This desolate situation could only be overcome by a policy:  
 
aimed at using the workers‟ leisure to overcome their alienation of body 
and mind, enabling them to realize all their natural potential and accept 
their responsibilities in social life, [only this] will be likely sooner or later 
to fulfil their deepest aspirations.338   
 
This statement‟s emphasis on the realisation of people‟s own potential 
and the importance of giving people the ability to take responsibilities for 
their own social life has a strong Herderian Bildung element to it. In line 
with such an approach to Bildung, Girard explicitly rejects the idea of 
workers‟ leisure time being filled with what he calls „the cultural activities 
typical of the leisured classes of former times‟, 339  which has little 
relevance to most people who face obstacles because they do not have 
the necessary „language, that complex code of symbols to which the 
uninitiated public does not have the key‟.340  
 
A cultural policy, which is preoccupied with these „fine arts‟ does not 
deserve to take its place alongside other more worthy areas like social 
policy and economic policy:  
 
                                            
337 Ibid. 
338 Ibid. 
339 Ibid. 
340 Ibid., p. 66. 
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Unless it is explicitly associated with a number of ultimate ends accepted 
by society and linked to a blueprint for civilization; unless it is a combat 
which can fire the minds of the young.341  
 
Thus, the intrinsic value of culture or the intrinsic value of the arts, is not a 
strong enough justification for a cultural or arts policy, unless it has these 
mentioned impacts and transformative effects.  
 
Girard argues that all these democratisation efforts have failed and that if 
the aim was to remove cultural inequalities, they have been 
counterproductive and instead increased them, „since it benefits those 
who already have access and the desire and means to ensure it [the high 
arts]‟.342 
 
Hence, the culture of the leisured classes or the intellectual aristocracy 
has no place in Girard‟s cultural policy ideas because they can only to a 
limited extent facilitate Bildung.  
 
Girard is equally sceptical about the Bildung potential of the profit-making 
cultural industries, which he describes as an „audio-visual bombardment‟. 
By making use of participation, independence and creativity, television 
might be able to contribute to universal communication. 343  However, 
Girard is sceptical of whether this is possible in practice and instead 
                                            
341 Ibid., p. 23. 
342 Ibid., p. 67.  
343 Ibid., p. 18. 
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describes television as an expression of „passiveness, superficiality, 
voyeurism and reduction to the lowest common denominator‟.344  
 
Girard‟s Bildung objectives can thus neither be achieved by a cultural 
policy which attempts to democratise the „fine arts‟, nor by the cultural 
industries, at least not in their current manifestation. Growth of the 
individual can instead be achieved through a cultural action which:  
 
has its source in the need to give leisure back its value as an element of 
culture, that is, its role in the re-creation of the personality, individual 
expression and social communication.345 
   
In other words, people‟s leisure time should be characterised by active 
participation. Girard breaks with the main principle behind the idea to 
democratise culture, which perceives the main cultural policy challenges 
in terms of quantity: that the culture on offer does not reach out to a wide 
enough audience, crossing social and geographical barriers. Girard asks 
instead a qualitative question: what type of culture should be mediated? 
 
As will be demonstrated below, these policy principles, which depart quite 
radically from the idea to mediate the high arts as widely as possible, 
were to a large extent adopted in the Norwegian cultural policy discourse, 
particularly in the 1970s, but also in the 1980s. This can, according to 
Vestheim, be explained because of the long traditions of subject focused 
                                            
344 Ibid. 
345 Ibid. 
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folkeopplysnings- traditions dating back to the Populist Nationalist 
movements of the nineteenth century.  
The political climate 
 
In 1971, inspired by these international trends, the Labour government 
started drafting a Green paper on a new cultural policy, but before the 
paper was finalised the government was forced to resign. 346  It was 
thereafter a non-socialist coalition government made up of the Centre 
Party (Senterpartiet - SP),347 the Christian Democrats (Kristelig Folkeparti 
- KrF) and the Liberal Party of Norway (Venstre - (V)348 which finally 
presented the paper entitled „About organising and financing the cultural 
sector‟ (Om organisering og finansiering av kulturarbeidet).349 Later, in 
1973, the Labour Party was back in government and this administration 
published an additional Green paper, called „New cultural policy‟ (Ny 
kulturpolitikk).350  
 
In 1981 the Labour Party had to relinquish power to the Conservatives 
(Høyre - H) who, together with the Christian Democrats and the Centre 
                                            
346 Due to the overall negative result in the referendum on Norway‟s membership of the EEC in 
1972. 
347 A party which traditionally represented and gained support from people in rural communities 
employed in the primary sector, like fishing, agriculture and forestry.  
348 Venstre, which is a liberal party, was introduced in Chapter Five. Venstre is Norway‟s oldest 
political party, but has since 1945 had a marginal role and only been able to exercise power in 
collaboration with other parties. 
349  Kyrkje og undervisningsdepartementet (KUD), 1973. St.meld. nr. 8 (1973-74): Om 
organisering og finansiering av kulturarbeid, Oslo. (KUD (1973)). For the sake of clarity, the 
first time a public document is referenced in a footnote, the full reference will be followed by an 
abbreviation, in this case (KUD (1973)). Subsequent references to the same document will be 
using this abbreviated connotation. A list of all the public documents I have consulted, with a 
short description, is listed in Appendix Two.  
350  Kyrkje og undervisningsdepartementet (KUD), 1974. St.meld. nr. 52  (1973-74): Ny 
kulturpolitikk, Tillegg til St.meld. nr. 8 for 1973-74 Om organisering og finansiering av 
kulturarbeid, Oslo. (KUD (1974)). 
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Party, gained majority in parliament.351. The two papers published in the 
early eighties called „Cultural policy for the 1980s‟ (Kulturpolitikk for 1980-
åra)352  and particularly „New tasks in cultural policy‟ (Nye oppgåver i 
kulturpolitkken)‟353 were conceived during a period characterised by major 
political changes in the name of liberalism.354 The 1980s were volatile 
times in Norwegian politics. The traditionally two strongest political parties, 
the Labour Party and the Conservatives, lost their dominance to parties 
further out on the left and the right flank of the political spectrum, notably 
the Socialist Left Party (Sosialistisk Venstreparti - SV) and the Progress 
Party (FrP), the latter experiencing a continuous rise, which, by the 
parliamentary elections of 1989 had gained 13 per cent of the votes and 
twenty-two seats in parliament.355 Until 1989, it had been regarded as a 
marginal party with a radical financial policy but had now become the 
third most popular party in the country. Its laissez-faire policies were 
based on a radically liberal financial policy, with huge tax-cuts and a 
rollback of the welfare state. This had implications for the party‟s 
approach to cultural policy, which broke significantly with the broad 
consensus of the parliamentary debates of the 1970s and the 1980s 
(more about this below).  
 
                                            
351 The Conservatives governed on their own between 1981 and 1983, after which the two latter 
parties joined the Conservatives in a three-party coalition.  
352 Kyrkje og undervisningsdepartementet (KUD), 1981. St.meld. nr. 23 (1981-82): Kulturpolitikk 
for 1980-åra, Oslo. (KUD (1981)). 
353 Kultur og vitskapsdepartementet (KUV), 1983. St.meld. nr. 27 (1983-84): Nye oppgåver i 
kulturpolitikken, Tillegg til St.meld. nr. 23 (1981-82): Kulturpolitikk for 1980-åra Oslo. (KUV 
(1983)). 
354 Examples of this liberalisation are deregulation of the finance and exchange markets, tax cuts 
for both businesses and individuals, privatisation of public companies and permission for 
commercial actors to enter the health sector; Furre (2000), p. 274. 
355  The Progress party originated from the Anders Lange’s parti, which had four seats in 
parliament in 1973. 
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In 1992 the Labour Party was back in power and formed a government, 
which presented the third Green paper on cultural policy in 1992, called 
„Culture in our Time‟ (Kultur i tiden).356 However, the Labour Party did not 
stay in power for long and the 1990s was a volatile time in Norwegian 
politics, with several different minority governments in charge for 
relatively short periods of time. At the parliamentary election of 2001, a 
centre-right government made up of the Conservatives (H), the Christian 
Democrats (KrF) and Venstre, with parliamentary support from the 
Progress Party, formed the government, and it was this coalition which 
presented the last Green paper that I analyse here: „Cultural policy 
towards 2014‟, (Kulturpolitikk fram mot 2014).357 
 
The Green papers discussed in this chapter were thus presented by a 
range of different governmental constellations including most of the 
parties that have been represented in parliament over the same period. 
The parties that were not part of the government at the time of publication 
of the respective papers had their chance to voice their opinions in 
parliament. 
 
                                            
356  Kulturdepartementet (KUL), 1992. St.meld. nr. 61 (1991-92): Kultur i tiden, Oslo. (KUL 
(1992)). 
357 Kultur- og kyrkjedepartementet (KUL), 2003. St.meld. nr. 48 (2002-2003): Kulturpolitikk 
fram mot 2014, Oslo. (KUL (2003a)). As described in footnote 214, cultural policy has over the 
years been placed under different ministries (with different names) together with a shifting 
selection of other policy-areas. By 2003 and the publication of KUL (2003a), culture was again 
joined by church affairs in the department for Culture and Church Affairs. The most significant 
of all these changes is perhaps culture being defined as a separate policy-area in ministry-terms 
(initially together with science) in 1982. Dahl and Helseth argue that this is significant but also a 
paradox, because, whereas the Green Papers of the 1970s, as we shall see, argued that culture 
should be perceived as an aspect of all other policies, the separation of culture in a separate 
department does, in their view, narrow down the concept of culture (Dahl and Helseth, 2006, pp. 
243 - 244).  
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I have included a more extensive introduction to my methodological approach to 
this whole project, in Appendix One. However, I shall briefly give a rationale for 
my selection of policy texts below.  
6.1.2 Choice of texts and analytical approach 
 
These Green papers and the parliamentary responses have set out long-
term policy plans and also to an extent articulated why the policies have 
been necessary as well as the rationales on which they have been based. 
However, they do not exclusively set out to explain the rationales behind 
Norwegian cultural policy. For example, they devote more space to what 
the government intends to do in the area of culture, rather than to why 
they are doing it. However, I argue that in these texts there are 
statements and formulations, which represent the rationales that underpin 
the policies. The challenge is thus to tease out a possibly underlying, 
albeit explicitly formulated, discourse, which harbours information about 
these rationales. With only a few exceptions, all the agencies that could 
contribute to these discourses (the political leadership in government 
(which importantly includes the bureaucrats who actually drafted the 
papers)358 as well as a broad parliament made up of both members from 
parties in government and in opposition) demonstrated a virtually 
consensual agreement about most of the main assumptions behind these 
policies as well as a subscription to their main elements. Some strong 
and resilient discursive practices, based on most agents‟ subscription to a 
                                            
358 The power potential held by the bureaucrats in the current Ministry of Culture has in recent 
years been highlighted by newspaper editors and researchers alike, where it has been argued that 
the bureaucrats have more influence over policies than the politicians (Røyseng (2006)). 
However, an analysis that only focuses on explicitly formulated policy-papers is not best suited to 
identify any power-distinction between bureaucrats and politicians and I shall thus not speculate 
any further on this here.  
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set of durable assumptions, particularly in terms of culture‟s potential to 
facilitate Bildung, appear to permeate these policy papers and the 
subsequent parliamentary responses. It is as if all the arguments, despite 
the potential contradictions within and between them, are being held up 
by all the voices presented here.  
 
The papers thus act as a useful starting point when analysing explicitly 
articulated Norwegian cultural policy measures. Upon publication, the 
Green papers are subsequently discussed by a parliamentary 359 
committee,360 which publishes its response in a parliamentary report361 
and finally this response and the original paper are debated by the whole 
parliament.362 I have identified the contributions of the government and its 
opposition in parliament through the analysis of these texts (the Green 
paper, the parliamentary committee‟s report and the minutes of the final 
debate in the parliament). This is the focus of this chapter.  
  
The inclusion of the parliamentary response both in terms of how it has 
been articulated in the committee‟s report but also in the subsequent 
debate in parliament, ensures that diverging voices are also included in 
the analysis. Another advantage of including the minutes from the open 
                                            
359 The Norwegian parliament is called Storting, although I will continue to refer to this entity as 
the parliament.  
360 The names of these committees have changed over the years, reflecting their responsibilities: 
culture has been grouped together with other, different policy areas. The correct name will be 
cited in the footnotes the first time each committee is referred to. In the main text the committee 
will be referred to simply as the „parliamentary committee‟.  
361  These parliamentary reports detail the parliamentary committee‟s response to the 
Government‟s Green Paper, in Norwegian; instilling (from the respective committee) (abbr; 
Innst. S.).  
362 Minutes of these debates are taken and published in the official report of the proceedings of 
the parliament (Stortingstidende). 
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debate in parliament is that it will include both MPs from the party (or 
parties) in government as well as members of the opposition. The 
governmental minister responsible for cultural policy also contributes to 
this debate, and receives questions from other members of parliament. 
Thus, all these actors get the chance to engage in an open debate. This 
context helps in teasing out possible different discursive practices as well 
as in demonstrating the practice of an eventual dominant one.363  
 
It is pertinent to start with the first Green papers from the 1970s because 
the policies as well as the policy-rationales outlined during this period 
have, as I explained above, been canonical in that they have been 
referred to frequently.364 They have also acted as reference points for 
subsequent Green papers and have thus had an impact on the 
Norwegian policy discourse ever since. 
 
As mentioned already, I have identified a main Bildung discourse, which 
incorporates four policy rationales: „value‟, „growth‟, „anti-commerce‟ and 
„protection of national culture‟. In addition to this I have identified two 
alternative discourses: the „marketisation‟ and the „Progress Party‟ 
discourses. The following section will start by outlining these discourses 
followed by an exposition of their policy implications. 
 
                                            
363  It should also be acknowledged that the Green Paper is circulated amongst a range of 
organisations for consultation. The government and parliament are also subject to the activities of 
lobby groups. However, any contributions by such organisations or individuals to the discourse 
only have an indirect impact, being filtered through the civil servants, political leaders in 
government and MPs. An analysis of the responses to such consultations is beyond the scope of 
this research.  
364 Bakke (2003), Mangset (1992), Vestheim (1995) and Dahl and Helseth (2006).  
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Rather than presenting each set of policy papers separately and 
chronologically, the focus here is on the different rationales that I have 
identified, and how some of them are discursively connected, as well as 
different representations of the main discourse. Most span the thirty years 
that I have charted. Some disappear or become less prominent over time 
and new ones appear later on. 
  
6.2 Tracing the rationales: The Bildung discourse and its 
policy implications 
 
 
Upon analysing the papers and the parliamentary responses, it soon 
became clear that these were permeated by a concern to facilitate 
Bildung. This was manifested through several rationales, which are all 
interconnected: the „value‟ argument, the „growth‟ argument, the „anti-
commercial‟ argument and the „national culture under threat‟ argument. 
All these cultural policy arguments are Bildung related, with a deep 
concern for the individual, but also for the nation‟s culture as a whole. In 
this section, I shall trace these rationales, and the cultural policy 
measures that were suggested in response to them, before I, in the 
following section, present the two alternative policy-discourses (the 
marketisation and Progress Party discourses).   
6.2.1 Values 
 
Within the Bildung discourse, a dominant argument was how society had 
become impoverished of values, and that people increasingly felt rootless. 
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Culture was presented as a force that could combat these worrying 
trends but this narrative did not go into more detail about the cultural 
content, or what kind of cultural expressions (beyond being based on a 
wide definition of culture), that would be useful in this respect. Two 
alternative arguments emphasised that cultural values were also related 
to the content of culture: one emphasising that culture could also have 
negative impacts and another that culture could help emancipate people 
and contribute to a class struggle.   
 
The main argument: the loss of values and our rootless society 
 
The term „values‟ was an important and oft repeated concept, which 
harboured a, presumably, commonly understood but not explicitly 
articulated, meaning. Only exceptionally was the intrinsic meaning of 
values spelt out, for example when reference was made to Christian 
values. These references to „values‟ or „cultural values‟ were inherent in 
the discourse right from the first policy texts that I have analysed. The 
parliamentary committee‟s response to the two Green papers of the 
1970s, for example, emphasised that „a conscious connection to cultural 
values is of essential importance for each individual‟s human 
development‟.365 
 
As we shall see below, the first Green papers explicitly stated that the 
government should not attempt to define culture or to get engaged in 
                                            
365  Kirke og undervisningskomiteen (KUK), 1974. Innst. S. nr. 23; Innstilling fra kirke og 
undervisningskomiteen om kulturarbeid og kulturpolitikk (St. Meld. Nr. 8 og nr. 52 for 1973-74), 
Oslo, p. 5. (KUK (1974)).   
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decisions about cultural content. However, this did not mean that a total 
relativism (or what was referred to as value-nihilism) should be allowed. 
The joint parliamentary committee of 1974 stressed that cultural policy 
decisions, and the objectives they were informed by, would implicitly 
influence the content of culture, either directly or indirectly. All cultural 
policy decisions would be based on value judgments founded on 
aesthetic, ethical and other overarching principles. Hence, a debate about 
cultural policy directions should not shy away from what culture is and 
should be: 
 
so that the necessary value choices can be made on a thought through 
and clear basis. In a democratic society, which emphasises intellectual 
freedom and tolerance, a basic requirement is that such value choices 
must be based on norms that have broad support amongst people, but 
which at the same time are broad enough to secure rights and 
opportunities for development amongst minorities.366   
 
This value rationale was also present in the 1980s when, in KUV (1983), 
it was argued that cultural policy was, to a higher extent than other policy 
areas, concerned with values.367 The parliamentary committee responded 
by setting out the overarching aim of cultural policy to be: 
 
to make it possible for everybody to experience cultural values so that 
each individual can grow and develop, widen their understanding and 
their insight. Cultural activities have had and must continue to have as 
                                            
366 Ibid., p. 3. 
367 KUV (1983), p. 3. 
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their overarching objective to give access to real values, and to make 
society more human368 (author‟s emphasis). 
 
Again, although „values‟ were referred to frequently the term was left 
undefined and the meaning of the term was not made clear or explored in 
depth, but instead presumed to be commonly accepted. In KUV (1983), 
for example, it was emphasised that it was necessary to „protect those 
values that we know as ours‟,369 without further explication as to what 
these values referred to exactly.  
 
The unspecified values concept was linked to the growth argument 
(presented below) in that, giving people access to cultural „values‟, was 
seen as an important element in their opportunity to achieve personal 
growth,370 and a distinctive feature of people‟s identity.371  
 
This value rationale was sometimes coined as a response to the threat, 
particularly to children and young people, posed by the commercial, 
cultural industries (more about this below). The negative influences of 
entertainment-content consumed at home should be combated through a 
„value‟  and quality conscious alternative, based on „our national heritage 
and Western cultural tradition‟.372   
 
                                            
368 Kirke og undervisningskomiteen (KUK), 1985. Innst. S. nr. 132 (1984-85); Innstilling fra 
kirke og undervisningskomiteen om kulturpolitikk for 1980-åra og nye oppgaver i 
kulturpolitikken (St.meld. Nr.23 for 1891-82 og St. Meld. Nr. 27 for 1983-84), Oslo, p. 21. (KUK 
(1985)). 
369 KUV (1983), p. 16. 
370 Ibid., p. 3. 
371 Ibid., p. 9. 
372 Kirke og undervisningskomiteen (KUK), 1993. Innst. S. nr. 115 (1992-93); Innstilling fra 
kirke og undervisningskomiteen om kultur i tiden (St.meld. nr. 61 for 1991-92 og St. Meld. Nr. 27 
for 1992-93), p. 24. (KUK (1993)). 
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The value rationale was strongly represented in the discourse throughout 
the first three decades charted here but in the 2000s, it was toned down.  
 
In the 1970s, 80s and 90s, the articulation of the value rationale was 
often preceded by an expressed cultural pessimism, which lamented 
certain developments in society and warned against the detrimental 
effects these could have on individuals and the national culture as such. 
In addition to the already mentioned fear of commercial culture and the 
forces of globalisation, this pessimism was also of a more generic 
character, often lamenting a loss of values. The situation and prospects 
for young people were particularly subject to laments. Citing a previous 
parliamentary committee that looked into the government‟s youth work, it 
was argued that „the great majority of young people is passive, incapable 
of managing their own affairs, and little engaged in what happens outside 
their own environment‟.373  
 
Thus, youth work had to be seen as an important part of cultural policy in 
order (as expressed by the parliamentary committee) to create „the best 
possible conditions for personal development, creative participation and 
social contact‟.374   
 
Also more generally, the fast pace of development and changing social 
structures could have a detrimental effect on people‟s psyche and well-
being. In the parliamentary debates of 1975, the cabinet minister for 
                                            
373 KUD (1973),  p. 60. 
374 KUK (1974), p. 7. 
204 
 
culture, Bjartmar Gjerde, argued that people had increasingly become 
alienated from the work they did and the tools they used.  
 
Another MP, Liv Andersen, commented about the impact of people‟s 
media-consumption, which had resulted in thousands of people just 
sitting glued in front of the television, without contact even with their own 
family, and that this had led to a strong sense of loneliness and isolation 
even amongst people who lived in central and urban areas.375  
 
In the 1980s it was also suggested that people‟s growth potential could 
be restricted due to insecurity and rootless feelings and what was 
referred to as „value-poverty‟376, where people had lost the real „values‟ in 
life. The task of cultural policy was thereby to urgently meet these 
challenges:   
 
Cultural policy must set as its objective the release of counter forces 
against the „lack of roots and value-poor‟ tendencies in society. […] A 
conscious cultural policy which gives people access to real values, will 
prevent and resist the dissolution of norms and values, by stimulating 
consciousness, reflection, individual and social responsibility‟. 377 
(author‟s emphasis) 
 
In the parliamentary committee‟s statement, it was further argued that 
people were more occupied with material things than with each other. 
                                            
375 MP (Member of Parliament) Liv Andersen, Forhandlinger i Stortinget (FIS), 1975. nr. 317: 
1975 9. Januar – Kulturdebatt Oslo, p. 2453. (FIS (1975)). 
376 KUV (1983), p. 4. 
377 Ibid., p. 14.  
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Related to this, the committee tended to observe an attitude where 
cultural activities were only affordable in financially good times.378 
 
Such tendencies, it was argued, contradicted Norwegian traditions, which 
implied a view of humanity and morality that places economical 
production targets on an equal footing with „a cultural policy objective, 
which is built on values like love for your next in kind, solidarity and the 
inviolability of each individual‟.379  
 
In the 1990s a break in the discourse can be observed where cultural 
policy was not only perceived as a remedy against the effects of 
structural changes in society, but where these changes were seen as 
opportunities. KUL (1992) argued that these opportunities begged for a 
positive response in cultural policy terms. Rapid change would make 
people face challenges „that would condition creative thinking, critical 
choice and independent action‟.380  
 
A cultural policy for the 1990s thus had to be „shaped in the span 
between tradition and innovation‟.381 
 
The discourse of the 2000s also acknowledges that rapid changes in 
society require a more active cultural policy. The approach was now more 
                                            
378 KUK (1985), p. 21.  
379 Ibid. 
380 KUL (1992), p. 10. 
381 Ibid. 
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positive where the forces of the global cultural industries should be 
countered by „quality conscious and critical consumers‟.382  
 
Alternative value-arguments  
 
 
As explained above, the articulation of the value rationale rarely made it 
clear what was really meant by the importance of, or, giving access to, 
„real‟ values. However, in the 1970s, two minority factions engaged in the 
discourse, articulating more explicitly what they meant by values and 
emphasising a more active engagement with the content of culture. This 
was related to the assumption, on the one hand, that culture also had 
potentially negative impacts, and, on the other, that it could also facilitate 
emancipation. This led to two more concrete ways of articulating values, 
originating from two factions in parliament: the Christian Democrats‟ 
centre ground and the left-wing faction respectively. Given that these are 
minority factions, which present an understanding that is somewhat 
different from the main Bildung discourse, I shall just briefly mention 
these here.  
 
Firstly, the Christian Democrats (KrF) argued that value judgments had to 
come to the fore when priorities were to be set, and that a more active 
engagement with the artistic content of culture was called for. Cultural 
policy should thus be subject to: 
 
                                            
382 Familie-, kultur- og administrasjonskomiteen (FKD), 2004. Innst. S. nr. 155 (2003-2004); 
Innstilling fra familie-, kultur-, og administrasjonskomiteen om kulturpolitikk fram mot 2014 
St.meld. Nr.48  (2002-2003), Oslo, p. 34. (FKD (2004)). 
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an ideological debate and conscious willingness to cultural engagement, 
by putting the significant, contemporary, intellectual currents to the test, 
and through a critique of the outcomes of certain activities, which, 
according to these members‟ view, are not true expressions of honest 
artistic efforts, or which represent a value-nihilism which should be 
opposed.383   
 
This approach did not emphasise quality in a positive Arnoldian way, but 
rather negatively through what should be excluded from public cultural 
policy.  
 
For the Christian Democrats such moral considerations translated into 
explicit condemnation of certain cultural expressions, particularly those 
that, in their view, „speculated‟ in violence and sex.384 A similar sentiment 
was echoed by the KrF members on the parliamentary committee in 1993, 
who again questioned whether cultural freedom should be without any 
limits. They argued that society should show willingness to expose such 
speculation and to impose limitations in order to „restrain the abuse of art 
and the degrading of human dignity and other ideals that our culture rests 
on‟.385  
 
The left-wing faction in parliament had, in common with the Christian 
Democrats, a more proactive approach to culture, but rather than 
restricting content they emphasised that culture had the power to 
emancipate. Culture, in their view, should not be seen only as activities to 
                                            
383 KUK (1974), p. 3. 
384 Ibid.  
385 KUK (1993), p. 8. 
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fill people‟s increasing amount of leisure time. In 1974, a member from 
Sosialistisk Valgforbund, 386  Otto Hauglin, argued that culture should 
instead be seen as a „power-tool‟ with the aim to „increase people‟s 
understanding of their social situation and motivate their effort to change 
social conditions‟.387  
 
The cultural activities on offer were, according to Hauglin, benign and 
impotent and not suitable to facilitate political change. A real socialist 
cultural policy would have drawn attention to „the fundamental social 
inequalities and controversial questions in society‟,388 in other words, a 
cultural policy which was intimately tied in with class struggle.  
 
Closely linked to the claim that society was becoming increasingly value-
poor, was the response that people needed to be helped in their efforts to 
achieve human growth, which is the focus of the following section.  
6.2.2 Growth 
 
The „growth‟ argument is particularly linked to and acts as a basis for 
cultural policies directed towards young people. Youth work was one of 
the policy areas embraced by the „new‟ cultural policies, where the 
objectives were the „best possible conditions for personal development, 
creative participation, well-being and social contact‟.389   
                                            
386 Sosialistisk Valgforbund was an alliance party made up of anti-EEC people from the Socialist 
People‟s Party (Sosialistisk Folkeparti) and the Norwegian Communist Party (Norges 
Kommunistiske Parti) amongst others.  
387 KUK (1974), p. 4. 
388 MP Otto Hauglin, FIS (1975), p. 2446. 
389 KUD (1973), p. 7. 
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However, the „growth‟ argument can also be easily located in more 
general terms in these policy texts. For example, echoing Herder‟s 
Bildung philosophy, the parliamentary committee of 1974 claimed that the 
prime objective of all cultural policies was to contribute to each 
individual‟s development or growth: 
 
to stimulate each individual‟s development of their own abilities and 
possibilities, extended comprehension, richer experiences, development 
of emotional life, ability to think, maturity in the appreciations and taste – 
in short, to human growth390  
 
For the Labour Party this was closely interconnected with a strong social 
cultural policy agenda, which is well illustrated in the following quote from 
Cabinet Minister Bjartmar Gjerde in the parliamentary debate of 1975: 
 
The objective is to build a qualitatively improved society with equality 
between groups of people and individuals, build a society where each 
individual can develop abilities and talents in a rich and safe 
environment.391  
 
Although „growth‟ was given less emphasis in KUD (1981), KUV (1983) 
linked this concept to the „value‟ argument, which I have already 
presented, and argued that: 
 
                                            
390 KUK (1974), p. 5. 
391 Minister of Culture, Bjartmar Gjerde, FIS (1975), p. 2469. 
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The task must be to create the right conditions for everybody to come in 
contact with cultural values, so that each individual can get the 
opportunity for human growth.392 
 
Similarly, the committee leader in parliament, Reiulf Steen, argued that: 
 
The cultural revolution of the 1980s and 1990s must have as its objective 
to develop independent, creative and conscious individuals in an 
interplay built on a deep and experienced feeling of solidarity.393   
 
The growth objective was just as important in the discourse of the 1990s, 
by which time it had become not just as an idealist goal in itself but 
increasingly phrased in response to needs created by rapid changes in 
society, as described in KUL (1992): 
 
Today‟s and tomorrow‟s people must be prepared for bigger changes 
during their life-time than previous generations. In today‟s complicated 
reality each individual‟s ability to sort impressions and information, to find 
new solutions, will thus be decisive. We will increasingly be faced with 
challenges which assume creative thinking, critical choices and 
independent actions.394  
 
This was echoed by the parliamentary committee, where the 
representative from the Centre Party emphasised: 
 
the great value cultural activities have for the development of each 
individual and for the development of a common culture and values 
heritage. In a society of rapid changes, where increasingly strong 
                                            
392 KUV (1983), p. 3. 
393  MP Reiulf Steen, Forhandlinger i Stortinget (FIS), 1985. nr. 203: 1985 28. Mars – 
Kulturpolitkken for 1980-åra og nye oppgaver i kulturpolitikken Oslo, p. 3027. (FIS (1985)). 
394 KUL (1992), p. 10. 
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demands are put on the individual, the importance of the cultural platform 
will just increase.395  
 
The instrumental need for growth in response to the fast changes in 
society was equally important in the 2000s, when it was once again 
emphasised that people need to develop cultural competences not only 
for their own sake but also in order to contribute to society‟s needs at a 
macro level. 396  
 
The chair of the parliamentary committee, Olemic Thommessen 
articulated this connection, between a strong level of cultural competence 
for the individual and for society at large, in the following way: 
 
A strong cultural competence gives space for a diverse type of 
development and good cultural competence is the best basis for all of us 
to contribute our best to the common good. High cultural competence is 
thus a central criteria for a good society where the objective is quality in 
every link.397 
 
This is a move away from the more idealistic approach in previous texts 
where human growth was celebrated for its intrinsic value, to one where 
human growth processes achieved through culture should not only 
benefit each individual person, but also, to a higher extent, be of benefit 
to society at large. To use an analogy often used when referring to the 
                                            
395 KUK (1993), p. 8. 
396 KUL (2003a), p. 7.  
397 MP Olemic Thommessen, Forhandlinger i Stortinget (FIS), 2004. nr. 68: 2004 1. April – 
Kulturpolitikk fram mot 2014 Oslo, p. 2388. (FIS (2004)). 
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autonomy of the arts, it is as if there was a shift from „growth for growth‟s 
sake‟ to growth as a means to an end.  
 
The values and growth rhetoric in the texts analysed here seem to 
underpin the broader approaches to cultural policy that the same texts 
outlined. In line with Vestheim‟s subject versus object approach to 
folkeopplysning, the two corresponding cultural policy principles: cultural 
democracy and the democratisation of culture (both of which were 
outlined in Chapter One), were given ample exposure in these policy 
texts. I argue that these signify two main representations in the Bildung 
discourse in terms of how the Bildung potential in culture could be 
achieved, through a wide definition of culture, a relative approach to 
quality, emphasis on participation and decentralisation or through the 
exposure to what was called the professional arts. I observe a shift from 
the former to the latter, over the three decades in question here, and I will 
demonstrate this in the next two sections.  
6.2.3 Policy responses – Subject representation 
 
The subject oriented representation was permeated by a sceptical 
approach to the Arnoldian view that experts or any representatives of the 
elite should determine cultural policy. Decisions about the delimitation of 
what should be included in the notion of culture, how quality could be 
assessed and ultimately which areas, projects or tasks should be 
prioritised or receive public support should be taken as close to the users 
of the subsequent cultural activities as possible. And just as Herder had 
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emphasised participation as an important dimension on people‟s path to 
Bildung, so did the subject oriented representation underline this idea that 
to „enhance one‟s values‟ people had to participate in cultural activities (or 
to contribute to the creation of culture) and that one‟s self-growth could be 
better achieved thus (rather than, on the contrary, through one‟s 
exposure to great works of arts and thinking, which would have been 
more in line with Arnoldian ideas). Central to this representation was an 
emphasis on decentralisation, where resources should be allocated to 
district councils and municipalities for cultural policy decisions to be taken 
as close to, and preferably by, participants themselves.  
 
This had, for a start, significant consequences for the definition of culture.  
 
The definition of culture 
 
 
Both Green papers presented in the 1970s: KUD (1973) and KUD (1974), 
shied away from attempting to define culture. It was deemed acceptable 
to define culture in administrative terms, in terms of which areas a cultural 
administration, whether at a local, regional or national level, should cover. 
However, given that cultural policy should not only be formulated for all, 
but, to an extent, by all, a rigid definition of culture, which potentially could 
exclude cultural content and cultural activities championed by people 
themselves, could not be supported. Consequentially, KUD (1973) 
concluded: 
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The department does not see it as its task to give an official definition of 
culture. However, administrative limits for culture as a policy-area must 
be drawn.398  
 
Similarly, the assessment of quality should also be carried out locally by 
those who are involved in policy decision-making. The quality judgements 
of any activity, should thus, according to the paper „here, as otherwise in 
the cultural sector, […] take place within each separate milieu‟.399 
 
This was echoed by KUD (1974), which argued that: 
 
In the department‟s [KUD] opinion, it is not the task of central public 
authorities to give an authoritative definition of the notion of culture, or to 
decide the content of cultural expressions.400 
 
Similarly, the parliamentary committee, unanimously subscribed to this 
statement: 
 
The state authorities can contribute to freedom becoming a reality, and a 
good for as many people and communities as possible. But in a 
democratic society the state does not see it as its task to decide what 
should be emphasised in the cultural creative process. This would mean 
to preside over the cultural policy, which could easily imply dangerous 
limitations on intellectual freedom in society.401 
  
When the Green papers and the parliamentary report were discussed in 
parliament, some individual MPs went even further in taking the Arnoldian 
concept of „the great men of culture‟ into account. The MP Thorbjørn 
                                            
398 KUD (1973), p. 6. 
399 Ibid.  
400 KUD (1974), p. 6.  
401 KUK (1974), p.2.  
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Kultorp, for example, argued that the cultural boards that should be 
established within each municipality should keep away from making 
qualitatively informed priorities between different cultural activities, and 
said that: 
 
Neither must it be the cultural board‟s task to challenge activities for 
which there is a demand with the argument that other activities are of 
more value. No member of a cultural board is better equipped to interpret 
each individual [member of the community]‟s needs than the persons 
concerned themselves. Activities, which are not regarded as valuable will 
be dropped automatically due to lack of enthusiasm. People‟s own felt 
need must in principle be the starting point for support of activities and 
not what public cultural „prophets‟ consider as more valuable.402   
 
This statement harbours an inherent distrust of cultural authorities, a 
sentiment similarly repeated in the way some of the rhetoric in these 
papers dealt with judgments of quality.  
 
Hence, in line with the thinking of Herder and Humboldt, this subject 
oriented Bildung representation was based on a wide approach to culture, 
where „all forms of cultural activities and cultural experiences must be 
regarded as being of equal value [and importance]‟.403  
 
In practical policy terms this open approach to culture meant that two new 
areas, youth work and sports, were included as integrated areas of 
cultural policy. However, even within what was termed the „traditional 
cultural area‟, (meaning areas that had previously received public 
                                            
402 MP Thorbjørn Kultorp, FIS (1975), p. 2440. It is worth noting that Kultorp here anticipates the 
argument of the right-wing Progress Party that was to surface later on.  
403 KUD (1974), p. 21.  
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support), it was argued that the demarcation lines for cultural policy in the 
future could not be determined by: 
 
the activities, which have been understood as cultural activities within the 
dominant cultural sphere, neither the cultural activities that have 
previously received public support.404  
 
This echoes Augustin Girard‟s rejection of what he called the activities of 
the leisured classes of former times.  
 
Lars Roar Langslet, the chair of the parliamentary committee, subscribed 
to this emphasis on culture as anything that enriched people‟s lives. He 
took a wide anthropological approach to culture, not limiting it to ideas of 
great art and thinking passed down from an elite, when he argued that, 
for him: 
 
„culture‟ is the word that we use for all values that give life meaning and 
elevation beyond the short-sightedness of the everyday tasks and which 
open the mind for new perspectives and new horizons. […] And this can 
refer to many types of phenomena: the ability to experience, and the 
need to create within each culture; common norms and interests in a 
working environment are culture; life style and sense of form in a local 
community are culture; the written language and dialects, good craft, a 
beautiful building, a painting, a folk song or a symphony – all these are 
expressions of culture. Because all these express values, which give life 
meaning and human dignity.405  
 
                                            
404 KUD (1973), p. 54.  
405 MP Lars Roar Langslet, FIS (1975), p. 2424. 
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Notwithstanding the emphasis on culture‟s Bildung potential in such a 
statement, implying that culture has the power to elevate human beings, 
this representation goes much further and includes many phenomena 
that had traditionally not been regarded as culture in a cultural policy 
context, and, that are closer to a Herderian/Humboldtian view that 
Bildung can only be achieved through activities that spring from man‟s 
own choice as opposed to the Arnoldian prescription of culture as the 
„best that has been thought and said in the world‟.  
 
This wide approach to culture, which is interlinked with the principle of 
people‟s involvement in the actual making of policy decisions, has 
survived as a significant principle and was repeatedly referred to in the 
policy papers of the 1980s and the 1990s. The definition of culture was 
again a wide one, and should not be reduced to „values and experiences 
connected to professional art and cultural heritage protection‟.406  
 
This anthropological approach forms a strong discursive practice, which, 
in the 1970s and 1980s at least, was hardly challenged at all, but instead 
hailed as conciliatory in the effort to cement cultural policy within a wider 
constituency, or as MP Ernst Wroldsen put it: 
 
The wider notion of culture has also contributed to making many who 
before felt a distance to the notion of culture, come to have a nearer and 
more positive relationship to a wider range of cultural activities.407 
 
                                            
406 KUD (1981), p. 34. 
407 MP Ernst Wroldsen, FIS (1985), p. 3056. 
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And again echoing Herder‟s view, KUL (1992), stated that:  
 
quality must be found in the expression or in the experience which gives 
meaning and engagement, which creates or changes attitudes, which 
gives insight and knowledge, gives identity and creates models. Both 
aesthetic and function, hand-craft and expression, appeal and 
communication must have quality built-in.408  
 
This brings us to the question of how to assess quality, which also had to 
be re-thought within a subject oriented context.  
 
Quality 
 
Quality was indeed important, and Bjartmar Gjerde warned against a trap 
of value nihilism. However, similar to the way culture was to be defined, 
we see a perception of value, which harbours doubt about the authority of 
qualified experts. Gjerde argued that people‟s appreciation of quality 
would instead be best developed if this was based on their own abilities, 
rather than on:  
 
norms which are developed under other and perhaps more privileged 
conditions. Quality-dictates from outside can also sometimes act as 
disabling and mostly make cultural activities unpleasant.409  
 
This rather un-Arnoldian approach to quality resonated well with the focus 
on equality in the subject oriented representation, and was echoed in 
KUD (1981) where quality was again defined in relative terms, and where 
                                            
408 KUL (1992), pp. 27 - 28. 
409 Minister of Culture, Bjartmar Gjerde, FIS (1975), p. 2470. 
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it was emphasised that any quality judgments should be decided within 
each context. There was thus a high level of consensus about this 
approach to quality in the discourses of the 1970s and the 1980s.  
 
 With reference to what he calls the Nordic countries‟ shift towards a 
pluralistic cultural democracy, the Danish cultural studies scholar Henrik 
Kaare Nielsen celebrates this, by arguing that only by opening up for „a 
dialogical exchange with cultural political goals‟,410 can a quality-debate 
achieve relevance. Hence, the „mono-cultural‟ objectives of the 
„democratisation of culture‟ with its „expert viewpoints‟ based on the 
principle of the intrinsic values of the arts, will only contribute to the 
achievement of cultural policy objectives if it also happened to „give birth 
to a processes of enlightenment (“Bildung”)‟, 411  something he argues 
would most probably only be a mere coincidence.  
 
It appears that the policy-discourse of the 1970s and 1980s is informed 
by such a less artistically driven approach to quality assessment, and 
instead takes the politically stated objectives to facilitate Bildung as the 
yardstick against which success is measured. A more relative quality-
approach was particularly taken to participatory projects where more 
stringent quality-criteria were deemed to be less suitable. Participation 
was also in general perceived to have a stronger Bildung potential 
compared to mere exposure.  
 
                                            
410  Henrik Kaare Nielsen, „Cultural Policy and Evaluation of Quality‟, in The International 
Journal of Cultural Policy 9.3 (2003), p. 242. 
411 Ibid. 
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Participation versus exposure 
 
Both KUD (1973) and KUD (1974) emphasised participation in what can 
be described as artistic activities such as music, singing, amateur theatre, 
painting and dance, which should be partly supported and supervised by 
national institutions. 412  However, this did not exclude other activities, 
which could:  
 
develop intellectual or practical abilities, or abilities to solve problems 
together with others, for example through studies and work in voluntary 
organisations.413  
 
The parliamentary committee emphasised that in the widest sense, 
everybody should participate in cultural activities based on their own 
conditions and in their own way. Again, in contrast to the ideas of Arnold, 
it emphasised that: „Culture is thus not something that is „created‟ by the 
few and „received‟ by the many. In the cultural creative process 
everybody participates‟.414  
 
MP Ambjørg Sælthun summed up this principle by saying that the new 
cultural policy should be based on the belief that each person, „is a 
creative, not just receiving and consuming, individual‟.415  
 
                                            
412 KUK (1974), p. 10. 
413 KUD (1973), p. 45. 
414 KUK (1974), p. 6. 
415 MP Ambjørg Sælthun, FIS (1975), p. 2454. 
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This participatory approach to culture survived in the discourse all the 
way to the 1990s, when this principle was emphasised particularly in 
cultural policies for children and young people. As stated in KUL (1992): 
 
there should be a large space for participation. Thus, the government will 
particularly support activities where children and young people are active 
participants in the shaping and adaptation of them.416 
 
In addition to celebrating participation in cultural activities, this quote also 
stresses that young people should be part of the policy-making process, 
which was a central principle in the subject oriented policies right from the 
first Green paper of 1973. Rather than „managing demand‟ in terms of 
pre-determining which cultural activities were good for young people, the 
cultural provision should be based on their own needs as expressed by 
themselves.417 Hence, it was argued that all the extra funding for the new 
subject oriented cultural policies should be allocated to regional and local 
municipalities, who in turn should appoint their own cultural boards, 
whose task it was to distribute funding. This brings us to another central 
policy principle, the decentralisation of both decision-making and funds 
for culture.  
 
Decentralisation 
 
The wide definition of culture and the emphasis on participation and 
engagement were closely related to the radical decentralisation measures 
                                            
416 KUL (1992), p. 96. 
417 KUD (1973), p. 63. 
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in the Green papers of the 1970s. In addition to fitting naturally with these 
two principles (wide definition and participation), it also signalled an 
increased focus on the „local‟ away from the „national‟, which, as will be 
seen through subsequent policies, was outlined as a response to 
globalisation, and which also implied a shift away from the international. 
As will be shown below, this decentralisation-policy represented suspicion 
towards centrally located high arts institutions as well as the commercial 
cultural industries.  
 
As already mentioned, an important measure proposed (and 
subsequently implemented) in KUD (1973) was that each county council 
and local council should elect a cultural board responsible for all the 
regional and local cultural activities respectively. This did not imply that 
these boards were actually supposed to run the cultural facilities in the 
respective counties and municipalities, but that they would allocate funds 
to cultural activities, many of which would be governed and executed by 
voluntary organisations.418  
 
This principle had significant ramifications for the financing of the cultural 
sector. The state departments would still finance and govern national 
cultural initiatives, including the support for national institutions, but a 
significant amount of additional funding would be transferred to district 
councils and municipalities, with the aim of reaching two objectives: to 
even out the disproportionate allocation of funding for culture between 
                                            
418 Ibid., pp. 8 - 9. 
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different districts and municipalities, as well as to boost the funding for 
culture and hence increase the priority given to this policy area, both 
regionally and locally. The levelling out of the current misbalance 
between counties and municipalities (with fewer resources and fewer 
citizens) would be achieved through positive discrimination.419 None of 
this would be achieved through re-allocations from current national 
schemes or institutions but through additional funding for regional and 
local culture.   
 
In return for this, municipalities and regional councils had to commit to 
establishing a minimum level of organisation amongst the democratically 
elected councils as well as in their local administration. This meant that 
every regional and local council had to establish a cultural committee 
dealing with cultural affairs as well as a cultural manager leading a 
cultural office in the local and regional administration.  
 
The focus on decentralisation was partly a response to a rejection of the 
idea that Norway harboured one national culture, informed only by a 
canonised national heritage supplemented by contemporary (of that time) 
high arts expressions, or an emphasis on the canonised „best‟. Echoing 
the Populist Nationalist representation of the late nineteenth century and 
the Labour movement of the 1930s, the parliamentary committee of 1974 
argued that this was too simplistic and that Norway was in fact made up 
of a range of sub-cultures, which coexisted in a tense relationship with 
                                            
419 Ibid., pp. 9 - 10.  
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national culture, with both feeding off each other.420 It was emphasised 
that despite being threatened by increased mobility, improved educational 
opportunities and the development of the mass media, many of the 
regional sub-cultures had retained their characteristics.  
 
The continuation of the subject representation  
 
 
When analysing the explicitly formulated cultural policy rhetoric of the 
1970s, it appears as if the subject oriented, Bildung argument completely 
saturated the discourse of the time. Despite being challenged in later 
years, cultural democracy principles have endured and were mentioned 
in all the subsequent sets of documents. However, this focus was to lose 
its dominance, and rather than being repeated as the best path to Bildung, 
some voices lamented how little progress there had been in this area. 
Despite all the efforts that had gone into a more subject focused cultural 
policy, an accomplished cultural democracy was still perceived to be 
something of an illusion. For example, KUD (1981) particularly 
emphasised that the attempt to develop a cultural democracy was still 
incomplete and that efforts to include as many people as possible in the 
shaping and prioritisation of cultural activities that received public funds 
should continue. Cultural democracy was thus still singled out as a 
priority area. This remained „alive‟ in the Green paper of 2003 (KUL 
(2003a)), particularly due to the continuing emphasis being put on 
voluntary organisations.  
 
                                            
420 KUD (1974), p. 5. 
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The reason why the subject oriented representation appeared to 
permeate the discourse in the 1970s was partly due to these policies 
being new and informed by international trends like the writings of Girard. 
However, as mentioned earlier, they did not replace already existing 
support-structures for culture (primarily earmarked for high arts 
institutions). Hence, although not so prevalent in the rhetoric to start with, 
support for the „professional arts‟ was not absent from the discourse. 
Instead it just grew in strength over the next three decades charted here.  
 
6.2.4 Policy responses – Object representation 
 
The wide definition of culture, or indeed the reluctance to define it at all, 
did not exclude the traditional art forms from the Bildung discourse. In 
1974, the chairman of the parliamentary committee, Lars Roar Langslet, 
argued, that the new policies should not „under any circumstances‟ 
replace support for the professional arts and culture.421  
 
However, the term „art‟, or the common reference in English to „the arts‟ 
have not been commonly used in Norway.422 Perhaps because the wider 
definition of culture is still accepted as an inherent dimension of cultural 
policy, policy papers have often referred to „art and culture‟, even when 
                                            
421 MP Lars Roar Langslet, FIS (1975), p. 2425. 
422 In Norwegian the term „art‟ is often colloquially interpreted as the visual arts. The more 
generic term „the arts‟ (in an English speaking context) invariably embraces a range of signifying 
practices, whether they are practiced by amateurs or professionals or whether they are profit-
making or not. I acknowledge, however, that there is not one unambiguous use of the term “the 
arts” in English, where the inclusion of products of some sectors within the cultural industries 
like popular music and film, is relatively recent, whereas others like classical music and fictional 
literature (for example the novel) have been included in this term for much longer.  
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what is referred to are (what in English would have been termed as) „the 
arts‟. For example, under the heading „The significance of the arts in 
society‟ in the parliamentary committee report from the 1980s, it is stated 
that: 
 
The arts and artists play a fundamental role in society. The arts and 
culture have a fundamental significance for any nation and any human 
being. It is above anything the arts and culture, which create a nation‟s 
identity, give it self-respect and connect its citizens together in a 
community.423 (author‟s emphasis).  
 
In the 1990s, in the parliamentary committee‟s response to the Green 
paper, the Conservative Party argued that it was the state authorities‟ 
responsibility to create the necessary conditions for Norwegian arts and 
culture to develop in terms of diversity and freedom, partly through being 
responsible for typical funding beneficiaries like arts education, support 
schemes, and securing the funding of national institutions.424 Although 
these schemes and institutions were included within the definition of the 
arts and culture, the policy discourse increasingly made references to „the 
professional arts‟. This did not have a prominent position in the initial 
discourse of the 1970s, but was by the 1990s, given increased emphasis. 
Similar to „the arts‟ more generally, the term the „professional arts‟ was 
rarely defined either. Instead, it rested on an implicit assumption of what it 
was not: namely amateur culture, commercial culture or culture defined 
more widely than just the arts. Thus, „the professional arts‟ were, implicitly 
at least, understood in accordance with one of Raymond Williams‟ 
                                            
423 KUK (1985), p. 22. 
424 KUK (1993). 
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definitions of culture as: „the works and practices of intellectual and 
especially artistic creativity‟, 425  which exclude a whole array of other 
cultural activities, that have been the subject of the government‟s cultural 
policies. As we shall see in the next chapter, the professional arts are 
what children and young people should be exposed to through DKS, but 
again without a thorough and specific definition, other than its clear object 
oriented approach to Bildung.   
 
As mentioned earlier this object oriented representation sits fairly 
comfortably alongside the subject oriented one, and the agents involved 
in these discourses 426  only to a limited extent divided into factions. 
Instead, it seems that everyone, with some exceptions, subscribed to 
several arguments.427 This was partly because the subject  and object 
oriented representations were not mutually exclusive. There was broad 
consensus about most of the ideas and the rationales on which these 
cultural policies should be based.  
 
                                            
425
 Williams (1988), p. 90.  
426 The people involved in drafting the two Green Papers, including bureaucrats and centrally 
positioned governmental politicians as well as MPs from both the governmental and oppositional 
parties in parliament. 
427 This is partly signified by the composition of parties in government and the corresponding 
parliamentary committees. KUD (1973) was presented by a centre coalition made up of the 
Centre Party, the Christian Democrats and the Venstre party, and KUD (1974) by a Labour 
government. The parliamentary committee was chaired by a Conservative MP, with a secretary 
from the Christian Democrats. The Labour party published KUD (1981), whereas KUV (1983) 
was presented by the Conservatives. This time the parliamentary committee was chaired by a 
Labour MP with a secretary from the Centre Party. KUL (1992) was presented by a Labour 
government, this time with a parliamentary committee chaired by the Conservatives and the 
leader from the Socialist Left. Finally, in 2003, KUL (2003a) was presented by a centre-right 
government made up of the Conservatives, Christian Democrats and Venstre, responded to by a 
parliamentary committee chaired by the Conservatives. All the political parties represented in the 
parliament at any time have thus contributed to the discourse and the only real dissenter has been 
the Progress Party.  
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The subject oriented cultural democracy argument was not particularly 
engaged with the conditions of artists. However, this was an important 
concern for the section of the papers, which emphasised the Bildung 
potential harboured within the „professional arts‟.  
 
Conditions for artists  
 
Just as much as being concerned with access to the arts and heritage as 
well as emphasising their Bildung potential and aggregated importance 
for the nation and national identity, the professional arts rationale has 
also been about the conditions for professional artists.428 In the set of 
papers from the 1970s it was already emphasised that the mediation of 
and the reduction of access barriers to the arts, as well as support for 
professional artists, were key policy objectives, which should be met by 
both the strengthening of existing arts organisations as well as the 
development of new ones situated regionally and locally.429 It was also 
suggested that amateurs and professionals should seek new ways of 
collaborating. The protection of cultural heritage, including the protection 
of the Norwegian language, was emphasised as well.430 
 
The first Green papers of the 1980s (KUD (1981)) discussed each art 
form in detail,431 including the conditions of artists as well as how these 
                                            
428 This was in fact the subject of a separate Green Paper published in 1976, but falls outside of 
this analysis.  
429 KUD (1973), p. 6, 11, 57 and 58; KUK (1974), pp. 10 - 11. 
430 KUD (1973), pp. 55 - 56; KUD (1974), p. 5.  
431 In addition to chapters covering sport and cultural heritage, KUD (1981) dedicated a chapter 
to each of the following art-forms; literature and libraries, the performing arts, music as well as 
visual arts and crafts.  
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should be nourished and mediated. The general conditions of artists were 
also given due attention in this paper, where a main objective was to 
create working conditions for this profession, that should be as equal as 
possible to those of other professions in society. Through a unique 
collaboration agreement, artists had been given the right to negotiate with 
the government through their membership organisations.432 The Green 
papers of the 1980s also argued that the public sector, and particularly 
central government, should „take a bigger responsibility for artists‟ 
working conditions and for the mediation of their art‟.433 Some of the tools 
in place included the guaranteed income scheme, which guaranteed a 
minimum wage for certain artists as well as three-yearly „working-
stipends‟.434  
 
However, what is perhaps more important in this account of Bildung 
rationales was how as many as possible should have access to the 
professional arts.  
 
Access to the professional arts  
 
The distribution of the professional arts as widely as possible was 
emphasised in the parliamentary response to the two Green papers of the 
1980s:  
 
                                            
432 Mangset (1992), p. 244. 
433 KUD (1981), p. 14. 
434 Ibid. 
230 
 
The arts have something to give everybody in society, and it is 
necessary with a conscious effort by society to ensure that the arts reach 
out to all groups in all parts of the country.435 
 
The MP Tom Thoresen argued in 1985 that although the broader 
definition of culture had created new possibilities for people to create and 
enjoy, as well as to break down barriers between forms of culture, it was 
important that the traditional notion of the arts was not forgotten. As he 
said: „It is good that we have torn down the ivory-towers. But we must 
acknowledge that they contained much of value, which we must develop 
further‟.436  
 
Moreover, in the rhetoric of the 1990s, it was argued that, although 
culture could be used instrumentally to reach social objectives (more 
about this below), this should not happen at the expense of its intrinsic 
value.437 The arts had the power to act as a critical corrective and to „act 
as a protective means against habitual thinking and social stagnation‟.438   
 
This emphasis on the arts‟ intrinsic values was brought forward into the 
2000s.439 In fact, when comparing KUL (2003a) with the initial Green 
papers of the 1970s, a shift from a subject oriented to an object oriented 
representation to Bildung emerges. KUL (2003a) focused to a 
significantly higher extent with the professional arts and its parliamentary 
response emphasised that the celebration of the intrinsic value of the arts 
                                            
435 KUK (1985), p. 22.  
436 MP Tom Thoresen, FIS (1985), p. 3060. 
437 KUL (1992), p. 29 and KUK (1993), p. 2.  
438 KUL (1992), p. 24. 
439 KUL (2003a), p. 7 and p. 108. 
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was based on the acknowledgment that: „each individual has needs 
beyond the material, and that the arts and culture are necessary 
conditions for a complete life‟.440  
 
Support for the arts‟ intrinsic values can also be detected implicitly 
through how they were defended against an increased marketisation. As 
we shall see below, a call for arts organisations to become more efficient, 
to get more funding from the private sector and to set clearer 
performance indicators had grown steadily since the publication of KUV 
(1983). However, such a marketisation has been met with resistance 
throughout these 20 years, and in 2004, a significant minority coalition in 
the parliamentary committee, made up of members from A, SV and SP, 
argued that success in the arts could not be reduced to (number) 
counting of sold tickets or to the number of productions. These members 
questioned whether the arts and culture should be made subject to 
quantitative objectives at all, asking whether this could lead to a 
straitjacketing of the sector.  
 
The object oriented representation of Bildung could also be detected in 
the increased emphasis on architecture and design from 1992 and 
onwards.  
 
 
 
                                            
440 FKD (2004), p. 33. 
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Architecture and design 
 
Since the first Green papers of the 1970s, all the texts presented here 
had given a broad definition of culture. Architecture and design were 
included in such definitions, but these had not been given any particular 
emphasis before. Architectural issues, for example, had been the 
responsibility of other departments than the Ministry of Culture. This was 
about to change with the Green paper presented in 1992, which 
incorporated a new emphasis on both the built environment and other 
design. This new priority certainly fitted in with the object oriented Bildung 
argument. The main objective was to ensure that the quality, particularly 
regarding architecture and design, of public spaces, but also within the 
area of design more generally, should improve. Emphasis was put on 
better coordination between different ministries, particularly with regards 
to public building projects, but also with the aim of changing public 
attitudes with regards to design: as the minister with responsibility for 
culture at the time, Åse Kleveland said in the parliamentary debate: to 
make „our surroundings more beautiful‟. 441  The appearance of the 
surroundings could have an important influence on people and their well-
being: 
 
The quality of our surroundings concerns everybody, every day. Our 
surroundings are being shaped by human activity, but this design goes 
two ways: Surroundings, at the same time, make an impact on all human 
interactions. […] People‟s surroundings must be taken seriously by a 
society which wishes to prioritise quality. Reflection and creativity when 
                                            
441 Minister of Culture Åse Kleveland, Forhandlinger i Stortinget (FIS), 1993. nr. 74: 1993 30. 
Mars – Kultur i tiden Oslo, p. 3126. (FIS (1993)). 
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designing our visual environment gives greater experiences and better 
well-being.442  
 
In similar ways that the high arts had a potential to enlighten people, so 
could good architecture and design, and it was thus emphasised that the 
aesthetic quality of the public sphere should be given priority. Quality was 
also given much emphasis more generally in this object oriented 
„professional art‟ case.  
 
Quality 
 
 
As mentioned above, there was a high level of consensus regarding the 
relative approach to quality in the discourses of the 1970s and the 1980s. 
However, by 1993 cracks in this cross-party alliance‟s idea of quality 
could be observed. Again, it was emphasised that a quality-focused 
cultural policy should not contradict a broad support for local culture, 
which was regarded as essential in order to nourish talents and 
excellence. The members from A, SV, KrF and SP on the parliamentary 
committee argued that if the quality criteria were set too narrowly or too 
statically, based „on alleged objective standards‟, this would „prevent 
innovative expressions of art and culture, both in terms of content and 
form‟.443 The Green paper (KUL (1992)) also argued against elitism in this 
context and with support from SV, KrF and SP emphasised that to 
                                            
442 KUL (1992), p. 29. 
443 KUK (1993), p. 3.  
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support quality meant to „create the necessary conditions to allow most 
people the ability to develop according to their abilities‟.444 
 
The Conservatives, however, thought that this was pushing it too far, and 
that a wide notion of quality was relativistic and ran the risk of becoming 
utterly meaningless. They argued instead, in a more Arnoldian way, for 
allowing the professional arts themselves to determine the measure of 
quality. It was „the artistic production that aims to create the most 
outstanding, that will develop and renew artistic expressions‟.445  
 
This represented a different rationale for cultural policy, emphasising 
excellence in the arts. By 2003, this Arnoldian approach to quality had 
manifested itself even more strongly in the discourse, where the three 
parties in government in particular emphasised the importance of quality 
and that, although this was not a static notion, it should be the subject of 
a qualified public debate, as for example outlined in KUL (2003a): 
 
A main message is to continue to support the professional arts and the 
professionally anchored cultural efforts as a value in itself. Moreover, 
quality is emphasised as a decisive criteria in order for a cultural activity 
to receive priority within the central government‟s cultural policy.446 
 
This was not met by the same resistance as previously from the 
opposition parties in parliament, which indicates that although Bildung 
was still a main objective, so increasingly was the celebration of the 
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intrinsic values of the arts. Although this quality-focus only to a limited 
extent emphasised the social impacts of the professional arts, such 
positive impacts could be detected in the object oriented policy 
suggestions, in the sense that it was argued that there was a Bildung 
dimension to being exposed to professional arts expressions. However, 
the assumption that public support for culture would make a positive 
social contribution to society was perhaps stronger in the subject oriented 
representation. This idea that cultural policy was equated with social 
policy is the focus of the next section.  
 
6.2.5 Cultural policy as social policy 
 
As already mentioned, right from the first Green paper (KUD (1973)), a 
strong emphasis was laid on cultural policy‟s potential to contribute to 
other policy areas. In fact, this paper attempted to get away from the 
perception of cultural policy as separate from other public policy sectors 
and advocated instead an aspect approach, where cultural policy should 
act as an overarching superstructure informing a range of other areas, 
particularly general social policies. It would have meant a shift away from 
cultural policy as an explicitly stated policy area, to an implicit policy as 
suggested by Jeremy Ahearne.447 Completely unconcerned by warnings 
like the one expressed by Belfiore, which I presented in Chapter Three, 
that the consequence of treating the arts and cultural policy as a public 
utility, might be that they could become absorbed within more general 
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social and economical policies, KUD (1973) stressed instead that cultural 
policy was part of general social policies, and an active cultural policy 
could itself contribute to shaping a desirable society. In this it echoes 
Augustin Girard‟s claim that only a cultural policy that was preoccupied 
with reaching social objectives deserved to take its place alongside 
economic and social policy. This was initially an inherent part of the 
subject oriented representation. However, as already mentioned and as 
will be demonstrated below, this instrumental approach to cultural policy, 
emphasising its social effects beyond its mere intrinsic values, was also 
increasingly applied to the object oriented Bildung representation.  
 
But it was in the initial papers that this argument chimed the strongest. 
KUD (1974) for example, emphasised that cultural policy should be 
regarded as part of a general social policy and that cultural policy was 
about social change: 
 
Cultural policy as a means to improve the social environment and create 
a qualitatively richer society is now the great challenge for cultural policy 
planning and practical work with culture.448 
 
To perceive cultural policy as an aspect of all other policies rather than an 
independent policy-sector can, in theory at least, be perceived to have 
wide implications. A separate post (or posts) on the annual budget had 
been earmarked for cultural affairs ever since the foundation of a 
department of culture within KUD in 1938. Culture was thus to be 
regarded as a sector, alongside other sectors such as, for example, 
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health, agriculture and industry. Under such a sector-model, the 
administration of culture is relatively simple and limited to the funding of 
institutions and individual artists supplemented with activities to make the 
artistic output available to a wider audience. The wider definition of 
culture does not necessarily make the administration of culture more 
intricate: it only implies that it will cover a wider area to include, for 
example, sports and amateur activities. However, the Green papers for 
the new cultural policy (particularly KUD (1974)) emphasised that cultural 
policy should set the terms for a range of other policy areas such as 
regional, housing and social policy, where the socialist principle of 
equality was a central objective.  As pointed out by Roshauw: 
 
The starting point for the ministry [of culture] is that the whole of society 
must be the framework for cultural policy, and not as before be limited to 
a narrow sector, with funding of the arts as the main task.449  
 
This was very much in line with the thinking behind some of the policy 
documents published by the Labour Party in the 1950s (for example „a 
cultural programme for debate‟). Thus, although not altogether a new idea, 
this was the first time that such an understanding, which perceives 
cultural policy not only to be preoccupied with a particular sector (in terms 
of organisations and delivery mechanisms that are established to mediate 
the arts), but rather to affect a whole aspect of society, was put forward 
as official policy. 
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Cultural policy was seen as a crucial vehicle in achieving the Labour 
government‟s overarching objective, which was to „build a qualitatively 
better society with equality between groups and individuals‟.450  
 
KUD (1974) went even further and, with reference to a Labour Party 
policy paper presented at the party‟s annual meeting in 1973, argued for 
the importance of cultural policy in the creation of a radically different and 
socialist society.451 Achieving socialism through democratic means was 
an explicitly stated objective for the Labour Party at the time and should 
also inform cultural policy, which should be an integral part of the 
instruments applied to reach this goal. 
 
As could be expected, MPs from the non-socialist parties objected to 
cultural policy becoming a tool in such an explicitly left-oriented policy and 
references were made to the limitation on speech and artistic freedom in 
countries labelling themselves as socialist. However, their protest was 
surprisingly mild, and a reading of their statements today gives the 
impression that it was mostly the word „socialist‟ that they objected to, not 
the policies as such. After having distanced themselves from this socialist 
orientation, committee members from the Conservatives, the Christian 
Democrats and the Centre Party stated that there were broad 
agreements about the most important opinions and suggestions raised in 
the two Green papers. 452  The Christian Democrat MP, Jakob Aano, 
suggested that the Labour Party find another word for „socialist‟ to 
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describe their policies, since they were not socialist in the crude term of 
the word at all.453 Thus, this subject oriented representation contained a 
strong emphasis on the inherent capacity of an active cultural policy to 
contribute to far-reaching social change. A further interrogation of a 
statement by Erik Gjems-Onstad from the right-wing Anders Lange‟s 
Party (the predecessor of the Progress Party), which was the only party 
that subjected the Green papers to a fierce attack, seems to support this. 
Gjems-Onstad expressed surprise at what he saw as the other non-
socialist parties‟ subscription to the Labour Party‟s rhetoric, grouping 
them all together in the same socialist camp.454 He thus observed that 
there was cross-party agreement on the policies that the Labour Party 
chose to call „socialist‟.  
 
The subject oriented Bildung representation was thus highly instrumental 
in the sense that cultural policy was perceived to have the potential to 
contribute to social change. This was closely connected to the wider 
definition of culture, on which the new cultural policies should be based, 
and in KUD (1974) it was argued (very much in line with Augustin Girard‟s 
ideas) that the aesthetic and partly intellectual dimension of traditional 
cultural activities was less suited to achieve these goals.455 Cultural policy 
would play a crucial role in the government‟s efforts to solve tomorrow‟s 
problems and the minister, Bjartmar Gjerde, argued that these new 
                                            
453 MP Jakob Aano, FIS (1975), p. 2442. 
454 Ibid., p. 2428. 
455 KUD (1974), p. 19. 
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proposed policies were a response to the government‟s analysis of social 
tasks and future problems.456  
  
The rationale behind this aspect approach, where cultural policy should 
act as an overarching superstructure informing a range of other areas, 
may be twofold. On the one hand, it may act as an acknowledgement of 
how fundamental and important culture is in people‟s lives. In fact, using 
one of Raymond Williams‟ categories of the modern usage of the word 
„culture‟, it can mean a particular way of life.457 Used in this way, culture 
incorporates everything people do, at their work place and in their leisure 
time, whether at or away from home. The idea to allow cultural policy to 
fundamentally influence and work in harmony with policies for most other 
areas could be a way to acknowledge that everything is culture, and that 
a policy which does not take people‟s common culture seriously, but only 
prioritises cultural heritage (particularly if this heritage originates from and 
is mostly enjoyed by an exclusive elite), cannot be justified as a social 
democratic policy where equality is a prime objective. Such a rationale 
can be traced back to the ideas and rhetoric of the Labour movement of 
the 1930s, which emphasised the importance of empowering an 
alternative working class culture to rival the existing bourgeois hegemony. 
The Green papers of the 1970s did not refer to working class culture 
explicitly though but rather to the popular culture (or way of life) amongst 
ordinary people.  
                                            
456 Minister of Culture, Bjartmar Gjerde, FIS (1975), p. 2468. Gjerde emphasised, however, that 
cultural policy could not patch up or treat damages caused by the development within other 
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The issue of how cultural policy could and should contribute to a more 
general social policy was also present in the discourse of the 1980s, and 
this time not only supporting the subject oriented representation to 
Bildung but also the democratisation of traditional art forms. This is 
perhaps epitomised by the leader of the parliamentary committee, Reiulf 
Steen, who emphasised that the arts did not exist outside a social, 
economic and political context and that a: 
 
„people, who do not have a culture and who do not have the arts, will be 
a people without identity, without tools to show them the direction and 
without means of getting to know the truth.458  
 
Several specific and tangible effects of an increased prioritisation of 
culture were mentioned, such as the fight against unemployment and a 
positive impact on people‟s physical, social and mental health.459 KUD 
(1981) also emphasised that: 
 
Cultural and environmental work become even more important if we shall 
manage to create a society that is more humane, safe and based on 
solidarity.460  
 
A consequence of this was again that cultural policy should not be 
reduced to one sector of society but have an overarching aspect-oriented 
remit.461   
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This sector-overarching aspect approach was again put forward in the 
Green paper of the 1990s.462 Support initiatives for culture were to be 
prioritised in areas where this could have social consequences in addition 
to the purely cultural objectives, although this was not to happen at the 
expense of culture‟s intrinsic values.463 In addition to specific and tangible 
policy objectives like the fight against unemployment, the development of 
cultural business enterprises such as tourism (which were mentioned 
briefly), and the use of culture to attract people to particular cities or 
regions due to their cultural provision, culture was seen to have the 
potential to improve quality of life more generally. 464  
 
This was particularly picked up by members of the Labour Party in the 
parliamentary committee, who argued that the sector-overarching 
principle had become even more important due to the impact of the 
international media-industries. Although their intrinsic values were 
acknowledged, cultural activities and cultural participation also 
contributed to „the encouragement of creativity and independence, and 
improve the ability to meet new challenges‟.465  
 
Members of the Socialist Left Party and the Centre Party in the 
parliamentary committee also subscribed to the sector-overarching 
approach. Members from SV also emphasised that cultural policy was the 
real policy and that it should determine developments in other fields such 
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as „education, building and construction, work environment and product 
design through strong standards for aesthetics, value-consciousness and 
quality‟.466  
 
On the other hand, SP members emphasised the principle that cultural 
policy should be overarching and integrated into all parts of society and 
not „overshadowed by other sectors‟.467  
 
The aspect approach to cultural policy was significantly toned down in the 
2000s, where KUL (2003a) focused much more on the professional arts, 
with little reference to their potential contribution to social policy. Again, it 
was instead mostly members from the centre-left parties that still 
emphasised that culture could have a positive social impact and thus 
lamented that cultural policy was still steeped in a sector-focus.468    
 
The aspect oriented approach to cultural policy emphasised that culture 
had a positive social impact on the individual. However, as from the 
1980s, it was argued that it was not just each individual that was 
threatened by a passive consumption of commercial culture, but the 
„common‟ Norwegian culture as a whole. This threat to national culture 
has been another important argument that underpins cultural policy 
rationales, and this is the focus of the following section.  
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6.2.6 National culture under threat 
 
As mentioned above, the value rhetoric from the 1970s and onwards was 
very much linked to another rationale, which argued that Norwegian 
culture and Norwegian cultural identity were under threat, particularly 
from the forces of the global cultural industries. The strong impact of 
commercial culture was, in line with Girard‟s critique of the pacifying 
forces of these industries, regarded by many as the main cause of the 
alleged rootless feelings and lack of values, which harboured the two 
previously mentioned interlinked, and again, pessimistic arguments. 
Firstly, a general reservation against the outputs of the commercial 
cultural industries, and secondly, a fear of the perceived threat posed by 
globalisation (partly due to the former) to Norwegian culture and identity. 
However, as will be shown, the anti-commercial argument changed 
during the course of the four decades analysed here, where commercial 
culture was gradually met with less scepticism, before it was embraced 
and actually hailed as the solution to the threat to national identity. The 
perceived threat to a Norwegian national identity also mellowed over the 
years.  
 
From the danger of commercial culture to embracing the cultural 
industries 
 
Right from the start in KUD (1973), the commercialisation of the cultural 
sector was seen as something inherently negative. A phrase that was 
often repeated was „undesirable commercialisation‟, which should be 
245 
 
counteracted in order to „secure everybody‟s real free choice of cultural 
activities and cultural provisions‟.469 
 
This was echoed even more strongly in KUD (1974), which made it clear 
that: 
 
certain forms of commercialisation [were seen] as a serious cultural 
policy problem. There is reason to believe that this question will become 
even more intense in the future, partly because of developments in the 
multinational cultural industries.470  
 
Hence, it was suggested that the government might intervene where 
market forces had undesirable effects. This included producing and 
distributing cultural products (particularly within the field of music), if 
private actors did not secure real choice.471 One of the alleged negative 
consequences of the commercial sector was that cultural areas that were 
not deemed profitable were not allowed to flourish within a market-
context.472 The freedom provided by the cultural industries was thus not 
always real, but perceived as an illusion brought forward by an 
aggressive advertising industry.473 This was particularly perceived to be a 
problem for young people, whose „commercialised leisure culture, gives 
an undesirable and one-sided offer, mainly developed with the aim to 
make a profit,474 and often resulted in „unhealthy consumption needs and 
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undesirable status norms‟, 475  as well as turning people into passive 
consumers.476  
 
Seven years later, KUD (1981) repeated these deep reservations towards 
the cultural industries, and revealed particular concerns regarding new 
technologies. However, the response was more reflective and less rigid. 
Although the paper still proposed regulations, for example through a ban 
on strong violence on videocassettes, it also emphasised that the power 
of the cultural industries could only be resisted through securing a thriving 
live culture. Undesirable commercialisation should thus be opposed 
through the encouragement of alternative quality products. 477  It is 
interesting to observe that, although the previous Green papers of the 
1970s had been reluctant to define quality, KUD (1981) did this implicitly 
when it lamented the products of the cultural industries, and their inferior 
quality when compared to the publicly financed professional arts. This 
contradicts the relativist approach to quality that was so apparent 
elsewhere in these policy texts and indicates a subtle discursive practice: 
a default position where quality is perceived in relative terms, but this 
does not extend to commercial culture, the inferior quality of which is 
taken for granted. Hence, this distinction between commercial and non 
commercial culture does not merit any further discussion.  
 
However, KUV (1983) presented an even more prominent proactive 
approach which, rather than just lamenting the impact of the cultural 
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industries, proposed a positive response. Here, the equation of mass 
produced cultural products with „undesirable commercialisation‟ was 
explicitly rejected as a gross simplification. Instead, the cultural industries‟ 
democratic potential, (because of their capacity to disseminate high 
quality art to everybody, beyond a narrow elite), was emphasised. 478  
 
In order to counter the negative effects of the commercial cultural 
industries, a vibrant domestic production of content was suggested, as 
well as the support of what was termed „superior‟ cultural production.479 
Again, a subtle distinction between „superior‟ non-commercial versus the 
„inferior‟ commercial appears as an implicit assumption.  
 
Moreover, due to the inherent value of increased international contacts, 
possibilities of opening up the media-landscape were considered to be 
inherently valuable, and a policy of isolation was unthinkable.480 However, 
a less isolationistic cultural policy, particularly in the area of broadcasting, 
made it more important to ensure that:  
 
Norwegian culture can excel through its own quality, and it is a social 
task to support superior cultural production, which cannot survive the 
competition without subsidies.481 
 
KUL (2003a) also contained a critical reflection on commercial culture, 
which should be combated through a diverse cultural sector, where: 
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a broad spectrum of creative, executive, documenting and mediating 
efforts from all parts of the cultural field are a valuable counterweight 
against the standardised power represented by different commercial 
powers in society.482   
 
However, the paper acknowledged that many cultural changes took place 
beyond political control, and that, although policies should be attentive to 
this, they could only create a framework within which these developments 
could come to fruition. Hence, a more receptive approach to the cultural 
industries was proposed, where rather than regulate and oppose, the 
government should interact with these industries and encourage a 
diverse production.  
 
The previously dark and pessimistic analysis of the products of the 
cultural industries had also changed. An intense consumption of media-
content had, for example, previously been seen as encouraging passivity 
or perhaps even as damaging, particularly for children. KUL (2003a), on 
the other hand, described some of these activities thus: 
 
Activities like watching television or playing computer games cannot only 
be appreciated as passive or damaging pastimes. Quite the opposite, 
these are activities which are very important in order to enable children 
to integrate with other children of the same age-group, through play and 
other social activities. Children gain confidence through an arsenal of 
stories, ideas and conceptions, which can be used creatively in their own 
play-times. Not at least for this age-group [children] is the media supply 
important, in giving common references for interaction across social and 
cultural divides.483  
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This marks a shift from an object oriented policy-measure where the role 
of decision-makers within government was to interfere with the market in 
order to protect audiences from content, which represented anti-Bildung, 
to an increased trust in people‟s self-determination also in terms of their 
consumption of commercial culture: a subject orientation. But it breaks 
with the Girard inspired cultural democracy policies, which did not include 
commercial culture amongst the manifestations that could facilitate 
Bildung.  
 
However, the paper still warned against „the standardised power‟ of 
different commercial actors484 and argued that this challenge should be 
met by an active cultural sector with a high level of production of 
Norwegian content. 485  This would be combined with an attempt to 
increase the level of knowledge and cultural competence in the 
population.486    
 
It was argued that the threat to national identity was primarily posed by 
global cultural industries, but also by other major trends connected with 
globalisation, such as increased immigration. Again, a significant 
discursive change can be observed from scepticism and pessimism to an 
active positive response. The next section will look more specifically at 
how cultural policies were formulated as a response to the forces of 
globalisation.  
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From pressure on national identity to abandonment of the national project 
 
Although it was not until the 1980s that the anti-globalisation argument 
was articulated with full force, the perception that Norway was a small 
and vulnerable country in cultural terms was already expressed in the 
1970s. It was argued that to democratise the professional arts as well as 
to attempt to create a cultural democracy were big challenges for a small 
country like Norway with what was described as a relatively short history 
of cultural traditions compared with the so-called „cultural nations‟ abroad. 
This was not made easier due to international cultural exchange being 
more intense than ever. Hence:  
 
It is even more important to recognise that cultural policy is of decisive 
importance for our ability to uphold our independence and distinctive 
character as a participant in international cultural exchange.487  
 
Although the 1980s saw a more positive approach to the cultural 
industries, concerns over the pressure on Norwegian culture and identity 
were expressed with a stronger force. The parliamentary committee in 
particular picked up on this and warned against the enormous power of 
media technologies, which in terms of content provision, presented 
uneven power relations between global industry-actors and domestic 
content providers, particularly within the audio-visual industries. The big 
media players produced „standardised‟ content that was designed to be 
marketed globally, and because of their market-base were able to 
„undersell‟ their products on domestic markets with the result that 
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Norwegian content lost out in the competition. Hence, the parliamentary 
committee observed that the „international consumption oriented cultural 
industry‟ was about to take over completely, and argued that: 
 
international major producers focus on products, which are produced 
with a world market in mind, where the conditions for crossing national 
cultural borders seem to make the products standardised and without 
character.488  
 
Again it was assumed that domestic content, and content not produced in 
the context of a commercial framework, by definition contribute more to 
diversity than what was branded as commercial. KUD (1981) was even 
more specific and lamented how new technology had supported a strong 
and undesirable commercialisation.489 
 
It was argued that this could, in the worst instance, threaten Norwegian 
culture at its core: 
 
There is a danger that commercial products and the efficient marketing 
of the multinational media and leisure industries, will characterise the use 
of leisure time in a way that can threaten even the foundation of 
Norwegian culture.490  
 
Hence, local content should be defended in order to protect: 
  
what is our own, the culture which burst out of our character, from our 
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experiences and deeply rooted values, which chimes in with the reality 
that is ours.491  
 
Increased Norwegian content-production, particularly within radio and 
television, with emphasis on quality and diversity, was prescribed as the 
remedy. It was thus seen as a national task for central government to 
create the necessary conditions for content producers to increase their 
production.492 The parliamentary committee emphasised that this was a 
national responsibility, and the most important cultural policy task ahead 
was „to lead an active policy which consciously secures our language, 
national and cultural identity‟.493  
 
It was also emphasised, to a larger extent than in the 1970s, how culture 
could unite people through a shared national identity,494 and that this 
could counter an increasing dissolution of norms and a crisis of 
identity,495 which again indicates a discursive subscription to the Bildung 
potential of national culture.  
 
The perceived threat to Norwegian identity was thus strong and remedies 
had to be identified to „save‟ what was perceived to be Norwegian.  
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The most important identity marker was, unsurprisingly, the language, 
and the need to protect and nourish the two Norwegian languages was 
thus given utmost importance by all members of the parliamentary 
commitee. MP Tore Austad, summarised this thus: 
 
Our call […] is to ensure that the language that is being spoken and 
written in our corner [of the world], remains a genuine and fine-tuned and 
a sonorous instrument for thoughts, and feelings and meanings. This is 
simply cultural task number one.496  
 
By the 1990s, a common Norwegian national culture was perceived to be 
in an even stronger squeeze: as before, by the global media industry on 
the one hand but increasingly also by regional and local culture on the 
other. It was thought that all this might lead to a more diverse culture, but 
that „this diversity might displace important parts of the culture, which 
should be our common heritage and give us our identity‟.497  
 
Thus, it was understood that a cultural policy for the 1990s should 
recognise this interplay between the national and the international, but at 
the same time be built „on our national roots and our tradition, in the way 
it is being expressed in Norwegian society‟.498  
 
Hence, the objective was an interplay with global culture. However, in 
accordance with Herderian ideas, an interplay where the national culture 
and identity were valued and respected: 
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There is no necessary contradiction between the need to take care of our 
own culture and the desire to be open to other countries‟ cultural 
expressions. It is important to keep this in mind when Norway now has 
become a multi-cultural society. Our art and culture have always been 
shaped and developed in an interplay, partly between the regional 
cultures in different parts of the country, partly through impulses from the 
world outside.499  
 
This was echoed by the parliamentary committee, where the majority 
commented that it had become more difficult than previously to protect 
national identity and values due to the intense influx of cultural content 
from abroad. The subsequent parliamentary debate exposed strong 
voices in support of the anti-globalisation rationale. It was argued that 
Norwegian culture had come under increased pressure from global mass 
media through a diverse number of TV-channels and the video-industry. 
To combat this a „state of readiness‟ should, according to MP Johan J. 
Jacobsen, be prepared against: 
 
a cultural influence, which over time can weaken the values which have 
given us a national distinctive character, kept us rooted with an identity 
as country and people. Thus, it is a national duty to protect our national 
cultural heritage, and renew and develop it. Not through isolation, not 
due to a fear of the unknown and the untried. We shall receive impulses 
from outside and give impulses in a fruitful interplay with the rest of the 
world. However, we must look after the balance in this interplay, so that 
important values in the Norwegian society do not get lost.500  
 
Hence, as expressed by a member from the Conservative Party (on the 
parliamentary committee), a historic consciousness, anchored in a 
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national cultural heritage, would give „greater safety in a society 
increasingly characterised by fast and significant change‟.501  
 
This was to change radically and by 2003 was replaced by a rhetoric 
which argued that (used in this context for the first time) „globalisation‟, as 
well as an increased level of individualisation, had resulted in „a more 
complex cultural situation, [...] where traditional ideas of a Norwegian 
common culture and national identity were challenged‟.502   
 
Hence, rather than the usual emphasis on a common national culture, 
this paper focused more on how contemporary cultural policy should 
encourage cultural diversity, both nationally and internationally. 
Globalisation had also increased the opportunities for international 
cultural exchange, where the importance of the arts and culture, including 
what was traditionally perceived as having a more „narrow‟ appeal, was 
emphasised as important.  
 
KUL (2003a) also stressed that there was a relationship between 
globalisation and people‟s renewed interest in local communities and 
local culture. This had contributed to increased activities locally and 
regionally, many of which had developed outside established institutions, 
but sometimes as part of international networks, which had enabled new 
opportunities, in an atmosphere of „glocalisation‟. Due to their 
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independent status some of these projects had also contributed to a 
blurring of the distinction between different genres.503  
 
All of this had, according to KUL (2003a), created a radically different 
context for cultural policy-making, which begged fundamental questions  
about the assumptions on which a common cultural policy had been 
based. There was thus a need: 
 
to create a new understanding of what a Norwegian common culture is 
made up of. Traditional ideas of the Norwegian and national identity are  
changing.504  
 
Hence, cultural policy, instead of nourishing a national culture under 
threat from globalisation as before, should: 
 
turn its perspective away from the construction of a uniform common 
culture and facilitate the development of culture based on diversity and 
complexity, which characterises today‟s cultural situation. This demands 
an understanding of culture as an open process, not as an isolated 
system. The basis must be that culture is something which originates, 
grows and changes in its encounter with other cultures. In this 
perspective cultural diversity becomes a condition for the creation and 
development of a living culture.505  
 
This new representation was marked by three concepts: a positive 
response to globalisation (a word which did not signify something 
unambiguously negative), a celebration of Norway as a multi-ethnic and 
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multi-cultural society, and finally, a more positive approach to the cultural 
industries.  
 
This received wide support, including from opposition parties. Similarly to 
the already mentioned changed perception of the commercial cultural 
industries, which implied a more positive approach to people‟s own self 
determination in terms of cultural consumption, this shift away from the 
emphasis on a common national culture (to the celebration of cultural 
diversity) signified a return of the subject representation. The subscription 
to one common monoculture was replaced with a celebration of diversity, 
where a range of cultures, situated in close proximity to, and even defined 
by, people themselves, implies a departure from the sole understanding 
that only a prescribed canon of cultural outputs can lead to Bildung. This 
implies the return of the subject representation where it is acknowledged 
that Norway was made up of several cultures and where decisions about 
what should be celebrated and supported should be taken as close to 
people as possible.  
 
The multi-cultural consequence of increased immigration had, in certain 
ways, made the social make-up of Norway more complex, and this could 
not be ignored.506 It was emphasised that new efforts, which made it 
possible for cultural expressions from immigrant-communities to make 
use of the full supply of cultural activities, should be instigated and that 
the majority should show respect and tolerance for these communities. 
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However, access to new and more diverse cultural expressions should go 
even further, where the long-term objective was to „develop changes in 
attitudes, so that what is different is perceived as something natural, 
valuable and of equal value‟.507     
 
In the words of the then Minister for Culture, Valgerd Svarstad Haugland:  
 
Cultural policy must in future turn its perspective away from the 
construction of such a [national] common culture and accept the 
complexity of today‟s cultural situation. It must be based on a dynamic 
and inclusive cultural perspective, which gives space for a plurality of 
different voices.508 
 
However, this description of Norway as part of a wider and more diverse 
culture, both internationally and at home, was still being challenged by an 
anti-globalisation / anti-commerce rhetoric. As mentioned above, KUL 
(2003a) presented globalisation as having both homogenising and 
heterogeneous effects. Members from A, SV and SP (on the 
parliamentary committee), argued that the diversity brought about by 
globalisation, paradoxically could be threatened by the same globalisation. 
This perceived threat was also still taken seriously in the Green paper, 
which concluded that a new cultural policy thus had to deliver a balancing 
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act between „collecting the gains from globalisation and implementing 
counter-strategies where diversity is threatened‟.509  
 
The aim to continue to strengthen the Norwegian language was also still 
seen as a priority, which received broad support. The Centre Party, for 
example, argued that the Norwegian language was threatened and that 
an „aggressive language policy‟ was important to protect the two official 
languages.510  
 
Notwithstanding all the celebratory rhetoric about cultural diversity and 
the positive effects of globalisation, „common‟ culture as an identity 
marker still received some support. Representatives from the 
Conservatives and the Christian Democrats for example, emphasised 
that belonging to „[our] cultural heritage, strengthens our identity as 
individuals and our common cultural reference points as a nation‟.511  
 
Hence, the open response to globalisation existed alongside a still critical 
and negative approach, which highlighted that Norway‟s common culture 
should receive protection.  
 
The analysis has so far exposed cultural policy arguments, which in one 
way or another prescribed how culture affected the individual or the 
society as a whole. I argue that they all, more or less tightly, sit together 
as an overall Bildung discourse. Whether through emphasising that 
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culture should be defined widely and that as many people as possible 
should influence the policy about what should be supported; whether the 
emphasis has been on the professional arts‟ potential to enlighten or 
whether the people and the culture as such should be protected from the 
forces of globalisation or commercial culture, it is the effect on and the 
well-being of the individual and the culture of the nation as a whole that 
has been the focus.  
 
I also identified two alternative discourses in my policy-material. These 
are not concerned with rationales for why Norway should put in place 
certain cultural policy measures. However, albeit alternative, both these 
discourses are so prevalent in the policy rhetoric that I have included 
them in my analysis, and this is the focus of the next section.  
 
6.3 Tracing the rationales: Alternative Discourses  
 
How the cultural sector is financed does not strictly speaking relate to 
cultural policy rationales. It is however still relevant to analyse how a 
„marketisation‟ rhetoric has developed over the thirty years charted here, 
partly because this would get close to advocating that the collaboration 
between the cultural and business sectors was an intrinsic cultural policy 
objective in the 2000s, but also because it is being given much attention 
in these papers. Hence, I shall relatively briefly present this, together with 
the radical alternative discourse uttered by representatives from the 
Progress Party. 
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6.3.1 The ‘marketisation’ of cultural policy: from diverse 
sources of funding to ‘culture and business’ 
  
The discourse of the 1970s did not question the sources of funding for 
culture at all. The institutions and schemes that were established by, or 
received a big part of their funding from, the government, were not 
expected to raise money, perhaps with the exception of a small 
proportion through ticketing income, from elsewhere. This was partly 
because improvements to the cultural infrastructure were seen as a 
public responsibility at a time when the Norwegian economy was doing 
very well. In fact, this was a period of general growth in the public sector.  
 
This changed in the 1980s. KUD (1981) reported that the funding for 
culture had tripled in real terms between 1970 and 1981, but that this 
bonanza, at least for that period, was coming to an end. Hence, rather 
than promising increased funding to new initiatives, the paper 
emphasised budget restraints, and an increased need for a re-
prioritisation within existing budgets. The funding restraints were echoed 
in KUV (1983). However, rather than reallocating budgets it was argued 
that extra funding had to be sourced from elsewhere, and that the cultural 
sector had to become more active in exploring alternative revenue 
streams. The Conservative government behind KUV (1983) argued that 
increased financial support did not necessarily boost either cultural output 
or consumption. At the same time as public funding for culture had 
increased significantly, people‟s consumption of some cultural activities 
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had gone down, and this was perceived as a problem.512 It was also 
argued that there was, most probably, a non-exploited potential for 
cultural funding from private sources. 513  However, funding from non-
public sources would not come instead of, but in addition to, existing 
levels of public funds. The administration of culture was also regarded as 
too inflexible, which restrained the margins for cultural output.514    
 
Several MPs, particularly from the Conservative Party, supported this 
view in parliament. Halgrim Berg, for instance, clearly argued that: 
 
the financing of intellectual life and cultural activities should never be 
exclusively a public responsibility, even though some might find such a 
policy both comfortable and ideologically correct.515  
 
Interestingly, the response by the parliamentary committee was broadly 
negative. A joint committee rejected a call for cultural institutions to 
increase their revenue through earned income. Neither did they embrace 
revenue from sponsorship and advertising. The majority, made up of H, 
KrF and SP argued that there were both positive and negative aspects of 
new revenue streams but that such funding in no way would exempt the 
government from its responsibilities. Sponsorship could be relevant for 
specific events, concerts and festivals but not as revenue for publicly 
funded cultural institutions. It also warned against events or institutions 
                                            
512 The private consumption of cinema tickets had for example been reduced from 124 million 
Norwegian kroner in 1975 to 108 in 1982, whereas for theatre tickets the spending had gone 
down from 26 million kroner in 1975 to 25 million in 1982 (KUV (1983), p. 18). 
513 Ibid., p. 19. 
514 Ibid., p. 4 and p. 10. 
515 MP Hallgrim Berg, FIS (1985), p. 3031. 
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becoming dependent on private funding, which was regarded as 
unacceptable. The minority made up of representatives from the Labour 
Party went even further and argued that a strong reliance on support from 
private business would be a step back in time to when the arts were 
supported by private patrons. This would compromise integrity, and this 
faction argued that such a threat from private industry should be 
countered through even more public support. This did not imply a total 
rejection of private funding, but the main message was one of scepticism. 
Above all, a joint committee reiterated that any gifts or sponsor-support 
from the business sector should not be granted at the expense of the 
recipient‟s artistic integrity.516 
 
However, by 1992 the attitude towards private business sponsorship had 
changed, and the Green paper (KUL (1992)) presented by a Labour 
government now argued that such contributions were positive, as long as 
the agreements did not violate the integrity of the artists involved. As 
before, the paper stressed that such funding should never replace the 
public sector‟s responsibility, but should be used for increased activity 
and special projects, and that organisations should not become 
dependent on this type of funding.517 Conservative members argued that 
alternative sources of funding should not be perceived as of less value 
than public funding, and that to prevent such funding with the argument 
that it could lead to „undesirable commercialisation‟ was too simple.518 
Conservative members declared that „the extent, and especially the 
                                            
516 KUK (1985), p. 31.  
517 KUL (1992), p. 13.  
518 KUK (1993), p. 5. 
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quality, of the cultural activities in our society is not determined by the 
public authorities or by public subsidies‟.519  
 
It was argued that it was the government‟s task to create the right 
conditions for a healthy cultural sector, but within this framework other 
financial sources should also be encouraged and allowed to flourish.  
 
Although KUL (1993) did not signal a reduction in funds, it emphasised 
the need for an efficient utilisation of money allocated. It therefore 
stressed that better performance indicators had to be developed. It 
emphasised particularly that a set of indicators to measure the qualitative 
dimension, in addition to quantitative measures, should be introduced.520 
Rather than focus on alternative sources of funding, this paper was thus 
more preoccupied with efficiency-measures within the cultural sector.  
 
By 2003, this marketisation rhetoric had moved a big step further, and 
both the Green paper, the parliamentary reply and the subsequent 
parliamentary debate revealed a much more open approach to increased 
interaction between the cultural and business sectors. An active cultural 
sector was increasingly perceived as a competitive advantage for Norway 
as a nation, which could partly be achieved through an increased 
Norwegian presence on the „international cultural arena‟. 521  Another 
argument emphasised that the divisions between the cultural sector and 
the business sector had become so blurred that it was difficult to identify 
                                            
519 MP Anders Talleraas, FIS (1993), p. 3142. 
520 KUL (1992), p. 62.  
521 KUL (2003a), p. 9. 
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a clear distinction any longer. The paper argued that increased 
collaboration between the arts and business would have general positive 
external consequences but that it was also necessary in order to achieve 
increased growth of the cultural sector.522  
 
However, the marketisation agenda was not only marked by the call for 
increasing collaboration between the arts and business, but also for the 
sector itself to be administered according to management principles more 
akin to those found in private business companies. Firstly, cultural 
institutions were requested to re-prioritise their activities in the name of 
efficiency to secure better utilisation of limited resources. Tighter financial 
control and more cost-effective operations were emphasised. Larger 
institutions were also expected to make more use of independent artistic 
partners and to initiate more temporary projects.523 The rationale behind 
these demands was not only for the organisations to become more 
efficient but also to enable them to be more flexible in artistic terms and 
to: 
 
be attentive and susceptible to impulses from outside, pick up new needs 
and collaborate both between each other [the institutions] and external 
actors in a dynamic way.524   
 
                                            
522 Ibid., p. 10. 
523 Ibid., p. 8.  
524 Ibid. 
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Thus, in the marketisation rationale, the need for cultural organisations to 
become more efficient went hand in hand with a demand for them to also 
become artistically more innovative.  
 
This marketisation discourse never questioned the public financing of 
cultural activities and institutions as such. Although it initially argued that 
the growth in spending could not continue and later that a funding-
potential from private sources should be exploited, it was still understood 
that the government was responsible for a cultural infrastructure, 
including not only the support of main institutions, but also individual 
artists. This position was perceived radically differently in the last 
discourse that I have identified, namely, that produced by the members of 
the Progress Party.  
6.3.2 The Progress Party: the end of policy and the return to 
the national project 
 
As mentioned above, the main elements of the Bildung discourse were 
supported by both the government and across most parties in parliament, 
and differing views appeared thus not as contradictory, but rather as 
complementary. However, one party distanced itself utterly from the 
others and championed a radically different approach, asking 
fundamental questions about Norwegian cultural policy and its public 
financing. The Progress Party was not represented in the parliamentary 
committees, that responded to the Green papers until the 1990s. 
However, judging from the party members‟ participation in the 
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parliamentary debate, their stance was clearly visible already in 1985.525 
At that time, their most vocal proponent was MP Jens Marcussen, who 
came up with clear recommendations for how certain cultural institutions 
could reduce their burden on the tax-paying public. Theatres, for example, 
should first do their utmost to cut costs, particularly by reducing their 
technical staffing. If they also „programmed plays that people actually 
want to see and increase the ticket-prices‟, then performing arts 
institutions would, in his view, be in less need of public money. 526 Also for 
museums and libraries the public should be expected to pay more of the 
costs. Furthermore, they fiercely attacked the government‟s policy on 
artists. The party could not find any rationale for why support for 
individual artists should be of any importance and suggested instead that 
all support schemes should be abolished. Artists should instead be 
perceived as self-employed tradesmen, who should accept that they had 
to live off the sale of their products: „Artists who do not manage to live off 
their products should have no claim to have their hobby activities paid by 
Norwegian tax-payers‟.527  
 
All these arguments were underpinned by a strong liberal ideology 
supporting a laissez-faire approach to culture, where the sector should 
manage on its own.   
  
                                            
525 This followed naturally from Erik Gjems-Onstad from Anders Lange‟s Party‟s (from which 
the Progress Party evolved) already mentioned arguments in parliament in 1975, which were also 
extremely critical of public spending on culture.  
526 MP Jens Marcussen, FIS (1985), p. 3046. 
527 Ibid., p. 3047. 
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By 1993, the party had four representatives on the parliamentary 
committee,528 and again their views presented a radically different stance. 
Their definition of culture was relativistic and echoed in many ways the 
approach from the Green papers of the seventies:  
 
Culture is an open notion which expresses those values and qualities 
which each individual attaches a high value to. […] Culture can be 
defined individually and generally. People‟s relationship to culture varies. 
How they interpret this notion will also vary strongly.529  
 
The committee members from FrP argued, in radical opposition to the 
other parties in parliament, that the government should only secure a 
legal framework and stop financing cultural activities. The cultural sector 
should be guided by people‟s own choices but the current cultural policy 
obstructed this through its taxation of individuals in order to spend it on 
politically prioritised cultural areas. Instead of this redistribution there 
should be an open market for culture. 530  
 
Culture should encourage innovation and progress, both intellectually and 
materially. However, governmental interference in cultural policy had the 
opposite effect and would instead lead to „passivity and stagnation‟.531  
 
                                            
528 One of the members, Finn Thoresen, had actually broken ranks with FrP by the time the 
parliamentary committee debated the Green Paper. However, his views on the Green Paper and 
cultural policy generally were more or less the same as those of other FrP members. Hence, 
statements from the FrP members will include those of Finn Thoresen. 
529 KUK (1993), p. 5.  
530 Ibid. 
531 KUK (1993), p. 6.  
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This was a liberal, highly un-Arnoldian approach, where people‟s freedom 
to choose should be secured through private markets. Any decisions 
taken by elites such as politicians or bureaucrats were, by definition, 
selective and thus unjust. Because the arts and culture were omnipresent 
and such an integrated part of people‟s lives, they did not need to be 
made subject to political governance. 532  
 
Such a liberal cultural policy would, according to FrP members, not have 
a devastating effect on cultural provision in Norway. Instead, the party 
argued that if there was, as claimed by others, popular support for the 
funding of culture, and that culture was absolutely necessary and had to 
be supported, then these cultural expressions and institutions would 
certainly survive in a free market, because of the allegedly massive 
support for maintaining them. 533  However, the party members were 
realistic enough to conclude that some cultural organisations might not 
survive without public funding, and they explained, rather bluntly, the 
consequences of a laissez-faire approach thus: 
 
Cultural activities which today are managed or supported by the public 
sector, would, according to a liberalistic objective, have to either; a) be 
transformed into commercial institutions, b) be supported on the basis of 
voluntary and idealistic activities or c) be shut down.534  
 
This sounds harsh and uncompromising, but it is worth noting that the 
Labour MP Thorbjørn Kultorp had uttered similar sentiments in 1974 
                                            
532 Ibid. 
533 KUK (1993), p. 15. 
534 Ibid., p. 7. 
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when he suggested dropping local cultural activities, which did not have 
popular support.535   
 
Money allocated to the arts in times of tight public budgets, where it could 
be better spent on social needs, such as the elderly, was seen as deeply 
problematic, and the party attacked the Conservatives for voting together 
with all the other parties, including the Socialist Left, for public support of 
culture.536  
 
The Progress Party‟s view had not changed much by the 2000s. The 
centre-right government behind KUL (2003a) had been criticised, by the 
opposition in parliament, for going too far in their emphasis on the 
marketisation of the cultural sector. However, the Progress Party 
presented again a much more radical approach. This time, attacking the 
funding of high arts institutions, their members lamented that broad 
cultural movements had been given so little emphasis.537 It is interesting 
that in this they built on the cultural democracy rhetoric of the seventies. 
However, this made them no closer to any of the other parties, and this 
was particularly evident in their condemnation of the government‟s 
alleged responsibility to support culture with a narrow appeal. Such 
expressions, and whether they would survive or not, would be determined 
by the market, where artists, businesses and audiences would meet and 
where different artistic expressions would develop naturally in one 
direction or another. The FrP members argued that „it is completely wrong 
                                            
535 See Chapter Six, sub-section 6.2.3.  
536 MP Jan Simonsen, FIS (1993), p. 3110. 
537 FKD (2004), p. 37. 
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to use public money and resources to attempt to influence this natural 
development‟.538  
 
Again, it was also argued that people who wanted to work as artists or in 
other jobs in the cultural sector did so as a career choice, and it was not 
the public sector‟s responsibility to continue to support them. However, 
FrP members argued that efforts should be made to create the right 
conditions for such workers so that they became independent of public 
support for example by assisting artists to exploit their intellectual 
property rights better.539  
 
The Progress Party also differed radically from other parties in their 
approach to the Green paper‟s celebration of cultural diversity, where, in 
their view, it was clear that to mix immigrant culture and Norwegian 
culture could have a detrimental effect on traditional culture. Hence, their 
assessment of immigrant culture was less relativistic and they warned 
against a policy that encouraged diversity, the results of which, according 
to this party, would be that after not many years: 
 
our own traditions would be blurred and Norwegian cultural tradition 
would be represented as a mixture of different cultural elements. These 
members cannot recommend this.540  
 
                                            
538 Ibid., p. 38. 
539 Ibid. 
540 FKD (2004), p. 37. 
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The Progress Party‟s rhetoric thus differed radically from the rest of the 
discourse on two accounts: on the rationales for having a cultural policy 
at all, and on the celebration of Norway as a diverse and multicultural 
society, which the party could not accept.  
 
Let me summarise the different discourses, as well as how they were 
manifested in the proposed policies by means of a table.  
 
6.4 Summary and discursive analysis 
 
Based on my analysis of these policy texts I argue that they harbour a 
strong understanding of, and subscription to, an inherent Bildung 
potential in cultural activities. This forms a discourse that is made up of 
four interrelated arguments: the „value‟ argument, the „growth‟ argument, 
the „anti-commerce‟ argument and the „protection of national identity‟ 
argument. Alongside this main discourse I have located two alternative 
discourses, which are less about policy-rationales per se, but which still 
take up a prominent space in these texts and hence merit inclusion, they 
are the marketisation discourse and the Progress Party discourse.  
6.4.1 The Bildung discourse 
 
Discounting the Progress Party‟s radical alternative suggestion to 
abandon the public support for cultural activities altogether,541 there is 
consensus amongst all agents here that such activities should receive 
                                            
541 Rather than continuously having to discount the Progress Party‟s counter-discourse, it should 
be taken as given that the discourses presented in this section are not subscribed to by this party.  
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public support, because they harbour a great Bildung potential both for 
each individual and for the nation as a whole. This was made most 
explicit in the „growth‟ argument where direct references were made to 
terms like „individual development‟, „comprehension‟, and „human growth‟. 
However, the argument that the nation had become value poor and that it 
was a public responsibility to compensate for this by providing culture of 
high moral value is also evidence of a Bildung rationale, as is the 
argument that Norwegian culture is under threat from a global cultural 
industry and from commercial culture more generally.  
 
This discourse has deep roots and can be traced in all the policy papers 
that I have analysed. There is thus a strong degree of durability in the 
subscription to these Bildung ideas. Neumann argues that discourses can 
often be perceived as being made up of several layers, depending on, 
exactly, the degree of durability of the different elements of the discursive 
structure.542  Ole Wæver refers to the degree of sedimentation in the 
discourse, where „the deeper structures are more solidly sedimented and 
more difficult to politicise and change‟,543 meaning that the „deeper‟ layers 
in the discourse, or the trunk and roots to use a tree-metaphor, signify 
characteristics of the representations over which there are fewer disputes. 
The branches and twigs, on the other hand, represent the surface level of 
the discourse, about which there might be less consensus. Neumann 
argues that:  
                                            
542 Neumann (2001b), p. 62.  
543 Ole Wæver, „Identity, communities and foreign policy: Discourse analysis as foreign policy 
theory‟, in Lene Hansen and Ole Wæver (eds.), European Integration and National Identity: The 
challenge of the Nordic states (London: Routledge, 2002), p. 32. 
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If some characteristics [of the representation] unify and others 
differentiate, then it is reasonable to imagine that the characteristics 
which unite are more lasting.544 
 
The discourse I have identified spans thirty years, and what holds it 
together is a deeply rooted subscription to the Bildung potential in cultural 
activities and artefacts. However, the discourse harbours two 
representations about the most effective way to facilitate Bildung: a 
subject representation, which defines culture widely in this respect, and 
which takes a relative approach to quality and emphasises participation 
and decentralisation, and an object representation, which emphasises the 
„professional arts‟. The weight of these two representations in the 
discourse varies both within the discourse at different points in time, but 
also over these thirty years. Consequently, the suitability of different 
policy-implications in terms of fulfilling this Bildung potential varies as well, 
or in other words, with reference to Vestheim‟s enlightenment-concepts, 
whether the policies had a subject  or an object approach to Bildung. I 
summarise all the features of this discourse in a Table Five.  
 
                                            
544 Neumann (2001b), p. 62. 
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Policy-
implications: 
Subject representation - Cultural Democracy 
 
• Wide definition of culture From the Left: 
• Relative approach to quality • Culture and emancipation 
• Emphasis on participation  
• Decentralisation  
  
• Cultural policy as Social policy 
 
Object representation - Democratisation of culture  
  
•Conditions for artists From Christian Democrats: 
• Access to the professional arts • The negative impacts of culture 
   
• Cultural policy as Social policy   
From 1980s 
• Hierarchical approach to quality 
From 1990s 
 Architecture and design 
   
 Value Growth 
 
Discourse: BILDUNG 
  
Commercial culture   
 
National Culture 
   
Policy-
implications: 
Object representation: The 
danger of commercial culture 
 
• Increased regulation and 
governmental intervention. 
• Develop mature broadcasting 
audiences. 
• Censorship of violent texts. 
• Clear quality hierarchies, where 
the products of the cultural 
industries are deemed inferior. 
From 1980s 
• Counter negative effects of 
commercial culture through 
increased production of domestic 
content. 
 
Subject representation: The 
embracing of the cultural 
industries 
 
From 2000s 
• Media-content deemed not to 
make audiences passive, but to 
stimulate. 
 
Object representation: Pressure on 
national identity 
 
From 1980s 
• Increased domestic content production 
to secure language, national and cultural 
identity. 
From 1990s 
• Strengthen Norwegian culture for its 
uniqueness.  
• Interplay between national and global 
culture.  
• Strengthen historic consciousness 
through national cultural heritage. 
 
Subject representation: Abandonment 
of the national project 
 
From 2000s 
•Abandon the idea of a uniform common 
culture and develop a culture based on 
diversity and complexity.  
• Change attitudes in the face of 
multiculturalism. 
• Abandon the national project.  
 
Table 5: The Bildung discourse 
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There are few contradictory voices within this discourse, in the sense that 
most agents appear to subscribe to the two representations. However, 
there are some contradictions that I shall discuss below. The point of 
departure for this discourse in the 1970s was one of cultural pessimism. 
Due to the structural changes in society, Norway was perceived to be 
threatened by a loss of „values‟, and there was hence a need for growth. 
Neumann argues that if a discourse only contains one representation of 
reality without any alternatives, then the discourse is politically closed and 
not politicised.545 It is tempting to draw this conclusion when reading the 
first set of policy texts from the 1970s. The mentioned focus on cultural 
democracy seems to be the unchallenged explicit representation. The 
response to the loss of value and the need for growth is heavily geared 
towards the wide definition of culture, the relative notion of quality, the 
decentralisation of decision-making and the emphasis on participation. 
This had such a dominant position and was repeated so many times that 
it almost totally permeated the discourse. As pointed out by Vestheim, 
much of this echoes the ideas of Augustin Girard.  
 
Leaving the commercial culture and „the protection of national culture‟ 
argument aside, we see a shift towards a more object oriented Bildung 
representation. Already in the 1980s, the relative approach to quality is 
being challenged by a strong argument in favour of clearer quality 
hierarchies and there is generally a stronger emphasis on facilitating 
access to „the professional arts‟ (and related to this the conditions for 
                                            
545 Ibid., p. 60. 
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artists), and in the 1990s an increased focus on architecture and design. 
This tension between the subject  and the object representation does not 
mean that the former ideas of the 1970s disappear, but they are given 
less emphasis and play a less prominent role. However, the subject 
representation continued to play its part and was still present in 2003; 
neither does it sit uncomfortably next to the object representation. Instead 
they both contribute to the strong Bildung rationale, which forms the roots 
of this discourse.   
 
The discourse is being held together both by frequently and explicitly 
uttered arguments, which are easy to locate, as well as more implicit 
assumptions, which are either taken for granted, or which rest on their 
assumed acceptance, some of which, as we shall see, are somewhat 
contradictory. A good example of this combination of repetitions and 
assumptions is the reference to the lack of values in society and how 
culture can act as a remedy for this. The frequent reference to lack of 
values is a distinct discursive practice, both through its frequent repetition 
but also because it is a concept that does not merit any further 
explanation. „Values‟ is a subjective term, which can be interpreted in 
several ways. However, this policy-discourse assumes a common 
subscription to what a lack of values actually means. It is coined in such a 
way that the immediate answer to their erosion is the provision of cultural 
content and cultural activities. Reading these policy texts thirty years later, 
it can only be assumed what these references to values imply. The term 
was particularly prevalent in the way it was applied in the context of 
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young people, and in this it relates to commercial culture, which was 
perceived to have a corrupting effect on this „vulnerable‟ group; 
commercial culture was perceived to be a force of anti-Bildung. The only 
departure from the assumed understanding of the interpretation of values 
in the 1970s, came from the Christian Democrats and from the Left, who 
respectively designated, in more tangible terms, a Christian interpretation 
and a socialist class struggle of emancipation when referring to values.    
 
The policy texts were generally more tangible in their reference to growth, 
where the exposure to cultural values could facilitate extended knowledge 
and insight. The early policy papers were interspersed with reference to 
growth, and this was related to values in the sense that by being exposed 
to cultural values people would grow, but also that growth would lead 
people to come in contact with cultural values. In the 1970s, the focus of 
this was on how this could lead to growth in each individual, but in the 
1990s and the 2000s this was given importance on an aggregated level, 
in that growth was not only given an intrinsic importance for each 
individual, but also as a response to a new social reality, which 
demanded that people could think creatively, make critical choices and 
take independent actions. A high cultural competence was argued to be 
the route to this growth.  
 
I mentioned above that the subject focused policy implications have 
cultural democracy as their objective, a concept that strongly rested on 
the principles of a wide definition of culture and a relative approach to 
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quality. However, this open view to culture and rejection of hierarchies 
does not extend to the „anti-commerce‟ argument, which instead harbours 
an implicit condemnation of the impacts of the cultural industries, 
particularly on young people. These two branches of the discourse: the 
explicit condemnation and patronisation of global commercial culture, sit 
uneasily together with the wide definition of culture and the relative 
approach to quality. Whereas, when debating the rationale behind cultural 
democracy measures the policy papers showed an explicit contempt for 
cultural hierarchies and cultural „prophets‟, the term „quality‟ became an 
indisputable assumption when the danger posed by globalisation and 
commercialisation was exposed. KUV (1983) for example, championed 
the necessity of supporting a „superior‟ cultural production, and thereby 
reintroduced the concept of cultural hierarchies that had been explicitly 
rejected from the rest of the discourse. The rejection of cultural 
hierarchies, which was such a central principle in the subject 
representation, was not applied to commercial culture, which was 
inherently evaluated as being of lower quality. Røyseng argues that by 
juxtaposing such a „superior‟ cultural production with the products of the 
cultural industries, popular culture is being perceived as the publicly 
financed culture‟s „other‟. The latter is positively defined against this 
„other‟, in the sense that the output of the cultural industries stands in 
opposition to publicly financed culture. 546  I believe that such a 
juxtaposition is clear in these documents.  
                                            
546 Røyseng (2007), p. 238. Referring to Peter Larsen, Røyseng applies this idea of the discursive 
perception of popular culture as the „other‟ in relation to the publicly subsidised performing arts. 
Based on the discourses analysed here, I argue that Røyseng‟s conclusion is equally valid for the 
less elitist participatory cultural activities in accordance with the subject-oriented approach.  
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In a similar way, the products of the multinational cultural industries were, 
by definition, standardised and without character, and more domestic 
content was both of higher quality and more diverse, and would 
strengthen Norwegian identity: the protection of the Norwegian language 
was an important response to this. The perceived commercial threat 
should both be countered by increased production of „quality‟ content as 
well as ensuring that Norwegian consumers became increasingly quality 
conscious and critical. Elites, presumably governmentally elected 
politicians, bureaucrats or perhaps other representatives of the cultural 
elite were given a clear role in accordance with Arnoldian principles that 
somebody should interfere in the cultural sector and the market to 
prevent people from being exposed to offensive material. Although this 
chimed well with the Populist Nationalist representation of the nineteenth 
century in its scepticism of global culture, it is essentially object oriented 
in its focus due to its paternalistic approach and its subscription to clear 
cultural hierarchies.    
 
In the 1980s, this „anti-commercial‟ argument developed into a broader 
critique of the forces of the international cultural industries, which not only 
took each individual citizen as its point of departure but expressed 
concern for the protection of Norwegian national culture and identity as 
such. However, by 2003 the „anti-commerce‟ argument had mellowed 
down, and media-content was regarded as less negative in Bildung terms, 
and as with the narrative of the cultural democracy policies of the 1970s, 
people were to a higher extent trusted to determine their own cultural 
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consumption. Similarly, the „national identity‟ argument, has been 
significantly rethought since 2003 when the idea of a uniform common 
culture and a national cultural project was abandoned in favour of a 
culture based on diversity and complexity. The words of the minister for 
Culture, Valgjerd Svarstad Haugland in parliament about cultural policy 
turning its back on the construction of a common culture thus mark a 
significant shift away from the strong „anti-globalisation‟ argument of the 
1980s. The discourse thereby underwent a radical transformation over 
the years analysed here, where the object oriented need to protect 
national culture gave way to a subject orientation, which, to a lesser 
extent, emphasised public intervention to protect a national culture.   
 
Girard‟s case for cultural policy to have a clear social objective is also 
strongly present in the Bildung discourse. Particularly in the articulation 
that cultural policy was in fact social policy. This took its most explicit form 
in the Labour Party‟s suggestion that cultural policy was an integrated 
instrument in the efforts to create a socialist society. And although the 
non-socialist parties in parliament distanced themselves from the term 
„socialist‟, there was broad consensus (again with the exception of the 
parliamentary predecessors to the Progress Party) about equality and 
freedom being clear cultural policy objectives. Just as with the wide 
definition of culture and the relative approach to quality-judgements, and 
again echoing the ideas of Girard, it was argued that the aesthetic and 
intellectual dimension to what was referred to as „traditional‟ cultural 
policy was less suited to achieving social objectives. As pointed out by 
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Vestheim, 547  this echoes clearly both the Populist Nationalist 
representation of the nineteenth century, which rejected the elitist culture 
from Denmark and Europe as well as the Labour project of the 1930s. 
Many of the ideas from that time are inherent in these initial policy 
discourses. There is a prevailing un-Arnoldian element of anti-elitism and 
scepticism of international, central and even national culture. In addition 
to being an „anti-commercial‟ argument, it celebrates the local and 
peripheral at the expense of the central. A common Norwegian culture as 
it had developed in the local communities is presented as beleaguered by 
both commercial culture and the high arts. It implies a Herderian focus on 
people‟s own culture, which should be defined widely and encourage 
participation, and a distaste of experts or „cultural prophets‟ and a 
definition of culture based on universal quality criteria (in accordance with 
Arnoldian principles). This echoed the Populist, Nationalist assessment of 
the nineteenth century, which, according to Neumann, rejected the role of 
the elite in society and their role vis-à-vis the people, because the latter 
could manage by themselves. 548  The focus was on people‟s innate 
qualities rather than on how they could become enlightened by the 
knowledge passed „down‟ from others.  
 
Also the more object oriented policies from the 1980s rationalised on their 
social impact, such as their ability to contribute to the fight against 
unemployment or to have a positive impact on people‟s physical, social 
                                            
547 Vestheim (1995), p. 174. 
548 Neumann (2001a), p. 171. 
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and mental health. The rhetoric celebrates cultural policy as the policy, 
which should not be overshadowed by other sectors.  
 
In Chapter One, I made reference to Chris Bilton and Oliver Bennett who 
both argue that it is a mistake to see the policy objectives 
„democratisation of culture‟ versus „cultural democracy‟ as completely 
separate and unrelated because they are both „culturalist‟ due to relying 
on idealistic assumptions that culture can have transforming impacts.549 
Their observation appears to be validated by this Norwegian Bildung 
discourse because both the subject focused cultural democracy policies, 
as well as the object focused aim to democratise the professional arts, sit 
tightly together, initially together with a rejection of commercial culture 
and with the wish to protect a common national culture. As demonstrated, 
these four arguments form policy-rationales, the focus of which changes 
somewhat over the years I have charted. However, from the first Green 
paper in 1973 to the last one in 2003, a subscription to Bildung according 
to Henrik Kaare Nielsen‟s definition forms the lasting roots of this cultural 
policy discourse.  
  
In addition to this I have also identified two alternative discourses.  
6.4.2 Alternative discourses 
 
The policy papers contain two alternative discourses, neither of which 
attempt to give rationales for governmental intervention in culture: one of 
                                            
549 Bilton (1997); Bennett (1996). 
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them argues instead that government should take a much more laissez-
faire approach. This latter discourse, which originated primarily from 
parliamentary members of the Progress Party, is truly a counter-
discourse in that it rejects all the assumptions and ideas on which the 
Bildung discourse rests. The marketisation discourse is not concerned 
with policy rationales, but it is oft repeated and broadly receives support 
from most agents, and does therefore in my view merit a mention in the 
context of this research.   
 
The Marketisation discourse 
From the 1980s it was clear that the finance-bonanza, which the cultural 
sector had benefited from for many years, would not continue. KUV 
(1983), presented by a Conservative government, argued that the sector 
should explore alternative sources of funding, particularly from the private 
sector. From then on this alternative discourse evolved, and would later 
celebrate culture‟s potential contribution to business and the economy as 
an intrinsic good.  
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 The Marketisation Discourse 
Policy 
implications: 
From 1980s 
- Increased funding for culture must be sourced from the 
private sector 
- Funding for culture should not be an exclusive public 
responsibility (met with resistance from the centre and 
the left) 
 
From 1990s 
- Private business sponsorship should be encouraged 
- Increased efficiency in the cultural sector through the 
introduction of performance indicators 
 
From 2000s 
- The cultural sector and the business sector should 
interact more 
- An active cultural sector is a competitive advantage for 
Norway 
- Tighter financial control and more cost-effective cultural 
organisations 
- Marketisation will also lead to artistically more innovative 
organisations 
 
Table 6: The Marketisation Discourse 
 
The suggestion that cultural institutions should increasingly look for 
funding from private sources was initially opposed by the opposition 
parties, particularly those from the left. However, by 1992 the Labour 
Party‟s attitude to such contributions, including business sponsorship, 
had become more positive and by 2003 a closer collaboration between 
the cultural and business sectors was said to have positive effects 
beyond the cultural sector itself and would also contribute to Norway‟s 
competitive advantage as a nation. This coincided with a closer embrace 
of the cultural industries, as mentioned above. The demand for more 
diverse revenue streams was joined by a demand for cultural institutions 
to become more efficient and to take a new approach to how they 
interacted with their external surroundings, including the use of freelance 
artists. 
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Finally, the counter-discourse originating within the Progress Party. 
 
The Progress Party discourse 
I am including this discourse because, from the 1980s, the Progress 
Party had grown in size and become an increasingly important force in 
Norwegian politics. The views of the Progress Party marked a radical 
departure from the hegemonic Bildung discourse.  
 
 The Progress Party Discourse  
Policy 
implications From 1980s 
- Cultural organisations to cut costs and produce 
more popular work 
- More funding to be covered by the audience and 
the consumer (also for museums and libraries) 
- Abolish support-schemes for artists 
 
From 1990s 
- Relativistic definition of culture 
- Cultural policy to be based on common European 
values 
- The cultural output to be guided by people‟s own 
choices 
- Governmental interference would lead to 
stagnation 
- Cultural organisations should either be 
transformed to commercial institutions, supported 
on a voluntary basis or shut down 
- Each cultural form to be treated equally 
 
From 2000s 
- More support for broad cultural movements 
- The mixture of immigrant culture and Norwegian 
culture would have detrimental impacts.  
 
Table 7: The Progress Party Discourse 
 
Initially, the Progress Party argued that the cultural sector should manage 
on its own and not receive subsidies from the public sector at all. This 
was particularly the case for individual artists. By 1993, the party was 
represented on the parliamentary committee, whose members chose to 
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formulate minority motions on most issues. For example, they defined 
culture as the values and qualities that each individual attached high 
value to, and thus moved in the direction of a subject oriented focus. This 
continued in the 2000s when the party lamented that so much money was 
allocated to high arts institutions in the capital at the expense of broad 
and locally anchored cultural movements. The party said little about 
culture‟s Bildung potential and was still reluctant to spend public money 
on the cultural sector. Instead the development of culture should be 
determined by the market where artists, businesses and audiences would 
meet. Finally, the party argued strongly against the mixture of traditional 
Norwegian and immigrant culture.  
6.4.3 Conclusion 
 
As I shall demonstrate in the next chapter, DKS epitomises the Bildung 
discourse at the beginning of the twenty-first century. This chapter has 
attempted to contextualise the trajectory of ideas within which this 
conception took place, and concludes that the Bildung discourse has 
been the key cultural policy rationale during the period between 1973 and 
2003. And although the subject representation, and its cultural democracy 
advocacy, had such a strong position in these policy texts in the 1970s 
and the 1980s, the already existing policies, which championed the 
„professional arts‟, continued to be centrally positioned within the 
discourse. This object oriented „professional arts‟ representation was not 
threatened in financial terms either. In fact, the budget allocation to, what 
Roshauw describes as, institutions primarily mediating the high arts, grew 
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steadily between and after the publication of KUD (1973) and KUD 
(1974).550 Thus, there seems to be a disparity between what is explicitly 
uttered in the rhetoric and the real priorities and allocations in the budgets, 
and the question is thus whether the object representation has perhaps 
been hegemonic all along.  
 
There is a strong civilising aspect to the Bildung discourse‟s prescribed 
provision of alternatives to commercial culture. The subject 
representation‟s claim to define culture widely, for example, and to 
assess quality in relative terms does not extend to commercial culture. 
This culture is regarded to be of inferior value and does not harbour a 
Bildung rationale. In fact, commercial culture partly obstructs growth and 
contributes to the lack of values in society. The main rationale behind 
public cultural policy is to provide alternatives, and although we see a 
gradual change in the perceived damage to commercial culture in the 
1990s and the 2000s, publicly supported culture, whether the 
professional arts or a wider more participatory and locally founded culture, 
is still being regarded as popular culture‟s „other‟. The return of the 
subject oriented Bildung representation in the 2000s, which was less 
condemning of commercial and global culture, did not have a significant 
impact on the rationales behind the initiation of DKS, which I shall 
demonstrate in the next chapter. This representation is again based on 
the juxtaposition of commercial culture and cultural content as certified by 
the government. The subject oriented representation - with its focus on 
                                            
550 Between 1975 and 1980 the proportion of the cultural budget allocated to high arts such as 
established institutions like the National Gallery and the National Theatre, located in central areas 
increased from 41 per cent to 42 per cent. 
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cultural democracy - appears to have lost its discursive power in the 
2000s, and DKS is thus introduced in a climate where the focus has 
shifted from participation to the celebration of the Bildung powers 
harboured by the „professional arts‟, and is strongly reflected in the DKS-
discourse. This is the focus of the next chapter.  
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7.0 Den Kulturelle Skolesekken (DKS) 
 
As demonstrated in Chapter Six, the understanding that Bildung can be 
facilitated through culture has been one of, if not the most, central 
rationale behind Norwegian cultural policy since the 1970s at least. I 
argue that this rationale is still very much alive, and in order to analyse 
how Bildung is understood to be happening as well as to interrogate what 
culture is valid in this context, this chapter will focus on a national scheme, 
which was formally launched in 2001 under the heading, den kulturelle 
skolesekken551 (DKS). The rationale behind this specific scheme will be 
discussed as well as how it relates to the Bildung rationale as explored in 
Chapter Six. I will argue that the scheme rests on an understanding that 
what is needed for children to achieve Bildung and dannelse is an object 
oriented approach, based primarily on being exposed to what is being 
referred to as the „professional‟ arts, where participation and what in 
some initial policy-papers was being described as children and young 
people‟s „own culture‟ are given less emphasis. Instead, it is understood 
that children need to gain „cultural competence‟ within which rests a 
Bildung potential in itself, and that such competence is also necessary to 
reap the Bildung potential inherent in the „professional‟ arts. This is 
pertinent given that school pupils today are by no means devoid of 
culture: quite the opposite, children and young people consume more 
culture than ever, albeit a commercial popular culture.  
 
                                            
551 „The Cultural Rucksack‟. 
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The analysis in this chapter is based on a selection of documents dating 
back to 1996, all having in common a focus on the cultural provision in 
schools and includes two green papers published in 2003, and a follow 
up paper published in 2007, which set out the ideas behind, and 
objectives of, DKS. However, how DKS can facilitate Bildung is left rather 
vague in these papers, and my analysis of these papers is therefore, as 
outlined in Appendix One, complemented with interviews of a selection of 
elites (as opposed to „ordinary people‟) drawn from the political, 
administrative and artistic sphere in Norway. The rationale for this is also 
based on my argument, as spelt out in Chapter Three, that an eventual 
hegemonic understanding of the Bildung potential in culture, and in this 
context a culture mediated by DKS, is held up by a wider discourse to 
which several constituencies contribute. I argue that DKS is a socio-
cultural practice or a socio-cultural phenomenon which can be analysed 
discursively for two reasons. Firstly, because it appears that the 
understanding that DKS can contribute positively towards children and 
young people‟s Bildung is taken for granted without being questioned, 
and secondly, because it appears that the DKS discourse harbours 
ideologies and power relations which are not generally obvious and 
whose effectiveness might depend on the fact that these issues are being 
left vague.  
 
I am referring to a DKS discourse, which harbours the two above-
mentioned characteristics, and which situate it comfortably within the 
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wider Bildung discourse that I presented in Chapter Six. 552  Hence, 
through an analysis of policy papers combined with the mentioned 
interviews, where it was possible to engage with people whose opinions 
are influential and actually ask questions if things were left unclear, it is 
my objective to critically explore this discourse with the aim to uncover 
hidden distinctions and connections that are not necessarily expressed 
directly.  Hence, I have identified several discursive practices, which 
represent how DKS can achieve Bildung. These will be clearly signposted 
throughout the chapter.  
 
In line with my research design, which takes a discursive analysis of the 
rationales behind Norwegian cultural policy generally and DKS 
particularly as its starting point, I shall not evaluate the success of DKS 
either in terms of whether it is able to reach its objectives, or in terms of 
its efficiency. Nor shall I interrogate the arts programme offered by the 
scheme. It is the rationales on which it is based that I am interested in, 
and how these sit within a broader analysis of the rationales behind 
Norwegian cultural policy more generally. Hence, I am only to a limited 
extent, making reference to the arts actually offered by the scheme, but 
instead analysing what is being said about what DKS should be.   
 
I shall also refer to some of the ideas that I presented in Chapters One 
and Two in order to illuminate the different potential approaches to 
Bildung. Some of the terms that I launched in these chapters will also be 
                                            
552 In this chapter I will refer to a DKS discourse and a Bildung discourse interchangeably.  
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frequently referred to here. Firstly, the term Bildung, which I have adopted 
from the Weimar circle of German thinkers around the late eighteenth 
century and early nineteenth century: secondly, the term dannelse, which 
I argued came close to being a Norwegian equivalent to Bildung. Hence, I 
am initially equating the two terms. However, dannelse is used frequently 
both in the policy texts that I have analysed and by my interviewees 
(initially without further explication). I therefore asked my interviewees 
explicitly how they interpret this term, in order to unpick this further. 
Otherwise the understanding of these two terms can be regarded as fairly 
similar.  
 
I will conclude that DKS represents a certain „official‟ culture, which is 
being understood to have a Bildung potential and that it is constructed as 
a departure from another culture, which represents anti-Bildung: that is, 
what is provided by the commercial cultural industries. This 
understanding sits within the wider Bildung discourse and has become 
institutionalised through a number of discursive practices, which in a DKS 
context has an implicit and explicit dimension: implicit in the sense that 
the „professional‟ arts‟ unique Bildung potential is not questioned and 
taken for granted, and explicit in the practice of branding the culture that 
children and young people relate to on an everyday basis as one of anti-
Bildung, meaning that it does not have the potential to enlighten as does 
the DKS certified culture.    
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The chapter will start with a brief introduction to DKS, followed by an 
introduction to some of the documents that the scheme is informed by. I 
move on to articulate how the Bildung rationale is manifest in DKS, 
through a set of discursive practices, which indicates a return to an object 
oriented approach to Bildung. Thus, exposure to the „professional arts‟ is 
superior to participation in its Bildung potential, commercial culture is a 
force of anti-Bildung and children and young people need to gain „cultural 
competence‟ both to gain access to the „professional arts‟ but also as an 
inherent path to Bildung. These discursive practices are internalised to 
such an extent that there is no need to interrogate any further how 
exposure to the arts actually facilitate Bildung. I then move on to discuss 
whether DKS acts as a civilising project.   
 
7.1 Introduction to DKS 
 
As mentioned in Chapter One, DKS is a permanent national scheme set 
up to enable all pupils in primary school to be exposed to a wide variety 
of „professional‟ arts and culture. The scheme has three overarching 
objectives:  
 
 to contribute to pupils in primary school getting a supply of 
professional culture, 
 to facilitate the access to and familiarisation with a wide range of 
artistic and cultural expressions for pupils in primary school in order 
for them to be favourably inclined towards these [the artistic and 
cultural expressions], 
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 to contribute to the development of a holistic incorporation of artistic 
and cultural expressions in the realisation of the school‟s learning 
objectives.553  
 
In practice the scheme is a collaborative project involving a range of 
organisations nationally, regionally and locally, such as local authorities, 
the cultural office in the county councils, national organisations for the 
mediation of different art-forms, as well as the actual artists and arts-
organisations who visit schools.   
 
As pointed out in Chapter Six, Norwegian cultural policy has, since the 
1970s at least, given due attention to children and young people. Norway 
has, for example, had a strong tradition of municipal music schools and 
later cultural schools for children and young people. Norway was in fact 
the first country in the world to legislate the provision of cultural schools 
for children and young people.554 Apart from the funding of music and 
cultural schools, many cultural activities for children and young people 
have over the years been financed through lottery money. In 1987, a new 
game called Lotto was introduced, which gave a significant funding-boost 
for cultural activities. It was a decision initiated by the Progress Party in 
2002 to change the lottery-distribution in favour of cultural causes for 
                                            
553 Kultur- og kyrkjedepartementet (KUL), 2003. St.meld. nr. 38 (2002-2003): Den kulturelle 
skulesekken, Oslo, pp. 9 - 10. (KUL (2003b)). The underlined section of the second bullet point 
in this quote about “being favourably inclined towards” was in Kultur- og kyrkjedepartementet 
(KUL), 2007. St.meld. nr. 8 (2007-2008): Kulturell skulesekk for framtida, Oslo, p. 22 (KUL 
(2007a)) replaced with „develop understanding of arts and cultural expressions of all kinds‟ 
because it was acknowledged that not all encounters with the arts and culture might leave a 
positive attitude, due to their ability to also annoy and provoke. 
554 Dahl and Helseth (2006), p. 256. 
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children and young people that enabled the decision to roll out DKS 
nationally.555  
 
During the 1990s several municipalities and county councils had created 
more comprehensive models for the mediation of the arts and culture to 
primary schools. These models came to act as trial schemes and were 
adopted by the Ministry of Culture and launched under the DKS-label with 
a small budget post on the national budget, primarily with the aim of 
piloting a handful of collaborative projects, of NOK 23.6 million.556 When 
DKS was introduced nationally it was in a way capitalising on 
experiments that were rooted regionally and locally. With the added 
proceedings from the National Lottery the DKS‟s budget received a 
tremendous boost in 2002 and for the academic year 2008/2009 the 
budget had increased to NOK 167 million.557 This is a major allocation, 
which makes DKS financially potent and one of the most significant 
                                            
555 Ibid., p. 247. It was increasingly understood that activities for children and young people 
should be a prioritised area for lottery-money allocated to culture, and by 2000, it was decided 
that at least 10 per cent of the proceeds channelled to sports and other cultural causes should be 
allocated to voluntary organisations working with these groups (Dahl and Helseth (2006), p. 259. 
Parallel to this, another significant development occurred in 2002, when the Progress Party 
proposed a parliamentary bill which suggested that the proceeds from the lottery should only go 
to sports and other cultural causes (with the funding for research to be allocated from elsewhere), 
under the condition that these funds should primarily be allocated to local activities for children 
and young people, particularly through the work carried out by voluntary organisations. The bill 
was approved, and from 2003 this meant a significant boost for sports and other cultural causes, 
and it was decided that 40 per cent of the lottery-proceeds that were not allocated to sports should 
be used to finance the new scheme that was called DKS. Ibid., pp. 258 - 260;  KUL (2003b), p. 7; 
Familie-, kultur- og administrasjonskomiteen (FKD), 2002. Innst. O. nr. 44 (2001-2002); 
Innstilling fra familie-, kultur-, og administrasjonskomiteen om forslag fra 
stortingsrepresentantene Per Sandberg og Ulf Erik Knudsen om lov om endring i lov 28. august 
1992 nr. 103 om pengespill mv. (Etter at det er foretatt fondsavsettelser skal selskapets 
overskudd fordeles med en halvdel til idrettsformål og en halvdel til kulturformål), Oslo, (FKD 
(2002)); KUL (2007a), p. 10). The parliamentary response to the Progress Party‟s bill proposal 
(by a majority made up of all members except from the Christian Democratic and the 
Conservative party) emphasised that DKS should both make sure that children and young people 
get access to cultural experiences and the ability to participate themselves; in other words, to 
combine a subject- and object-approach. 
556 KUL (2003b), p. 53. 
557 http://www.denkulturelleskolesekken.no/index.php?id=om&sub=oko 
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Norwegian cultural policy moves of recent years. It should also be 
stressed that this is all new money for cultural production and mediation, 
which has not been re-allocated from elsewhere.558  
 
DKS is overseen by a steering committee made up of one politically 
appointed Statssekretær 559  from the Ministry of Culture and Church 
Affairs and one Statssekretær from the Ministry of Education and 
Research (Kunnskapsdepartementet). The scheme is coordinated on a 
day to day basis by a secretariat. The operation is supported by, and 
receives advice from, an advisory group made up of representatives from 
the education sector, the bureaucracy, the arts sector and arts education 
professionals, whose remit is to give advice to the steering committee 
and the secretariat.  
 
KUL (2007a) positioned DKS in the context of two other schemes for 
children and young people: cultural schools and Ungdommens 
Kulturmønstring (a national performance and arts contest for people 
below the age of nineteen). The objectives of these three schemes were 
juxtaposed in the following way: in the cultural schools training was most 
important, in Ungdommens Kulturmønstring the activity itself was most 
                                            
558 KUL 2003b. Most of the money (NOK 123 million) is allocated directly to nineteen county 
councils (including Oslo city council), whereas the rest (NOK 44 million or 26 per cent) is 
allocated to a few national museums, galleries and science centres as well as to Rikskonsertene, 
Arts Council Norway and the National Touring Network for the Performing Arts 
(Scenekunstbruket) (KUL (2007a)). The majority of the proportion allocated to the county 
councils is subsequently allocated to municipalities.  It is an explicit principle that the scheme 
shall be organised with a minimum of interference from central government, and the county 
councils are given significant freedom (KUL (2003b), p. 11). There are thus significant regional 
variations in how the scheme is implemented, for example, in terms of content 
(www.denkulturelleskolesekken.no). 
559 A statssekretær is a politically appointed senior executive officer in a Ministry. They are 
appointed by the cabinet and work closely with each minister.  
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important whereas for DKS, the experience was of most importance. DKS 
was, according to KUL (2007a) „the core in the government‟s policy for 
the mediation of culture to children and young people. 560 
 
This, as I shall demonstrate, indicates that DKS takes an object approach 
to its Bildung efforts.  
 
7.2 Policy background 
 
The policies and rationales for DKS are laid out in three green papers, 
two published by the Ministry of Culture and Church Affairs (KUL (2003b); 
KUL, (2007)) and one by the Ministry of Education and Research (UDF, 
2003). KUL  (2003b) and UDF (2003) was published by a centre 
government made up of the Christian Democrats, the  Centre Party and 
Venstre (the same government, that published KUL (2003a)). A 
subsequent centre-left government made up of Arbeiderpartiet (DNA), 
Senterpartiet (Sp) and Sosialistisk Venstreparti (SV) published KUL 
(2007a), which took stock of the development of DKS thus far, and 
outlined its development for the future. All three papers emphasise the 
Bildung rationale behind DKS, and I will refer extensively to these below. 
However, the understood Bildung potential in the mediation of the 
„professional‟ arts in a DKS context goes back as far as 1996 and is 
reiterated in several documents in between. Before I focus on KUL 
(2003b), UDF (2003) and KUL (2007a), as well as some of the 
statements made by my interviewees, I shall briefly explore how the 
                                            
560 KUL (2007a), p. 8. 
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rationale behind the DKS policy is contained in these earlier policy 
documents.  
 
In 1996 the Ministry of Culture and the Ministry of Church, Education and 
Research (Kirke- Utdannings og Forskningsdepartementet)561 published 
a joint plan.562 In what appears as a combined subject  and object based 
approach to Bildung, the plan emphasised that pupils in primary school 
should both be offered meetings with the „professional‟ arts of high quality, 
as well as be able to develop through their own participation in cultural 
activities, based on what was described as „their own‟ culture. However, 
the plan seems to conclude that the time is ripe for a change in the 
schools‟ relation with the cultural sector and how children and young 
people engage with the arts. Consequently, the joint plan suggests a 
range of actions and objectives. The most important of these in a DKS 
context is that there must be a much closer and obliging collaboration 
between schools and the cultural sector regarding the mediation of the 
arts, where pupils in primary school get to meet and work collaboratively 
with artists and experience a diverse range of artistic expressions.563 
 
Furthermore, in 2002 the Ministry of Children and Equality (Barne- og 
Likestillingsdepartementet), published a green paper on a common youth 
policy (BLD, 2002), which also emphasised the importance of the arts 
                                            
561 The predecessor of the Ministry of Education and Research, before church affairs was moved 
to the Ministry of Culture and Church Affairs in 2002.  
562 Kulturdepartementet og Kirke-, Utdannings- og forskningsdepartementet (KKU), 1996: 
Handlingsplanen Broen og den blå hesten. (KKU (1996)), available online at 
http://www.regjeringen.no/nb/dokumentarkiv/Regjeringen-Brundtland-
III/Kulturdepartementet/231603/231642/broen_og_den_bla_hesten.html?id=231646 
563 Ibid.  
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and culture in the context of children and young people‟s personal 
development and identity.564 Allowing children and young people to get in 
touch with professional artists and mediators as well as to participate 
themselves, were amongst the „best investments‟ a society could 
make. 565  It was argued that children and young people were under 
intense pressure from different kinds of media, that advocate „different‟ 
sets of values, and it was therefore important to help young people to sort 
out what was regarded as positive and valuable from the negative, and to 
be conscious of non-material values. However, traces of the cultural 
democracy mind-set of the 1970s and 1980s could be traced when it was 
emphasised that young people themselves get the opportunity to 
influence which activities should be prioritised through their own ideas 
and involvement, and that this could counter some of the „homogeneity, 
intolerance and lack of knowledge‟, harboured within what was referred to 
as the commercial entertainment industry.566  Again, it appears that a 
combination of subject  and object focused Bildung methods is being 
encouraged.  
 
The alleged benefits of children and young people being more closely 
involved with culture and the arts, particularly in a school-context, had 
thus been emphasised in several governmental publications before the 
Ministry of Cultural and Church Affairs and the Ministry of Education and 
Research published their two respective papers, which both clarified the 
                                            
564 Barne- og likestillingsdepartementet, 2002. St.meld. nr. 39 (2001-2002): Oppvekst og levekår 
for barn og unge i Norge. (BLD, 2002).  
565 Ibid., p. 148. 
566 Ibid., p. 138.  
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rationales behind, and the implementation, of DKS. 567  However, the 
subject oriented approach to Bildung that co-existed with the more object 
oriented focus on the „professional‟ arts in the earlier papers, was to 
almost disappear in these two DKS green papers.  
 
7.3 DKS and the Bildung rationale 
 
The importance of Bildung is more or less explicitly articulated in all the 
material I have analysed, but how is this contextualised? How can 
Bildung be achieved and what type of culture is valid in this context? I will 
attempt to illuminate these questions by mapping out how Bildung is 
understood in the DKS discourse, by scrutinising both the three 
mentioned green papers and transcripts from my interview subjects. Most 
of the respondents that I interviewed also perceived DKS as a 
continuation of a cultural policy project, whose rationale has been to 
improve people‟s quality of life through the democratisation of culture. In 
fact, when asked how they understood „values‟ in the way they are being 
presented in various public cultural policy papers, this term was linked to 
growth or Bildung, implying that the „professional‟ arts could help people 
not only improve their quality of life but also become better people. 
Pluralism was also mentioned in this context, where people‟s 
opportunities could be improved in accordance with the level of choices 
they have. As opposed to the discourse identified in some of the initial 
policy papers presented above, KUL (2003b), UDF (2003) and KUL 
                                            
567 KUL (2003b); Utdannings- og forskningsdepartementetn (UDF), 2003. St.meld. nr. 39 (2002-
2003): ”Ei blot til Lyst”: Om kunst og kultur i og i tilknytning til grunnskolen, Oslo. (UDF 
(2003)). 
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(2007a), as well as my interviewees, all appear to exclusively advocate a 
return to an object oriented approach to Bildung.  
7.3.1 Return to an object oriented approach 
 
An important principle behind Thomas Carlyle‟s and Matthew Arnold‟s 
ideas of culture‟s transforming potential was that a minority of enlightened 
people informed by their „best selves‟ and „guided by a general humane 
spirit‟ should mediate culture because of their understanding of the type 
of culture that could have the power to transform: a culture which, 
according to Arnold, should pursue total perfection, meaning the best that 
has been thought and said in the world.568 The culture mediated by DKS 
is understood to be a culture of quality and professionalism. This is 
repeatedly underlined both in the policy papers that spell out the ideas 
behind DKS, and by my interviewees. Consequentially, the culture offered 
to children should be „as good as possible‟. This of course does not imply 
that it necessarily has to be the best the world has ever seen, but what is 
clear is what it is not: culture which is not created in a professional 
context or by professionals, amateur culture, and, as we shall see, culture 
that is produced primarily to generate a profit in a market.  
 
As pointed out in Chapter Six, the Bildung discourse does only to a 
limited extent explicitly specify what is meant by the „professional‟ arts. 
Similarly the DKS discourse does not specify what kind of „professional‟ 
art is suitable for children and young people: instead it rests on an implicit 
                                            
568 Arnold (1935). 
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understanding of the type of culture that is not suitable: the culture that 
children and young people mostly consume outside of a DKS-context that 
is provided by the commercial cultural industries. KUL (2007a) 
acknowledged that the distinction between what should be regarded as 
professional or not is blurred. Still, in this paper, a professional in a DKS 
context was defined as somebody who had „artistic or cultural work as 
their profession‟.569 This can in principle of course include artists and 
others employed in the profit-making cultural industries but it does not 
appear as if these are covered by this definition.570  
 
The Bildung potential in DKS refers mostly to the inherent potential in 
children‟s exposure to the „professional‟ arts and, to a much lesser 
degree, to what both KKU (1996) and BLD (2002) referred to as 
children‟s „own culture‟. Furthermore, in the cases where the pupils were 
to be given influence over which activities should be prioritised, through 
their own ideas and involvement, this should be restricted to, and 
conditioned by, a framework, which emphasised the „professional‟ arts. 
KUL (2003b) mentions only once that the pupil‟s own participation should 
be regarded on the same terms as the meeting with the „professional‟ arts 
and culture, but without elaborating further. Hence, the DKS discourse 
does not appear to subscribe to Humboldt‟s argument that self-cultivation 
could be achieved literally through any activity or means, where Bildung 
                                            
569 KUL (2007a), p. 38. It was also acknowledged that some sectors (for example within cultural 
heritage) relied on volunteers or other individuals, who did not have the mediation of culture as 
their main preoccupation. However, it was important that any project was quality assured within 
a professional framework.  
570 Although it should of course be acknowledged that film has a central position in DKS, it is 
important to emphasise that this covers film-project specifically designed for this scheme. 
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would be determined by the matter of approach and attitude, rather than 
on the content of the culture one was exposed to.571 
 
What was described as „creative competence‟ was deemed important in 
order to prepare the pupils for their future working life, where things like 
the ability to communicate, to deal with symbols and to develop a sense 
of graphic modelling were mentioned. However, a more prominent 
principle in both KUL (2003b) and KUL (2007a) was that the arts and 
culture should be celebrated for their less tangible Bildung potentials, and 
that they:  
 
can have a major impact for each individual and society as a whole.[…] 
The arts and culture can give experiences, which can have decisive 
influence on each individual‟s personality and quality of life.572  
 
More concrete utilitarian rationales like facilitating more innovation or the 
creation of jobs in the creative sector were only given secondary 
importance and only mentioned by a minority of the interviewees. An 
example of how little emphasis was put on the more crude instrumental 
potentials of a scheme like DKS is the response given by one previous 
minister for culture who, when asked whether an increased cultural 
competence amongst young people would also be beneficial for the 
economy, answered in the affirmative that yes it probably would, but „I am 
                                            
571 Humboldt (1993), p. 23. 
572 KUL (2003b), p. 15; KUL (2007a), p. 8. 
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not first and foremost preoccupied with that part of it [the economical 
impact]‟.573  
 
Another example of how the arts were regarded to have a solid Bildung 
potential can be found in a quotation in KUL (2007a) from one of the 
institutions supplying content for DKS: Nordnorsk kunstnersenter 
(Northern Norway Artists‟ Centre), which reads: „The objective [of DKS] is 
not first and foremost to become clever, but to grow as a person and 
fellow human being‟.574  
 
However, KUL (2007a) also argued that the business sector increasingly 
demanded values that exist in the cultural sector, such as „creativity, 
wealth of ideas, the ability to be curious and the ability to readjust‟.575 
 
In a similar vein to the marketisation discourse that I presented in Chapter 
Six, KUL (2007a) also argued that „the arts and culture, design, 
entertainment and experiences [as in the experience economy]‟ would 
contribute to „economical growth, innovation and the creation of 
wealth‟.576 It is interesting to note though that in this more instrumental 
valuation, „design, entertainment and experiences‟ have been added to 
the usual reference to the arts and culture, which again appear to imply 
that the latter are celebrated to a lesser extent for their ability to 
contribute to the above-mentioned instrumental objectives.  
                                            
573 Valgerd Svarstad Haugland, interviewed 12th April 2007. 
574 KUL (2007a), p. 17.  
575 Ibid., p. 7. 
576 Ibid.  
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It is my strong impression that more instrumental rationales, such as 
DKS‟s contribution to the creative economy, were given less emphasis. 
Instead, the green paper echoes the ideas of Matthew Arnold, and his 
emphasis on how culture could both lead to human perfection by 
developing all sides of humanity and consequently to a general perfection 
that could develop all parts of society.577  
 
Echoing the emphasis on „values‟ as it was articulated in the green 
papers presented in Chapter Six, KUL (2003b) continues by arguing that 
taking part in cultural activities and experiencing culture would make the 
pupils participate in „the great story, the deep community of values, which 
make us civilised people‟.578 The importance of identity was echoed in 
KUL (2007a), where it was argued that: „The arts, culture and cultural 
heritage create identity, and contribute to and make us privy to who we 
are and where we come from‟.579  
 
There is hence, such a thing as the great story, which again alludes, on 
the one hand, to an Arnoldian view of culture, and his emphasis on 
perfection.580 Herder, on the other hand, rejected this and argued for a 
pluralistic or multiple approach to culture,581 later echoed by Stuart Hall 
who advocated for a rhetorical shift away from the talk about culture and 
instead to replace it by the term cultures.582  In fact, it is in Herder‟s 
                                            
577 Arnold (1935), p. 11. 
578 KUL (2003b), p. 15. My own emphasis.  
579 KUL (2007a), p.7. 
580 Arnold (1935), p. 6. 
581 Barnard (1969), p. 24. 
582 Hewison (1995), p. 17. 
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opinion preposterous to argue that some cultures are superior to 
others.583 However, the green papers concerning DKS argue that it is the 
„professional‟ arts that harbour a potential Bildung effect. This is echoed 
amongst my interviewees, most of whom argued that by being exposed to 
the arts, pupils would become more enlightened and better people. It 
would make them gain increased comprehension both of themselves and 
their surroundings, which would make their lives richer and enable them 
to utilise their own potential better, as well as to release their curiosity in 
the arts and stimulate their fantasy and creative zest. This again would 
have a positive impact on society at large. Herder also argued that the 
chief aim of everybody should be to develop their own potential and 
hence contribute to the wider society.584 However, he maintained that 
there was no single standard of culture in terms of which human 
phenomena could be judged. Instead, he applied a definition of culture, 
that was not limited to works of intellectual and artistic sophistication, and 
it is in this context that the DKS discourse is more Arnoldian than 
Herderian. Consequently, the main focus is on an object oriented 
approach to Bildung, which does not take the pupils‟ own ideas, identity 
and culture as its point of departure, but rather a pre-established 
canonised range of art-forms.  
 
This understanding of the „professional‟ arts‟ unique Bildung power is the 
first stable condition inherent in this DKS discourse. This can perhaps 
best be demonstrated by referring to a speech given at a national 
                                            
583 Barnard (1969). 
584 Bruford (1962). 
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conference about DKS by the then statssekretær in the Ministry of 
Culture and Church Affairs, Yngve Slettholm. After having referred to 
research which concluded that the arts, as presented by DKS, can help 
pupils with their learning in other subjects as well as contribute to the 
creative economy, (which he, in accordance with the discursive practices 
that I present in this chapter, gives less importance to), he proclaims: „For 
us who know the value of the arts and culture, it is of course unnecessary 
to refer to research‟.585  
 
He takes it for granted that everybody present (people who, in some way 
or another, are involved with DKS) share the understanding that the arts 
have this strong transformative power, on which the rationale of DKS is 
based; this forms an unquestioned and stable discursive practice.  
 
With this strong emphasis on the exposure to the „professional‟ arts as a 
path to Bildung, what about participation?  
7.3.2 What about participation? 
 
As argued in Chapter Six, Norwegian cultural policy has, at least since 
the 1970s, put much emphasis on participation in cultural activities, which 
has been perceived as an integrated part of the objective to facilitate a 
cultural democracy. However, I have suggested that this has been given 
                                            
585 Yngve Slettholm, „Kunst og kultur – mer enn pynten på kransekaka‟, Speech at the opening of 
a national conference about DKS, Sandefjord, 7 June 2004. Available online at  
http://www.regjeringen.no/nb/dokumentarkiv/Regjeringen-Bondevik-II/Kultur--og-
kirkedepartementet/265337/267816/kunst_og_kultur_mer_enn_pynten.html?id=268450, not 
paginated. When referring to the arts and culture in this quote he means primarily the arts; this is 
revealed further on in his speech. As mentioned in Chapter Five this imprecise reference to “the 
arts and culture” is quite common in Norway. 
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less prominence in the cultural policy rhetoric since the 1990s. BLD 
(2002) and KKU (1996) stressed that cultural democracy and what was 
referred to as children and young people‟s own culture was not forgotten 
in a school-context. BLD (2002), for example, emphasised that children 
and young people should be able to contribute to how the cultural 
activities provided for them were shaped:  
 
We must look after children and young people‟s own ideas and 
commitments. Children and young people must be allowed to try out a 
broad field of activities and experiences.586 
 
KKU (1996) also stressed the need for a combination of an object 
approach, which would foster „the artistic, aesthetical and creative 
dimension in children and young people‟s everyday life‟, with a subject 
approach, which would facilitate „children and young people‟s own 
culture‟.587  
 
This action plan continued by emphasising that the role played by the 
media industries was not necessarily vulgar, but that it could instead help 
build cross-cultural bridges and mediate youth culture. Just as it was 
important that children and young people got to experience the arts in 
order to gain knowledge, it was equally important to stimulate creativity in 
the children and young people themselves.588   
  
                                            
586 BLD (2002), p. 138.  
587 KKU (1996), not paginated.  
588 Ibid.  
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However, this rhetoric was toned down a great deal in KUL (2003b), UDF 
(2003) and KUL (2007a). The parliamentary response to KUL (2003b) 
emphasised that the exposure to the arts should in itself be regarded as 
an active process, albeit complemented by measures, which enabled the 
pupils to express themselves and „to give good arenas to cultural 
productions developed by young people themselves.589 The participating 
pupils should not be reduced to passive spectators. There is thus a 
certain emphasis on participation here.  
 
However, most of my interviewees placed little emphasis on participation 
by pupils beyond mere exposure to art-works. It was argued that so many 
other governmental schemes had participation as their main objective, 
and that DKS should instead be about a different kind of activity: that of 
experiencing the arts. Echoing FKD (2003) this was supported by the 
understanding that attending arts events was an active process and 
several interviewees argued that sitting on a chair and watching a theatre 
performance or listening to a piece of music performed live was not at all 
passive because it triggered responses beyond merely being entertained. 
The pupils might be passive during the actual performance, but it was 
assumed that they would reflect over what they had seen or heard 
afterwards. This was echoed by KUL (2007a), which stipulated that: 
 
Even in an event where those who are on stage, apparently are the most 
active, there will be a large element of dialogue with the audience. Even 
                                            
589  Familie-, kultur- og administrasjonskomiteen (FKD), 2003. Innst. S. nr. 50 (2003-2004); 
Innstilling fra familie-, kultur-, og administrasjonskomiteen om Den Kulturelle skulesekken 
St.meld. Nr.38 (2002-2003), Oslo, p. 5. (FKD (2003)). 
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a spectator or listener is active, and an audience member who sits 
quietly, can both experience and learn.590  
 
Similarly, the participatory element was pretty much neglected by most of 
my interviewees. It was instead argued that the emphasis should be on 
enabling children to be directly exposed to art works created by others. If 
children were to participate then this should at least be mediated by 
professional artists, who could initiate and inspire children‟s creativity. 
This would stimulate children‟s growth through their interaction with the 
art-works and be guided through experiences of works that were more 
demanding, and through which they would actively get in touch with a 
universe „greater than their own‟.  
 
Jorunn Spord Borgen and Synnøve S. Brandt, who in 2006 published an 
evaluation of DKS, refer to two approaches to the mediation of the arts 
and culture for young people: a „monological‟ versus a „dialogical‟ 
approach, where the former does not call for much dialogue between 
artist and audience and where the pupils are typically receivers and the 
artists senders. The „dialogical‟ approach emphasises instead that both 
pupils and teachers participate actively.591 It seems clear from both the 
green papers and the parliamentary response that DKS is meant to 
mediate the arts and culture in both a „monological‟ and „dialogical‟ way. 
KUL (2003b) mentions that there is an untapped potential in terms of 
dialogue-based methods of mediation, and Spord Borgen and Brandt, 
                                            
590 KUL (2007a), p. 40. 
591 Jorunn Spord Borgen and Synnøve S. Brandt, Ekstraordinært eller selvfølgelig: Evaluering av 
Den Kulturelle skolesekken i grunnskolen, rapport 5 (2006). Oslo: NIFU STEP.  
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based on interviews with both teachers and pupils, conclude, in their 
evaluation, that many artists and schools have found „dialogical‟ ways of 
mediating content, despite this needing more effort and being more 
expensive. They also conclude that pupils seem to „get more out of‟ 
„dialogical‟ events than „monological‟ ones.592  
 
Humboldt argued that it was the things that spring from people‟s own free 
choice that would receive their full attention, as opposed to anything 
being imposed from outside through instructions and guidance, which he 
argued would not receive the same attention and merely be performed 
with „mechanistic exactness‟ without true human energies. 593  Both a 
„monological‟ and a „dialogical‟ approach to arts mediation rely on a 
certain level of instruction and guidance. A scheme such as DKS requires 
indeed a minimum of structure and programming: it could probably not be 
run by the pupils themselves without any involvement of facilitators. It 
could still be argued, though, that a dialogical approach would be more 
open to involve the pupils on their own terms, and hopefully avoid them 
following whatever is being presented to them with „mechanical 
exactness‟. However, despite the emphasis on participation as well as on 
children and young people‟s „own‟ culture in the initial papers (KKU 
(1996) and BLD (2002)), Spord Borgen and Brandt‟s informants seem to 
indicate that the structure of DKS does not appear to invite a „dialogical‟ 
                                            
592 Spord Borgen and Brandt (2006), p. 19. It should be emphasised here that the report is less 
clear about what getting „more or less out of‟ DKS events actually means, in other words; what 
the criteria are.   
593 Humboldt (1993), p. 23.  
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model,594 and consequently, in the context of Humboldt‟s view at least, 
being less suitable in helping the pupils achieve Bildung. In fact, with 
reference to the above-mentioned idea that being exposed to an arts 
event is in itself an active process, KUL (2007a) rejected Spord Borgen 
and Brandt‟s juxtaposing of monological versus dialogical modes of 
mediation. This implies the view that all mediation of the arts is by 
definition dialogical.  
 
It is as if what was emphasised in the initial papers like KKU (1996) 
regarding the importance of participating in what was described as 
children and young people‟s „own culture‟, had been submerged by the 
object oriented representation. To create arenas for the pupils‟ own 
cultural productions is mentioned briefly in the parliamentary response 
FKD (2003), but this does not act as a discursive condition in the way the 
importance of the „professional‟ arts is, and the policy rationale to 
facilitate a cultural democracy, is, as far as I can see, not a rationale 
behind DKS at all. And although DKS is a decentralised scheme with a 
significant amount of decision-making power being devolved to regional 
and local councils, this does not appear to extend to the children 
themselves and their parents.595  
                                            
594 Spord Borgen and Brandt (2006), p. 112. 
595 Furthermore, the term „young people‟s own culture‟ is of course not unproblematic. Most 
children and young people in Norway, as in the rest of the developed world, are exposed to an 
array of aesthetic culture on a daily basis, most of which is consumed at home (or on portable 
technological devices). Statistics Norway‟s own survey for 2006 Norwegian Media Barometer 
shows that in the 9 to 12 year old age bracket 51 per cent play TV or computer games daily; that 
56 per cent of all 9 to 15 year olds use the internet daily; that 52 per cent listen to records, 
cassettes, CDs or MP3 daily on average for 38 minutes; and that 90 per cent watch television 
daily on average for 123 minutes. Odd Frank Vaage, Norsk mediebarometer 2006 (Oslo: 
Statistisk Sentralbyrå, 2007), available online at http://www.ssb.no/emner/07/02/30/medie/. To 
refer to this as children‟s own culture is questionable given that much of this is arguably provided 
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KUL (2007a), was published four years after DKS had been given its 
significant funding-boost due to the decision to change the lottery-
distribution in 2002, and attempted to take stock and reflect over the level 
of success thus far and the road ahead. In the response by the 
parliamentary committee to this green paper, the members from the 
Progress Party argued that DKS had not developed according to the 
intentions laid out in FKD (2002)596 because it focused to such a low 
extent on children and young people‟s participation as opposed to how 
they should relate to artistic expressions as audience members. These 
committee members noted that KUL (2007a), hardly made any 
references to activities in the voluntary organisations, which according to 
these members were supposed to benefit from the scheme. 597 These 
members therefore felt somewhat cheated, given that it was their 
suggestion to change the lottery-funding in the first place in such a way 
that it would benefit culture, and their suggestion had hence come to act 
as a midwife for DKS. The fact that the Progress Party was in a minority 
position in this context, appears again to imply that the object oriented 
approach to Bildung permeates the discourse, where DKS‟s participatory 
                                                                                                                      
by large media conglomerates, and although it could be argued that these cultural artefacts are 
responding to demand, many might claim that they in fact create demand. The formation of the 
type of culture that children and young people engage with on an everyday basis lies outside of 
the remit of this project, and I shall not make this subject to an in-depth analysis here. However, 
several agencies, including the mentioned media conglomerates, parents, friends (again perhaps 
indirectly conveying products from the media industries), as well as other cultural activities 
offered through governmental supported schemes outside of DKS, such as the already mentioned 
music and cultural schools, youth clubs and other participatory activities like performing in a 
brass band or singing in a choir, all contribute perhaps to the children and young people‟s „own‟ 
culture. 
596 The parliamentary response to the bill to change the allocation of lottery-money proposed by 
the Progress Party.  
597 Familie- og kulturkomiteen (FKD), 2008. Innst. S. nr. 200 (2007-2008); Innstilling fra familie 
og kulturkomiteen om kulturell skulesekk for framtida, St.meld. nr.8 (2007-2008), Oslo, p. 8 
(FKD (2008)). 
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dimension, which was mentioned in BLD (2002) and KKU (1996) 
somehow got lost along the way.  
 
The lack of emphasis on cultural democracy in a DKS-context, makes 
way for an explicit expression of the lack of Bildung potential in the 
culture provided by the commercial cultural industries, which is regarded 
to represent a force of anti-Bildung.   
7.3.3 The commercial cultural industries: a force of anti-
Bildung 
 
One of Arnold‟s principal concerns was what people would do with the 
increased freedom they had acquired in nineteenth-century Britain. In this 
new age characterised by liberties and democratic reform, Arnold saw a 
need for people to be „steered‟ towards perfection in order to prevent the 
newly acquired liberties leading to anarchy. Arnold‟s perception of 
anarchy is, according to Bennett, not limited to a potential social anarchy 
manifest by chaos in the streets where people worshipped „freedom in 
and for itself‟, but also to an intellectual anarchy where all opinions were 
given equal value and where any hierarchies were abandoned.598 The 
fear of social anarchy is naturally long gone, or at least no longer 
explicitly articulated. However, the fear of an intellectual anarchy as it 
might be manifest in a relativistic valuation of culture can be traced in the 
DKS discourse, and it is partly to counter this that the understanding of 
the arts‟ ability to contribute to a better life, and, as mentioned above, 
                                            
598 Bennett (2005), p. 467; Arnold, (1935) p. 76. Arnold also referred to a spiritual anarchy within 
religion warning against the fragmentation of the Anglican Church.   
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also having an accumulated positive effect on society as a whole, 
endures.  
 
The fear of social anarchy seems to have been replaced by an anxiety 
about the power of the high arts‟ „other‟: commercial culture, which is 
what DKS is coined in opposition to. The DKS discourse does not reject 
commercial culture and has acknowledged that this is a phenomenon that 
has come to stay. However, this is not a culture which harbours the ability 
to enlighten. As mentioned earlier, BLD (2002) referred to the 
homogeneity, intolerance and lack of knowledge harboured by the 
commercial entertainment industry. In fact hardly any positive references 
to commercial culture (and marginally few to the children‟s „own‟ culture) 
can be traced in KUL (2003b), UDF (2003) and KUL (2007a), and it is 
clear that it is the „professional‟ arts that have the ability to enable the:  
 
human „dannings‟-process to become as complete as possible, so that 
we also develop people‟s „åndsliv‟,599 and not only the distant intellect 
and the purely instrumental abilities.600    
 
As mentioned in Chapter Six, the nature of the term the „professional‟ arts 
was hardly made explicit in the Bildung discourse, the way it was 
                                            
599 The word „åndsliv‟ is difficult to translate to English, particularly when it appears in the same 
sentence as, and is juxtaposed with, the term „intellect‟. The linguistic challenge to translate this 
term might relate to a central difference between Norwegian cultural policy discourse and the one 
found in English-speaking countries. „Åndelig‟ can be translated as intellectual; the English term 
intellectual property for example is translated to Norwegian as „åndsverk‟ („intellectual work‟). 
However, „åndelig‟ relates to a deeper meaning and can also be translated as spiritual, sometimes, 
but not necessarily, in a religious sense. By using the term 'åndelig'/spiritual in connection to art, 
the Norwegian language signals that for instance a poet through her poetry or a sculptor through 
his sculpture is aiming to convey a non-material intention, a reflection on human experiences and 
achievements. I am indebted to Kjell Magne Mælen for his assistance on this clarification.  
600 KUL (2003b), p. 16. 
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manifest in the green papers between 1973 and 2003. However, as 
already mentioned, KUL (2007a) defined „professionals‟ as anybody who 
had artistic and cultural work as their profession, and subsequently gave 
a breakdown of the art-forms that were included in DKS over the 2006-
2007 school year. These were (listed in the order of the number of pupils 
experiencing events within each art form): music, the performing arts, 
literature, cultural heritage, visual art, film, and the multidisciplinary 
arts.601 Although there is of course scope for cultural artefacts produced 
within the context of the profit-making cultural industries to be included 
within such a list of art-forms (for example within music, film and 
literature), and notwithstanding the fact that culture produced by the 
profit-making commercial cultural industries is inevitably also professional, 
the paper does not give the impression that this is prioritised, if 
considered at all.  
 
A range of cultural manifestations that are often classified as high arts is 
provided by the commercial cultural industries: seminal literary works, 
avant-garde contemporary music and non-commercial films all rely 
invariably on the profit-making companies to be produced and distributed. 
It is therefore too simplistic to juxtapose what in the DKS discourse is 
being referred to as the „professional‟ arts on the one hand, and 
„commercial‟ culture on the other. No definition of these terms has been 
attempted in the data material that I have analysed (neither in policy 
papers nor amongst my interviewees). Instead, reference is made (in the 
                                            
601 KUL (2007a), p. 27.  
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interview context partly prompted by me as the interviewer) to all the 
culture that children and young people consume outside of a DKS-context 
as commercial. 
 
In fact, the green papers make little reference to cultural artefacts 
originating within the cultural industries at all. This is further demonstrated 
by Yngve Slettholm, who in the above-mentioned speech, emphasised 
that schools should work closely with „local museums, libraries, music 
and cultural schools, cultural monuments, the church, local professional 
artists or others in the local community‟.602  
 
There might be room for children and young people‟s „own culture‟ here 
but this is certainly not emphasised. Instead, as I shall make clear later 
on in this chapter, despite a lack of definition, the DKS discourse makes it 
clear that the „commercial‟ culture consumed by children outside a DKS-
context, and the forces of what in the initial policy papers were referred to 
as children and young people‟s own culture were regarded to be of anti-
Bildung.  
 
However, the earlier policy-papers took a different stance. KKU (1996), 
for example, argued that youth culture was: 
 
often expressed through life-style, language and cultural activities like for 
example music and sports. Young people are drawn to international 
genres and fashion. Although many will claim that media can contribute 
                                            
602 Slettholm (2004), not paginated.  
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to cultural vulgarisation, it is pertinent to emphasise the role media plays 
as a cross-cultural bridge-builder and mediator of youth culture.603   
 
What is here referred to as the media, presumably implying the cultural 
industries, is deemed as an agency that can contribute positively to the 
development of young people‟s own culture. However, the gravity of DKS 
lies elsewhere. This is, for example, typified in Slettholm‟s emphasis on 
the quality dimension of the DKS content: 
 
It is however important to emphasise the importance of quality assurance, 
both in terms of the arts and culture and educationally. The rucksack 
shall not be characterised by amateurish activities or dilettantism, but be 
filled with good professional activities from A to Z.604 
 
As already mentioned, children do not need a scheme like DKS to be 
exposed to culture, particularly if we refer to culture as a signifying 
practice in accordance with Raymond Williams‟ interpretation. The 
objective of DKS is thus not to give access to aesthetic experiences as 
such, but to a particular type of aesthetics. Just a cursory glance at the 
type of productions that are currently on offer to schools by DKS in the 
different counties in Norway shows that they are not preoccupied with the 
type of aesthetics that children and young people are exposed to through 
the popular culture they consume in their spare-time, such as pop-music, 
computer games or television content.605 Obviously, given that these DKS 
productions are devised particularly for children and young people they 
                                            
603 KKU (1996), not paginated.  
604 Slettholm (2004), not paginated. 
605  For a breakdown of all the DKS productions currently available see 
http://www.denkulturelleskolesekken.no/index. 
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are different and perhaps more accessible to children in their expression 
than what is on offer in traditional theatres, concert-halls and galleries 
around the country. However, it appears that these productions represent 
a clear alternative to mainstream commercial culture, with significant 
differences both in terms of its content and delivery, the most apparent 
example of the latter perhaps being that most productions (apart from 
film) are being performed live. Only a few productions rely heavily on the 
pupils‟ own participation, and then in a fairly strictly designed scheme 
supervised by professional artists or mediators.606  Although there are 
elements of dialogical modes of mediation within these productions, the 
DKS culture is a far cry from the culture most children and young people 
consume on an everyday basis.  
 
The green papers‟ lack of celebration of commercial culture was echoed 
by my interviewees, who expressed an antagonistic attitude, at least to 
this culture‟s Bildung potential. Interviewees elaborated on this in 
response to a comment I made during my interviews about the fact that 
most children and young people are being exposed to culture most of the 
time. Most of the interviewees did not perceive commercial culture as 
downright negative or dangerous. Instead, its presence was accepted as 
a given. However, almost all interviewees agreed that commercial or 
„media‟-culture is less able to mediate the emotions and meaning that the 
                                            
606 KUL (2007a) cites a DKS project, which appears to be typical. It is the „transparent realism‟ 
project supplied by North Norway‟s Artists‟ Centre (Nordnorsk Kunstnarsenter) where; „pupils in 
fifth grade, are offered a tour by glass-artist Kari Malmberg. The tour covers a conversation about 
glass and what it is made of, an assessment of the exhibited art-works of glass, and finally 
drawing and engraving on glass supervised by the artist. The school has been prepared for the 
meeting and everything is agreed beforehand‟ (KUL (2007a), p. 24). 
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„professional‟ arts can, and the latter should instead act as a counter-
force to commercial culture. To get behind the media-pictures in order to 
gain understanding and growth, children and young people needed 
something more profound, which can bring them out of a superficial and 
trivial sphere. As mentioned by a former Minster of Culture: 
 
But I think there is an emotional level, which we are absolutely reliant on 
tuning into […] the emotional [...] in other words, the register, which I 
believe these technical media find difficult to mediate. Hence, I mean that 
children need a counter-force, in order to get behind those pictures 
[conveyed by the media industry] and understand some of the universe 
that they consume. And there is something like feelings, something like 
smell, something like nerve [...] other layers within ourselves, which I 
sense that many gradually are a little underfed on.607  
 
The „generalisation of everything‟, was, by another respondent, deemed 
to completely destroy children‟s curiosity and ability to experience art-
works that aimed to hit deeper. He continued by saying that: 
 
our society is overloaded by superficialities and trivialities. In other words 
the generalisation of any context in society completely destroys our 
curiosity and ability for arts‟ experiences. DKS has an important task in 
this respect. To bring us out of the trivial and over into that, which in a 
way scratches and hits a little deeper.608  
 
Hence, children should have access to a wider menu of expressions in 
order to give them a taste of things they would otherwise not encounter. 
What would be of greater value to children would be to „experience 
                                            
607 Ellen Horn, interviewed 12th April 2007. 
608 Olemic Thommessen, interviewed 17th April 2007. 
322 
 
people [artists] who actually contribute something, who add a personal 
stimulus, or a personal involvement‟.609 
 
This clear understanding that commercial culture is less able to offer this 
is another condition on which the Bildung potential in the DKS discourse 
is based: the stimulation of creativity, experiences, dreams and individual 
thinking can not be achieved through commercial culture. Similarly, 
knowledge was also mentioned: 
 
For those who attempt to penetrate ever new spheres of comprehension, 
it is obvious that the answer is more knowledge. We need to understand 
more, we need a wider perspective, a more long-term perspective, hence 
we need knowledge. Then you have to see where knowledge exists and 
that is not within pulp fiction [metaphorically; popular culture].610   
 
This again would help pupils to make their own valuation of culture, and 
the exposure to the type of art presented by DKS, would help young 
people to obtain: 
 
a totality and a language, which enables you to discriminate between 
what is good and bad, and gives you the opportunity to make some 
choices about where you are going.611  
 
Following on from this, Slettholm makes a strong contribution to this 
understanding of a dichotomy between the arts and commercial media 
culture when he advocates for more experimental arts to be included in 
                                            
609 Ibid. 
610 Stein Olav Henrichsen, interviewed 20th April 2007. 
611 Vidar Thorbjørnsen, interviewed 16th April 2007. 
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the DKS programme. Pupils in schools, he argued, should be exposed to 
content which is initially not familiar or accessible to the children:  
 
There shall be room for what can be both challenging and difficult to 
receive. I am thinking for example of expressions from other cultures, 
contemporary art, contemporary music, dance and experimental art-
forms. It is important to develop qualities like tolerance, interest and 
wonder for what is unknown and not immediately comprehensible. The 
pupils deserve to have access to the best, and to get something they 
perhaps did not know that they needed – and perhaps did not know 
existed – and which was also unknown for the teachers and other grown-
ups.612    
 
A little further down in his speech Slettholm continues: 
 
The arts can give pinpricks to our anaesthetic feeling of well-being. 
Today, it is so easy to opt out of what is challenging. One can just close 
oneself in one‟s living-room, sit down on the sofa and change channel. In 
its encounter with an increasingly commercialised children- and youth-
culture I hope DKS can contribute to a more critical and reflective attitude 
amongst children and young people.613  
 
This idea that commercial culture like TV is of less value and not very 
edifying was echoed by most of my interviewees, and it was suggested 
that children and young people perhaps spend too much time on such 
content. It could have damaging effects, but rather than cursing it, the 
emphasis was on what commercial culture was not: 
 
                                            
612 Slettholm (2004), not paginated.  
613 Ibid.  
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The point for me is that if they are only going to absorb that part, which 
they can get through children‟s TV and such things, they will get a too 
restricted part of culture, and perhaps not the most edifying or, in my 
view, the most valuable.614  
 
This was related to commercial culture‟s reliance on the market, which in 
turn required it to satisfy customer demand. As a consequence 
commercial culture was less able to say something important about 
ourselves as human beings. Echoing Matthew Arnold‟s call for a culture 
„guided by a general humane spirit‟,615 my interviewees called for art-
works that are not restrained by commercial limitations, but which instead 
are allowed to put „humanistic‟ values at the forefront. Such art has the 
potential to penetrate ever new spheres of comprehension. There is thus 
a need for knowledge: a knowledge that does not exist within „pulp fiction‟. 
As opposed to within the sphere of commercial culture, outside of it, 
artists may be found, who:  
 
have thought about completely new things, who have taken completely 
new approaches, who have found answers to several both important and 
unimportant questions that humanity has always asked, and those are 
the ones we in a way must get in touch with.616   
 
Cultural manifestations that had to relate to market-parameters would 
have fewer qualities than the „professional‟ arts mediated through DKS, 
which were better able to convey humanistic values: 
 
                                            
614 Valgerd Svarstad Haugland, interviewed 12th April 2007.  
615 Arnold (1935), p. 109. 
616 Stein Olav Henrichsen, interviewed, 20th April 2007.  
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that would say something important about us as human beings. In other 
words, a purely human project, a humanistic project, if you like. It will be 
there [in culture that had to relate to market-parameters], there will be 
lyrics, there will be tunes, that definitely have that value, but it is less of it 
than in a project, …, in an artistic project, which immerses itself in exactly 
that. [...] As a composer I all the time work to find, … I research a 
material both musical and humanistic where I all the time attempt to say 
something important about society, and what it means to be a human 
being. Right? I don‟t think about whether it will sell, that I need to relate 
to an audience as consumers. I relate to an audience, definitely, and 
write for an audience, but not as consumers.617   
 
For most of my interviewees, therefore, commercial culture is not diverse 
enough to facilitate Bildung, hence, by exposing children and young 
people to a wider menu of arts-experiences than those on offer in the 
commercial sector, they will be better able to discriminate between what 
is good and bad, meaning to place artistic expressions in a quality 
hierarchy, which again will enable them to make decisions about their 
own direction in life. People will always be fascinated by commercial 
culture‟s technology fuelled fulfilment of their need for entertainment, but 
in this sense it is a force of anti-Bildung, because „the more you want 
culture to entertain you, the less it gives you the impulses that enable you 
to get in dialogue with yourself‟.618  
 
                                            
617 Glen Erik Haugland, interviewed 12th April 2007. 
618 Trond Okkelmo, interviewed 13th April 2007.  
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What is referred to by some as commercial culture, is characterised as 
„typically one-sided. In other words, it does not contain the whole breadth 
of expressions, at least this is not secured‟.619 
 
Hence, although commercial culture cannot be stemmed, its inability to 
be critical and ask fundamental questions (in short to facilitate Bildung) 
serves as a powerful discursive practice. Commercial culture does not 
take any responsibility in terms of giving children and young people the 
culture that they need. Hence, the public sector, and in a DKS context, 
the schools have to facilitate alternatives in order to secure pluralism and 
quality. In the words of one interviewee: „The use of public money on 
culture is about filling the weaknesses of the market and to complement 
it‟.620  
 
It is argued that cultural competence cannot be obtained through 
exposure to commercial culture, and it is thus inferior because these 
experiences are less diverse. It does not have all the expressions, 
nuances and details that are on offer in a wider arts context: instead 
commercial culture is perceived to be homogenous in comparison. This is 
often repeated and subscribed to across the two green papers, by most 
of my interviews and certainly by the then statssekretær Slettholm.  
 
Hence, commercial culture should not be an area of priority for DKS, and 
if at all included, it should merely act as a starting point, from which 
                                            
619 Einar Solbu, interviewed 13th April 2007.  
620 Olemic Thommessen, interviewed 17th April 2007.  
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children can explore more challenging arts expressions. Instead pupils 
should gain the necessary „cultural competence‟ in order to both be able 
to appreciate the arts as well as to reap the Bildung effect of such 
competence itself.  
7.3.4 ‘Cultural competence’ - The need to learn the arts 
 
The arts are understood to have an inherent Bildung potential. However, 
this potential is conditioned by knowledge and ability. KUL (2003b) 
explicitly argues that:  
 
The audience‟s ability to experience and understand the arts is 
something that must be developed – if one shall reach most of the 
richness, which the world of art contains.621  
 
This is also emphasised by Slettholm, who argues that despite being 
competent and engaging with culture, there are aspects of the arts that 
children need to learn that require knowledge and experience. This is, in 
his view, the dannelses-project.622 
 
The schools‟ aim to give the pupils basic and complete qualifications 
cannot, according to KUL (2003b), be achieved without cultural 
competence being a „natural, integrated and important‟ part of this.623 To 
understand their cultural identity and the cultural historical tradition within 
                                            
621 KUL (2003b), p. 15.  
622 Slettholm (2004).  
623 KUL (2003b), p. 17. 
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which they live, is regarded as a necessary condition for participation in 
society. 
 
In KUL (2007a), a succinct „cultural competence‟ rationale for DKS is 
given, when it argues that: 
 
The meeting with the arts and culture throughout adolescence can 
contribute to children and young people having experiences and 
knowledge that can form the basis of their own creative activities and 
ability to judge different artistic and cultural expressions. To understand 
the arts and culture is in many cases a learning-process.624  
 
Hence, an important rationale behind DKS is to give pupils this „cultural 
competence‟. However, „cultural competence‟ is not just an important skill 
that children and young people need to be able to acquire knowledge 
about the arts in order to improve their experience: such skills also have 
inherent values. This is particularly emphasised in UDF (2003) where it 
was argued that cultural competence „has both an intrinsic value, great 
significance for an increased quality of life, and for qualification for the 
future and career‟.625 This was echoed in the parliamentary response to 
UDF (2003), which stated that cultural competence was decisive for the 
pupil‟s ability to „interpret a complex society, and a condition for acquiring 
the diversity of expressions one encounters‟.626   
 
                                            
624 KUL (2007a), p. 7. 
625 UDF (2003), p. 8. 
626  Kirke-, utdannings- og forskningskomiteen (KUF), 2004. Innst. S. nr. 131 (2003-2004); 
Innstilling fra Kirke-, utdannings- og forskningskomiteen om kunst og kultur i og i tilknytning til 
grunnskolen (”Ei blot til lyst”) St.meld. Nr.39 (2002-2003), Oslo, p. 3. (KUF (2004)). 
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Hence, in addition to allowing the arts and culture to contribute to the 
fulfilment of the curriculum, DKS is perceived as giving a supply of culture 
beyond this.  
 
Drafted by the Ministry of Education and Research, it was perhaps not 
surprising that UDF (2003) also stressed that one aim of DKS is to 
develop a cultural competence, which can also help pupils prepare for the 
future.627 However, it is the intrinsic value of such a competence and its 
ability to facilitate pupils‟ growth and development inherently contained 
within the arts, in short Bildung, that is emphasised most, even in a green 
paper drafted by the Ministry of Education and Research:  
 
the concept of culture can be connected to the aesthetic and to individual 
„dannelses‟-processes. Culture is also something that challenges, aids 
reflection and innovation. It is something we acquire, a result of our 
thoughts and a background where the frames of reference for 
understanding is developed; this is what is called a horizon of 
understanding. The school‟s role as a cultural bearer makes way for all 
these forms of cultural expressions. The school is thus a central arena 
for children‟s meetings, communication and learning in terms of concepts 
such as aesthetic, culture and „dannelse‟. The school as a cultural bearer 
can make it possible for the pupil‟s cultural competence to develop as 
part of a broader process of „dannelse‟ and learning.628   
 
Slettholm argues for the importance of playfulness and mentions that the 
pupils will get most out of their engagement with an art-work if they and 
the teachers play together with it. However, Slettholm also maintains that 
                                            
627 UDF (2003), p. 8. 
628 Ibid., p. 9. 
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this can have a positive utilitarian impact on the children‟s learning in 
other subjects.629  
 
The importance of this cultural competence was reiterated by my 
interviewees, who were mostly in agreement about what was meant by 
this term and why it was important in a DKS context. The more utilitarian 
dimension of cultural competence was mentioned by several: for example, 
that it might help young people in their future career (at least within some 
professions). 630  It was also argued that the richer the lives people 
manage to live on their own terms, the more they would contribute to the 
wider community, and that the path to a good society goes through the 
realisation of what is harboured within each individual. It would also play 
a part in the nation‟s self-esteem by contributing to domestic creativity 
and avoid Norway lapsing into a nation of passive consumers on an 
international market.631   
 
However, these understandings of more utilitarian and collective benefits 
were again overshadowed by the representation of cultural competence 
as something inherently beneficial for each individual, more in line with 
the thinking of Humboldt who advocated that whatever Bildung activity 
man embarked on, it should not be carried out simply as a means to an 
end.632  Instead, my interviewees asserted that cultural competence is 
                                            
629 Slettholm (2004).  
630 One interviewee argued that if you had a certain level of „cultural competence‟, you would 
probably not gravitate towards a profession such as stock-broking, interview with Trond 
Okkelmo, interviewed 13th April 2007.  
631 Olemic Thommessen, interviewed 17th April 2007. 
632 Humboldt (1993), p. 23. 
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related to having the tools to master something, or to have the necessary 
knowledge in order to break codes (for example, to understand music). 
Hence, pupils should have access to both cultural heritage and the 
contemporary arts, which were perceived as connected. An 
understanding of contemporary art in the context of arts history would 
also help pupils conceptualise how they are related. All of this would, 
according to the interviewees, contribute to Bildung.    
 
People with a wide cultural competence would find it easier than others to 
value and utilise the cultural impulses they come across, as well as to 
relate to other cultures, in order to communicate, understand, appreciate 
and be respectful and tolerant. It is something on which each individual‟s 
personality could be based: with cultural competence people would have 
a platform for their own confidence and be conscious of their belonging 
and point of departure. This would facilitate Bildung where cultural 
competence is argued to be of importance to people‟s emotional life, self-
confidence and ability to reflect on a range of different impulses. 633 
Without cultural competence, people would simply be less able to judge 
what would influence their life and how they should position themselves. 
Cultural competence is thus both a tool needed to appreciate the arts, 
which again is a prerequisite for Bildung as well as a path to personal 
growth itself.  
 
                                            
633 It is important to emphasise at this stage that the respondents frequently generalised statements 
about children and young people in a DKS context to be of relevance to people more generally. 
Similarly, when being asked about issues relating to DKS they often also answered more 
generally.  
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In their emphasis on exposing children and young people to a wide range 
of artistic and cultural expressions, the green papers, as well as my 
interviewees (who all argued that pupils should be exposed to as wide a 
range of „professional‟ arts as possible), echo Humboldt‟s argument that 
Bildung can only be achieved by exposing the individual to a „variety of 
situations‟:634 however, this means a „variety of situations‟, which, in a 
DKS context at least, does not include popular culture.  
 
Cultural competence is closely related to dannelse, and when asked how 
they interpreted this term, most of my interviewees argued that this 
implied that one had been trained to know what to appreciate in life as 
well as to realise one‟s own limitations and that these are not the same as 
everybody else‟s. Dannelse would thus make people more empathic, or 
in other words help them to understand others and be able to enter into 
their situation; Dannelse meant to be considerate, caring and respectful.  
 
It was also argued that dannelse was determined by diverse forms of 
knowledge and one‟s ability to refine and mediate this in accordance with 
different circumstances. This diverse set of knowledge could only be 
obtained through the exposure to a diverse set of experiences, and this 
was why public support for a diverse range of cultural expressions was an 
essential part of public cultural policy: the market was not sufficient in that 
it was not able to sustain the same diverse range of cultural expressions, 
and thus not to the same extent able to tear down prejudices and 
                                            
634 Humbolt (1993), p. 10. 
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promote respect and tolerance. Finally, cultural competence was also 
related to being able to become articulate as well as to apply one‟s own 
experiences creatively when meeting new situations. 
 
The programming of the arts to be mediated through DKS can obviously 
not be left to chance, and just as Arnold called for a strong state 
represented by the great men of culture,635 it is DKS and those who 
govern and make decisions for this scheme that are granted the privilege 
to steer the pupils and help them gain knowledge and the ability to break 
the codes. Whether they are guided by their „best selves‟, which was 
what Arnold hoped for, shall not be said, but they are at least understood 
to be purer and more benign than those cultural mediators the pupils 
meet at home in their interaction with the commercial cultural industries.  
 
Despite the focus on a subject oriented approach to enlightenment 
throughout the twentieth century, this emphasis on guidance „from above‟ 
has also had, as described in Chapters Four and Five, long traditions in 
Norway, with P.A. Munch, Johan Sebastian Welhaven and Bjørnstjerne 
Bjørnson as pertinent advocates of an elite informed approach to 
dannelse in the nineteenth century, and in 1935, even the future Labour 
Party secretary Håkon Lie argued that the working classes should be 
guided by the cultural taste and habits of the middle classes.  
 
                                            
635 Arnold (1935), p. 70. 
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However, where the inherent benefits of cultural competence (or Bildung) 
and the idea that this could be achieved through the exposure to a wide 
range of cultural expressions echo the thoughts of Humboldt, the object-
focused aspect of DKS, which relies on a pre-prepared programme of 
cultural offerings drawn from what is being termed the „professional‟ arts, 
does not. Humboldt argued instead that the best conditions for self-
cultivation (or cultural competence) would be achieved when there was a 
minimum of interference from without, and where the maximum variety of 
choice in the opportunities for experience was not necessarily limited to 
the arts. As mentioned in the introduction to DKS earlier on in this chapter, 
it is an explicit principle that the scheme shall be organised with a 
minimum of interference from central government. This seems to suggest 
a subject oriented approach in the spirit of cultural democracy: one of the 
principles of which, as outlined in Chapter Five, was that cultural policy 
decisions should be taken as close to the users as possible. However, 
whereas county councils and municipalities are allowed to make 
decisions away from central government, this does not appear to extend 
to pupils themselves, or their families.  
 
So, to sum up, there is a clear understanding that cultural competence is 
needed in order to understand and acquire an appreciation for the arts at 
the same time as such competence is important for its own sake. The 
fundamental role of this cultural competence, which perhaps should be 
better described as an arts competence, in acquiring Bildung acts as 
another discursive practice. The understanding that there might be other 
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alternative routes to Bildung, which do not rest on the values of the 
„professional‟ arts is excluded by the discourse.  
 
However, what is still being left vague is how exactly this growth, through 
the exposure to the DKS-culture, can happen.  
7.3.5 How exactly can Bildung be facilitated?  
 
The DKS discourse is based on the claim that children‟s meeting with the 
„professional‟ arts can facilitate Bildung. This is put forward as obvious 
without the need for further explication. However, how can this happen? 
The „professional‟ arts are allegedly able to help pupils gain 
comprehension both of themselves and their surroundings, which again 
will make their life richer and enable them to utilise their own potential 
and so on, but how? Although participation is not excluded from DKS, in 
the material I am referring to it is argued that this Bildung can be 
facilitated through mere exposure, for example by children sitting on their 
chairs listening to music or watching a theatre performance, because this 
is not regarded as passive but an active process.  
 
Given that neither the green papers nor the parliamentary responses 
appear to attempt to dissect these alleged impacts further, nor refer to 
any empirical research that could „prove‟ such growth, I asked my 
interviewees to explain how the arts and culture could have such 
influences on children and young people. Again, there was consensus 
about the arts having such effects. One informant mentioned that this 
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could primarily be achieved through participation as opposed to the mere 
exposure to artistic content. However, the main understanding is that the 
arts represent a unique vehicle through which people can share 
experiences, and which could give their lives a wider perspective and 
greater insight: it is the arts‟ distinctive character to give people who 
come into contact with artistic expressions a broader platform for their 
experiences, and if this contact is given through DKS early in life it could 
consequently give children and young people wider associations, which in 
turn could enable them to have an increased set of experiences later on 
in life. It was further understood that the more knowledge children have 
about what life is represented by, the greater chance they have to 
develop their own lives and organise them according to their own 
presuppositions and preferences. Hence, exposure to the arts and culture 
can help children expose their own personalities as well as to see 
themselves in a larger context. It is also thought to help them express 
themselves better. Those who are able to do this will have a better quality 
of life because they have fewer inhibitions that would prevent them from 
developing further.  
 
It is being argued that this is part of a humanistic project, where to be a 
human means that you are able to communicate with others:  
 
„all these unfinished things, form part of what it means to be a human 
being. And to relate to both one‟s unanswered questions and others‟ 
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unanswered questions are absolutely fundamental, and there I think that 
the meeting with the arts is absolutely fundamental.636   
 
Hence, the arts are perceived as unique in this respect. They could 
perhaps overlap with other things: 
 
but if you […] value the whole breadth of human expressions, then 
nothing can replace what it is to express oneself through pictures, 
through movement and music.637  
 
It is argued that the arts would enable children to access some „rooms‟ in 
their mind, which they would otherwise not be able to enter; to give them 
aspirations, which would enable them to see outside of the space they 
live in. This was seen as a crucial addition to the theoretical approach 
offered in the formal part of the school curriculum. As opposed to the 
other topics taught in school, the arts and culture engage a range of 
children‟s senses, where they would make use of the whole body in a 
different way than they would in traditional learning. Children‟s quality of 
life would be limited if they were not exposed to these experiences. 
These references to using the whole body and expressing oneself 
through the arts like movement or music seem to indicate that DKS 
should contain a significant proportion of participation. However, almost 
all my interviewees made it clear that DKS should primarily focus on 
exposing pupils to the „professional‟ arts.  
 
                                            
636 Einar Solbu, interviewed 13th April 2007. 
637 Ibid.  
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It was difficult, in my view, to get a clear explanation of exactly how 
children‟s exposure to the „professional‟ arts could facilitate growth. This 
rests on an understanding that the arts have such transforming powers. 
Instead, this is repeated again and again, not based on any kind of 
empirical proof but on a conviction. Hence, exactly how the arts help 
children and young people achieve Bildung is left unclear.   
 
Moreover, although DKS sits comfortably in a Norwegian cultural policy 
context, which for so many years has had as an important rationale to 
democratise culture, this scheme is unique in that its provision of culture 
is compulsory and something pupils cannot avoid. Within this lies the 
potential to use culture actively to civilise its audience.  
 
7.4 DKS as a civilising project  
 
Bildung is understood in the DKS discourse as enabling children and 
young people to become aware of their own limitations, to become more 
empathic, considerate, caring and respectful as well as to improve their 
ability to articulate their experiences. The opportunity for future 
generations to attain this Bildung is democratised through an authorised 
and sanctioned selection of arts-experiences, which excludes the culture 
that children and young people are mostly inclined to engage with. Hence, 
I shall make reference to the DKS-„sanctioned‟ or DKS-„authorised‟ arts. 
DKS harbours an underlying power-dynamic, which is manifest through 
the fact that the children, or their parents for that matter, have little 
influence over the means by which this Bildung develops.  
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7.4.1 The DKS-sanctioned ‘professional’ arts  
 
As already mentioned in the previous chapter, within Norwegian cultural 
policy rhetoric, as it has been presented by central government, the 
„battle‟ against commercial culture has given way to a more nuanced and 
perhaps more constructive way of dealing with what is still regarded as a 
challenge. At the same time, the consumption-level of the content 
provided by the commercial cultural industries increases year on year and 
pervades most people‟s everyday lives in unprecedented ways. Nowhere 
is this as evident as with children and young people. Popular culture is 
being disseminated in ever new ways, and children and young people 
have access to content wherever they are, twenty-four hours a day, 
seven days a week.638 If perhaps not sharing the same cultural content, it 
could be argued that the difference in cultural habits between children 
and parents is also contracting, at least in terms of the channels through 
which culture is consumed: both parents and children are, for example, 
active on the internet, both groups watch TV and DVDs, both listen to 
iPods, both play computer-games and so on.639 I shall not speculate on 
the nature of the content that each of these segments consumes, but it 
can be assumed that it is primarily what can be described as popular 
culture, which indicates a development towards convergence: if not in 
terms of the actual content of the culture consumed by parents and 
                                            
638 See footnote 592 for statistics of the media habits for children and young people.  
639 For example, where 53 per cent of Norwegian children and young people between 9 and 15 
listened to recorded music daily in 2006, the percentage for 25-44 year olds was 48 per cent, and 
they listened for longer; 45 minutes on average versus 38 minutes for the younger ones. For 
watching television the figures were 90 per cent and 123 minutes for 9 to 15 year olds, 81 per 
cent and 142 minutes for 25 to 44 year olds and 81 per cent and 146 minutes for 45 to 66 year 
olds. Vaage (2007), available online at: http://www.ssb.no/emner/07/02/30/medie/. 
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children then at least in terms of the type of culture, in the sense that it is 
commercial and popular.  
 
However, this is, as already mentioned above, not the culture sanctioned 
by DKS, and it can therefore be assumed that this is not the „dominant‟ 
culture, at least if compared hierarchically in terms of quality-judgments 
as approved by official bodies, artists and others who are involved in the 
programming of DKS. As outlined in Chapter Two, Antonio Gramsci 
argued that a „dominant‟ culture must be treated carefully by a dominant 
group in society and not enjoyed exclusively by them. Instead, the 
„dominant‟ culture must be identified with the culture of society as a 
whole.640 If the „dominant‟ culture is not represented by popular culture 
supplied by the commercial cultural industries but instead the one 
sanctioned by public bodies, then the elite, according to Gramsci, ought 
to ensure that this culture be adopted by the populace as a whole. 
Gramsci argued that most of the ideological institutions of both the state 
and civil society have been established in order to obtain consent from 
the populace for the „dominant‟ culture.641 Applying Gramsci‟s ideas of 
hegemonies by consent to the DKS project is of course contentious. It 
can equally be argued, perhaps much more convincingly, that the real 
dominant culture is the one produced by the commercial cultural 
industries, in terms of its popularity and impact. Hence, I shall place the 
term „dominant‟ in inverted commas.  
 
                                            
640 Hewison (1995).  
641 Bennett (1998a). 
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However, as argued above, in a public cultural policy context, and 
certainly in terms of DKS, the professional arts are dominant. I argue that 
one of the rationales behind DKS is exactly to counter the forces of 
popular culture, and the fact that such a large effort goes into this project, 
indicates that this is a hegemonic battle. Whether DKS will succeed in its 
effort to internalise the „professional‟ arts and dominate popular culture is 
a different matter, which remains to be seen.642 However, as quoted at 
the very beginning of this chapter, one of DKS‟s overarching objectives, 
as stated in KUL (2003b), is to facilitate access to and familiarisation with 
a wide range of artistic and cultural expressions for pupils in primary 
school in order for them to be favourably inclined towards, or to develop 
an understanding of, them. It is an authorised official culture that the 
pupils should be favourably inclined towards. Hence, the DKS-sanctioned 
arts are dominant within a cultural policy discourse, and more specifically 
within a DKS discourse, which is based on a strong wish that the 
„professional‟ arts could dominate, or at least counter, the forces of most 
of the culture provided by the commercial cultural industries.  
 
Gramsci‟s reference to an elite or a „power bloc‟ is equally contentious in 
the context of a discussion of the DKS-santioned arts, because who 
constitutes the elite is not obvious. As mentioned in Chapter Two, Tony 
Bennett questions Gramscian criticism, partly because in a people versus 
the power-bloc antagonism it becomes impossible to identify who the 
                                            
642 An investigation into the success or otherwise of DKS falls outside the remit of this project.  
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people are and whom they include or exclude. 643  Similarly, it is 
problematic to identify who the elite is, and finally the extent to which 
class belonging determines cultural consumption has been questioned in 
recent years.644 Furthermore, Norway is regarded as a more egalitarian 
country with not so distinct class differences when compared to other 
countries like the UK. It might therefore be difficult to catch sight of the 
assumed antagonism between the people and a bourgeois power-bloc (or 
indeed between any power-blocs) nowadays, and the extent to which a 
Gramscian hegemony- concept is relevant might therefore be questioned.  
 
I therefore find it more convincing to perceive power as exercised through 
the discursive production of „truths‟, and the discursive practices I have 
analysed have emanated from policy papers, a speech by a 
statssekretær, and from several interviews with bureaucrats, politicians, 
artists and arts managers. In this material I have found discursive 
practices which position the „professional‟ arts in a superior position when 
compared with commercial culture and hence at least attempt to make 
these manifestations dominant.  
7.4.2 The fear of intellectual anarchy 
 
There seems to be an Arnoldian fear of the anarchical potential in young 
people‟s own culture, or indeed the culture of their parents, which I have 
attempted to demonstrate as not being significantly dissimilar, and that 
                                            
643 Bennett (1990), p. 254.  
644 Nobuko Kawashima, „Beyond the Division of Attenders vs Non-Attenders‟ (Coventry: Centre 
for the Study of Cultural Policy, Working Paper 6, University of Warwick, 2000), p 24. 
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this does not, as already mentioned, facilitate Bildung, but also that it is a 
threat to the „dominant‟ culture. One interviewee, for example, argued that 
DKS was primarily targeted at children from homes „without a bookshelf‟, 
and continued: „The objective of DKS is to give all people equal right to 
an as rich a life as possible‟.645  
 
This was echoed in KUL (2007a), where it was argued that DKS:  
also has a democratic and socially distributive perspective, which sits 
well both within [more general governmental] cultural and educational 
objectives.646  
 
Several respondents argued that the level of arts exposure currently 
granted to children was deemed, to a great extent, to be dependent on 
their parents‟ cultural consumption and cultural habits. Hence, the work 
should start now, in the school system, to create the next generation of 
arts-loving parents who would learn to experience and seek out the arts 
for themselves as well as passing it on to their children to enable them to 
get closer to the universe and expressions of artists. The aim is thus 
partly to even out differences, as part of a democratising project, and to 
stimulate a bigger arts audience for the future. Similar ideas were echoed 
in the response by the parliamentary committee (FKD (2003)). In its 
attempt to even out differences and allow all children access to a 
universal culture, the DKS discourse echoes the rhetoric from the Labour 
Party of the 1950s, which was less concerned with a grass-root culture, 
                                            
645 Ellen Horn, interviewed 12th April 2007.  
646 KUL (2007a), p. 20.  
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and aimed instead to democratise the arts as part of a welfare-provision 
programme. Thus, DKS clearly attempts to democratise the arts.  
 
The importance of cultural competence was also stressed in UDF (2003) 
which emphasised how this is related to children‟s identity through their 
cultural expressions and cultural background. The response by the 
parliamentary committee states that „schools have a great responsibility 
to balance and compensate for pupils‟ unequal cultural ballast‟.647  
 
A similar argument is put forward by Spord Borgen and Brandt who state 
that the objective of DKS must be to democratise children‟s dannelses-
potential, in the sense that pupils acquire common reference points, 
common tools and access to common arenas, and that this can best be 
achieved within a school context.648 Norway has few private alternatives 
to the public school system, hence, children from a range of different 
backgrounds meet in the same schools, and my interviewees argued that 
this enables a scheme like DKS to level out children‟s cultural 
competence. However, the expressed „fear‟ of the culture most children 
and young people consume outside of a DKS context (like watching TV, 
playing computer games and so on) might also demonstrate a perceived 
threat to the „dominant‟ culture, whereby it might be assumed that if the 
latter is not nourished and shared with the wider populace, it might lose 
its hierarchical dominance: the „dominant‟ culture representing a certain 
cultural identity and historical tradition.  
                                            
647 KUF (2004), p. 3.  
648 Spord Borgen and Brandt (2006).  
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It thus appears as if the culture represented by DKS is part of a 
hegemonic battle, where the supporters of the „dominant‟ DKS-
sanctioned „professional‟ arts attempt to attain consent around the 
importance of this culture when challenged by the impact of the culture 
that people mostly engage with on an everyday basis. In this battle it 
appears as if the initial emphasis on what initially was referred to as 
children and young people‟s own culture has been eclipsed and that 
popular culture is regarded to be a force of anti-Bildung. DKS can thus be 
perceived as a response to a fear that certain identities and historical 
traditions might become irrelevant and lose their justifications.  
 
Although two of my interviewees, in a criticism of the Progress Party‟s 
cultural policy (or the lack of such), made reference to representatives 
from this party allegedly having equated the value of attending opera or 
ballet with going to the pub or the bar (a comparison which both 
interviewees regarded as preposterous),649 what Tony Bennett refers to 
as a bourgeois fear of the tavern and the fair is presumably a thing of the 
past. However, it is pertinent to ask whether this fear has been replaced 
by an anxiety about the power of the culture provided by the commercial 
cultural industries.  
 
Dannelse and Bildung could be achieved through an enhanced 
understanding of one‟s cultural identity, and knowledge of one‟s cultural 
historical traditions. However, the extent to which the culture mediated 
                                            
649 Trond Okkelmo, interviewed 13th April 2007, p. 7; Einar Solbu, interviewed 13th April 2007.  
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through DKS would mesh with the cultural identity as experienced by the 
pupils through their own upbringing is not questioned. Instead it appears 
as if the DKS discourse on some levels echoes Tony Bennett‟s analysis 
of the museum of the nineteenth century as an agent for the promotion of 
a primarily bourgeois culture presented as belonging to all in order to 
contribute to cohesion around a bourgeois hegemony as well as 
programming the behaviour of its audience. My data-material is not 
sufficient for me to argue that the DKS discourse is part of a bourgeois or 
middle-class project, which aims to discipline other classes, in 
accordance with what Gramsci suggested was the purpose of all major 
ideological apparatuses of both the state and civil society.650 However, it 
appears as if there is an inherent fear of the potential negative impact that 
too much exposure to what is being provided by the commercial cultural 
industries can have, twinned with an anxiety of what children and young 
people would lose out from in terms of Bildung potential if they were not 
being made subject to a sufficient measure of the „professional‟ arts.   
 
Similarly, there appears to be a disciplining aspect to the Bildung 
measures presented through DKS where the school is not only 
preoccupied with giving its pupils knowledge through learning. 
Additionally, they should obtain dannelse and Bildung through an 
authorised path facilitated through exposure to the DKS sanctioned arts. 
It is as if the government, through the school, is capturing some of the 
space previously being left for the family, in a way which is perhaps more 
                                            
650 Bennett (1998a), pp. 67 - 68. 
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efficient, but also more intrusive, than any other cultural policy measure 
due to this scheme being sanctioned through the school system and 
therefore something that all children have to be exposed to, whether they 
like it or not. Unlike other state supported arts policies, DKS is not just 
about providing the arts but given that it is delivered through the school 
and not being optional, pupils are in a way „forced‟ to experience this 
culture.  
 
By entering into the sphere of the family, it is as if DKS is being used as a 
vehicle of „governmentality‟, which, as presented in Chapter Two, in 
Foucault‟s terms is characterised by an upwards and downwards 
continuity between man, his family and the state: when the state is run 
properly, the head of the family will look after his unit, and individuals will 
behave well, and on the other hand, man‟s government of himself will 
enable him to look after his family, which again is a prerequisite for the 
successful government of the state. 651  Such governmentality is thus 
reliant on the maturity of man‟s family and its ability to look after itself. 
Those families with a small book-shelf, who, as expressed by one 
interviewee, have fewer resources (not just financially but also socially), 
who do not read to their children or take them out to the cinema or to 
concerts,652 are not fit to govern the „family‟-link in the „governmentality‟-
chain, and hence this responsibility must be replaced by DKS, which will 
take on the role of fulfilling the expected Bildung function, and level the 
                                            
651 Foucault (1991), p. 92. 
652 Valgerd Svarstad Haugland, interviewed 12th April 2007.  
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differences so that all children are familiarised with and socialised into the 
enjoyment of the „dominant‟ culture.  
 
With reference to Foucault, Tony Bennett argues that cultural institutions 
like museums can historically be perceived as technologies of 
behavioural management. Bennett explains that this disciplining aspect of 
museums and their preoccupation with the reform of the inner self (the 
inner life): 
 
is just as much dependent on the provision of appropriate technologies 
for this purpose as is the achievement of desired ends in any other area 
of social administration.653  
 
In other words, museums were perceived to form part of social policy, 
albeit a social policy which focused on Bildung, as opposed to physical 
health. Can we perceive DKS to be such a technology of behaviour 
management? The DKS discourse does not appear to refer directly to 
children and young people‟s behaviour. However, I sense a fear of what 
could be the consequences of children (and their families) being left to 
decide their own cultural repertoire. Hence, if DKS is a technology in the 
Foucauldian sense, „which aims at regulating the conduct of individuals 
and populations‟, 654  then this relates to children and young people‟s 
cultural consumption: not necessarily in terms of reducing their 
consumption of commercial culture, but rather to offer alternatives that 
are perceived to be better for them. This discourse appears to harbour a 
                                            
653 Bennett (1995), p. 18. 
654 Ibid., pp. 89 - 90. 
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fear of anarchy, not unlike Matthew Arnold‟s reference to an intellectual 
anarchy: an anarchy of value-nihilism and cultural relativism.  
 
Tony Bennett argues how the manner in which governments have applied 
culture historically „as a field of social management‟ has seen: 
 
culture‟s governmental deployment in two ways. First, it carried that 
reach beyond the public surface of civic conduct and into the interior of 
the person in the expectation that culture would serve to fashion new 
forms of self-reflexiveness and reformed codes of personal conduct. 
Second, it developed new capillary systems for the distribution of culture 
that were calculated to extend its reach throughout the social body 
without any impediment or restriction.655  
 
This is a fairly accurate description of the policy rationale to democratise 
culture. In other words, to extend the access to a certain established 
culture to as many as possible in order to facilitate Bildung. If this is a 
technology of behavioural management, then DKS appears to be its most 
advanced application, particularly due to its compulsory inclusion during 
school hours and hence it reaching every child without „impediment or 
restriction‟. 
 
The familiarisation and socialisation of children into, what I term, the 
„dominant‟ culture should happen perpetually from generation to 
generation, as described by one interviewee:  
 
                                            
655 Bennett (1998a), p. 129. 
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in order to get culturally alert parents, you have to actually already during 
childhood give them [the children] experiences, which make them want 
to experience themselves, to seek out [arts experiences] when they get 
older.656 
 
Such sentiments appear to harbour a fear of the repercussions of children 
and young people not being made subject to the type of arts that DKS 
has to offer; what would happen if they were not to become „favourably 
inclined‟ towards these manifestations of „professional‟ culture? 
Presumably, the outcome would be that children and young people would 
favour the type of culture they mostly consume anyway on their TVs, 
game-consoles and iPods. This culture is not „dominant‟ in the Bildung 
discourse, and, as I have said, represents anti-Bildung, because it is not 
perceived to harbour a Bildung potential as the DKS sanctioned arts do. 
The normality represented by DKS could thus be under threat, with the 
result that tomorrow‟s audiences would neither subscribe to the 
„professional arts‟ like music (mediated by professional musicians from a 
diverse range of genres), the visual arts, performing arts, literature and 
libraries, cultural heritage and cultural relics and film, nor the institutions 
that mediate them. The power relations between the government and the 
pupils (and their families) are thus „productive‟ in the sense that they 
shape their skills and understandings.  
 
The disciplining dimension of DKS is portrayed as enjoyable, and it is 
through an internalisation of such pleasures that Foucault argues that 
                                            
656 Valgerd Svarstad Haugland, interviewed 12th April, 2007.  
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power can be executed. In Chapter Two I presented, with reference to 
Foucault and Augestad, the example of how Norwegian health policy has 
attempted to internalise amongst people the enjoyment of living a healthy 
life, exercising and eating healthy food.657 Similarly, parents who know 
that their children (and perhaps themselves) spend a lot of time playing 
computer-games might, if asked, argue that theatre is of higher value. 
One of my interviewees argued that it is important that people go around 
with a little bad consciousness because they do not go more often to the 
theatre:658 in other words, a bad consciousness because they do not to a 
higher extent „help themselves‟ to what they presumably know the arts 
can offer.  
7.4.3 The understood commensurate Bildung potential of the 
‘professional arts’ 
 
If there is a hegemonic battle between a „dominant‟ culture, that is, the 
„professional‟ arts, and commercial culture, then it appears as if the 
former still stands firm as dominant. However, the maintenance of such a 
hegemony is reliant on the internalisation of discursive practices in order 
to cement the ideologies that advocate a certain truth and knowledge in 
such a way that any contention would be hidden away and the „right truth‟ 
will be obvious and taken for granted. DKS can be perceived as an 
important element in such a discursive practice, which institutionalises the 
Bildung potential in the „professional‟ arts.  
 
                                            
657 Augestad (2005).  
658 Trond Okkelmo, interviewed on 13th April. 
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There is continuity between how the alleged impacts of the „professional‟ 
arts are presented in the policy papers and how they are understood by 
my interviewees, and they all seem to subscribe to the same hegemonic 
practice. This indicates that it is within a DKS-context that we find this 
hegemonic perception of the superiority of what is being termed the 
„professional‟ arts, and that this demonstrates that the object approach to 
Bildung still stands strong within Norwegian cultural policy discourse.659  
 
Interestingly, the professional arts‟ hegemony is based on an 
understanding that the experiences that all pupils will have when meeting 
the range of art-forms on offer through DKS are commensurate, meaning 
that it is possible to generalise about their „experiences of the arts within 
art forms, across art forms and across a diverse population‟.660  
 
In their critique of the alleged social impacts of the arts in the context of 
British arts policy, Belfiore and Bennett argue that the assumption that 
arts experiences can be commensurate is highly questionable and argue 
instead that the: 
 
value or impact of the arts will vary enormously, according to all the 
factors that make up a person‟s identity, including age, class, health, 
wealth and so on.661  
                                            
659 Having said that, I must stress again that this does not negate that the culture supplied by the 
global cultural industries may have a greater impact on most people‟s everyday lives, at least in 
terms of the amount of time people chose to be exposed to this culture. It is in terms of their 
perceived bildung potential that the „professional arts‟ continue to dominate.   
660  Eleonora Belfiore and Oliver Bennett, „Rethinking the social impacts of the arts‟, in 
International Journal of Cultural Policy 13.2 (2007), pp. 135 - 151. 
661 Ibid., p. 137. 
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Children exposed to an art-work in a DKS-context, will all be of the same 
age, but apart from that they come from a range of different backgrounds: 
from families whose book-shelves are of various sizes. At the same time, 
as one of the objectives of DKS is to level out the differences that are 
caused by the pupils‟ backgrounds, these same differences impact on 
how pupils experience, value and engage with what is being offered. The 
DKS discourse ignores this and assumes instead that DKS activities as 
such can contribute to Bildung and dannelse. However, since how this 
can happen is left vague and unclear, it is difficult to argue rationally 
either for or against these impacts. Equally, there appears to be a similar 
commensurate understanding of the absence of Bildung potential in 
commercial culture, where little consideration is given to the opposite: 
that some commercial culture can also perhaps facilitate Bildung. Instead, 
the power of commercial culture is understood to be one of anti-Bildung.  
 
Due to the mentioned vagueness, the understood superior impacts of this 
„dominant‟ culture rest on the institutionalised discursive terms which 
claim them to be so. The kind of art that harbours the ability to facilitate 
Bildung is not specified, only that it is different from the culture children 
and young people consume that is provided by the commercial cultural 
industries. This rests on an implicit and explicit dimension to this 
discourse: the superiority of the „professional‟ arts, which does not need 
to be specified further, is institutionalised, obvious and taken as given 
whereas the culture provided by the cultural industries in a Bildung 
context is explicitly expressed as not having such a Bildung potential. 
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7.5 Summary 
 
This chapter started with an introduction to DKS and some of the policy 
papers in which the ideas and rationales behind this scheme were 
formulated. I then moved on to present the results of an in-depth 
discursive analysis of these policy papers as well as the results of 
interviews I conducted with key elite opinion-makers and which draw from 
the political, bureaucratic and arts-sector in Norway. Through this 
analysis, I identified that the dominant understanding of the Bildung 
potential in the „professional‟ arts is sustained by the following range of 
discursive practices: that an object oriented approach, which relies on the 
„professional‟ arts, is superior in terms of its potential to facilitate Bildung, 
implying that participation is inferior, that the culture that children and 
young people relate to on an everyday basis is one of anti-Bildung, 
because the market is not able to sustain a similarly wide range of 
cultural expressions as DKS and where pupils need cultural competence 
both to gain access to the „professional‟ arts (to learn how to break the 
codes) as well as to facilitate Bildung as such. Finally, these discursive 
practices are internalised to such an extent that exactly how Bildung is 
facilitated does not need to be subject to further interrogation and can be 
left vague. 
 
Based on this, I moved on to argue that there is a civilising aspect to DKS, 
because this is a scheme that is compulsory for all primary school 
children, and because it presents children and young people with a 
„sanctioned‟ programme of the professional arts, partly in response to a 
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fear of an intellectual anarchy. These „professional‟ arts are understood to 
have a commensurate bildung potential which transcends any differences 
in the pupils‟ demographic background. However, this civilising aspect 
does not appear as authoritarian with raised magisterial forefingers. It is 
internalised as positive and sets the terms for how Bildung, through 
culture in school, can be achieved. It is a value-based hegemony, whose 
influence stretches beyond the people who engage with DKS strategically 
or on a day-to-day basis. It also appears to fit with a wider Bildung 
discourse, which, as demonstrated in Chapter Six, appears to have 
returned to an object oriented approach to Bildung more generally.  
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8.0 Norwegian Cultural Policy: A Civilising 
Mission? 
 
 
In this dissertation, I have set out to assess the extent to which a civilising 
mission has been a prime rationale behind Norwegian cultural policy. In 
this concluding chapter I shall attempt to address and answer this 
question. I shall also reflect on my observations about how culture, and 
particularly the arts, are valued discursively in Norway (particularly 
amongst elites within the cultural field itself), in order to make some 
concluding remarks about whether a civilising mission emerges as a 
demand for publicly funded cultural activities to demonstrate measurable 
impacts, or as more abstract ideas about its broader civilising potential.  
 
I started the thesis by identifying a selection of theorists who could help 
me to contextualise how Norwegian cultural policy rhetoric has been 
informed by a wish to facilitate enlightenment and growth: the Norwegian 
term for this being folkeopplysning. In doing so I adopted the German 
term Bildung, which, according to Henrik Kaare Nielsen, can be 
understood as integrating „the development of individuals‟ sensuous, 
emotional and intellectual potentials‟ and thus help people to reflect on 
themselves,662 and I applied this as a concept with which to theorise 
folkeopplysning.  
 
                                            
662 Nielsen (2006).  
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In this concluding chapter I shall start by briefly summarising how the idea 
of Bildung has acted as a rationale behind Norwegian cultural policy, 
between the middle of the nineteenth century up to today. I conclude that 
this has been a key rationale. So strongly has it featured in the cultural 
policy rhetoric that I refer to a Bildung discourse. This is followed by a 
discussion of how this relates to the civilising mission, where I conclude 
that this has been a key rationale and still is represented by DKS.  
 
As mentioned in the introductory chapter, there is a common 
understanding amongst many cultural policy scholars that the arts are 
beleaguered and that their intrinsic values are threatened. I shall attempt 
to position my research findings alongside some of these, who I argue 
are gaining a seminal position within the field of cultural policy research. I 
will conclude that my findings appear to nuance the picture they paint 
somewhat in that I conclude that there is still space for the civilising 
mission in Norwegian cultural policy and that this is epitomised by DKS.  
 
In Chapter Three, I defined discursive practices as those: 
  
interpretations of conduct that produce and affirm actions and their 
concomitant subjects and objects that are institutionalized because the 
interpretations are oft repeated and accepted.663  
 
This civilising mission bears all the hallmarks of resting on such strong 
discursive practices, which advocate the transformative power of what is 
                                            
663 Shapiro (1981), p. 130.  
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being termed „the professional arts‟. These discursive practices rely both 
on what is being explicitly uttered and what is understood to be so 
obvious that it does not need to be said, let alone questioned. What is 
explicitly uttered is repeated often and accepted by all the empirical 
sources that I have analysed (apart from the Progress Party). In this 
chapter, I refer to a general Bildung discourse as well as a DKS-
discourse, the latter being part of the former but permeated by an object 
approach to Bildung, which branded commercial culture as representing 
anti-Bildung. I acknowledge the existence of a marketisation discourse as 
well though, and the Ministry of Culture has also recently published a 
number of policy papers that celebrate art-forms which are traditionally 
positioned in a commercially industrial context, such as film, interactive 
leisure software and, what is referred to as „rhythmic‟ music,664 as well as 
a paper on the potential synergies between the cultural sector and other 
business sectors. I shall present these very briefly. However, this does in 
my view not detract from my claim that the object approach to Bildung is 
still strong in Norwegian cultural policy rhetoric, and that this is based on 
the abstract faith in the transformative powers of the arts.665 This abstract 
faith implies that DKS is not an instrumental cultural policy in the crude 
sense that its social impacts are expected to be measured in accordance 
with evidence-based policy practices.  
                                            
664 This is at term which encompasses pop, rock, jazz, folk-music and world-music.  
665 As a consequence of the increased object-focused Bildung discourse of the 2000s and that 
DKS is preoccupied with the „professional arts‟, this concluding chapter will focus mostly on the 
arts according to how this was defined in a DKS context in Chapter Seven (including music, the 
performing arts, literature, cultural heritage, visual art, film and the multidisciplinary arts (KUL 
(2007a), p. 27)), rather than culture in the wider sense. As demonstrated in Chapter Six and 
Seven a subject-approach to Bildung based on a wider definition seem to have lost its position in 
the Bildung discourse and is certainly not part of the DKS-discourse.   
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Finally, I will declare some of the limitations of this project as well as 
make some suggestions for further research.  
 
8.1 Summary of dissertation 
 
I shall start by summarising briefly how Bildung features in Norwegian 
cultural policy rhetoric before I move on to talk about how this underpins 
the civilising mission as a continuous key rationale.  
8.1.1 Bildung in Norwegian cultural policy – a brief summary 
 
 
Civilisation is a concept rooted in the ideas of the Enlightenment666, and 
accordingly, Oliver Bennett argues that what he has coined the civilising 
mission is based on the superior value of European high art. 667  Geir 
Vestheim, on the other hand, suggests that in Norway, the Norwegian 
term for enlightenment – opplysning – and the derived term 
folkeopplysning, have been interpreted in two different ways: as 
„enlightenment of the people‟, or „enlightenment by the people‟, where 
only the former has been based on a certain universal approach to 
culture in accordance with Bennett‟s suggestion about the civilising 
potential of European high art. The enlightenment by the people is more 
open in its valuation of culture, implicitly negating the idea of one 
universal culture in favour of the more relativistic idea of several cultures, 
which is more in line with the ideas of Herder and Humboldt. Accordingly, 
                                            
666 Williams (1998).  
667 Bennett (1995).  
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Vestheim coined the concept of object versus subject approach to 
folkeopplysning.  
 
With reference to Øystein Sørensen, the nation building project in 
nineteenth-century Norway was, in Chapter Four, referred to as a 
hegemonic battle in terms of getting „control of a society‟s intellectual life 
purely though cultural means‟.668 Several historic blocs: the Statists, the 
National Romantics and the Populist Nationalist, which perceived the 
path to Bildung in different, albeit related, ways were hegemonic at 
different times during the nineteenth century. No matter whether these 
blocs took an object or a subject approach to Bildung, there was a 
reforming dimension to them. The Populist Nationalist project, which I 
have argued leaned more towards a subject approach was, for example, 
as concerned with discipline and reform (possibly even more so) than the 
object focused measures of the Statists. Most of the latter‟s initiatives in 
the field of culture, like the establishment of the Drawing-school and the 
National Gallery, were unashamedly elitist and the Bildung remit of these 
measures did not extend beyond guarding „the good taste and the good 
art‟,669 primarily for the middle and upper classes. The Populist Nationalist 
initiatives on the other hand, and their efforts to create consensus around 
the construction of a new pure Norwegian language, the alternative 
subject focused educational system through the folkehøgskole and the 
foundation of the Society for the Promotion of Folkeopplysning, were, 
despite largely being made outside of the state apparatus, arguably all 
                                            
668 Sørensen (2001), p. 20. 
669 Solhjell (2004b), p. 462.  
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administrative programmes. With reference to Tony Bennett in Chapter 
Two, I referred to these as programmes that „act on the social‟.670  
 
As can be observed throughout my exposition in Chapters Four to Six, a 
subject and object approach to Bildung are not mutually exclusive and 
both these paths to Bildung have co-existed in the Norwegian Bildung 
discourse. According to Oliver Bennett, as mentioned in Chapter One, 
they are both essentially „culturalist‟ in that they both accord culture a key 
role in personal and social transformation.671 So when the Statists of the 
nineteenth century took the Arnoldian view that it was the great European 
cultural heritage originating in Denmark and further south that was best 
suited for Bildung purposes, and in the words of Welhaven, that the light 
should always shine from above, 672  this coexisted with the Romantic 
Nationalists‟ celebration of the peasants‟ own culture, but where the elite 
was still the governing strata. Hence, the Romantic Nationalists‟ subject 
approach to Bildung was, at this stage, only half-baked because the 
populace was not entirely trusted to define their own culture in the spirit of 
what in the 1970s would be referred to as a cultural democracy. Such a 
subject approach would not receive a stronger following until the Populist 
Nationalist representation of concepts like the „people‟ and the „nation' 
became hegemonic during the second half of the nineteenth century and 
where the role of the elite was abandoned because the people were 
deemed to be able to manage themselves. This manifested itself in 
cultural policy measures like the efforts to construct a new Norwegian 
                                            
670 Bennett (1998b).  
671 Bennett (1996), p. 7.  
672 Seip (1994), p. 284. 
362 
 
language based on what most people actually spoke and an independent 
school-system (the folkehøgskole), which rejected a Danish curriculum 
and attempted instead to make knowledge about local culture its starting 
point.  
 
Vestheim argues that the ideas harboured within these subject focused 
traditions profoundly influenced the cultural policy discourse of the Labour 
movement of the 1930s. One of the prime objectives of this movement 
was to make the working classes conscious of their own culture, but in 
tandem with an object approach with the aim to gain control over and 
reap the perceived benefits of being exposed to the culture mediated 
through established cultural organisations and institutions. It is during this 
period that the field of culture becomes a distinctive policy concern: 
championed by the Labour movement both outside and inside of 
government. Already here we can see a desire by the Labour movement 
to manage cultural resources to „regulate ways of life‟.673   
 
However, the period between the 1930s (or more specifically after 1945) 
and the publication of the first proper Green paper about cultural policy in 
1973, was mostly characterised by the wish to democratise a certain 
universal culture, represented by the arts such as theatre, music by 
classically trained composers and musicians and the visual arts. The 
approach to Bildung is mostly object focused.  
 
                                            
673 Bennett (1998b), p. 272.  
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It is not until the 1970s that we see the emergence of a clearly articulated 
Bildung discourse, from which the understanding that Bildung could be 
facilitated through culture became a key rationale. So central was this 
understanding that I refer to the first green papers (the kulturmeldinger) 
and their reception in parliament as being dominated by a Bildung 
discourse. As mentioned above, the Bildung discourse in these policy 
papers harbours a strong disciplining aspect where the lack of values in 
society is lamented and where people‟s need for access to culture in 
order to facilitate growth is emphasised. The forces of commercial culture, 
on the other hand, are lamented and the national culture is perceived to 
be under threat.  
 
The key responses to this threat in policy-terms are both to facilitate a 
cultural democracy based on co-determination, a wide definition of culture, 
decentralisation and the emphasis on participation, as well as to continue 
the efforts to democratise culture by facilitating access to the 
„professional‟ arts. In fact, both these representations harboured a belief 
in cultural policy as social policy. As mentioned in Chapter Four, Tony 
Bennett suggests that institutions like museums have traditionally been 
coined partly as disciplinary alternatives to the alehouse.674  Similarly, the 
measures to facilitate a cultural democracy were equally coined as a 
response to a fear of the increasing value deficit in society and people‟s 
need for human growth, partly as a counter-weight to the commercial 
cultural industries. Indeed, in the 1970s and 1980s, the cultural 
                                            
674 Bennett (1998a), p. 125. 
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democracy rhetoric almost permeates the Bildung discourse. This 
changes in the 2000s when the „battle‟ against commercial culture is 
perceived as lost, and this culture is accepted as less harmful, which 
indicates a subject representation of Bildung with respect to the cultural 
industries. Similarly the idea of a uniform common culture is abandoned 
in favour of the development of a culture based on diversity and 
complexity.  
 
So, as demonstrated in Chapter Six, an object and a subject approach to 
Bildung were represented side by side, albeit the former ascending in the 
1990s and 2000s. What is noticeable, though, is that - with the exception 
of the voices from the Progress Party, which formed an alternative 
discourse - all constituencies, across political party-lines - both in 
government and parliament (over the thirty years I have charted), as well 
as the bureaucratic apparatus of the Ministry of Culture - appear to 
subscribe to both Bildung approaches.  
 
The mentioned shift in attitude to commercial culture in the Green paper 
of 2003 and its reception in parliament, where such culture is perceived 
more positively are not, according to my account in Chapter Seven, 
echoed in DKS. The DKS discourse brands commercial culture again as 
a force of anti-Bildung not having the same transforming power as the 
„professional arts„: consequently the latter is still needed as an alternative.  
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8.1.2 Bildung in DKS – a Civilising Mission? 
 
Hence, DKS is inherently about not only servicing, but also policing a 
certain culture, and it harbours a concern about the uneven distribution of 
cultural capital amongst children. This is particularly evident in DKS‟s 
preoccupation with children „learning‟ the arts, or helping them gain 
cultural competence in order to even out differences, in other words to 
democratise the children‟s dannelses-potential. It is risky to conclude 
whether the culture provided by DKS can be classified as bourgeois or 
middle-class, but it is surely „official‟ or „certified‟ and it excludes popular 
commercial culture which, based on cultural consumption statistics 
presented in Chapter Seven, is the culture consumed by most people 
most of the time. In its aim to democratise children‟s dannelses potential, 
DKS fits in with a long tradition in Norwegian cultural policy, which has 
had the democratising of culture as its objective. This predates the „new‟ 
cultural policies of the 1970s which instead aimed to civilise by means of 
facilitating a cultural democracy.  
 
DKS is firmly committed to making children and young people favourably 
inclined to a pre-defined set of cultural and artistic expressions, which do 
not only exclude commercial culture, but which are coined in opposition to 
it. I have, admittedly somewhat ambiguously, referred to this culture, 
which translates as the „professional arts‟ as „dominant‟. DKS has as one 
of its prime objectives to create consent around this „dominant‟ culture: 
not necessarily to cement any power-relations, but in order to assume a 
cultural, moral and ideological leadership about which culture is superior 
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in facilitating Bildung. This superior positioning of the „professional‟ arts, 
compared with commercial culture is upheld by discursive practices that 
institutionalise their exclusive Bildung potential. Such practices exclude 
both commercial culture and the participation in activities that define 
culture widely beyond the „professional arts‟.  
 
DKS is also programmed by an elite, where the children themselves, or 
indeed their parents, have little influence over its programming. Instead, 
the government steps in and substitutes for those parents who have a 
small book-shelf and who do not have the necessary resources 
(financially, socially or intellectually) to engage with their children 
culturally in a Bildung productive way. Hence, weak links in the 
governmentality-chain are addressed, and DKS attempts to rectify the 
unequal cultural provisions that different children are granted at home. 
This is what Tony Bennett with reference to Foucault calls a technology of 
behaviour management.  
 
A cultural policy rhetoric that targets young people dates all the way back 
to the first Green papers of the 1970s. However, the DKS-discourse 
differs from the Bildung discourse of the 1970s and 1980s in 
acknowledging that the battle to prevent young people engaging with 
commercial culture has now been lost. However, its project to provide 
alternatives so as to prevent the descent into a culturally relativist 
intellectual anarchy fuelled by the power of commercial culture, echoes 
the warnings uttered in the general Bildung discourse before it 
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represented a more positive approach to commercial culture in the 2000s. 
The fear of such a cultural anarchy is an inherent dimension of the DKS-
discourse.   
 
Hence, whether successful or not, the civilising mission as a cultural 
policy rationale in Norway is not disappearing: if anything it is intensifying. 
DKS is explicitly set up to offer alternatives to the commercial culture that 
children and young people are mostly inclined to consume in their spare 
time: a commercial culture, which is branded as anti-Bildung. DKS 
signifies a return to an object approach to folkeopplysning, very much in 
accordance with how Oliver Bennett coined the civilising mission as a 
response to the superior value of European high art. The hegemonic 
project of DKS is not exclusively preoccupied with European high art, but 
strives to achieve consent around a „certified‟ culture, which is coined 
implicitly on what it excludes: the popular, commercial and the 
participatory.  
 
The object focused civilising mission rests on some significant 
understandings about the transformative powers of the arts, which are 
held up by powerful discursive practices. This is the subject of the next 
section.   
 
 
 
368 
 
8.2 The social impacts of the arts: crude instrumentality or 
an abstract faith? 
 
This dissertation concludes that what has been termed „the civilising 
mission‟ has been, and still is, a central rationale behind Norwegian 
cultural policy. However, as mentioned in the Introduction Chapter, Jim 
McGuigan argues that cultural policy is increasingly informed by a market 
discourse, and that state intervention in the cultural field is informed by a 
market reasoning, where the prime objective is to offer people (as 
customers) what they want. 675  Peter Duelund goes even further and 
argues that traditional cultural policy goals like education and 
enlightenment had been replaced by the notion that people should be 
offered experiences. Similarly a key objective was now to achieve 
turnover and profit, and hence the intrinsic values of the arts and culture 
had been „colonised‟ by financial and political concerns. 676  Neither 
McGuigan nor Duelund‟s description of the status quo leave much room 
for a paternalistically imposed path to Bildung, but instead trust people to 
make their own judgements about the culture they would like to engage 
with, free from a cultural offering determined by public policy makers. Let 
me attempt to demonstrate how the Bildung discourse sits in the context 
of this alleged hegemonic market discourse.  
8.2.1 Is cultural policy conquered by market forces? 
 
In Chapter Three, I made reference to some of Oliver Bennett and 
Eleonora Belfiore‟s earlier work and I concluded that these works 
                                            
675 McGuigan (2004).  
676 Duelund (2003). 
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harboured a concern for the autonomy, and intrinsic values, of the arts, 
as well as uneasiness with contemporary cultural policy‟s alleged lack of 
concern with cultural value.677 To this could also be added Clive Gray, 
who argues that cultural policies are increasingly suffering a „burden of 
expectation‟ whereby they should „host a solution to problems that are 
originally economic, social, political or ideological (or some combination 
of these)‟. 678 In the Nordic countries this diagnosis of instrumentality has 
been echoed by scholars like Per Mangset, Geir Vestheim and Peter 
Duelund.679  
 
These writers observe (and to an extent lament) that public cultural policy 
has increasingly become guided by evidence-based policy-making, and 
that this puts the arts, in particular, under pressure to demonstrate its 
social impacts, instead of being celebrated as an end in itself. 
 
As mentioned in my introduction to this dissertation, Belfiore and Bennett 
acknowledge that the arts have secured a prominent position in society 
and that this is due to the understanding that they can transform lives. 
This is exemplified well by DKS, which rests on such an understanding. 
However, as mentioned in Chapter Three, according to Belfiore and 
Bennett, despite having been given such a prominent place in society, the 
arts are also marred by an alternative narrative of beleaguerment, due to 
the above-mentioned transformative powers being hard to substantiate or 
                                            
677 Bennett (2005); Belfiore (2002); Caust (2003).  
678 Gray (2007), p. 206. 
679 Røyseng (2007), p. 230; Mangset (1992); Vestheim (1994 and 1995); Duelund (2003).  
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prove. The increasing lamentation of the so-called instrumental use of the 
arts (or culture), also represents this sense of beleaguerment.  
 
It is the threat against the arts being celebrated as an end that triggers 
cries against the politicisation of, and excessive pressure and demands 
on, arts policy. As mentioned in Chapter Three, such cries can be found 
amongst both arts advocates outside and within academia, for example 
by the likes of John Tusa. All these voices contribute to this discourse of 
beleaguerment, which can be perceived as a response to the alleged 
ascendancy of the market discourse as pointed out by McGuigan.  
8.2.2 Marketisation discourses 
 
 
As outlined in Chapter Six, I concluded that the Bildung discourse in 
Norway exists alongside two alternative discourses: the marketisation 
discourse and the Progress Party discourse. McGuigan argues that a 
consequence of the ascendancy of the market discourse is that publicly 
funded organisations must increasingly behave like private businesses. 
There is an indication in my empirical material that, from the 1990s at 
least, this kind of reasoning was also evident in Norway. The 
marketisation discourse was brought to bear with the Green papers of the 
1980s, and emphasised that eventual increases in the financing of that 
part of the cultural sector, which normally received public funds, had to be 
sourced from the private sector. Similarly increased efficiency was 
encouraged through the introduction of performance indicators. In the 
2000s a closer interaction between the cultural sector and the business 
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sector was encouraged and it was argued that an active cultural sector 
would act as a competitive advantage for Norway. However, none of this 
contradicted the Bildung discourse: in fact this discourse was not really 
about cultural policy rationales in the first sense, but focused more on 
how the cultural sector should be managed. 
 
Having said that, the Ministry of Culture has published other policy papers, 
which help to nuance the idea that cultural policy is dominated by a 
Bildung discourse. This pertains particularly to the way the government 
has identified the cultural sector‟s potential contribution to economic 
growth and how it can collaborate more closely with that part of the 
business sector, which is not primarily concerned with the production of 
the symbolic, aesthetic or artistic,680 as well as to how in recent years it 
has attempted to „upgrade‟ the valuation of art-forms or artistic genres, 
which traditionally have been perceived as popular or commercial. 681 
These include two papers on the economic conditions and public support 
for the Norwegian film-industry (KUL (2004) and KUL (2007b)), one on 
interactive leisure software (or computer games) (KUL (2008a)) and one 
on the support for rhythmic music, (KUL (2008b)), and finally one paper 
on the collaboration between culture and business (KUL (2005). However, 
I would argue that none of these counter the continuous existence of a 
                                            
680  For a more extensive discussion on how to define industries as cultural and creative as 
opposed to other industries, see; David Hesmondhalgh and Andy C Pratt, „Cultural Industries and 
Cultural Policy, in International Journal of Cultural Policy 11.1 (2005), p. 6. 
681  Kultur- og kirkedepartementet (KUL), 2004. St.meld. nr. 25 (2003-2004): Økonomiske 
rammebetingelser for filmproduksjon, Oslo. (KUL (2004)); Kultur- og kirkedepartementet 
(KUL), 2005. St.meld. nr. 22 (2004-2005): Kultur og næring, Oslo. (KUL (2005)); Kultur- og 
kirkedepartementet (KUL), 2007 St.meld. nr. 22 (2006-2007): Veiviseren: For det norske 
filmløftet, Oslo. (KUL (2007b)); Kultur- og kirkedepartementet (KUL), 2008. St.meld. nr. 14 
(2007-2008): Dataspill, Oslo. (KUL (2008a)); Kultur- og kirkedepartementet (KUL), 2008. 
St.meld. nr. 21 (2007-2008): Samspill: Et løft for rytmisk musikk, Oslo. (KUL (2008b)). 
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strong Bildung discourse. KUL (2005) for example does not suggest that 
public cultural policy should change, but that cultural policy and business 
policy should remain separate, with separate objectives, tools and 
impacts. The main objective of cultural policy is still, according to this 
paper: 
 
to encourage cultural and aesthetic diversity, stimulate artistic quality and 
innovation, preserve and secure cultural heritage and enable all citizens ‟ 
access to a rich and diverse cultural offer. […] The development of the 
cultural sector should be guided by the demand of artistic and culturally 
professional quality and not commercial interests.682 
 
Similarly, the other papers do not, in my view, threaten the Bildung 
discourse either: KUL (2004) and KUL (2007b) call attention to the 
importance of public support for the production of Norwegian films „of a 
certain quality‟, which reflects a Norwegian way of thinking and promotes 
Norwegian culture and its traditions,683 whereas KUL (2008a) argues for 
the importance of giving children and young people access to „games of 
high quality based on the Norwegian language and culture‟.684 The only 
exception is perhaps KUL (2008b), which explicitly argues that the 
already mentioned rhythmic music, „should be given equal status to other 
musical forms in terms of recognition and importance‟.685 This indicates 
an increasing subject focused response to the challenges posed by the 
commercial cultural industries, similar to that found in KUL (2003a), and 
                                            
682 KUL (2005), p. 6.  
683 KUL (2004), p. 7; KUL (2007b), p. 7.   
684 KUL (2008a), p. 6.  
685 KUL (2008b), p. 7. 
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sits perhaps less comfortably next to the Bildung ideas that inform 
DKS.686 
 
Nevertheless, based on the material that I have collected (especially 
about DKS) I will still argue that despite the government‟s recent focus on 
art-forms that traditionally fit within a commercial industrial context and its 
focus on the cultural sector‟s potential contribution to other business-
sectors, the object approach to Bildung is still strong in Norwegian policy-
rhetoric. Hence, if there is a trend towards an increased celebration of 
popular culture‟s stimulating potential, this is far from the whole picture. 
The democratisation of culture and its objective to give access to the 
(professional) arts still has a profound position in Norwegian cultural 
policy, where the key objective is to facilitate Bildung. DKS, for example, 
harbours strong ideas of which cultural manifestations should be given 
priority, and this is far from related to children and young people‟s own 
„demand‟.  
 
I mentioned above that the narrative of beleaguerment, as outlined by 
Belfiore and Bennett, is characterised by a lament over the increasingly 
instrumentalised employment of the arts as a means for other purposes 
                                            
686 Sigrid Røyseng has also observed that the legitimacy of popular culture has increased in 
cultural policy papers over the last couple of decades, for example, through support schemes for 
popular music and comic strips. However, this changed perception of the value of popular culture 
is in KUL (2003a) explained by the population‟s increased level of education, which allegedly 
makes people prone to accept more sophisticated content, also within „the cultural industries and 
popular culture‟. Hence, popular culture is no longer perceived as one discreet artistic field. 
Instead, some genres have been given higher status and are: „redefined by being embraced by the 
morale positive valuations that normally the arts are favoured by‟, Røyseng (2007), p. 239. In 
other words, parts of popular culture become „artified‟. However she continues: „Those parts of 
popular culture, which do not reach high enough on this scale, are hit just as mercilessly as before 
by moral devaluation‟, Røyseng (2007), p. 23. 
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than the art work itself. However, are not cultural policies or public 
interferences in the field of culture instrumental by definition? 
8.2.3 What kind of instrumentality? 
 
The conclusion that the arts now are being applied as an instrument to 
such an extent that their autonomy is threatened and no longer 
celebrated for their intrinsic value, have triggered unease and 
consequently been the focus of much writing and scholarly works within 
the field of cultural policy studies. However, Sigrid Røyseng takes issue 
with this conclusion and argues that to refer to cultural policies as 
instrumental implies that they are governed by utilitarian principles, which 
„reduce culture to a useful tool, which is awarded little value by virtue of 
itself‟.687 Such narratives would, according to Røyseng, partly be fuelled 
by discourses that advocate marketisation, which, according to Jim 
McGuigan, as mentioned above, dominates contemporary cultural policy. 
She argues that, in a Norwegian context, rather than having threatened 
the position of the arts, the increasing „cultural turn‟ in the business sector, 
in the public sector‟s regeneration and integration efforts, the health 
sector and so on, signifies instead a deep respect for the arts and their 
alleged transforming potentials.688  
 
Røyseng labels the new cultural policies that are a consequence of the 
mentioned „cultural turn‟ as „ritual‟ and argues that these are informed by 
an abstract faith in their transforming potential rather than a crude 
                                            
687 Ibid., p. 230.  
688 Ibid., p. 231.  
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measurable calculated interest. 689  This assumption that something 
actually happens to people when they are exposed to the arts seems, 
according to Røyseng, to be firmly rooted in Norway‟s cultural policy 
discourse. However, what eventually happens is rarely articulated 
explicitly:690 it is rather understood as given according to the discursive 
practice of Bildung as mentioned above. Given this lack of explication it is 
of course also difficult to formulate concrete impacts that can be 
measured.   
 
However, some cultural policies, at least in the UK, are explicitly 
instrumental in the sense that they aim to reach tangible „non-cultural‟ 
objectives. As mentioned in Chapter Three, it might be relatively easy to 
identify such cultural policy decisions, whereas it might be more difficult to 
grasp, in practical terms, policies that are entirely occupied by culture as 
an end in itself. As mentioned in Chapter Six, KUL (1992) referred to the 
arts‟ ability to „act as a critical corrective‟ and as a „protective means 
against habitual thinking and social stagnation‟ as part of their „intrinsic‟ 
value.691 It is therefore pertinent to ask whether these alleged powers of 
the arts are part of their valuation as ends in themselves, and that they 
are only valued instrumentally, when their alleged transformative impacts 
are articulated more explicitly as measureable. Due to this conundrum, I 
suggested in Chapter Three that it is perhaps more fruitful to refer to 
instrumental cultural policy as a matter of degree rather than as an 
absolute.   
                                            
689 Ibid., p. 230. 
690 Ibid. 
691 KUL (1992), p. 24.  
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Measuring the social (or economic) impacts of cultural activities is an 
expected consequence of the increasing application of evidence-based 
policy-making, which, according to Belfiore and Bennett, developed in the 
1990s. Such policy-making implies that decisions are based on pragmatic 
evidence of impacts as opposed to ideologies or values. However, 
cultural policies prior to the advent of this alleged new evidence-based 
paradigm were also designed to achieve results, no matter how 
intangible.692  I have argued that both policies designed to achieve a 
cultural democracy and the policies designed to democratise culture were 
to a large extent based on the idea to facilitate Bildung, with the intention 
to civilise. Both these policy objectives subscribe to the understanding 
that culture (however defined) has a transformative potential, but not 
necessarily in a crude measurable sense.    
8.2.4 The abstract faith in the transformative powers of the arts  
 
DKS falls into this category, which hinges on an abstract faith in the 
transforming impacts of the arts. This is not sought measured, for 
example through a decrease of bullying in the school-yard or through the 
children‟s improved academic achievements. Instead it fits in with a 
tradition of attempting to civilise the population, not on a measurable 
micro-level, but on an aggregated level, for the population as a whole: 
particularly for those children who come from families with low cultural 
capital.  
 
                                            
692  In fact, as mentioned in Chapter Six, the cultural policies of the 1970s were explicitly 
articulated as forming an integral part of social policy.  
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Hence, according to my understanding, DKS is not a scheme that 
instrumentalises the arts in a crude sense, but more a „ritual‟ cultural 
policy to follow Røyseng‟s terminology. The lack of measurable evidence 
has not prevented the Norwegian Bildung discourse from underlining its 
transformative powers. Both the two DKS green papers KUL (2003b) and 
KUL (2007a) for example, were unequivocal about the arts and culture‟s 
capacity to influence each individual‟s (who come into contact with it) 
personality and quality of life. 693  Former minister of culture Valgerd 
Svarstad Haugland echoed this when she argued that the objective of 
DKS first and foremost was to make children and young people grow as 
people and fellow human beings.694 However, the discourse deals with 
this Bildung rather metaphorically as a faith, as opposed to resting on  
claims that can be substantiated through impact studies. The 
measurement of Bildung impacts (or other impacts) is almost absent from 
both the DKS-discourse and the wider Bildung discourse. In fact, the 
statssekretær Yngve Slettholm argued that there was no need to refer to 
research and that everybody would share the understanding that the arts 
have strong positive transformative powers.695 This understanding rests 
as much on what is not said (or what does not have to be said) about the 
arts‟ Bildung potential as on what is explicitly uttered. Again, this silent 
understanding is a strong discursive practice.  
 
Furthermore, DKS does not support the idea of an artistic decline, which 
fuels and account of widespread relativism, and which Oliver Bennett 
                                            
693 KUL (2003b), p. 15; KUL (2007a), p. 8. 
694 Valgerd Svarstad Haugland, interviewed 12th April 2007. 
695 Slettholm (2004). 
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suggests was presented as a powerful narrative of cultural pessimism, 
either. Instead, DKS sets out, in my opinion, to offer an alternative to the 
relativist cultural industries with the objective to make children and young 
people experience „proper‟ art to prevent their descent into a culturally 
relativist anarchy.  
 
McGuigan argues that the discourse of the market has gained the upper 
hand in public cultural policy, whereas other cultural policy scholars like 
Caust, Belfiore, Bennett, Duelund and Gray suggest that the arts have 
been made subject to an instrumentality to such an extent that their 
intrinsic value is under threat. Hence, similar to McGuigan‟s claim that the 
market rationale is in its ascendancy within cultural policy discourse, it 
might perhaps be pertinent to suggest that the understanding that the arts 
are beleaguered and that their intrinsic values are threatened is gaining a 
rather dominant position amongst cultural policy scholars. However, as 
mentioned in the introduction to this dissertation, Mangset et. al. have 
lately suggested that some of the alleged „transformation processes‟ that 
the above-mentioned authors appear to have observed might have been 
overestimated.696 My research findings appear to indicate that this might 
be the case, at least in a Norwegian context.  
 
My conclusion is that whether Norwegian cultural policy has become 
increasingly instrumental depends on how this instrumentality is defined. 
Accepting that all cultural policies are initiated to achieve something, then 
                                            
696 Mangset et. al. (2008), p. 3.  
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this something has to a large extent in Norway been to facilitate people‟s 
Bildung, both on an individual level and for society as a whole, and this is 
increasingly based on the abstract faith in the transformative power of the 
arts. If by instrumental we mean the wish to achieve tangible and 
measurable outcomes in accordance with neo-liberal evidence-based 
policies, then DKS appears to buck the trend. There is still a significant 
space for policies that aim to civilise the population on a generic, not 
necessarily measurable, level and this is epitomised by DKS. Hence, the 
conclusion that Norwegian cultural policy is entirely governed by a 
tangible utility calculating rationale is in my view questionable.  
 
But why is it then that different scholars appear to reach such different 
conclusions when analysing the same policy objects? I shall suggest that 
this is related to the scholars‟ positions in the field they are investigating 
and their subjectivity, which might lead to epistemological obstacles. So 
also with me, and this, as well as some suggestions for further research, 
is the topic of the final section.   
 
8.3 Limitations of this study and issues for further 
research.  
 
Both Belfiore and Bennett on the one hand, and Røyseng on the other, 
appear to have made similar observations: that there is a strong 
understanding of the arts‟ transformative powers both in the UK and 
Norway. However, the interpretation of how this impacts on the arts in 
terms of the extent to which they are treated as a policy-instrument 
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seems to vary significantly. Where Belfiore and Bennett argue that the 
arts occupy a „fragile position in public policy‟697 because their alleged 
transformative powers are so hard to substantiate, Røyseng concludes 
that the arts (and culture) are given a central position in society because 
any societal problem can find „healing powers‟ in them. Hence, Røyseng 
does not read the ritual cultural policy primarily as a threat to the 
autonomy of the arts. There might be two reasons why Belfiore and 
Bennett on the one hand, and Røyseng on the other, reach different 
conclusions: because the normative platforms from which they conduct 
their analysis differ, or because there are significant differences between 
Britain and Norway. The validity of the latter hypothesis, which would 
appear to indicate that a scheme like DKS is made subject to less of the 
imperative of evidence-based policy-making than in Britain, is difficult to 
assess given that this project does not include a comparative study of the 
two countries.698 Hence, I must leave that aside, but I would like to reflect 
a little over the normative platform from which researchers operate.  
8.3.1 The values of the cultural policy researcher 
 
First I should declare that my own approach to the study of the civilising 
mission in Norway was not informed by a perceived threat to the intrinsic 
values of the arts. As pointed out in Chapter Three, my research interest 
has been informed by a critique of the assumptions on which the ideas of 
the alleged intrinsic values of the arts rest, as well as an investigation into 
how culture has been used to civilise. This might of course have coloured 
                                            
697 Befiore and Bennett (2008), p. 5. 
698 This could however be an interesting follow-up to this project.  
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my research question, research approach, readings and selection of 
empirical material. This might also explain the different conclusion 
between Belfiore and Bennett versus Røyseng, the latter of whom had to 
undertake what she termed epistemological breaks in order to be able to 
objectify her research object.699  
 
As mentioned in Chapter Three, cultural policy studies is an academic 
field which, almost by definition, is informed by the subjective values of its 
researchers, who might find it difficult to „objectify‟ the area they are 
investigating. I referred to Pierre Bourdieu and Loïc Wacquant who 
stressed that any researcher should reflect on how the research 
questions she raises might easily be the product of the very same object 
that is the focus of the research.700 This is particularly relevant for much 
cultural policy research, including this project, because, as argued by 
Røyseng, it appears as if many cultural policy scholars associate strongly 
with what she terms the values of the field of the arts and culture.701  
 
Not all cultural policy researchers do of course subscribe to these alleged 
values, but my observation, as outlined in Chapter Three, is that many 
researchers in the field of culture, and perhaps particularly the arts, have 
some personal affinity with the field they are researching.702 Evidently 
only based on anecdotal evidence, I assume for example that few cultural 
policy researchers subscribe to the Progress Party‟s liberalist take on 
                                            
699 Røyseng (2007), p. 79. 
700 Bourdieu and Wacquant (1992).  
701 I outlined how Røyseng perceives these values in Chapter Three.  
702 This is of course not exclusive to cultural policy studies, but can be found in other area of 
public policy-making, like health, education and development policies.   
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public cultural policy. Belfiore and Bennett also reveal their values when 
they argue, as mentioned in Chapter Three, that impact studies do not 
„engage with the real purpose of the arts‟, and that the arts‟ eventual 
economic and social impacts „are not the primary characteristics of the 
aesthetic experience‟. 703  The platform from which they conduct their 
intellectual interrogation, is hence based on the normative idea that the 
arts should be celebrated and nourished as an end.  
 
This distances them from a more instrumental policy-maker (and scholar) 
like Augustin Girard, who was so influential on the cultural democracy 
movement of the 1970s and who argued that only a cultural policy that 
was „explicitly associated with a number of ultimate ends accepted by 
society‟704 could take its place as an equal next to social and economic 
policy.  Such a subscription to the idea that cultural policy should put 
human and social qualities, if not before then at least on a par with artistic 
ones, might imply a different perception of the value of the arts and what 
is instrumental and what is not, compared to somebody who is more 
inclined to celebrate what they would refer to as the intrinsic values of the 
arts. I am instinctively sympathetic to Girard‟s position, and this might of 
course act as my epistemological obstacle.  
 
Furthermore, a potential shortcoming of this project is that it engages 
primarily with policy rhetoric the way it is manifest in policy reports and 
other so-called „grey‟ literature, or indeed empirical data-collections 
                                            
703 Belfiore and Bennett (2008), p. 7. 
704 Girard and Gentil (1983), p. 23.  
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amongst policy-makers and other elites. The way I have collected and 
analysed my material will of course be informed by my research question, 
which again might be informed by my own personal conviction about how 
culture should be valued. The analysis of policy rhetoric might be carried 
out at the expense of rigorous empirical studies of the actual 
consequences of shifts in the rhetoric; not only the impact on audiences, 
but the impact on culture and cultural provision itself. Without in-depth 
studies of how changes in policy rhetoric impact on both the conditions of 
culture and how it is largely valued, cultural policy researchers are limited 
to making their conclusions on the rhetoric only. Mangset et. al. argue 
that cultural policy researchers perhaps should focus more on „actual, 
substantial structural changes‟ in the field of culture than reducing their 
research to focus on rhetorical statements only. 705  I mentioned very 
briefly in the conclusion of Chapter Six that the increased attention given 
to cultural democracy in the 1970s did not, in monetary terms, happen at 
the expense of funding to institutions primarily mediating the high arts. In 
fact, the funding of such institutions grew steadily at the same time as the 
subject focused cultural democracy rhetoric almost permeated the 
Bildung discourse, which might indicate that in monetary terms the object 
approach to Bildung has been hegemonic all along. A research design 
like mine, which exclusively focuses on policy rhetoric, would not capture 
such an observation.  
                                            
705 Mangset et.al. (2008), p. 3. 
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8.3.2 Other limitations of this study  
 
There are perhaps two other limitations to this project: one relating to my 
theoretical framework, and the other to my empirical data collection. I 
have consciously selected a limited theoretical framework in order to 
shed light on the extent to which Norwegian cultural policy has been and 
still is informed by the mission to civilise its populace. In terms of ideas 
about the function of culture (particularly the arts), Belfiore and Bennett‟s 
already mentioned book on the origins of the value of the arts, presents a 
substantial selection of thinkers dating all the way back to Plato‟s 
Republic published 2500 years ago. 706  Such an extensive (and 
impressive) literature review was unfortunately beyond the scope of my 
project. However, rather than tracing intellectual trajectories, my project 
focuses on whether the civilising mission has been a rationale behind 
Norwegian cultural policy and none of the four thinkers that I drew upon 
from eighteenth and nineteenth-century Germany and Britain were 
chosen for their documented influence on Norwegian thinking on culture. 
Instead the rationale for my selection was these scholars‟ power to 
illuminate. But my theoretical framework might have been strengthened 
by a larger (or different) selection of theorists.  
 
It must also be acknowledged that my data-material is limited, certainly in 
terms of the informants that I interviewed. I could have interviewed more 
people from the constituencies that I chose to focus on: politicians, artists 
                                            
706 Belfiore and Bennett (2008). 
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and central elites in the arts field. As I have outlined in Appendix One I 
could also have included other constituencies.707  
8.3.3 Suggested further research 
 
As mentioned at the beginning of this chapter, KUL (2003a) abandoned 
the idea of a uniform common culture in favour of the development of a 
culture based on diversity and complexity. This has become a much 
prioritised topic during the current government in Norway, and policy 
makers are increasingly coming to terms with Norway becoming more 
complex in ethnic terms.708 This has triggered some reflection into how 
this impacts on cultural policy, and a recent Green paper asked: how can 
the society of the majority facilitate minority groups‟ ability to participate in 
and continue to develop their own cultural activities? On the other hand, 
the paper asked to what extent should minority-cultures become 
integrated in the society of the majority‟s own established schemes and 
institutions, and how should established culture reflect a multicultural 
reality?709  
 
This, in my view, demonstrates that the object and subject approach still 
continues to play out in the government‟s policy-rhetoric, where both 
                                            
707 Similarly, I did not make the more recent Green Papers published by the Ministry of Culture 
on the economic conditions and public support for the film industry (KUL (2004) and KUL 
(2007b)), on interactive leisure software (KUL (2008a)), on the support for rhythmic music (KUL 
(2008b)) and on the collaboration between culture and business (KUL (2005)) subject to the same 
in-depth analysis as I did with the general Green Papers presented in Chapter Six. Neither have I 
made a more in-depth study of a phenomenon equivalent to DKS relating to more commercially 
oriented culture (for example, the government‟s film-funding scheme). 
708  As an example, 2008 was designated the Norwegian Year of Cultural Diversity by the 
Ministry of Culture.  
709  Kultur- og kirkedepartementet (KUL), 2006. St.meld. nr. 17 (2005-2006): 2008 som 
markeringsår for kulturelt mangfold, Oslo (KUL, 2006). (KUL (2006)). 
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approaches are being considered. Cultural democracy was not 
necessarily referred to in this context, but this is essentially about the 
extent to which the culture of ethnic groups that have established 
themselves more recently in Norway and added to its social fabric should 
be reflected in cultural programmes decided by elite decision-makers and 
curators, or the extent to which these groups should be allowed to devise 
their own programmes. These are topical issues, which deserve more 
research-focus and I believe that much of the theoretical framework 
developed in this thesis can be applied for this purpose.  For example, 
how does the civilising mission play out in such policies, which potentially 
have an integration-dimension to them?  
 
8.4 Summary 
 
In this concluding chapter I have briefly summarised the findings of my 
empirical study of Norwegian cultural policy rhetoric from about 1814 up 
to today. I have demonstrated how the civilising mission, through the 
ambition to facilitate Bildung, has been a key rationale behind Norwegian 
cultural policy and still is. Although a subject  and object approach to this 
Bildung have traditionally sat comfortably alongside each other the object 
presentation has taken precedent during the 2000s. The exception to this 
has been the discourse‟s perception of commercial culture, which since 
2003 has been accepted as less harmful. However, this changed 
understanding of the Bildung potential in commercial culture is not 
brought forward into the DKS-discourse, which is based on a pure object 
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representation of Bildung where commercial culture is branded as a force 
of anti-Bildung. Hence, I have concluded that the civilising mission is not 
disappearing as a Norwegian cultural policy rationale: rather, it is 
intensifying.  
 
I continued by attempting to situate my findings within the context of what 
appears to have become a dominant position amongst cultural policy 
scholars: that the arts have become beleaguered and that their intrinsic 
values are threatened. I repeated that there is a marketisation discourse 
within Norwegian cultural policy discourse too, and the government has 
since 2004 published several Green papers, which it can be argued 
contribute to such a discourse. However, despite this discourse I 
concluded that an object focused Bildung rationale still stands strong in 
Norwegian cultural policy and that this is manifest through DKS. This is 
based on an abstract faith in the transformative powers of the 
„professional arts‟ and not informed by a more crude instrumental interest 
based on measurable evidence. I therefore concluded the middle section 
of this chapter by arguing that there is still a significant space in 
Norwegian cultural policy for the civilising mission and that this is 
epitomised by DKS.  
 
In the final section of the chapter I reflected first on some of the limitations 
of this study, namely the potential bias caused by my own subjective 
position, and that this could be exacerbated by the fact that I am 
analysing cultural policy rhetorically only. This was followed by a critique 
388 
 
of my use of theory and empirical data. I finally suggested very briefly 
some suggestions as how this project could give birth to future research 
projects.  
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APPENDIX 1: Empirical material  
 
As mentioned in the introductory chapter to this thesis, my empirical study 
of Norwegian cultural policy rationales can be divided into three parts. 
Firstly I gave a historical study covering the period between 1814 and 
1973 based on secondary sources by other scholars. This was followed 
by an in-depth textual analysis of key policy documents covering the 
period between 1873 and 2003, as well as the reception of these papers 
in parliament. Finally, I provided a comprehensive analysis of the 
rationales behind the national arts in school programme DKS. In this 
appendix I shall outline my choice of this empirical information and how 
and why I chose the material that I did.  
 
An historical approach to policy contexts: 1814 - 1973 
 
Chapters Four and Five focus on how concepts of power influenced the 
formation of a Norwegian identity from the early nineteenth century 
onwards, taking different positions and understandings in this discourse 
as the starting point, and applying these to locate the priorities in the 
cultural policy discourse for the period between 1814 to 1905 and 1905 to 
1973 respectively. This is based on secondary literature, presenting 
studies carried out by other scholars such as political scientists, historians 
and cultural policy scholars, some of whom have made it a more or less 
explicit project to focus their analysis on discourses and representations.  
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There are several reasons why this focus on secondary literature is being 
adopted for the focus of the first 159 years (1814 to 1973) of this study. 
First, it is beyond the scope of this project to analyse archived documents 
dating all the way back to 1814. Secondly, it is of course also more 
difficult to get access to documents the further back the focus of the 
research stretches. Finally, the reason why I chose 1814 as the departure 
point is because this was the year when Norway left its 400 year long 
union with Denmark and instead entered into a union with Sweden and 
received its constitution in the process. This paved the way for a real 
nation-building project in Norway, although it did not gain complete 
independence from Sweden and recognition as a sovereign state 
amongst states until 1905.  
 
I mentioned in the introduction that it is commonly acknowledged that the 
state in Norway did not intervene in the field of culture in a coherent and 
structured way until 1945.711 Similar observations have also been made 
for several other Western countries. Cummings and Katz, for example, 
argue that, although for some countries state patronage for the arts date 
back many years, it has since 1945 „expanded tremendously‟.712 This is 
not to say that the state in Norway did not intervene in cultural affairs prior 
to 1945 (or in other countries for that matter). Dag Solhjell for example 
takes issue with what has been termed „the conventional wisdom‟ 
amongst Norwegian cultural policy researchers, who in his view, over-
                                            
711 Vestheim (1995); Mangset (1992); Bakke (2003). 
712 Milton C. Cummings and Richard S. Katz, „Government and the Arts: An Overview‟, in 
Milton C. Cummings and Richard S. Katz, The patron state: Government and the Arts in Europe, 
North America, and Japan (New York: Oxford University Press, 1987), p. 4. 
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emphasise 1945 as the time when Norway developed its cultural policy. 
Such a conception, he argues, undermines the fact that Norway was both 
made subject to a conscious and structured cultural policy during 1940-
1945, which were the years when Norway was under Nazi occupation, 
but also that Norway has had a clear state-sanctioned cultural policy all 
the way back to 1814.713 
 
I have chosen not to include the period 1940 – 1945 in my analysis 
because this period was characterised by a political climate of 
totalitarianism and dictatorship and was not representative of the period 
afterwards, and I have not found any suggestions that the policies of this 
regime has been influential on policy measures after 1945. I believe that 
the cultural policies of the Norwegian Nazi regime, which has not been 
researched much,714 merits a separate scholarly analysis.   
 
The reason why I chose 1973 as the cut-off point for my reliance on 
secondary sources was because this was when the Norwegian 
government published its first green paper devoted to an articulation of 
the nation‟s cultural analysis in general terms.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                            
713 Solhjell (2005), pp. 143 – 155. 
714 Dahl and Helseth (2007).  
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Policy discourses: 1973 – 2003 
 
For the cultural policy discourse from 1973 until 2003, the study will be 
based on primary analysis of texts 715  from governmental documents, 
originating from the Ministry of Culture as well as their reception in 
parliament. This analysis will be presented in Chapter Six. 
 
When identifying public documents like policy papers, an immediate 
question is which documents (or even type or classification of documents) 
contain information that can help address the research question? The 
focus of this research project covers a wide field of Norwegian cultural 
policy (apart from sport and media), on a national level as formulated by 
the Ministry of Culture, making use of a wide definition of culture. Such 
policies are drafted in a range of documents and it is not necessarily 
obvious where to start. Neumann argues that the researcher should look 
for those texts, which are canonical „in that they are often referred to and 
cited from. They have a wide reception, which in itself implies that they 
play a prominent role in the discourse‟.716  
 
I could therefore quickly conclude that the six green papers that the 
government has published over the 30 years charted here - the so-called 
kulturmeldingene - were amongst the most seminal public policy 
documents in terms of their impact on scholarly work. However, these are 
not the only green papers published by the Ministry of Culture. Just a 
                                            
715 „Text‟ is here referred to as text the way we refer to it in everyday speech as signs on paper (or 
screen), not as defined in Chapter Three as any signifier of meaning.  
716 Neumann (2001b), p. 52. 
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quick glance on the ministry‟s website shows that it has produced green 
papers on a range of cultural topics over the last year. During the time-
period 1996 and 2003 the government also published papers focusing on 
the impact of digital technology on archives, libraries and museums, the 
use of the Norwegian languages in the public sector, the government‟s 
involvement in the welfare of artists and the arts-community and the 
government‟s relationship with voluntary organisations.717 Since 2003 the 
government has also published green papers, amongst others, on the 
economic conditions for film production, the development, conditions and 
challenges for culture-based business development and the collaboration 
between culture and business, cultural diversity, on policies for the 
performing arts and on making an „effort‟ for popular music. None of 
these papers have in my view been as seminal as the ‘kulturmeldingene’ 
and I have therefore decided to base this textual analysis on the latter 
only, where the last of these published in 2003 will act as a cut-off point 
for this selection of green papers. However, I am contextualising my 
findings against some of these other green papers in the conclusion 
 
Each of the green papers presented by government receive a written 
response by the corresponding parliamentary committee, before both the 
green paper and this response are made subject to a debate in 
parliament, where the secretary of state responsible for culture also 
participate. My empirical material is thus made up of altogether 14 
                                            
717 See 
http://www.regjeringen.no/nb/dep/kkd/dok/regpubl/stmeld.html?id=578&epslanguage=NO for a 
list of the Ministry of Culture and Church Affair‟s Green Papers from the parliamentary year 
1996-97 until today.    
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documents (six green papers, four written responses by the parliamentary 
committee, and four sets of minutes from the parliamentary debates).718 A 
list of all these papers can be found in Appendix Two. Each of the six 
papers and their responses is presented in more detail in Chapter Six.  
 
Cultural policy documents, like other policy documents, contain 
information about policy priorities and policy instruments such as the 
funding of schemes, projects or institutions, various forms of incentives 
(for example in the area of tax), legislation (for example in the area of 
copyright) and so on. Policy papers may also reveal reasons and 
rationales based on values or ideologies on which policies or policy-
suggestions are based. These may be spelt out explicitly or may be 
embedded in the text, through the already mentioned representations, 
and it has been my objective to identify whether these representations 
form part of a discursive practice, in other words, how they are being 
institutionalised through, for example, repetitive interpretations and 
production. It may be relatively easy to locate such discursive practices: 
they may be revealed by their assumed acceptance, or by the 
representations being „taken for granted‟. Other times this might be more 
subtle. The frequency of their appearance is also an indicator.  
 
                                            
718 Two of the Green Papers were additions to a paper that had been published one or two years 
before. The reason for this was that a change in government took place soon after these two first 
Green Papers had been published and the new government decided to publish an additional paper 
to supplement and correct the previous one. This happened both in the 1970s and the 1980s, and 
given that parliament had not had the chance to respond to the paper before the government 
changed and a new Green Paper was published, it gave a joint response to the two papers and the 
debate in parliament referred also to the two papers. This is why there are only four parliamentary 
responses and four minutes from the parliamentary debates, despite there being six Green Papers.  
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The objective of this research is partly to learn more about the 
relationship between discourses and social or political practices. However, 
by analysing policy documents it will only be possible to say something 
about social practices within the institution whose public documents are 
being analysed, in this case the government and its ministries responsible 
for culture as well as parliament. Hence, these policy papers were 
supplemented with interviews of elites, some of whom represented a 
different sphere from the political one: that of the arts-sector. The 
rationale for the selection of these will be explained below. In addition to 
talking to these interviewees about the rationales behind Norwegian 
cultural policy generally, they were particularly questioned about the art in 
school programme, DKS.   
 
Arts policy in the 2000s: Den Kulturelle Skolesekken 
 
 
According to Dahl and Helseth, Den Kulturelle Skolesekken (DKS) is one 
of the most ambitious cultural policy programmes in Norway in recent 
years.719 It is a programme that aims to make all children in primary 
schools get in contact with, what is being termed, the „professional arts‟. 
Although the objectives of DKS are presented in more detail in Chapter 
Seven, I will here present the one object, which caught my attention and 
which made me conclude that the programme is highly suitable for an 
analysis of the civilising mission in Norwegian cultural policy. The scheme 
states as one of its overarching objectives:  
                                            
719 Dahl and Helseth (2006), p. 260. 
408 
 
to facilitate the access to and familiarisation of a wide range of artistic 
and cultural expressions for pupils in primary school in order for them to 
be favourably inclined towards these [artistic and cultural 
expressions].
720
 
 
I should emphasise here that I did not choose to focus on DKS in more 
depth until after I had carried out the textual analysis of policy documents 
as presented above. During this phase of my research, I detected a 
tendency of the cultural policy discourses of the 1990s and 2000s to 
return to an object  approach to enlightenment where the path to Bildung 
would be achieved through, what Norwegian policy-papers often refer to 
as, the „professional arts‟, and I also detected a certain civilising 
dimension to this. DKS might not be representative of Norwegian cultural 
policy as such, but it can be argued that it is like a microcosm of that part 
of Norwegian cultural policy, which attempts to promote and disseminate 
these „professional arts‟. I found that many of the same rationales that 
appear to govern contemporary arts policy more generally were also 
rationales for DKS.  
 
However, although DKS sits comfortably in a Norwegian cultural policy 
context, which for so many years has had as its most important objective 
to democratise culture, this programme is unique in that its provision of 
culture is compulsory and something the pupils cannot avoid. If there is a 
civilising dimension to Norwegian cultural policy, it could be argued that 
this scheme goes even further in accomplishing this mission than other 
policy measures, and I thus concluded that the discourses on which the 
                                            
720 KUL (2003b), p. 9. 
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scheme was based would serve as good empirical material. Having said 
that, it must be declared that this third part of my empirical investigation is 
primarily concerned with arts policy, defining culture more narrowly as 
signifying practices (by professional artists it should be added), rather 
than cultural policy in the wider sense. This is due to the already 
mentioned general shift in focus to an object oriented path to growth in 
Norwegian cultural policy discourses in the 1990s and 2000s.721 I should 
emphasise that it is the rationales behind DKS, that are the focus of my 
research, not how efficient or effective this programme have been in 
reaching its objectives. I am not evaluating DKS.  
 
I had initially also meant to analyse another major public investment in 
the cultural field: the decision to build a major opera house in Oslo to 
house Den Norske Opera (DNO), a building which was opened in April 
2008. However, it became clear to me, when I started analysing my 
empirical material, that to include two examples implied a level of 
complexity, both in terms of the sheer volume of information that I had to 
deal with but also because of the multifaceted dimension that this would 
bring to my study that was beyond the scope of the project. Hence, I 
chose to mostly ignore the data material I had collected regarding this 
project, although references to this were made both in the initial letters I 
sent to potential interviewees as listed in Appendix Four and within the 
interview guide I used for my field research as listed in Appendix Five.  
                                            
721 This shift is documented in detail in Chapter Six. 
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Policy papers 
 
The policies and rationales for DKS are laid out in two green papers, one 
published by the Ministry of Culture and one by the Ministry of Education 
and Research (Kunnskapsdepartementet). They were both published in 
2003 and formed a natural starting point for the search on the rationales 
behind DKS as they are contained in public policy papers. These papers 
were complemented by a third paper published by the Ministry of Culture 
and Church Affairs in 2007. Reading these papers, it soon became 
apparent that they were again informed by other papers dating back to 
1996. These were an action plan for the aesthetic subjects and the 
cultural dimension in schools jointly published by the Ministry of Culture 
and the Ministry for Church, Education and Research. Another green 
paper that was referred to in the two above-mentioned green papers was 
on a common youth policy published by the Ministry of Children and 
Equality (Barne og likestillingsdepartementet) in 2002. I also quote 
extensively from a speech by statssekretær in the Ministry of Culture and 
Church Affairs, Yngve Slettholm, were he accounts for the rationales 
behind DKS and the values he hopes that it will fulfil.722 In addition to this, 
I found some factual information on DKS‟s own web-site. Together these 
papers laid the foundation for my textual analysis of the rationales on 
which DKS was based.  
 
Although I open up the analysis to also include contributions to the 
discourse, or alternative counter-discourses, from opponents to the 
                                            
722 Thanks to Nina Vestby for prompting me towards this speech.  
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government in office at the time, by including the parliamentary response 
documents and the debates in parliament, these documents only chart 
politico-bureaucratic contributions. However, an exclusive focus on policy 
documents published by governmental bodies, and responses by 
politicians in parliament would exclude eventual other contributions to the 
discourse. I therefore decided to supplement my analysis of policy 
documents with in-depth interviews of a sample of elite-informants drawn 
both from the politico-bureaucratic sphere and from the arts sector.  
DKS – Interview informants and interview guide  
 
The rationales for conducting interviews of key people in the field are 
three-fold. In addition to the weaknesses of defining discourses too 
narrowly as I have just mentioned, conducting interviews following a 
semi-structured interview-guide enabled me to follow up on some of the 
observations I had made through my analysis of the policy papers. As 
already mentioned, discourses can gain their resilience and longevity by 
assumptions, knowledge and truths that are internalised and taken for 
granted. They don‟t necessarily have to be spelt out or explained 
frequently because of how they have become internalised. Given that I 
observed several assumptions in this vein, I thought it would be useful to 
attempt to unpick them further through asking questions and follow-up 
questions in cases where the assumptions were still left opaque. Finally, I 
wanted to secure the validity of my results by triangulating more than one 
type of data collection, both sampling policy papers and conducting 
interviews.    
412 
 
The discursive practices, on which commonly accepted rationales for 
Norwegian cultural policy can be understood, might draw their 
contributors from a range of constituencies. At the top of my head I could 
think of several: civil servants and elected politicians, cultural 
administrators, critics and academics, the media, teachers and parents 
(with particular reference to DKS), managers and investors in the private 
business sector and „ordinary people‟ (encompassing more or less 
everybody else). For my empirical study I chose to focus only on the first 
three of these constituencies or categories: civil servants/elected 
politicians, cultural administrators and critics/academics. It would have 
been interesting and pertinent to also have included the media and 
ordinary people. However, due to limited resources, I abandoned a focus 
on ordinary people and the media in favour of in-depth interviews with 
elites from the political, bureaucratic, intellectual and cultural sector. I 
chose these three categories because, through my observations, they 
contribute more explicitly to cultural policy discourses in the public sphere 
than the other groups. I mentioned earlier that this is not an ontological 
research project that aims to prove generalised truths. This is reflected in 
this aspect of the chosen research methodology, which focuses on 
discourses collected through qualitative interviews of relatively few 
informants. In her doctoral dissertation, Jenny Johanisson writes that the 
consequence of the qualitative approach for her research is that it is 
geared towards understanding rather than explanation.723 It is a closer 
understanding of what the rationales behind Norwegian cultural policy are 
                                            
723 Jenny Johannisson, Det lokala möter världen: Kulturpolitisk förändringsarbete i 1990-talets 
Göteborg, (Högskolan i Borås og Göteborgs universitet: Valfrid, 2006), p. 28. 
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and what they are based on, partly using DKS as an example, which is 
the purpose of this project. A list of all the interviewees, including material 
from interviews I have actually made use of in the project is listed in 
Appendix Three.  
 
These interviews, which all lasted between one and two hours went 
generally well and the results are analysed in detail in Chapter Seven. 
However, three of the four interviewees drawn from the category 
critics/academics and who were all academics, appeared to be less 
informed or less interested and engaged in the subject matter than the 
others. The transcripts from these interviews did not unveil much in terms 
of rationales behind cultural policy generally or DKS particularly. I 
therefore decided to exclude the data-material that I had gathered from all 
the informants in the category critics/academics and was thus left with 
twelve informants drawn from the categories arts-administrators and 
politicians/bureaucrats. The interviews with these twelve interviewees 
have all been included in my empirical data material.  
 
As mentioned above, my definition of culture for the purpose of this 
project is wide. As I demonstrate in Chapter Six, such a wide definition 
complies with what has been a common principle behind Norwegian 
cultural policy, at least since the 1970s. However, the informants that I 
sampled from the cultural sector all represented what in Norwegian 
policy-discourse is often referred to as the „professional arts‟ (a term I 
interrogate in further detail in Chapter Six and Seven). All my informants 
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from the cultural sector had a background in institutions, which either 
represented or mediated performing art-works created or performed by 
artists who had been formerly trained in their field, and who all relied on 
public subsidies. None of my informants from the cultural sector 
represented artists or organisations who are described as commercial or 
who mediate popular culture, and neither were they employed in 
broadcasting or acted as cultural „animateurs‟ in the wider sense. The 
reason for this is that DKS is a scheme which aims to bring pupils in 
primary school in contact with the „professional arts‟. This is upheld by a 
discourse that advocates how the professional arts can facilitate human 
growth in this context, and I was interested in interrogating how elites in 
the cultural, politico-bureaucratic and academic/intellectual fields 
contribute to this discourse.  
 
Four of the interviewees sampled from the politico-bureaucratic 
constituency were or had been either elected members of parliament or 
appointed cabinet ministers. Two had served for the Labour Party, one for 
the Conservative Party and one for the Christian Democratic Party. As 
will be demonstrated in Chapter Six, the textual analysis of the green 
papers showed a remarkable consensus about most of the common 
understandings on which the rationales behind Norwegian cultural policy 
are based. However, an alternative understanding advocated by the 
members of the Progress Party was significantly at odds with that of the 
government and most other parties in parliament. I shall not go into more 
detail about this here, but it could be argued that a natural consequence 
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of this would be to include representatives of this understanding in my 
sample. However, I deliberately chose not to do so, because I was more 
interested in the main representations within the discourse or indeed the 
main discourse. Accounting for this, I believe the sample of four 
politicians (or ex-politicians) I interviewed, safeguards a valid political 
spread.  
 
Please refer to Appendix Five for an English translation of an interview 
guide that was sent to informants about two weeks before each interview, 
outlining approximately what the interview would cover. The interview 
guide was pilot-tested on a colleague who has long experience as an arts 
manager in Norway. This same interview guide was followed for all the 
sixteen interviews. However, the interviews were loosely structured and 
took the shape of conversations. Hence, both I as the interviewer and the 
interviewees often strayed from the guide. The questions asked in 
relation to DKS and to cultural policy more generally were informed both 
by my textual analysis of general green papers on cultural policy as well 
as my analysis of policy papers pertaining to DKS. I was particularly 
interested in gauging the informants‟ opinion about whether and why DKS 
was an important scheme, as well as the type of impacts that could be 
expected from it and particularly how it related to Bildung. Given that I 
had detected a return to an object oriented approach to enlightenment in 
more recent cultural policy discourse, I wanted to converse with the 
respondents on, how they related these object/subject approaches to 
each other and, which of them they thought most important. I also wanted 
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to gauge their opinion on how cultural policy is aiming to relay a set of 
values and to what extent such policies should contribute to Bildung, and 
finally whether a public cultural policy should have as its objective to 
restrain commercial culture and offer alternatives.  
 
When meeting the interview subject and entering the room where the 
interview was to take place, I often got the feeling that the interviewee 
signalled that the two of us had a common understanding in terms of how 
we perceived the value of the arts. After all, and in terms of what I 
mention in Chapter Three, most researchers in the field of cultural policy, 
and particularly arts policy, might, in accordance with Solhjel‟s description 
of cultural policy researchers, designate specific values to the arts as 
needing protection and that this can be obtained through social-
democratic and welfare-ideological principles. I shall leave the details 
about the results of my empirical interview-study for Chapter Seven, but 
just mention here that I got the impression that most of my interview 
subjects subscribed to the above-mentioned ideas based on social-
democratic and welfare-ideological principles themselves, but more 
importantly that they also assumed that I did. This posed a significant 
challenge, particularly during interviews with respondents who I had met 
before in an arts-management or arts-promotional context. The only 
strategy I could level in face of this challenge was to avoid being dragged 
into conversations that were not related to the actual interview and 
otherwise acting as objectively and professionally as possible. I must 
admit though that this was difficult and there might of course have been 
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times when this has slipped. This might create a potential flaw in the data 
material in that I as a researcher might be perceived to verify a certain 
discourse that the interviewees themselves want to be part of, which 
again might influence what they say. However, given that the subject was 
being approached from several angles through the number of questions I 
asked, and the fact that most of the interviews lasted around ninety 
minutes, I believe that in practice for the purpose of this project this was 
in the end less of a problem.  
 
All interviewees had the opportunity to read my analysis of their 
interviews and to make comments about any quotes that I included.  
 
Summary 
 
In this appendix I have presented my empirical material, which was 
divided into three parts, and which more or less corresponds with the 
focus of Chapters Four to Seven: an analysis of cultural policy discourses 
as presented in secondary literature, covering the period between 1814 
and 1973, followed by an analysis of key policy texts from the period 
1973 and 2003 which are finally complemented by in-depth interviews 
with elites from the politico-bureaucratic and arts sector, focusing both on 
cultural policy rationales in general and rationales behind the arts in 
school project Den Kulturelle Skolesekken in particular.  
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APPENDIX 2: Policy documents consulted, with 
abbreviations  
 
Abbreviation Document Description  
KUD (1973) Kyrkje og 
undervisningsdepartementet 
(KUD), 1973. St.meld. nr. 8 
(1973-74): Om organisering 
og finansiering av 
kulturarbeid, Oslo. 
Green paper from the 
Ministry of Church and 
Education Affairs, 
entitled: „About the 
organisation and 
financing of the cultural 
sector‟.  
KUD (1974) Kyrkje og 
undervisningsdepartementet 
(KUD), 1974. St.meld. nr. 52  
(1973-74): Ny kulturpolitikk, 
Tillegg til St.meld. nr. 8 for 
1973-74 Om organisering 
og finansiering av 
kulturarbeid, Oslo. 
Green paper from the 
Ministry of Church and 
Education Affairs 
(addition to KUD 
(1973)), entitled: „New 
cultural policy‟. 
KUK (1974) Kirke og 
undervisningskomiteen 
(KUK), 1974. Innst. S. nr. 
23: Innstilling fra kirke og 
undervisningskomiteen om 
kulturarbeid og kulturpolitikk 
(St. Meld. Nr. 8 og nr. 52 for 
1973-74), Oslo. 
Response by the 
parliamentary 
committee of church 
and education affairs to 
KUD (1973) and KUD 
(1974). 
FIS (1975) Forhandlinger i Stortinget 
(FIS), 1975. nr. 317: 1975 9. 
Januar – Kulturdebatt, Oslo 
Negotiations in 
parliament: 9th January 
1975.  
KUD (1981) Kyrkje og 
undervisningsdepartementet 
(KUD), 1981. St.meld. nr. 23 
(1981-82): Kulturpolitikk for 
1980-åra, Oslo. 
Green paper from the 
Ministry of Church and 
Education Affairs, 
entitled: „Cultural policy 
for the 1980s‟. 
KUV (1983) Kultur og 
vitskapsdepartementet 
(KUV), 1983. St.meld. nr. 27 
(1983-84): Nye oppgåver i 
kulturpolitikken, Tillegg til 
St.meld. nr. 23 (1981-82): 
Kulturpolitikk for 1980-åra, 
Oslo. 
 
Green paper from the 
Ministry of Culture and 
Science (addition to 
KUD (1981)), entitled: 
„New cultural policy 
assignments‟.  
KUK (1985) Kirke og 
undervisningskomiteen 
(KUK), 1985. Innst. S. nr. 
132 (1984-85): Innstilling fra 
Response by the 
parliamentary 
committee of church 
and education affairs to 
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kirke og 
undervisningskomiteen om 
kulturpolitikk for 1980-åra og 
nye oppgaver i 
kulturpolitikken (St.meld. 
Nr.23 for 1891-82 og St. 
Meld. Nr. 27 for 1983-84), 
Oslo. 
KUD (1981) and KUV 
(1983).  
FIS (1985) Forhandlinger i Stortinget 
(FIS), 1985. nr. 203: 1985 
28. Mars – Kulturpolitkken 
for 1980-åra og nye 
oppgaver i kulturpolitikken, 
Oslo. 
Negotiations in 
parliament: 28th March 
1985. 
KUL (1992) Kulturdepartementet (KUL), 
1992. St.meld. nr. 61 (1991-
92): Kultur i tiden, Oslo 
Green paper from the 
Ministry of Culture, 
entitled „Culture in our 
time‟. 
KUK (1993) Kirke og 
undervisningskomiteen 
(KUK), 1993. Innst. S. nr. 
115 (1992-93): Innstilling fra 
kirke og 
undervisningskomiteen om 
kultur i tiden (St.meld. nr. 61 
for 1991-92 og St. Meld. Nr. 
27 for 1992-93), Oslo. 
Response by the 
parliamentary 
committee of church 
and education affairs to 
KUL (1992). 
FIS (1993) Forhandlinger i Stortinget 
(FIS), 1993. nr. 74: 1993 30. 
Mars – Kultur i tiden, Oslo. 
Negotiations in 
parliament: 30th March 
1993. 
KKU (1996) Kulturdepartementet og 
Kirke-, Utdannings- og 
forskningsdepartementet 
(KKU), 1996: 
Handlingsplanen Broen og 
den blå hesten, Oslo. 
Joint action plan by the 
Ministry of Culture and 
the Ministry of 
Education and 
Research about 
aesthetic subjects and 
the cultural dimension in 
schools. 
FKD (2002) Familie-, kultur- og 
administrasjonskomiteen 
(FKD), 2002. 
Innst. O. nr. 44 (2001-2002): 
Innstilling fra familie-, kultur-
, og 
administrasjonskomiteen 
om forslag fra 
stortingsrepresentantene 
Per Sandberg og Ulf Erik 
Knudsen om lov om endring 
i lov 28. august 1992 nr. 103 
Proposal by the two 
MPs Per Sandberg and 
Ulf Erik Kundsen from 
the Progress Party to 
change the distribution 
of lottery money, with 50 
per cent allocated to 
sports and 50 per cent 
to cultural causes.  
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om pengespill mv. (Etter at 
det er foretatt 
fondsavsettelser skal 
selskapets overskudd 
fordeles med en halvdel til 
idrettsformål og en halvdel 
til kulturformål), Oslo 
BLD (2002) Barne- og 
likestillingsdepartementet, 
2002. St.meld. nr. 39 (2001-
2002): Oppvekst og levekår 
for barn og unge i Norge, 
Oslo.  
Green paper by the 
ministry for Children and 
Equality about 
adolescence and 
conditions for children 
and young people. 
KUL (2003a) Kultur- og 
kyrkjedepartementet (KUL), 
2003. St.meld. nr. 48 (2002-
2003): Kulturpolitikk fram 
mot 2014, Oslo. 
Green paper from the 
Ministry of Culture and 
Church Affairs, entitled: 
cultural policy towards 
2014. 
KUL (2003b) Kultur- og 
kyrkjedepartementet (KUL), 
2003. St.meld. nr. 38 (2002-
2003): Den kulturelle 
skulesekken, Oslo.  
Green paper by the 
Ministry of Culture and 
Church Affairs, entitled 
„Den Kulturelle 
Skolesekken‟.  
FKD (2003) Familie-, kultur- og 
administrasjonskomiteen 
(FKD), 2003. Innst. S. nr. 50 
(2003-2004): Innstilling fra 
familie-, kultur-, og 
administrasjonskomiteen 
om Den Kulturelle 
skulesekken St.meld. Nr.38 
(2002-2003), Oslo.  
Response by the 
parliamentary 
committee for family, 
culture and 
administration to KUL 
(2003b). 
UDF (2003) Utdannings- of 
forskningsdepartementet,  
St.meld. nr. 39 (2002-2003): 
‘Ei blot til Lyst’: Om kunst og 
kultur i og i tilknytning til 
grunnskolen, Oslo.  
Green paper by the 
Ministry for Education 
and Research about the 
arts and culture in and 
in connection with 
primary schools.  
KUL (2004) Kultur- og 
kirkedepartementet (KUL), 
2004. St.meld. nr. 25 (2003-
2004): Økonomiske 
rammebetingelser for 
filmproduksjon, Oslo. 
Green paper by the 
Ministry of Culture and 
Church Affairs, entitled 
„Economic conditions for 
film production‟. 
KUF (2004) Kirke-, utdannings- og 
forskningskomiteen (KUF), 
2004. Innst. S. nr. 131 
(2003-2004): Innstilling fra 
Kirke-, utdannings- og 
forskningskomiteen om 
Response by the 
parliamentary 
committee for church, 
education and research 
to UDF (2003). 
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kunst og kultur i og i 
tilknytning til grunnskolen 
(‘Ei blot til lyst’) St.meld. 
Nr.39 (2002-2003), Oslo. 
FKD (2004) Familie-, kultur- og 
administrasjonskomiteen 
(FKD), 2004. Innst. S. nr. 
155 (2003-2004): Innstilling 
fra familie-, kultur-, og 
administrasjonskomiteen 
om kulturpolitikk fram mot 
2014 St.meld. Nr. 48  (2002-
2003), Oslo. 
Response by the 
parliamentary 
committee of family, 
culture and 
administration to KUL 
(2003a). 
FIS (2004) Forhandlinger i Stortinget 
(FIS), 2004. nr. 68: 2004 1. 
April – Kulturpolitikk fram 
mot 2014, Oslo. 
Negotiations in 
parliament: 1st April 
2004. 
KUL (2005) Kultur- og 
kirkedepartementet (KUL), 
2005. St.meld. nr. 22 (2004-
2005): Kultur og næring, 
Oslo. 
Green paper by the 
Ministry of Culture and 
Church Affairs, entitled 
„Culture and business‟. 
KUL (2006) Kultur- og 
kirkedepartementet (KUL), 
2006. St.meld. nr. 17 (2005-
2006): 2008 som 
markeringsår for kulturelt 
mangfold, Oslo. 
Green paper by the 
Ministry of Culture and 
Church Affairs, entitled 
„2008 as a year of 
celebration of cultural 
diversity‟. 
KUL (2007a) Kultur- og 
kyrkjedepartementet (KUL), 
2007. St.meld. nr. 8 (2007-
2008): Kulturell skulesekk 
for framtida, Oslo.  
Green paper by the 
Ministry of Culture and 
Church Affairs about the 
future of DKS.  
KUL (2007b) Kultur- og 
kirkedepartementet (KUL), 
2007. St.meld. nr. 22 (2006-
2007): Veiviseren: For the 
norske filmløftet, Oslo. 
Green paper by the 
Ministry of Culture and 
Church Affairs, entitled 
„The Pathfinder: for the 
Norwegian film effort‟  
FKD (2008) Familie-, kultur- og 
administrasjonskomiteen 
(FKD), 2008. Innst. S. nr. 
200 (2007-2008): Innstilling 
fra familie- og, 
kulturkomiteen om kulturell 
skulesekk for framtida, 
St.meld. Nr. 8  (2007-2008), 
Oslo. 
Response by the 
parliamentary 
committee of family, 
culture and 
administration to KUL 
(2007a). 
KUL (2008a) Kultur- og 
kirkedepartementet (KUL), 
2008. St.meld. nr. 14 (2007-
Green paper by the 
Ministry of Culture and 
Church Affairs, entitled 
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2008): Dataspill, Oslo. „Computer games‟. 
KUL (2008b) Kultur- og 
kirkedepartementet (KUL), 
2008. St.meld. nr. 21 (2007-
2008): Samspill: Et løft for 
rytmisk musikk, Oslo. 
Green paper by the 
Ministry of Culture and 
Church Affairs, entitled 
„Harmony: An effort for 
rhythmic music‟.  
 
 
APPENDIX 3: Interviewees 
 
Interviewee Position 
Ellen Horn Currently Artistic Director for 
Riksteatret (The Norwegian Touring 
Theatre) and since June 2007, 
Chair of the Board of Den Norske 
Opera (The Norwegian Opera and 
Ballet). Was Minister for Culture 
between March 2000 and October 
2001. 
Valgerd Svarstad Haugland Currently church-warden in Oslo. 
Was Minister for Culture and 
Church Affairs between October 
2001 and October 2005. 
Britt Hildeng MP for the Labour Party and 
member of the parliamentary 
committee for family, culture and 
administration. 
Olemic Thommessen MP and cultural spokesperson for 
the Conservative Party (Høyre) and 
member of the parliamentary 
committee for family, culture and 
administration. 
Arne Holen  Project Director in the Ministry of 
Culture and Church Affairs.  
Vidar Thorbjørnsen Director, Department of Culture, 
Vestfold County Council. Often 
referred to as „the father of DKS‟. 
Einar Solbu Freelance consultant, previously 
Director for Rikskonsertene (the 
national touring organisation for 
music) and until January 2007 
Chair of the Board of Den Norske 
Opera (The Norwegian Opera and 
Ballet). 
Trond Okkelmo Director of NTO (Association of 
Norwegian Theatres and 
Orchestras). Previously Managing 
423 
 
Director for Oslo Philharmonic 
Orchestra.  
Glen Erik Haugland Composer. Previously Chair of the 
Norwegian Society of Composers.  
Geir Johnson Artistic Director of Ultima, Oslo 
Contemporary Music Festival 
Aadne Sekkelsten Manager of The National Touring 
Network for the Performing Arts.  
Stein Olav Henrichsen Artistic Director of BIT20 (a 
contemporary music ensemble) and 
Opera Vest (a contemporary opera 
company), Bergen  
Ida Lou Larsen *) Freelance theatre critique, writing 
for a range of Norwegian 
broadsheets. 
Svein Bjørkås *) Director, Music Information Centre 
Norway. Previously Head of 
Research, Arts Council, Norway. 
Siri Meyer *) Professor of Art History, University 
of Bergen. 
Jostein Gripsrud *) Professor of Media Studies, 
University of Bergen.  
 
*) The interview transcripts from these four interviewees were excluded 
from the final analysis-sample.   
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APPENDIX 4:  Email-letter to potential interviewees 
(English translation) 
 
Egil Bjørnsen 
Centre for Cultural Policy Studies 
University of Warwick 
Coventry 
CV4 7AL 
UK 
To: 
 
REQUEST FOR AN INTERVIEW IN CONNECTION WITH A 
RESEARCH PROJECT ABOUT NORWEGIAN CULTURAL POLICY 
GENERALLY AND DEN KULTURELLE SKOLESEKKEN/DECISION TO 
BUILD A NEW VENUE FOR DEN NORSKE OPERA PARTICULARLY.   
I am currently working on a doctoral project at the Centre for Cultural 
Policy Studies, University of Warwick, UK. The project has as its working 
title: A Civilising Mission? Rationales behind Norwegian cultural policy. I 
wish to illuminate the underlying ideas that Norwegian cultural policy is 
based on through an analysis of Norwegian cultural policy from 1945 up 
until the present time. Some might perhaps argue that this is obvious and 
already illuminated thoroughly. I am of the opinion however that, even 
though several researchers have lately studied the history of Norwegian 
cultural policy, most studies have first and foremost focused on how 
Norwegian cultural policy has developed throughout the years and less 
on why it has developed the way it has. This is where my focus lies.  
I wish to interview central politicians, administrators, employees in cultural 
organisations and cultural commentators about two specific cases in 
more recent Norwegian cultural policy: den Kulturelle Skolesekken, and 
the decision to build a new venue for Den Norske Opera in Oslo. Thus, I 
hereby take the liberty to enquire whether you have the opportunity to be 
interviewed and thus share your opinions and understandings about 
these cases with me for my doctoral project.  
I am particularly interested in the two mentioned cases because as well 
as being amongst the largest Norwegian cultural policy initiatives in 
recent years, they have high symbolic value and expose some of the 
contradictions and tensions, which Norwegian cultural policy is 
characterised by. Den kulturelle skolesekken for example, has both an 
instrumental objective to „give children in primary school cultural capital 
and cultural competence, which will improve their ability to meet the 
challenges in society’, as well as an ideal objective, which implies that 
„knowledge about and understanding of the arts and culture is an 
important and basic knowledge, which is important that children and 
young people obtain’ (St. meld. Nr. 38 (2002-2003) Den Kulturelle 
Skulesekken). My other case: the decision to build a new venue for Den 
Norske Opera in Oslo was subject to intense debate in the 1990s, and 
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even though this debate appears to have calmed down somewhat by now, 
I am of the opinion that the decision is still a good case for my project, 
which focuses on underlying ideas in Norwegian cultural policy.  
In my interview with you I wish to understand what cultural policy 
significance you give to these projects, and which values you believe they 
are based on. I wish to carry out a relatively free and loosely structured 
conversation lasting about an hour to 90 minutes. The information that I 
collect through the interview will be included in my analysis material at an 
aggregated level and will be treated confidentially. I should bring to your 
attention the fact that I wish to record the interview. I would like to make 
contact in a few days by telephone and if you would be interested in 
being interviewed then I will give you further information about myself and 
my project. I will also, prior to the interview, send you a more detailed 
interview guide, which will indicate how I wish to structure our 
conversation. I believe that the time you eventually will set aside for the 
interview will be fruitful and interesting for both parts.  
I am planning to spend the time between 12th and 20th April in Norway, 
and wish to make all the interviews during this time-period. I hope to be 
able to establish a more specific time for the interview when I call you in a 
few days‟ time.  
I look forward to talking to you.  
 
Yours sincerely,  
Egil Bjørnsen 
Senior Teaching Fellow 
Centre for Cultural Policy Studies 
University of Warwick  
Coventry 
CV4 7AL 
United Kingdom 
 
Tel: +44 (0) 2476 524912 
Mobile: +44 (0) 7973 251331 
E-mail: Egil.Bjornsen@warwick.ac.uk 
Check out our website www.warwick.ac.uk/culturalpolicy 
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APPENDIX 5: Interview guide 
 
Den kulturelle skolesekken (DKS) 
 
1. What is, in your view, the objective of DKS?  
 
2. Which values, in your opinion, does the DKS project attempt to 
disseminate?  
 
3. In St.meld. nr. 38 (2002 – 2003) „Den Kulturelle Skulesekken‟ it is 
stipulated that „Art and culture has an intrinsic value and can have 
great impact on both each individual and society as a whole‟. 
Further on: „Art and culture give experiences, which can have 
decisive impact on the development of each individual human 
being’s personality and life-quality’. Do you have any thoughts 
about how art and culture can have such an impact on children 
and young people?  
 
4. In another green paper from the Ministry of Education and 
Research, St. meld. Nr. 39 (2002 – 2003) „Ei blot til Lyst: About art 
and culture in and in connection with the primary school ‟ it is 
argued that „Cultural competence has both intrinsic values, big 
importance for increased life-quality and can contribute to 
qualifications for the future and for working-life’. Further on it is 
stated that „The school as a cultural pillar will be able to facilitate 
the development of the pupils’ cultural competence as a part of a 
wider ”dannelses”- and learning-process’. The aim of DKS is partly 
to develop the pupils‟ cultural competence. How do you interpret 
cultural competence? Do you agree that it is important to develop 
pupils‟ cultural competence, and if so, why? 
 
5. Can you say something about what type of artistic and cultural 
expressions DKS, in your opinion, should mediate? Why?  
 
6. To what extent does DKS, in your view, represent the development 
of Norwegian cultural policy in later years?  
 
7.  
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New venue for Den Norske Opera in Oslo  
 
1. Do you agree that the building of a new opera-house was the right 
cultural policy decision? Why? 
 
2. There has been political agreement in Norway across the board 
about the building of a new venue for Den Norske Opera, 
particularly in parliament. The only members of parliament who 
actively opposed it were the representatives from 
Fremskrittspartiet. Are you of the opinion that people who either 
express support for or reject this decision by taking either of these 
two stances implicitly reveal something about their attitude to the 
arts more generally?  
 
3. In the green papers about the new opera-house it is stipulated 
explicitly that opera and ballet do not have long traditions in 
Norway and that therefore there is not a large audience for these 
art-forms today, and that it is important to develop a new audience 
for opera and ballet. Do you agree that this is important? If so, 
why? 
 
 What type of repertoire should Den Norske Opera 
programme when they move into the new building?  
 
4. To what extent does the building of a new opera-house, in your 
view, exemplify the development of Norwegian cultural policy in 
recent years? 
 
 
Cultural policy generally.  
 
These questions relate to the cultural policies of the Norwegian state. 
However, you may want to answer with reference to the two already 
mentioned cases should you wish to do so. State cultural policy is here 
defined as arrangements that are implemented in order to support and 
regulate Norwegian culture in the widest sense.  
 
1. Norwegian cultural policy has over the last thirty years both had as 
an objective to mediate the professional arts as well as to enable 
participation where the decisions about what should receive 
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support should be taken as close to the users as possible. Which 
of these objectives do you think is most important? Why? 
 
2. To what extent does Norwegian cultural policy aim to mediate a 
set of values to people? If so, what type of values?  
 
3. It is being argued from time to time that state cultural policy is 
about contributing to people‟s [‟dannelse‟]. How do you define the 
notion [„dannelse‟]? Do you think it is important that cultural policy 
contributes to people‟s [„dannelse‟]? Why?  
 
4. The green papers on cultural policy from the 1980s and 1990s 
emphasised that there were several dangers connected to an 
increased consumption of commercial culture. The cultural policy 
rhetoric of that time emphasised, to a large extent, the importance 
of countering these cultural impulses, as well as offering 
alternatives. Do you think that this is still important?  
 
5. To what extent is Norwegian cultural policy, in your view, about 
protecting a Norwegian national culture? Should it?  
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APPENDIX 6: Norwegian governments: 1973 - 
2004724 
 
Period Prime Minister Parties (with party 
abbreviations) 
Policy 
document 
18.10.1972 -  
16.10.1973 
Lars Korvald (KrF) Coalition between:  
 Kristelig 
Folkeparti 
(Christian 
Democrats – 
KrF) 
 Senterpartiet 
(Centre Party – 
Sp) 
 Venstre (The 
Liberal Party – 
V) 
KUD (1973) 
16.10.1973 -  
15.01.1976 
Trygve Bratteli (A)  Arbeiderpartiet 
(the Labour 
Party – A) 
KUD (1974) 
KUK (1974) 
FIS (1975) 
15.01.1976 -  
04.02.1981 
Odvar Nordli (A)  Arbeiderpartiet 
(the Labour 
Party – A) 
 
04.02.1981 -  
14.10.1981 
Gro Harlem Brundtland 
(A) 
 Arbeiderpartiet 
(the Labour 
Party – A) 
KUD (1981) 
14.10.1981 -  
08.06.1983 
Kåre Willoch (H)  Høyre (the 
Conservative 
Party – H) 
 
08.06.1983 -  
09.05.1986 
Kåre Willoch (H) Coalition between:  
 Høyre (the 
Conservative 
Party – H) 
 Kristelig 
Folkeparti (the 
Christian 
Democrats – 
KrF) 
 Senterpartiet 
(the Centre 
Party – Sp) 
KUV (1983) 
KUK (1985) 
FIS (1985) 
09.05.1986 -  
16.10.1989 
Gro Harlem Brundtland 
(A) 
 Arbeiderpartiet 
(the Labour 
Party – A) 
 
                                            
724 Source: 
www.regjeringen.no/nb/om_regjeringen/tidligere/oversikt/ministerier_regjeringer/nyere_tid/regje
ringer.html?id=438715&epslanguage=NO 
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16.10.1989 -  
03.11.1990 
Jan P. Syse (H) Coalition between:  
 Høyre (the 
Conservative 
Party – H) 
 Kristelig 
Folkeparti (the 
Christian 
Democrats – 
KrF) 
 Senterpartiet 
(the Centre 
Party – Sp)) 
 
03.11.1990 -  
25.10.1996 
Gro Harlem Brundtland 
(A) 
 Arbeiderpartiet 
(the Labour 
Party – A) 
KUL (1992) 
KUK (1993) 
FIS (1993) 
KKU (1996) 
25.10.1996 -  
17.10.1997 
Thorbjørn Jagland (A)   Arbeiderpartiet 
(the Labour 
Party – A) 
 
17.10.1997 -  
17.03.2000 
Kjell Magne Bondevik 
(KrF) 
Coalition between:  
 Kristelig 
Folkeparti 
(Christian 
Democrats – 
KrF) 
 Senterpartiet 
(Centre Party – 
Sp) 
 Venstre (The 
Liberal Party – 
V) 
 
17.03.2000 -  
19.10.2001 
Jens Stoltenberg (A)  Arbeiderpartiet 
(the Labour 
Party – A) 
 
19.10.2001 -  
17.10.2005 
Kjell Magne Bondevik 
(KrF) 
Coalition between:  
 Kristelig 
Folkeparti 
(Christian 
Democrats – 
KrF) 
 Senterpartiet 
(Centre Party – 
Sp) 
 Venstre (The 
Liberal Party – 
V) 
FKD (2002) 
BLD (2002) 
KUL (2003a) 
KUL (2003b) 
FKD (2003) 
UDF (2003) 
KUL (2004) 
KUF (2004) 
FKD (2004) 
FIS (2004)  
KUL (2005) 
 
17.10.2005 - Jens Stoltenberg (A) Coalition between:  
 Arbeiderpartiet 
(the Labour 
KUL (2006) 
KUL (2007a) 
KUL (2007b) 
431 
 
Party – A) 
 Senterpartiet 
(Centre Party – 
Sp) 
 Sosialistisk 
Venstreparti  
(The Socialist 
Left Party – SV) 
KUL (2008a) 
KUL (2008b) 
  
 
 
 
